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The figure of madness has long been positioned as the literary, poetic or philosophical 
‘other’, functioning as a point of non-meaning that marks the boundaries of discourse, thought and 
culture. Despite this, the task of rendering meaning from madness, often via its written expression, 
has a long and rich history. From psychiatry through to psychoanalysis and forms of critical theory, 
‘psychotic’ text has continually been utilised to further knowledge claims about what constitutes 
madness as well as to demarcate disciplinary interests. The contemporary field of ‘Mad Studies’ is 
the latest project to problematize the act of supplanting meaning onto individual experience and 
thereby co-opt these complex facets of the human condition into academic or professional 
frameworks. This thesis engages with this set of debates and asks whether the written expression of 
madness can ever be analysed without necessarily re-inscribing it within such systems of knowledge, 
thereby committing forms of ‘epistemic violence.’ Whilst very urgent concerns circulate regarding 
the proliferation of ‘mental illness’ in contemporary society as well as questions as to who is best 
placed to tackle this contested arena, this thesis holds that the task of rendering meaning from 
madness requires urgent revisiting in order to provide a epistemological basis from which very real 
political and ethical action can follow. 
The thesis is then divided into two parts. The first provides a survey of the ways in which 
examples of ‘mad writing’ have been repeatedly analysed to assist in the production of knowledge 
about ‘psychosis’ and, by implication, the social bond. The Memoirs of Daniel Paul Schreber is the 
main focus as the thesis moves from the psychoanalytic readings of Freud and Lacan, through to the 
positioning of Schreber as an arch modernist before engaging in the schizoanalytic project of 
Deleuze and Guattari. The second part of this thesis engages with a body of ‘mad writing’ produced 
by celebrated science fiction author, Philip, K. Dick. By demonstrating how PKD’s Exegesis can be 
read at the level of ‘psychosis’ whilst at the same time providing insight on PKD’s specific socio-
cultural moment, this thesis constructs a method for analysing mad writing that challenges reductive 
or pathologising reasoning that ultimately serves to ‘other’ madness. It does so by offering a 
psychosocial reading, and an associated understanding of ‘psychosis’ as being key to moving beyond 
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 A little under ten years ago, at the start of my mental health social work training, I made the 
obligatory visit to the local psychiatric inpatient facility. Supported by an experienced colleague, well 
versed in psychiatric assessment and treatment, my task was to interview a patient to plan his 
eventual discharge. During the visit, the patient recounted the events that had led to him being 
forcibly detained by mental health services. These were characterised by numerous paranoid and 
conspiratorial themes related to the security services, MI5 and the broader intelligence community. I 
was informed that the patient’s ‘delusional architecture’ was one that repeatedly referenced his 
ongoing monitoring and surveillance by such clandestine, shadowy government forces. Such a 
delusional pattern was quite routine in psychotic patients. Although I can recall being taken aback by 
my first fully-fledged encounter with ‘psychosis’, I left the ward secure in the knowledge that what I 
had experienced was nothing more than an deviation from psychological ‘normality’. One that would 
be managed and, ultimately, alleviated via the continued use of antipsychotic medication and a 
stable package of support once discharged back into the community.  
Some days later, I came to learn that the patient in question was, in fact, subject to a 
‘Control Order’, as implemented by the new Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. I quickly found that 
such orders were utilised by police services to manage those deemed to be at high risk of 
committing terrorist activity, while allowing for various restrictions on their liberty. In the wake of 
the 7/7 bombings and the wave of media-led hysteria engulfing the western world about the threat 
of violent extremism, the patient had found himself under the direct management of police services. 
This situation had transpired following a low-level incident whereby others preying on his clear 
vulnerability had led him into a compromising situation. Mental health issues and vulnerability aside, 
the then Home Secretary ruled that the ‘Control Order’ should stand. This decision was made 
despite what the patient’s psychiatrist and wider supporting team knew to be true; that this patient 
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was far from a criminal mastermind engaged in the planning and carrying out of terrorist atrocities. 
To the contrary, it was the individual’s proximity to a geographical site of police interest that had led 
to him coming to the attention of security services.  
 This newly acquired knowledge on the patient’s very particular social and legal situation 
gave me pause for thought. His supposed delusional thinking, related to surveillance by intelligence 
services, now took on a wholly different light. I was left wondering where exactly did his madness 
begin. The patient had a very genuine and plausible concern about being monitored by the police 
services. What was the pathological element to his paranoid worldview? Although his recounting of 
events took on an eccentric, if not bizarre form, it did not seem completely unreasonable to me that 
his increased levels of paranoia were well placed. Moreover, it is possible that his preoccupation 
with MI5 and their continued monitoring of his movements contained a kernel of truth. Yet, due to 
his certified ‘schizophrenia’ diagnosis, as well as the strange fashion in which he presented his 
paranoid ideas, whatever possible truth he was witness to was being overridden by a dominant 
medical discourse, as well as his perceived lack of legitimate reasoning. Subsequently, I found myself 
questioning the exact nature of his ‘psychosis’ and whether it could so easily be divorced from the 
social or cultural situation in which he found himself. Was there a clear and precise dividing line 
between his alleged madness and the actual truth? Could it be possible that this patient was simply 
amplifying a sense of paranoia, which was permeating throughout his local community? More to the 
point, was the body of knowledge and practice known as psychiatry best placed to assist me in 
gaining answers to these complex issues?  
In many respects, this thesis represents the culmination of my time spent reflecting on those 
questions, which came from my initial encounter with this patient. It is my attempt to tackle the 
vexing concept of madness and to enter into some form of understanding concerning it. The path 
that I have taken to try and address these questions, that has led to my specific research project, has 
been a long and winding on. It is a path worth recounting, however, so that I can demonstrate how 
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the project initially took shape and how I was led to my research questions. In this way, I can also 
illustrate the various ideological or philosophical positions that underpin my own subjective stance; 
a stance that has led to the political framing of the entire project.  
By the end of my training programme (mentioned above), I moved into the field of statutory 
mental health service. Here, my initial queries about the nature of madness quickly established 
themselves as fully-fledged concerns. First-hand, I saw the inadequacies of psychiatric diagnosis and 
the evident flaws of a system that categorised individuals in such a haphazard fashion. One did not 
need to be trained in medical science to see that how diagnostic terms were applied held little claim 
to objectivity or impartiality. Likewise, the use of anti-psychotic medication appeared, at times, 
coercive if not outright abusive. A disjointed foray into the world of critical theory (shoe-horned into 
the end of a social work MA) led me to a wholesale denouncement of all things psychiatric. As I 
stumbled through the texts, authors and theoretical positions contained under the banner of ‘anti-
psychiatry’, a term coined by David Cooper and popularised by the work of R. D. Laing in the 1960s, I 
was greatly encouraged that there was widespread recognition of psychiatry as, at the very least, a 
problematic enterprise. Provided I followed the standard anti-psychiatry line, the answers to my 
concerns seemed clear. ‘Schizophrenia’ was not a deviation from reality, but rather a means for 
coping with a maddening world (Laing, 1960). Mental illness, I read, was not a disease similar in 
nature to physical ailments. It was a myth propagated by pharmaceutical companies and the worst 
excesses of capitalist interest (Szasz, 1961; Baruch & Treacher, 1978). Moreover, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and its system of psychiatric classification, so the 
argument went, was an exercise in control and subjugation with medication providing the means to 
do so (Moynihan & Cassels, 2005). I was so sure that a wholesale re-ordering of the mental health 
services and related systems of disciplinary knowledge was required that my mind soon began to 
centre on the notion of undertaking a PhD to work through these ideas. Ultimately, I was looking to 
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position myself in respect of the arguments that had emerged from 1960’s radicalism and the 
counterculture.  
However, the initial naivety that accompanied my new-found sense of purpose soon 
subsided as I delved further into the world of critical psychiatry, pop philosophy, psychodynamic 
theory and many fictional or literary works detailing the workings of madness. Clearly, the question 
of madness was a complex, multifaceted one with a rich history of intersecting ideas and artistic 
representations. A general bewilderment now tempered my revolutionary zeal to dismiss all things 
psychiatric. To paraphrase Roy Porter (2002, p.1), a medical historian, madness appeared to me as 
the 'mystery of mysteries'. It was an enigma both inviting and repelling attempts at understanding. 
Put simply, I was left in a state of confusion as to how I could disentangle the diverse histories, 
systems of knowledge, and the numerous political positions that dealt with the concept. I knew I had 
a commitment to exploring the relation between madness and the socio-political forces that shape 
it. Still, I was adrift in a sea of competing disciplinary interests, complex ethical questions, and a 
library’s worth of medical, scientific and philosophical texts: all competing to define madness as an 
aspect of the human condition.  
 While sifting through the literature comprising this diverse field, I chanced upon a text that 
had repeatedly surfaced across my preliminary research. The book was Daniel Paul Schreber’s 
Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (1903), and it would provide the impetus to my later project, as well 
as help structure my overall research questions. Schreber’s Memoirs is a Supreme Court Judge’s 
detailed first-hand account of his slide into ‘psychosis’, and the book is characterised by a panoply of 
paranoid and delusional themes. I found the text a challenging, disorienting read. But what really 
struck me were the numerous different critical analyses that had been performed on the text—both 
within the psychoanalytic tradition and wider social theory (Freud, 1911; Lacan, 1955-56; Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1972; Santner, 1996; Kittler 1985). Schreber’s Memoirs, I discovered, were providing 
inspiration for several theoretical formulations that straddled both clinical and cultural domains. In 
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the same way that my encounter with the ‘schizophrenic’ patient had made me re-evaluate my 
thinking about madness, I found myself reflecting on what this text meant, as well as what the 
means by which it had been utilised indicated about the text. Both the ‘schizophrenic’ patient and 
Schreber’s Memoirs had elicited a strong reaction within me. This was based upon my fundamental 
difficulty in understanding what precisely was going on with their respective patterns of speech and 
writing. What exactly was being communicated to me in the patient’s conversation and the Judge’s 
script? In addition, both I realised had been presented to me via a system of knowledge already 
imposed upon them. The ‘schizophrenic’ patient had arrived already couched in the language and 
terminology of psychiatry—even before I had set foot on the ward. Likewise, Schreber’s text was 
familiar to me by the time I first read it. This was due to the psychoanalytic thinkers and social 
theorists who had utilised it in their intellectual endeavours. This insight seemed of the utmost 
importance.  
In so many ways, the diverse set of analyses surrounding Schreber, ones that largely 
comprise Part 1 of this thesis, ultimately provided the spark for my project. First, I began to 
appreciate how mad writing or ‘psychotic’ text seemed to be able to provide the raw material for a 
great many different readings, some of which were complementary, many less so. Schreber, far from 
being a mere example of the written ravings of the insane was, in fact, being held up by a range of 
prominent thinkers, theorists and authors as an especially profound document for gaining insight 
into the workings of human consciousness, as well as into the cultural, social and historical moment 
in which he was placed. This felt worthy of further exploration. Not only did it suggest that 
‘psychotic’ writing may hold a particular value in understanding paranoid or delusional processes, 
but it also suggested that it provides a platform, possibly a privileged one, from which to critique or 
analyse ‘the social’. Madness was, in effect, straddling the psychological and the social to the point 
where they could perhaps not so easily be divorced from one another. This, in turn, seemed to offer 
very real challenges to mainstream psychiatry which, for the most part, treated the expression of 
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madness (either through speech or writing) as simply ‘proof’ of a psychological irregularity, 
something that was plainly symptomatic of an underlying pathological abnormality that required 
alleviating or treating. If Schreber’s text was being utilised to reveal his attunement to the social 
world in which he lived, then it suggested that one’s madness may not, actually, represent the very 
opposite of reason and rationality that standard psychiatric theory implied. The division that medical 
thought establishes between the normal and the pathological (Canguilhem, 1978) was upended here 
by a set of associated thinkers utilising Schreber to argue that his ‘pathological’ writing does, in fact, 
reflect, harness or channel immediate socio-cultural themes. Just as the ‘schizophrenic’ patient’s 
descriptions of his social standing reflected, in some complex sense, the pervading paranoia that he 
was legitimately experiencing, Schreber’s ‘mad writing’ reveals to us something profound. 
Schreber’s writing, according to a number of interpreters illustrates that psychological and social 
qualities are inexorably intertwined.  
My new-found appreciation of ‘psychotic text’ and its potential to challenge psychiatric 
discourse enabled me to bring my initial search to a close and identify an adequate starting point for 
my thesis. Whatever project I was going to pursue, I realised that I should start with the expression 
of madness itself: in my case, with its written form. Rather than getting lost in the sea of theory 
about madness, I decided that I should start with the ‘psychotic’ subject themselves. This too 
contains potential pitfalls as expressions of madness will always, to some degree, be trammelled by 
systems of language or the communicative medium through which they are relayed. However, I was 
sure that my commitment to critical psychiatry would be best realised by taking the subjective 
experience of madness as my starting point, rather than the systems of knowledge surrounding it. 
It was during my preliminary survey, where I chanced on the Schreber material, that I was 
also introduced to ‘Mad Studies’. This was a pioneering new interdisciplinary approach to madness, 
which sought to radically overhaul the way it is thought about and taught—inside and outside of 
traditional areas of scholarship. Mad Studies placed a strong emphasis on service user rights, and it 
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demonstrated a commitment to examining the ethical basis for placing madness within certain 
political, medical or broader societal frameworks. Moreover, I soon discovered that a central 
concern of ‘Mad Studies’ related to the very question of what it means to take mad narratives and 
use them to further claims to knowledge. In fact, a sizable amount of the literature contained under 
this umbrella term seemed to be tackling head-on the entire notion of academics utilising ‘mad’ 
narratives to deduce clinical or cultural theory. The aforementioned analyses of Schreber now took 
on a different light. Did Mad Studies now offer a challenge to this set of theorists? Or, was there 
scope for incorporating how this ‘psychotic’ text had previously been read with this new 
development for thinking about madness and forms of distress?  
Such questions form the basis of my research project, which asks whether it is possible to 
interpret ‘psychotic’ text to produce knowledge. My project also seeks dialogue with the central 
issues expressed by Mad Studies. By examining how ‘psychotic’ text has been interpreted, I will 
demonstrate how the task of rendering meaning from madness speaks to a core issue at stake within 
critical psychiatry: namely, how knowledge on madness is produced effectively determines who has 
the right to speak for it and determine where it is situated within society at large.  
Critical Psychiatry, Mad Studies, ‘psychotic’ text and the mad writing of Daniel Paul Schreber 
were all now providing me with the coordinates for mapping out the beginnings of a research 
project. Yet, there was still one piece missing. If I was going to make an original contribution to a 
long history on the interpretation of madness, then it did not seem sufficient to simply regurgitate 
the readings of Schreber that had occurred over the last century. I needed something new; a text yet 
to be interpreted. In this way, I could enter directly into the critical practice of reading madness. 
Most importantly, I would see if I was able to do so while considering the key issues expressed 
within Mad Studies. However, the search for a ‘suitable’ ‘psychotic’ text was already beginning to 
raise some difficult questions. Was I not now already repeating the same manoeuvre as an aspiring 
academic and mental health professional who effectively wanted to use the narrative of another to 
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further my intellectual aims? What criteria could be employed to ascertain what counts as a 
‘psychotic’ text without ensuring that the text itself is already shaped by certain forms of knowledge 
naming it as ‘psychotic’? Indeed, many of the published texts that I chanced upon were presented as 
illustrative examples of medicalised understandings of ‘schizophrenia’ or ‘bipolar disorder’ (see 
Schiller, 2011; Hornbacher, 2009). Many more were styled as autobiographies or recovery 
narratives, often written sometime after the actual experience of ‘psychosis’ itself (Saks, 2008). 
These texts often came with the author’s own attempt to make meaning from their experience. 
Many more came with attendant comments from treating psychiatrists or therapists, which again 
served to frame the experiences recounted in medical or theoretical terms (Sechehaye, 1994). 
Undoubtedly, a considerable proportion of the texts that I encountered primarily documented the 
coercive and draconian nature of asylum life, as well as the horrors witnessed within locked 
psychiatric wards (Kaysen, 2000). Identifying a text within the arena of mad writing (an arena which I 
sketch out below) was not proving a straightforward task.  
As is often the case, I eventually found what I was looking for in quite an unexpected place. 
The missing piece to my proposed research project presented itself not through the trawling of 
databases, libraries and internet sites (which had engaged me for months), but through an area of 
interest that, up until then, I thought of as entirely separate to my professional and academic life. 
Science fiction, gothic horror and the weird literature of authors such as H. P. Lovecraft and Edgar 
Allan Poe through to William Burroughs and J. D. Ballard had long been my means of enjoyment and 
escape. Although madness and ‘psychosis’ are regular tropes in these speculative genres, which no 
doubt contributed to my interest in them, they are contained within works of fiction. Locating 
another Schreber in this literary corner seemed unlikely, or so I believed. One author who, more 
than most, utilised these tropes relating to psychopathology for his science fiction imaginings was 
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Philip K. Dick.1 Someone I had read and admired for several years, although I knew little about his 
biography. A drug-addled hack within California’s 60s counterculture? A psychedelic guru of new-age 
spiritualism? A pop philosopher churning out pulp sci-fi? These descriptions were the extent of my 
knowledge on PKD, who has received posthumous fame mainly through several big-screen adaptions 
of his work. A year into my PhD programme, I stumbled across PKD’s intriguingly entitled Exegesis of 
Philip K Dick (2011). Recently published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, this abridged collection of 
nearly ten years of intense writing had been embargoed by the family estate since the writer’s 
untimely death in 1982. Whatever algorithm threw up the title within my recommended purchases 
via an online bookseller had identified the text that I had been searching for.  
As I skimmed over the blurb and reviews of Exegesis, my eyes were drawn towards the 
terms ‘religious experience’, ‘spiritual visions’, as well as the author’s quest to unearth the ‘nature of 
reality’ and the ‘relationship between the human and the divine.’ I bought it immediately. Running 
at almost 1000 pages, and darting between any number of philosophical and theological themes, the 
task of reading the book did not come without certain challenges. PKD had undergone a ‘spiritual’ 
experience in 1974, and it was this experience which is said to have provided the catalyst for his 
writing the Exegesis. However, I was aware that although the possibility of the author’s madness was 
not wholly absent from the editor’s comments and reviews circulating around the book, any 
discussion related to that ‘spiritual’ experience, the writing of the book and its relation to ‘psychosis’ 
seemed minor at best. Once I had read PKD’s biography, this inattention seemed even more curious 
as he undoubtedly held a near life-long relationship with different forms of mental distress and 
psychiatrisation. Indeed, I quickly learnt that PKD had, in fact, received a number of psychiatric 
labels. Moreover, I discovered that ‘mental illness’ was not only a familiar theme in his many novels 
and short stories, but that it could be used as a framework for understanding the life of the author 
and his works. The more I read the Exegesis, the more convinced I became that an argument could 
                                                          
1
 From here on I shall mostly refer to Philip K. Dick by the popular shorthand, ‘PKD’ which he is often known by 
particularly within the science fiction fan community.   
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be made for positioning this as an example of ‘psychotic’ writing. It repeatedly struck similarities 
with the Schreber text and the theorists with whom I was engaged. Furthermore, the Exegesis 
invited a broader social interpretation whereby the main concepts, themes and ideas within it could 
form the basis for a cultural analysis. Just like Schreber’s Memoirs, PKD’s writing invited multiple 
readings. It raised the possibility of a ‘psychotic’ text once again providing the material for 
theoretical formulation—in both a clinical and cultural sense.  
I am interested in PKD’s Exegesis because it has specifically not been shaped by medicalized 
terminology or theoretical understandings of ‘psychosis’. As stated, questions concerning the 
author’s madness abound throughout his biographies and documented life. Likewise, many have 
questioned PKD’s sanity during the writing and composition of the Exegesis, but they remain largely 
just that, questions. To the best of my knowledge, no thorough textual study has been done on this 
body of writing that explicitly frames it in respect of ‘psychosis’. The chance to engage with a text yet 
to be taken over by the ‘psy-discourses’ (Rose, 1998) of psychiatry, psychology and psychoanalysis in 
respect of ‘psychosis’ allows me to explore doing so fully, but from a critical perspective. What does 
it mean ultimately to position such a text as being illustrative of ‘psychosis’? And by doing so, does 
this disavow any other knowledge or interpretative reading that can be given? As I aim to show over 
the coming chapters, my answer to this is no. By rendering a body of writing as mad or ‘psychotic’ 
does not mean one has to delimit or foreclose other modes of understanding. To the contrary, I 
believe that opening up mad texts to plural readings has something of value to offer the Mad Studies 
project.  
From the outset, I should state that my intention throughout this PhD project is not to prove 
that PKD was a certified ‘psychotic’. As we shall see, his diagnostic picture is beset by multiple labels 
applied by numerous professionals over a lifetime of psychiatric involvement. It is also hampered by 
contradictions within his biography and own attempts at self-diagnosis. Despite the dubious ethics 
of trying to diagnose an individual via their textual output (some 30 years after their death), I am not 
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especially interested in proving one way or the other that PKD was clinically paranoid or 
‘schizophrenic’ (if we can even agree on what those terms denote!). Rather, I am interested in 
mobilizing certain understandings of ‘psychosis’ as a way of organising the text around some 
conceptual criteria. As far as this thesis is concerned, the texts are the object of study, not the 
associated assumptions about the author’s mental states when writing them. I am reading and 
interpreting Schreber’s Memoirs and PKD’s Exegesis to enter into the debates circulating within Mad 
Studies and further afield.  
My intention with this project, then, is to examine, unearth and analyse how ‘psychotic’ text 
has been read to further different forms of theoretical production. My central hypothesis is that 
such a diverse set of readings—that straddle the individual and the social, or the clinical and the 
cultural—effectively reveals to us something about the nature of madness. Moreover, these 
readings (and their perspectives on madness and ‘psychosis’) are in stark contrast to current 
psychiatric knowledge, which serves mainly to relegate ‘psychosis’, ‘schizophrenia’ or any other 
related term to mere pathology. First, I will test my hypothesis by examining, in detail, how Schreber 
has been read by different theorists (Freud, 1911; Lacan, 1955-56; Santner 1996; Kittler, 1985; 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1972). This will present a series of interrelated theoretical concepts about the 
relation between the ‘psychotic’ subject and writing, as well as between psychic and social life. Then, 
I will utilise these concepts for my own analysis of PKD’s Exegesis and conduct a series of readings. 
Drawing from Schreber’s Memoirs and my readings of the Exegesis, I examine how knowledge is 
produced from instances of mad writing. Most important, I explore what this process does to 
madness itself. I hope that by tracing this line of enquiry, via forms of philosophical investigation, I 
encourage a renewed appreciation of how one can engage with madness itself—not just in an 
abstract literary sense, but in a very practice-orientated way. In sum, I hope to establish a method or 
practice for engaging with ‘psychosis’, drawn from my readings of mad text, which ultimately moves 
19 
 
beyond some of the debates circulating within critical psychiatry and Mad Studies; many of which 
argue that any reading of mad writing inadvertently commits forms of violence against it.  
I have structured my thesis in two parts. Following a literature review on mad knowledge 
and the interpretation of ‘psychotic’ text, Part 1 comprises an extensive review of the different 
analyses of mad writing and the subsequent theories developed from these. Particular focus is given 
to Schreber’s Memoirs. The second part includes three different, but complementary analyses that I 
have performed on Philip. K. Dick’s Exegesis. The thesis closes by re-evaluating the place of claims to 
knowledge drawn from the interpretation of mad text. And I conclude by offering a set of reading 
practices for engaging with mad text. I hope these practices extend beyond pure textual analysis to 
inform mental health practice in the wider sense.  
Chapter 1 provides a philosophical foundation to my thesis by examining madness and its 
relation to writing. It also provides the beginnings of a methodology from which I will examine 
examples of mad writing and their corresponding analyses. To begin, I enter into the field of Mad 
Studies, and I draw out some of the key debates within it. These debates concern mainly how 
theorists have utilised mad narratives to further forms of knowledge production. I then trace a 
history of thought beginning with Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida’s much-cited debate on 
madness’ relation to language, discourse and knowledge. Madness, we will see, can be conceived as 
something occupying a strange position; an internal excess at the heart of reason which conditions 
language and thought itself. Foucault and Derrida are the first critical thinkers employed here, and I 
employ them throughout to advance the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis further. I also draw 
on Shoshana Felman’s work (1978), as well as Derrida’s (1994) later thoughts on psychoanalysis. This 
is to demonstrate the potential value of Freudian theory to this project’s aims. Following this, I 
expand upon Louis Althusser’s work (1968) to begin constructing a methodological framework, 
which will carry on throughout the whole project. Althusser’s practice of ‘symptomatic reading’, as 
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well as a methodological caution offered by Eve Sedgwick (2003) in the form of her ‘surface reading’, 
conclude the chapter. 
Chapter 2 begins my extensive literature review of the theories that has been developed 
from mad writing, in particular the analyses conducted on Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs. I start 
with Sigmund Freud (1911) and psychoanalysis generally. And I demonstrate how Freud’s initial 
reading (the reading that Schreber will perhaps forever be positioned against) introduces the idea 
that a ‘psychotic’ subject’s writing may contain a fundamental truth about their social or cultural 
existence. I emphasise Freud’s assertion that ‘psychotic’ delusions or instances of paranoia are not, 
in fact, pathological events, but an attempt to provide stability or establish a social bond of sorts. 
Next, I discuss Jacques Lacan’s (1955-56) reading of Schreber, as well as his other engagements with 
‘psychosis’. Lastly, I discuss Lacan’s writing in the context of his later preoccupations with James 
Joyce (1975-76), and I especially focus on Lacan’s concept of the Sinthome.  
Chapter 3 moves on to examine three other readings of Schreber that I argue can be 
grouped under the banner of modernism. I demonstrate how the works of Louis Sass (2017), Eric, L. 
Santner (1996) and Friedrich Kittler (1985) all utilise Schreber’s Memoirs to identify particular 
modernist themes. From modern forms of surveillance and mechanisms of self-reflexivity, through 
to a specific socio-symbolic crisis experienced within fin de siècle Saxon Germany, and finally to 
marked changes in the structure of writing and language that resulted from modernist forms of 
media technology, Schreber’s text will be shown to channel modernist themes in both form and 
content. It is through Freud and these later theorists of modernism that I show the psychosocial 
nature of Schreber’s text.  
Chapter 4 closes Part 1 of this thesis. I engage with the works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari (1972), in particular those aspects of their theoretical output taken from examples of 
‘psychotic’ text (for example, the writing of Schreber), to offer an alternative theoretical framework 
for reading mad writing. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘schizoanalysis’ provides an important counter to 
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the largely psychoanalytically-inflected theory that has underscored the psychosocial nature of mad 
writing thus far. By introducing concepts, such as the ‘Body-Without-Organs’ and the ‘desiring-
machine’, I demarcate schizoanalysis from its psychoanalytic forbear, as well as from aspects of the 
anti-psychiatry movement, all of which can be established via Deleuze and Guattari’s own use of 
‘psychotic’ text. At the end of Part 1, I introduce a wide range of different theoretical positions and 
concepts drawn from examples of mad writing. I argue that a psychosocial form of analysis is the key 
to conjoining individual experience to broader socio-cultural issues. In my view, a commitment to 
psychosociality might be the means to move beyond some of the reasoning within Mad Studies, in 
particular, those projects that get embroiled in the issue of epistemic violence.  
Part 2 of the thesis introduces my study of Philip K. Dick’s Exegesis. Chapter 5 sets out some 
brief biographical material on PKD and his relation to ‘psychosis’. I touch upon some of the critical 
commentary surrounding PKD’s life and work, which situates him against a postmodern paradigm 
(which is itself partly constructed from the notion of ‘cultural schizophrenia’). I emphasise the 
inherent dilemmas of trying to diagnose the character of PKD, as well as discuss some of the debates 
surrounding this issue and the Exegesis. To close the chapter, I review some of the current 
scholarship on the Exegesis. 
Chapter 6 begins my own psychosocial reading of the Exegesis by drawing on a largely 
Lacanian framework. I refer to Lacan’s theoretical insights (1955-56) gained from his analyses of 
Schreber, as well as Lacan’s general approach to the ‘psychoses’. From this, I conduct a Lacanian 
interpretation of the Exegesis that argues for a ‘psychotic’ structure at work within the text. Moving 
from the Imaginary, to the Symbolic, and onto the Real, I demonstrate how PKD’s writing serves as 
his very own Sinthome. I argue that he does this as a means to fashion a social bond and stabilise his 
subjectivity through the practice of writing. I also evidence PKD’s use of idiosyncratic language and 
the role of the body in his exegetic output, which illustrate the ‘psychotic’ structure that can be said 
to be underwriting the composition of the Exegesis. 
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Chapter 7 extends my analyses of the Exegesis beyond strict clinical concerns related to 
‘psychosis’. It does this by focusing on one major thematic element within PKD’s writing: time, or 
rather his notion of ‘orthogonal Time.’ I demonstrate how this concept for PKD, as well as his 
subjective relation to time that he commits to writing, not only accords to various phenomenological 
accounts of time experienced by ‘psychotics’, but also harnesses a set of socio-cultural debates that 
emerged at a similar historical period as the Exegesis’s construction. These debates and theoretical 
propositions relate to what I am labelling ‘postmodern time’. I introduce various ‘postmodern’ 
theorists who advocate for a fundamental change in our collective experience of temporality, 
because of the rapid changes in digital and communicative technology. This, I argue, strikes a chord 
with PKD’s conception of orthogonal time. Moreover, this discussion introduces the theme of 
networked digital communication and the way in which subjectivity has been affected by such 
developments. I close by examining how Gilles Deleuze sees one’s relationship with altered domains 
of time as offering the means to ‘become’ something ‘other’. 
PKD’s changing nature of subjectivity, evidenced through his writing, is the theme of Chapter 
8. This last psychosocial reading of PKD’s Exegesis examines how his writing about the nature of his 
own body (the same element I examine in chapter 6), also evidences his attunement with various 
technological changes and developments within information theory at the same historical period in 
which he resided. Referring to the evolving theory known as cybernetics, I demonstrate how PKD’s 
altered sense of subjectivity illustrates his process of ‘becoming-information’, as well as his evolving 
understanding of the post-human condition. In doing this, I show how the Exegesis has a cultural 
value beyond revealing clinical insights related to ‘psychosis’. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. I re-examine some of the central issues pertaining to the use 
of mad writing. This is to deduce knowledge following my excursion through the Exegesis of Philip K. 
Dick and the Memoirs of Daniel Paul Schreber. Moreover, I emphasise my main argument for the 
benefits of a psychosocial interpretation of mad text. In my view, a psychosocial reading that 
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identifies the paradoxical status of madness as something existing in between the individual and the 
social or, put differently, as an entity that exists on a continuum between clinic and culture, is able 
to free itself from the restrictive language used within Mad Studies. To close the final chapter, I 
review my own set of reading practices so that they may be utilised in future attempts to analyse 
‘psychotic’ writing which adhere to the ethical impulse at the heart of the Mad Studies project. I also 
put forward these reading practices as a means to go beyond those debates solely centred on the 
issue of epistemic violence. 
 
A Note on Language 
 Engaging in any academic project that contains technical or specialised language runs the 
risk of terms, concepts, or ideas losing some precision as we enter into the debates concerning the 
meaning of such terms. The language of madness is perhaps one of the most fraught in terms of its 
contested nature, and this represents a degree of difficulty going forward. As we shall come to see in 
detail, terms such as ‘psychosis’, ‘schizophrenia’, delusion and madness hold a great many different 
meanings to a great many different people. Where an individual stands in relation to these terms 
speaks to this thesis in its entirety. Although I have stated from the outset that my interest is in 
madness and the forms of knowledge derived from it, I have specifically chosen not to try and define 
what madness is. This is mainly because I think it is near enough impossible to do. At best, I view 
‘madness’ as an umbrella term that encompasses a wide range of emotional, psychological and 
subjective states of being, which have shifted over time and which are dependent on any number of 
socio-cultural framings. The strength of projects such as Mad Studies, in my opinion, is that they 
avoid prescriptive understandings of these terms. Instead, they opt for forms of self-definition by 
those who wish to name themselves as mad. It is also important to acknowledge that my interest in 
madness is largely in respect of another hugely contested term: ‘psychosis’. This ‘classic form’ of 
madness relating to delusions, paranoia and hallucinations may appear to have a stronger case for 
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arriving at a definition. However, I would again argue that the contested nature of the term ensures 
that it remains problematic. Therefore, whenever I refer to ‘psychosis’ within the following chapters 
I denote it in parentheses to acknowledge its contested status. Regarding the concept of madness, I 
keep with the spirit of Mad Studies and forms of mad pride/activism, which seek to establish the 
term as positive or, at least, non-negative. ‘Psychosis’, of which most of this thesis is concerned, 
stems largely from intellectual attempts to define an area of madness. The two are not 
interchangeable. However, I do often refer to mad text or ‘psychotic’ text in a very similar way. 
Whatever ‘psychosis’ may or may not be, it is for the purposes of this thesis one way in which an 
attempt to define a specific area of madness has been made yet it remains a hotly debated category, 















“Nothing can be interpreted out of a work without at the same time being interpreted into it” - 
Theodore Adorno (1984, p.153). 
 
Chapter 1: Literature Review: Situating Mad Studies and the Interpretation of   
Mad Text 
 
 As I embark now on a survey of the many different sites that comprise the field of Mad 
Studies, ‘psychotic’ text and previously established attempts to derive knowledge from madness, it is 
worth noting from the outset that this intersection between madness, writing and knowledge has a 
rich history and one that has been enacted in various different disciplinary or intellectual guises. This 
initial chapter will demonstrate how this ‘madness-writing’ relation has been conceived within 
literature and philosophy as well as forms of psychoanalysis. The emergence of Mad Studies as the 
latest incarnation of attempts to problematize thinking about the place of madness in contemporary 
society is built upon this historical legacy, whilst incorporating these diverse areas of thought. As we 
shall come to appreciate it also, importantly, seeks to challenge them. As stated above, my initial 
entry into these debates concerning the nature of madness and how we comprehend it was greatly 
influenced by the work emanating from the high radicalism of the mid to late twentieth century. The 
figures of R.D Laing, Michel Foucault and Thomas Szasz laid the intellectual groundwork for a general 
questioning of psychiatry’s place and purpose and, by implication, the way in which ‘mental illness’ 
has come to be constructed. Although the anti-psychiatry movement provided the initial impetus to 
forms of political, ethical and philosophical critique in respect of psychiatry’s continued dominance 
over all things mad related, its popularity and credibility has dropped off considerably since the 
1960’s. My wish to establish the ‘madness-writing’ relation within the current Mad Studies paradigm 
necessitates an acknowledgement that Mad Studies has evolved out of this historical anti-psychiatry 
legacy and which perhaps takes its current form in the broader arena of critical psychiatry. As such, 
this literature review shall firstly provide a brief overview of what we mean by critical psychiatry and 
how Mad Studies fits with this area of research and praxis. Following which, I shall provide an 
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overview of what we mean by Mad Studies and how debates about the use of mad narratives or 
patient writing are central to its stated aims and commitment to emancipatory action. As will 
become apparent, however, this taught relation between madness and those who produce 
knowledge about it is far from new. In fact, it is a problem that is as old as philosophy itself, perhaps 
even a condition for it.  
Moving from my discussions related to Mad Studies and the use of narratives of those with 
lived experience of madness, this literature review shall delve into this historical legacy proper. By 
using the well-publicised ‘Foucault/Derrida’ debate as a means to enter into the ways in which 
philosophy, literature and psychoanalysis have, historically speaking, consistently reformulated this 
central concern, I will demonstrate how the contemporary project of Mad Studies shares this age-
old questioning of the way in which madness relates to culture, thought or philosophy. What shall 
emerge over the course of this literature review is the beginnings of a method for reading madness -  
a method which hopefully seeks to move away from the authoritarian ways in which psychiatry and 
other disciplinary practices have previously sought to overwrite or co-opt madness within differing 
intellectual frameworks. This method will then be tracked across my readings of the Schreber 
analyses, put to work in my own readings of Philip K. Dick’s Exegesis, and then finally revised in my 
conclusion to establish a set of reading practices which allow for a reading of mad text that 
promotes a dialogue with it and does not seek some form of interpretative dominance. 
 
1.2 Critical Psychiatry 
Whatever Mad Studies may or may not comprise, it undoubtedly finds itself firmly placed 
within an established precedent for widespread critiques of psychiatry, as well as more general 
attempts to re-think what it is we mean by terms like madness, ‘psychosis’ or ‘schizophrenia’. In the 
tradition of anti-psychiatry, a loose theoretical, political and practice-based approach has emerged 
over recent years that is collectively understood as critical psychiatry and I would argue comprises 
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the broader terrain in which Mad Studies sits. Whilst remaining true to the ethos of anti-psychiatry 
in terms of a general questioning of psychiatry’s place in current society, critical psychiatry is 
separated from its ideological forbearer in a number of different ways. Indeed, the worlds of 
psychiatry and mental health have undoubtedly changed since the high radicalism of the 1960’s and 
in many respects the heterogeneous field of critical psychiatry has come to reflect the different 
elements that today make up the concept of ‘mental health’ and forms of treatment. All of these 
strands share the same essential qualities in that they contest the power of medicalised diagnostic 
psychiatry with its tendency to relegate forms of madness, ‘psychosis’ or ‘schizophrenia’ to mere 
psychopathology or forms of psychological abnormality.  
As with its cultural and theoretical influence, anti-psychiatry, it is difficult to know where to 
begin in summing up the field comprising critical psychiatry. The term itself seems to have first been 
adopted by David Ingleby in 1980 with his collected edited work Critical Psychiatry which contained 
a number of writings contesting the then orthodoxy preached by medical psychiatry that mental 
illnesses were similar to any other illness and simply required alleviating via medical intervention. 
The volume contains chapters from Franco Basaglia (1980), the famous Italian psychiatrist largely 
credited with abolishing the asylum network in his native country, as well as psychoanalytic historian 
Sherry Turkle (1980) on the relevance of Jacques Lacan to anti-psychiatric positions; someone that 
shall come to be a familiar figure to us during the course of this thesis. In a much more recently 
edited volume entitled Critical Psychiatry: The Limits of Madness from 2006, David Ingleby returns to 
the question of ‘what precisely is critical psychiatry?’ He identifies the following elements that make 
up any critical psychiatry perspective. Firstly, he acknowledges the rift between positivist and 
interpretive approaches to mental health. As he states, “critical psychiatry is not so much directed 
against a biological approach to mental illness as against a one-sided positivist approach” (p.65). He 
goes on to add:  
Critical psychiatry, therefore, does not regard mental illness as a ‘myth’; rather, it 
insists that an emphasis on biological determinants must never blind us to the possible 
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human sense of people’s behaviour and experience. This means combining positivist 
and interpretative approaches. An example of such a ‘mixed discourse’, in the view of 
the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, is psychoanalysis (p.67).  
 
Straight away we see, therefore, how critical psychiatry is opposed to an over reliance on positivist 
framings of mental illness and how Ingleby, for one, sees Ricoeur’s reading of psychoanalysis as a 
means to overcoming such a one sidedness. We will touch on Ricouer’s ‘philosophy of 
psychoanalysis’ later in this chapter. The second area of focus for any form of critical psychiatry 
worth the name is concerned with the power of psychiatry and its role in society. Here Ingleby 
highlights how the questioning of the social role of mental health interventions, and the way in 
which psychiatrists exercise their undoubted power, is a central theme to the field. In this respect, 
Ingleby writes: 
the gist of the critique was that whereas mental health interventions are carried out in 
the guise of benevolence [….], to a greater or lesser extent they serve other interests: 
those of the profession, for example, or (more generally) those of social groups which 
have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo (p.67).  
 
From this initial questioning of psychiatry’s power and the positivist paradigm on which it is based 
come a whole host of interrelated positions.   
Richard, P. Bentall (2004/2010) is one of the most prominent writers contesting an overly 
biological model of mental health and has provided popular and widely read critiques on the 
shortcoming of genetic theories regarding the causes of ‘psychosis’ and depression, as well as the 
widely held notion that mental disorders are diseases of the brain. Bentall, a psychologist by 
profession, finds support from others within his discipline who are promoting a general questioning 
of contemporary psychiatric practice many of whom are, likewise, writing from a British context.2  
                                                          
2
 Bentall in his well-received works such as Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature (2004) as well as 
Doctoring the Mind: Why Psychiatric treatments Fail (2010) has provided a thorough critique of psychiatric 
practice and in particular the triumph of the biological paradigm within which it now sits. Bentall describes 
three myths that circulate within psychiatry; the myth that psychiatric diagnoses are meaningful, that 
psychiatric disorders are genetic diseases and that mental illnesses are brain diseases.  
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Lucy Johnstone (2000) remains an outspoken advocate for many of the abuses that occur under the 
name of psychiatric treatment. Her co-authored Power, Threat, Meaning Framework (2018), 
recently published by the British Psychological Society, also represents perhaps the first attempt to 
provide a robust schema for dealing with states of mental distress that does not rely on the DSM 
model of classification.  
Outside of critiques emerging from the world of clinical psychology, there are a number of 
practising psychiatrists who themselves are working towards overturning many of the falsehoods or 
discrepancies that exist within their discipline (see, for example, D. B. Double, 2006). Joanna 
Moncrieff, a practicing consultant psychiatrist within London, remains the foremost outspoken critic 
of the effectiveness of psychiatric medication and has tirelessly published a range of papers and 
books which not only question the efficacy of anti-psychotic and anti-depressant medication (2013) 
but also exposes the harm such psychiatric drugs can have particularly on long-term users (2007). 
  The discipline of social work has, to a lesser extent, also contributed towards the critical 
psychiatry position. Shulamit Ramon (2006) has advocated for a psychosocial approach within the 
context of British Mental Health Social Work and sees the profession as being in a potentially 
advantageous position in being able to further non-reductive, non-medical framings of mental 
health. However, she also rightly points to the barriers to this, with social workers in the UK being in 
a unique position following the implementation of the Mental Health Act 1983 which affords social 
workers the specific task of assessing and detaining those deemed to be of high risk due to their 
mental state. This ‘approved’ status, combined with social workers’ roles in ‘sectioning’ individuals, 
arguably contradicts any progressive influence they may have in the wider field due to the very 
coercive nature of this role and the proximity they have to psychiatry in undertaking it.  It would 
perhaps be pertinent to state here from the outset that this is a role that I currently fulfil and 
although I would argue has little bearing on the course of this thesis, it does raise a fundamental 
question as to my stated political or ethical stance that I seek to align myself within. It is an issue I 
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shall return to at the end of this thesis following my excursion through mad writing and associated 
forms of theoretical production.  
Psychology, psychiatry and possibly even social work provide some of the professional and 
disciplinary points of reference for the critical psychiatry field. However, remaining solely with 
professional or disciplinary references in attempts to provide an overview of this field undoubtedly 
leaves it one-sided and, ultimately, does not do justice to the core of the critical psychiatry project.3 
The reason for this is that whatever counts as critical psychiatry has to acknowledge the strong 
tradition and continued involvement of service user activists, those with lived experience of 
madness and the ongoing work of those outside professional settings to provide a counter to 
psychiatric power. Again, succinctly defining the psychiatric survivor movement is no easy task and it 
too has a long and diverse history. Set against the backdrop of the civil rights movement and the 
prevailing anti-psychiatry sentiment, the psychiatric survivor movement came into prominence with 
the publication of Judi Chamberlin’s 1978 book, On Our Own: Patient Controlled Alternatives to the 
Mental Health System, which advocated for increased involvement of patients in their psychiatric 
treatment. By the 1980’s, this movement began to shift in line with ideological forces such as 
Reaganomics and Thatcherism. As a result, many service user groups began to refer to themselves as 
‘consumers’ who, instead of wishing to abolish the Mental Health system, argued instead for it to be 
expanded to offer a greater choice  of treatments and support in line with patient preferences. Not 
long after its inception the psychiatric survivor movement quickly, therefore, became split between 
opposing political leanings, resulting in an explosion of different service led user groups across the 
globe.4   
                                                          
3
 There is indeed a significant amount of research, commentary and critique of the psychiatric profession from 
across varied sections of society. Although beyond the means of this chapter to provide a full literature review, 
the following provide some of the touchstones for the contemporary critical psychiatry field from an 
Anglophone perspective: R. Whitaker (2010) Mad In America. New York: Basic Books; J. Davies (2012) Cracked: 
Why Psychiatry is doing more harm than good. London: Icon Books.  
4
 An early instance from the British context may include the campaigning group ‘Psychology/ Politics/ 
Resistance’ formed in Manchester in the 1990’s which included amongst its members the critical psychologist 
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Undoubtedly, one of the biggest and most successful examples of service user led groups 
and forms of organising would relate to the Hearing Voices Network which originates from the 
Netherlands.5 The Hearing Voices Network has, since its inception in 1987, grown to become a 
leading international forum for those experiencing issues with their mental state, to form alliances 
and provide spaces to exist outside formal medical settings (Romme et al, 2011). In fact, numerous 
groups or networks exist across the globe, all of which are united by a common aim: to resist the 
power of psychiatry whilst providing alternatives through different forms of social interaction. In the 
US, the Icarus Project is perhaps the best established. The Icarus Project also produces zines and 
articles written by those who themselves have undergone forms of mental distress which represent 
instances of mad text.  In 1993, an emergent campaigning group came together in Toronto, Canada 
and eventually morphed into what is now known as the ‘Mad Pride’ movement. Although originating 
from a Canadian context in response to local community prejudices against those with psychiatric 
involvement, it has since become an international movement seeking to reclaim the negative 
language used against those with experiences of the psychiatric power.6  
 
1.3 A New Paradigm for Studying Madness 
Out of this loose grouping of forms of mad resistance has come an innovative area of cross 
disciplinary activity that is known as Mad Studies. As stated, this is a framework I am seeking a 
dialogue with in my examination of the interpretation of mad writing. This is because ‘interpretation’ 
is an issue that speaks to the core of the Mad Studies project but one that reverberates also with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Lacanian analyst, Ian Parker (see Parker, 2014). The group eventually dissolved into Asylum Magazine 
which remains one of the leading examples of service user led publishing and which also contains many 
examples of mad writing or ‘psychotic’ text. 
5
 Credited with starting the ‘Hearing Voices’ movement, Marius Romme and his colleagues have published an 
account of 50 service user experiences of voice hearing and their individual processes of recovery which also 
represent instances of mad writing. See Romme et al (2009).  
6
 In order to further contextualise ‘Mad Pride’ through more examples of mad writing, this time in the form of 
18 autobiographical stories of individual’s psychiatric treatment and subsequent involvement with the ‘Mad 




much older philosophical debates of which Mad Studies is perhaps the latest articulation. But what 
do we mean by the term? Richard Ingram (2016) recognizes that he is often credited as the first 
person to have coined the term ‘Mad Studies’. Following a period of unemployment from Ryerson 
University, Canada in 2008, Ingram began to think outside the confines of university life and to 
wonder about some of the limitations of disability studies as a space to do research on this thing 
called madness, as well as ‘mad people’. Ingram, whilst incorporating the work of those researching 
mad people’s histories, such as Roy Porter (referenced above) and his own colleague David Reville, 
soon started to problematize the way in which thinking about madness was often contained under 
the overarching and governing concept of disability. Madness, for Ingram, required a slightly 
different paradigm for undertaking research and he introduced the idea of thinking about madness 
as distinct from the broader notion of disability, specifically framing it as Mad Studies later in 2008 at 
Syracuse University during a Disability Studies Symposium.  
For Ingram, Mad Studies was something separate to the study of disability as it required the 
production of knowledge alongside those labelled mad. Ingram cites various historical examples of 
people doing Mad Studies and in particular the figure of Frederick Nietzsche who, he states, was 
writing about his own struggle with madness from within his own philosophy. Ingram references a 
number of other Nietzscheans who, he believes, also speak to this production of knowledge in 
tandem with their own madness; figures such as Bataille (1988; 1988b; 1989); Blanchot (1993; 1992; 
1995); Klossowski (1997) and Deleuze and Guattari (1972; 1980), all of whom provide ‘launching 
points’ (2016, p.120) for Ingram’s idea of Mad Studies. The reason being is that the knowledge 
produced by this diverse set of thinkers incorporates some maddening quality to their writing. Mad 
Studies from its inception was concerned with the production of knowledge and the inclusion of 
some form of madness within it. It is, as Ingram (2016) has later described, about making sense and 
making (non)-sense together; it is about bringing nonsense or the extra discursive back into 
academic language and writing. Drawing on the influential text Mad at School (2011) by Margaret 
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Price, Ingram also acknowledges that disability studies, with its focus on bodies as opposed to minds, 
was an insufficient paradigm for investigating forms of mental distress.7 
Speaking alongside Jijian Voronka, the 2008 Syracuse talk laid out what Ingram believed to 
be an emerging discipline or rather in/discipline for thinking through and with madness. By this he 
meant that whatever Mad Studies was evolving into, and has perhaps since become, it was both 
intended as a distinct discipline and alternative non-discipline. It was intended to draw from within 
the academy and forms of intellectual research but, simultaneously, to be free of these professional 
and intellectual constraints that have often served to whitewash what it is we mean by madness. 
This form of in/discipline speaks directly to the inclusion of madness in the production of knowledge 
about it. Only by moving beyond the walls of the academy could Mad Studies truly incorporate the 
voice and experience of those labelled mad and ensure that Mad Studies did not just become 
another reiteration of well-intentioned academics or researchers effectively creating another system 
of meaning or language about them. In keeping with this, prominent Mad Studies figures, Jan Russo 
and Peter Beresford query , in respect of previous well-meaning attempts to theorise madness, “why 
approaches that at first seem inviting and like they might even help to disrupt psychiatric control 
over our voices, ultimately resort to marginalising mad peoples own knowledge” (2015, p.154). Mad 
Studies directly engages with this problematic and seeks to ensure that it does not marginalise mad 
people whilst constructing forms of knowledge about them.  
Over the ensuing years what was initially conceived within this Canadian context rapidly 
grew and reached into different areas across the globe. However, as Peter Beresford (2016) 
acknowledges, “international interest in and the visibility of Mad Studies increased greatly with the 
                                                          
7
 In fact, there is an established literature that problematizes the conflating of madness and disability. Forms of 
mad pride and proponents of mad positive approaches, in general, challenge the view that madness is in itself 
inherently disabling and is, therefore, unable to form a constructive foundation from which claims to identity 
or knowledge can be derived. For further discussion on the normative nature related to disability judgements, 
as well as the political implications of mad pride activism in respect of this conflation with disability, see,  M. A. 
Rashed (2019) “In Defence of Madness: The Problem of Disability” in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: 
A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine. Volume 44, Issue 2: p. 150-174.  
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publication in 2013 of Mad Matters” (p. 9). Mad Matters (2013) is in many respects the inaugural 
text for the entire Mad Studies project and brings many of its disparate elements into one focal 
point. Edited by Brenda, A. Le François, Robert Menzies and Geoffrey Reaume, the text collects 
numerous essays and papers from those working under the Mad Studies moniker. The world’s first 
reader in Mad Studies aimed to share the experiences of those operating from within the Canadian 
context and those who identify both as survivors and researchers. Its impact was felt internationally. 
Several courses have since commenced both inside and outside universities within Europe. In 
September 2014, the first UK ‘Mad Studies Stream’ was convened in Lancaster University during the 
International disabilities Studies Conference, which was followed by two further events. In 2015, 
Durham University also held the ‘Making Sense of Mad studies’ conference where Ingram was 
invited as Keynote Speaker. It is against this vibrant backdrop of thought and action, contained 
under the rubric of Mad Studies, that my own attempts at research were first being formulated. This 
project, unwittingly at first but no doubt explicitly so later, has been influenced directly by this 
backdrop of ‘mad activity’.   
Lucy Costa (2014), a Canadian survivor/activist has provided a useful definition of Mad 
Studies on the Mad Studies network site. It reads as follows: 
an area of education, scholarship, and analysis about the experiences, history, 
culture, political organising, narratives, writings and most importantly, the PEOPLE 
who identify as: Mad; psychiatric survivors; consumers; service users; mentally ill; 
patients; neuro-diverse; inmates; disabled – to name a few of the ‘identity labels’ 
our community may choose to use (Costa, 2014, n.p). 
 
The editors of Mad Matters similarly describe Mad Studies as: 
 a project of inquiry, knowledge production, and political action devoted to the 
critique and transcendence of psy-centred ways of thinking, behaving, relating, and 
being (Le François et al, 2013, p 13).  
 
These loose definitions speak not only to my earlier comments about the political or ethical framing 
of this project but also to the way knowledge is produced alongside madness. We note in Costa’s 
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definition that the place of mad narrative and mad writing is also central to Mad Studies stated 
focus. My intention to analyse the ways in which mad writing has been utilised to produce theory 
starting with Schreber and then moving to my own enquiry with PKD’s Exegesis finds an intellectual 
home with the Mad Studies project. Yet it is important to remember that Mad Studies seeks to open 
up the idea of madness beyond strict academic focus. The question as to how this mad analysis may 
be performed allows us the opportunity now to delve further into some of the debates circulating 
within the Mad Studies project and ones that are of the utmost relevance to my own stated research 
aims.  
 
1.4 Who is the Knower and Whose Knowledge Counts? 
 Maria Liegghio (2013) argues within the Mad Matters reader that the process of 
psychiatrisation, or rather the way in which the ‘psy-discourses’ (Rose, 1998) of psychiatry, 
psychology and psychoanalysis not only create the mad subject but also deny those with lived 
experience their voice and “ultimately, their very existence as legitimate knowers” (p.122). Liegghio 
finds the concept of epistemic violence a particularly useful idea for exploring the ways in which 
psychiatry associated professions, as well as academic researchers, effectively overwrite the 
knowledge, feelings, thoughts and experience of those who have undergone forms of mental 
distress or what we also term ‘madness’. Their experience is often reformulated by medical jargon, 
expert terminology or abstract theoretical models that serve to do some form of violence to their 
subjective, personal meaning. The idea of epistemic violence, as Liegghio states, refers, “to the ways 
certain persons or groups within society are disqualified as legitimate knowers at a structural level 
through various institutional process and practices” (p.123). This harks back to the patient I 
encountered on the locked ward some years ago and the way in which his ‘mad knowledge’ was 
being disqualified due to his medicalised ‘schizophrenic’ status. This is precisely the epistemic 
violence of which Liegghio writes. More broadly, Russo (2016) highlights how mad narratives or first 
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person accounts of those with lived experience of madness “have become an object of increasing 
interest for non-survivor scholars with backgrounds in psychology and psychiatry” (p.215) and how 
“by assigning the tasks of understanding and making meaning of madness to ‘experts’ and not those 
directly concerned, the great majority of narrative analyses perpetuate the role and power divisions 
central to psychiatric treatment” (p.216). Enacting forms of ‘epistemic violence’ in the context of 
research on mad narratives appears to be a central concern from within the Mad Studies project.  
Liegghio has adopted this term ‘epistemic violence’ from postcolonial studies where it was 
first formulated. Gayatri Spivak (1987) posed the question in the late 80’s, ‘Can the Subaltern 
Speak?’, asking whether colonised people can ever formulate ways of knowing and, by implication, 
ways of being that are not denied by institutional and historical processes that delegitimize their 
worldviews in favour of oppressive forms of knowledge and power.8  Voronka (2016) highlights how 
critical scholarships such as post-structuralist, postcolonial and feminist theory have explored the 
“possibilities, limits, and conditions of relying on experiential knowledge, and debated both the 
advantage and risk of relying on lived experience and identities to pluralize knowledge” (p.190). A 
substantial part of the Mad Studies project is then directly engaged with this problem and asks how 
those with experience of madness can ever maintain their own forms of knowing. Beresford and 
Russo (2015) develop the idea of epistemic violence in line with Miranda Fricker’s (2010) work, 
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. For Fricker, epistemic injustice refers to the 
way in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a ‘knower’. Beresford and Russo 
argue that “epistemic injustice could thus be a very helpful framework for those faced with the 
uphill task of making the case for first-person knowledge of madness and distress” (2015, p.155). 
                                                          
8
 This debate on who is allowed to speak for whom forms part of the wider crisis in representation which took 
hold within the humanities and beyond towards the end of the twentieth century. Following on from the 
figure of the postcolonial subject, the relevance of the concept of epistemic violence has been opened up to 
include many different subject positions (subaltern, disabled, queer, racialized, diasporic) and has been 
instrumental, as Voronka (2016) states, in its ability to have “critiqued the ways in which scholarship had 
historically been produced on them – rather than with or from them” (p. 190). 
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They deftly outline the inherent issue that researchers, like myself, face when attempting to take the 
experience of others and utilise it for research purposes. They write:  
It may not be the intention of the scholars without such first-hand ‘outsider’ 
experience who undertake research on narratives, to take them over, but there do 
seem to be serious risks of this happening. Then what might have been intended as 
a challenge to traditional epistemic inequalities and exclusions could actually act to 
reinforce them. How do we avoid this happening and creating new kinds of 
exploitation and inequality? What might ethical principles and methodologies for 
such work look like? (p.156). 
 
The risk of scholars without first-hand outsider experience taking over narratives is particular apt to 
my situation. I cannot make any claims to any outsider status, having had no first-hand experience of 
‘psychosis’ (that I am aware of) and, whilst working within statutory mental health services, in many 
respects I am as ‘inside’ as one could get. My research project, as stated, is explicitly about the way in 
which narratives are utilised to form knowledge and I am proposing to perform my own analyses on 
a mad text. Beresford and Russo’s (2015) caution here to not reinforce epistemic inequalities is one I 
should take seriously.  Whatever methodology I am working towards must engage with this central 
issue. Yet, the more we strip away at the different layers and nuances of this concern, the more 
complex it becomes. Is it so easy to devise a clear demarcation between those with lived experience 
and those without? Between the inside and the outside? And what are the implications of doing so? 
 Jijian Voronka (2016) identifies the inherent problem of taking ‘lived experience’ of 
madness, something that has traditionally been referred to as survivor research, and essentializing it 
to ensure that it becomes the bedrock of any subsequent intellectual endeavours. As she writes: 
 I argue that using ‘people with lived experience’ as a form of strategic 
essentialism to unify our divergent ways of making meaning of our experiences to 
enact political gains holds risks. These risks include undercutting our various 
differences by effacing interlocking oppressions and the different ways we 
experience madness, conflating our conceptual and ideological standpoints as 




The issue here is that ‘lived experience’ can serve to overwrite very real differences between those 
who identify as mad and can ultimately serve paradoxically to re-establish a kind of privileged site 
from which some are allowed to speak and others not. The risk of reifying madness to ensure that it 
becomes a protected category that only certain individuals or groups are allowed to access 
effectively means that it becomes closed off and a potential hierarchy of oppression can again take 
hold. To the best of my knowledge I have no lived experience of madness but does this mean that I 
can never speak of it or about it? And perhaps more importantly, what are the actual criteria for 
stating one has authentic lived experience? If madness is a constantly shifting entity with no 
agreeable limits or definition (an idea we will explore further below) then surely one person’s ‘lived 
experience’ can not only be vastly different to another’s but potentially contradictory. As Voronka 
(2016) further states, “Dangers when we strategically essentialize lived experience include 
whitewashing how madness lands and is graphed onto bodies” (p.197). This is precisely the point I 
wish to emphasize. Essentializing ‘lived experience’ runs the risk of once again overwriting madness 
to fit into a collective understanding of what the term means. Voronka goes on to write:  
Experience happens, but how we as individuals make sense of them matters, 
because it informs the ways in which we set research priorities, our frameworks for 
meaning-making, how we collect, analyse, and interpret knowledge, and how we 
work through notions of truth in our own knowledge production (p.197-198). 
 
In order to conclude this review of the Mad Studies project, and this set of debates within it, I want 
to close by venturing into some of the ways in which those within Mad Studies are proposing to do 
research that work through notions of ‘truth in our production of knowledge’. Crucially, these are 
ones that do not run the risks highlighted above of overwriting mad people’s experience, 
essentializing such experience or indeed reinforcing forms of exploitation and control that are such a 





1.5 Narrative and Dialogical Research 
We turn again now to Jan Russo (2016) whose work on narrative research and the possibility 
of engaging in dialogue with mad narratives is invaluable to my attempts to formulate a position 
from which I can ethically engage with analyses of ‘psychotic’ text. In revisiting the area of narrative 
studies, particularly those that pertain to the fields of psychiatry and mental health more broadly, 
Russo focuses in on what she terms, borrowing from Mike Oliver (2009), the ‘social relations of 
research production’. The relevant issue here within such ‘social relations’ is Oliver’s assertion that 
the research task of meaning making must always be shared. Once again, Russo acknowledges the 
many pitfalls researchers have previously made when they take first person accounts of madness as 
research material. In her review of some of the most prominent examples of research on first person 
accounts she concludes that: 
Despite the vast differences in the analyses they undertake, what most of these 
papers have in common is the uninhibited way that their researchers turn publicly 
accessible survivor work into data for analysis (p.217).  
 
Russo is here asking whether mental health narratives can ever be treated like any other research 
document, journal article or published work especially when consent is rarely sought. The issue at 
stake is one of narrative ownership. Russo also draws on the work of Smythe and Murray (2000) who 
define this quite simply as “the issue of who has control over the presentation and interpretation of 
research participants’ narratives” (p.312). In order to highlight this problematic dynamic, Russo 
analyses one of the more infamous attempts to utilise narratives emanating from the experience of 
mental health service users. The piece of research in question is Sue Estroff’s 2003 paper 
Subject/subjectivities in dispute: The Politics and Poetics of first-person narratives of schizophrenia. 
Estroff (2003), when discussing the utilisation of such experiences from the consumer/survivor/ex 
patient (C/S/X) movement within psychiatry (what is also referred to as the psychiatric survivor 
movement), argues that her motivation for analysing such narratives was that:       
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The inclusion of c/s/x experiences as legitimate subjects and subjectivities 
worthy of study, serious examination, and inclusion in the science of 
schizophrenia would challenge brain-based paradigms, but is not of necessity 
incompatible (p.299). 
 
It is this passage that is so telling for Russo and one that highlights the central issue in well 
intentioned researchers utilising mad narratives for their own ends. In direct response to the Estroff 
quote above, Russo writes:  
Leaving aside the issue of the ‘compatibility’ of survivor knowledge with the 
biomedical model, what remains overlooked here are the questions of 
whether psychiatrised authors should be ‘seriously examined’ further as 
subjects and whether we at all want our subjectivities to be integrated into the 
(apparently objective) ‘science of schizophrenia.’ That translation, 
interpretation, and appropriation of our experiences are inherent in such 
undertakings remains unspoken (p.220). 
 
For Russo (2016), Estroff has already, perhaps unknowingly, shaped the account with the ‘science of 
schizophrenia’- a term that is itself hugely contested and politically loaded.  I include this debate 
between Estroff and Russo as just one small example of the way in which those within Mad Studies 
are problematizing researchers’ attempts to perform analysis, and therefore derive knowledge, from 
first person accounts of madness. Following on from this example, Russo’s further examination of 
similar types of research endeavour leaves her to conclude that perhaps the most common factor 
amongst them all is that there is seldom any direct contact between the researcher and those who 
have authored such mad narratives. Again, I want to quote Russo at length here as she provides one 
possible means to overcoming this much cited problem. She questions:  
How to generate a research account that includes the authors/participant’s 
own understanding of their experience and brings it into dialogue with other 
author/participant’s and the researcher? Such an undertaking requires 
alternative approaches and methods because it fundamentally questions the 
conventional division of roles and assignment of authority in psychiatric and 
mental health practice and research. Nevertheless, I am convinced that work 
of this kind does not have to stop at a ‘descriptive’ level. On the contrary, such 
joint undertakings have great potential to deepen and expand the 
understanding of complex human experiences – like madness- in a way that 
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cannot be achieved by a single researcher who claims sole interpretive 
authority (2016, p.222). 
 
The answer seems clear: include the authors of such narratives in the joint production of the 
research account, thereby blurring the line between researcher and researched. Rather than treating 
authors as research subjects, by collaborating and incorporating their understanding into research 
practices we may help to avoid whitewashing their experience and committing forms of epistemic 
violence. However, we might want to pause here to remember that my stated aim is to undertake 
research on a body of mad writing penned by an author deceased for over 30 years. Clearly any 
opportunity to engage in dialogue with PKD and jointly construct research together is a non-starter. 
Does this, however, mean that this concern for constructing dialogue with the author is altogether 
lost? Are there ways in which I can still behave ethically as a researcher in respect of mad narratives 
without necessarily authoring the research in tandem with Philip K. Dick? I believe there is and I base 
such a belief again on comments circulating still within the Mad Studies literature. Once again these 
emanate from Jan Russo, who highlights the work of Canadian Sociologist, Arthur Frank (2000) and 
his writing on what he refers to as ‘dialogical research’. In fact, Russo so strongly believes in the 
ability of dialogical research to overcome  inherent pitfalls relating to research on mad narratives 
that she boldly states, “In my opinion, any attempts to shift dominant social responses to madness 
and create viable alternatives to its medical treatments must rely on a dialogical methodology” 
(2016, p.225). Again, we should question what Russo is referring to here in respect of Frank’s 
dialogical research. To quote her and Frank at length, she writes: 
So what does a dialogical approach mean concretely? For one thing, it involves giving 
up aspirations to interpretive dominance and understanding interpretation as an 
“ongoing dialogue with the story” (Frank, 2010, p.104). It means that the analysis 
does not position itself outside or above the dialogue but aims “to open continuing 
possibilities of listening and of responding to what is heard” (2012, p.37). 
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Dialogical research is foremost concerned with ensuring that no final analysis is achieved but rather 
an opening or enlargement of knowledge about a narrative that is done so in co-production with the 
narrative itself. Frank himself states the following about his innovative research technique: 
Within a dialogical relation, one person can never say of another, ‘This is who such a 
person is.’ One can say, at most, ‘This is how I see this person now, but I cannot know 
what she or he will become.’ Dialogue depends on perpetual openness to the other’s 
capacity to become someone other than whoever she or he already is. Moreover, in a 
dialogical relation, any person takes responsibility for the other’s becoming, as well 
as recognizing that the other’s voice has entered one’s own (2005, p.967). 
Russo directly adopts this tactic in her own work on mad narratives and it is something that informs 
my own research. The issue of an author’s ‘becoming’ in respect of another’s (researcher’s) dialogue 
with them is something that reverberates with how I have undertaken this project. I have borrowed 
from Russo extensively as her work provides a reflexive and ethical way forward. My project 
represents a deviation away from perhaps the usual narrative research undertaken in strict 
psychologic or medical science knowledge production. There is an undoubtedly much stronger 
literary focus to the mad writing I am focusing in upon. Yet I ascertain that this dialogical approach, 
with a commitment for avoiding interpretive dominance, a focus on the interrelation between 
researcher and researched, as well as the understanding that no final analysis is ever arrived at but 
rather an open system of ‘becomings’, can be transplanted into the reading method I shall employ on 
PKD’s exegetic writing. Before reviewing more closely the different examples of mad narrative that 
make up the broader arena in which this project sits, I want to give the final word to Jan Russo whose 
work has so helped inform my own. She writes:  
By focusing the narrative analysis on the dialogue and interplay among diverse 
perspectives rather than on discrete individual accounts, we can disrupt the static 
role division between the researcher and the researched. In its place, space opens 
up for the co-creation and enlargement of knowledge (2016, p.225).  
In sum, although my project is essentially aiming to perform different analyses on the writings of a 
now famous author, and where question marks still remain as to his alleged madness, I maintain 
that the Mad Studies field is a fruitful one for examining the way in which knowledge is produced 
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from ‘psychotic’ text. I very much wish to retain the spirit of this Mad Studies project as we go 
forward but also seek to move beyond these debates centred on epistemic violence and dialogical 
research. Although they provide a solid foundation on which to construct and critique methods of 
interpretation, I am aiming to build upon them via my own review of the Schreber material and 
subsequent reading of PKD.  Although the author I am analysing can have no direct influence on my 
final results, I also aim to ensure that I remain open to what PKD is telling us and that, by doing so, a 
space is opened up for the creation of knowledge between this project and his body of writing. 
Before moving on to the final part of this literature review it is necessary that I highlight the wider 
terrain in which PKD’s writing sits. Although his writing is rarely, if ever, strictly referred to as a mad 
narrative or an example of ‘psychotic’ text, my project is effectively aligning it with a rich tradition of 
patient narratives, asylum writing, memories of psychiatric illness and many other instances of 
madness being committed to script. It is worth surveying some of the more prominent examples of 
mad writing that have surfaced over the years.  
 
1.6 Establishing a Field of Mad Writing 
 Trying to establish a field of mad writing is hampered by the many different separate 
domains or traditions in which it has been collated, documented or indeed celebrated. So much so, 
that no real agreed identifiable field could rightly be said to exist. Yet, there are particular sites, 
archives and published anthologies which do comprise the beginnings of such a field. As an aside to 
my own particular project, consideration could, and perhaps should, be given to a more formal 
consolidation of mad writing as a distinct area of enquiry in its own right. Unlike its close cousin, 
‘Outsider Art’ (or what is also known as ‘Art Brut’) which details the artistic expression of 
‘schizophrenics’ and inmates of psychiatric asylums, mad writing has no central institution or easily 
identifiable body of research underpinning it. Whereas Outsider Art holds a rich history (see Wojcik, 
2016; Maclagan, 2009) and has been collated in prominent galleries such as the Prinzhorn collection 
in Heidelberg, Germany, the Collection de l’art brut In Lausanne, Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, 
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the Maudsley Museum in London, mad writing lacks a distinct unified research area and is often 
tagged onto other projects or examples of artistic expression emanating from asylum life or 
therapeutic practice.  Although archives based at the Prinzhorn collection, as well as digital archive at 
the Wellcome Trust in London, undoubtedly contain many examples of writing produced by 
‘psychotic’ or ‘schizophrenic’ subjects, it does not appear that writings produced by the mad have 
had the same cultural impact as the paintings, drawings and sculptures undertaken by such famous 
‘schizophrenics’ or mad artists such as Henry Darger and Richard Dadd. A current research project 
headed by Matt Ffychte at the Department for Psychosocial Studies, University of Essex, in tandem 
with the University of Chicago’s Neubauer Collegium for culture and society, may go some ways to 
rectifying this.9  We should also note that any attempt at consolidating mad writing into a distinct 
field will have to grapple with the issue of where those writing from within the bounds of traditional 
literature, who themselves may have maintained a relationship to some form of personal madness, 
would sit. The history of literature is replete with mad authors whose own idiosyncratic relation to 
language, thought and emotional life was greatly touched by experiences or states of mind which 
could quite easily fall into a psychiatric framework.10. Indeed, much of the modernist literary 
landscape, to pick just one area of the literary world, is populated by figures who famously 
harboured forms of madness that have been reworked into their writing. From Virginia Woolf to 
                                                          
9
 More information relating to this project can be found at: 
https://neubauercollegium.uchicago.edu/faculty/outsider_writing/ . The outsider writing project, with its 
stated aims of investigating how certain forms of textual production by those deemed ‘mentally ill’ fall inside 
or outside of culture, has brought together a series of symposia and one international conference. The project 
intends to build an international network following the archiving and sharing of such outsider writing with a 
view to the establishment of a permanent centre for these forms of textual output.  
10
 The madness and literature field undoubtedly has a long and rich history. Although there are many different 
entry points into this field, the “Madness and Literature Network” provides a particularly useful resource for 
working through this. It can be accessed http://www.madnessandliterature.org/aims.php . In addition, Baker 
et al (2010) Madness in Post 1945 British and American Fiction provides a useful Anglo-centric overview of 
representations of madness in a wide-ranging works of fiction.  
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James Joyce and many others besides, madness has been a key trope and source of personal 
experience with which to pen any number of famous literary works.11  
 A good starting point would be medical historian Roy Porter (1996), who collected an 
anthology of mad writing and its place within evolving conceptions of mental illness entitled A Social 
History of Madness. Porter draws our attention to what is often regarded as the first example of 
autobiographical writing in the English Language, The Book of Margery Kempe (2005), who many 
have suspected was suffering from some form of ‘schizophrenic’ illness. Indeed, this initial example 
of autobiographical writing within the English language from the 16th century charts Kempe’s 
spiritual life after she began seeing visions, entertaining a close relationship with god and 
undergoing intense bouts of weeping. Kemp’s autobiography in fact instigates a long tradition of 
women documenting their psychological turmoil and experiences of madness that have, in turn, 
been co-opted into a narrative that places psychological illness and femininity in close proximity. 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s (1892) The Yellow Wallpaper and the origins of Freud’s (1901) 
psychoanalysis in the form of his Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, are called upon by 
Porter to advance his argument that conceptualisations of madness have, historically speaking, often 
found themselves drawing from, or being applied to, particular examples of women’s experience. In 
fact, of the very few anthologies of mad writing that exist, it is notable that one of them is entirely 
focused on instances of female writing. Out of her Mind, edited by Rebecca Shannonhouse (2000) 
continues this tradition and documents many other notable writers who have committed their lived 
madness to script. This includes the writings of New Zealand author, Janet Frame, in particular her 
Faces in the Water (1961), as well as portions of The Bell Jar (1963) by Sylvia Plath and Girl 
Interrupted (1993) by Susanna Kaysen.  
                                                          
11
 A further exploration of the link between modernist literature and tropes of madness is undertaken in J. C. 
Farrell’s (2000) Paranoia and Modernity which argues that paranoia is a primary concern in modern literature, 
and common themes relating to grandiosity, suspicion, unfounded hostility, delusions of persecution and 
conspiracy are common psychological facets of the modern hero. 
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One notable account of an individual’s documented experience of ‘psychosis’ that is not 
included in Shannonhouse’s collection is Barbara O’Brien’s (pseudonym) (1958) Operators and 
Things: The Inner Life of a Schizophrenic, which charts O’Brien’s schizophrenic experience and 
subsequent journey across the US during the 1950’s. O’Brien penned the account as she travelled 
through various States whilst all the time believing that she was being coerced, or indeed controlled, 
by unseen beings that used humans to further their own ends in an elaborate system of power 
struggle and monetary exchange. Porter is quick to point towards the parallels within American 
society, in particular the political economy of ‘organisation man’ running throughout O’Brien’s text. 
This startling paranoid account concludes with O’Brien seeking the assistance of a psychoanalyst 
who proves to be entirely ineffectual, whilst also enforcing a dominant patriarchal world view onto 
O’Brien in an attempt to cure her - a world view as propagated within the workplace and structures 
of corporate America that may well have been a factor in O’Brien’s initial ‘breakdown’ and resultant 
‘schizophrenic’ delusion.12 In the end, O’Brien finds relief from the malign influence of these 
‘operators’ through the act of writing itself, a therapeutic practice that is able to calm her mind and 
allow her to return to psychic stability. This is an important theme that resurfaces across the entire 
course of this thesis.  
 Returning to the various historical examples that Porter highlights, there is one particularly 
famous account that has specific relevance to the later findings of my project. It is also one that can 
perhaps lay claim as the sole rival of Schreber’s Memoirs in terms of the wide reception and critical 
commentary it has received. The case concerns James Tilly Mathews and his infamous ‘Air Loom’. 
Mathews was a London tea-merchant who, having visited Paris in the late eighteenth century, 
became familiar with mesmerism - a belief system in a form of animal magnetism that had the 
                                                          
12
 This issue of an individual’s madness in some sense reflecting prevailing socio-historical themes via their 
paranoia is explored to great effect in Laura Murat’s (2011) The Man Who Thought He Was Napoleon: Toward 
a Political History of Madness. Murat examines how cases of particular historical events or traumas, such as 
the French revolution and the returning of Napoleon’s remains to Paris, became interwoven within the 
content of an asylum patient’s delusional beliefs. This intertwining of madness, history and political theory is 




power to control and influence others and one that had some bearing on the origins of 
psychoanalysis. Freud famously found Anton Mesmer’s work of interest and his earliest work with 
Breuer and Charcot drew on the potential for mesmeric forms of hypnosis to alleviate certain 
maladies or afflictions. Whilst in France, Matthews became embroiled in the escalating political crisis 
with England and attempted to mediate with the governments at the time. Upon his return to 
England he accused the government and House of Commons of treason, referencing various 
conspiracies he believed were being directed against him. He was soon after committed to the 
Bethlem psychiatric hospital where he then began to experience a series of delusional beliefs 
pertaining to a criminal syndicate known as the ‘Air Loom Gang ’ who, he believed, were tormenting 
him by the use of an ‘influencing machine’ which, via magnetic rays, were directly controlling his 
body. His treating physician at the time, John Haslam, in an attempt to prove his patient’s clear 
insanity allowed for various first-hand accounts of Mathews’ experience to be published. The rather 
curiously titled, Illustrations of Madness: Exhibiting a Singular Case of Insanity, And a No Less 
Remarkable Difference in Medical Opinions: Developing the Nature of An Assailment, And the 
Manner of Working Events; with A Description of the Tortures Experienced by Bomb-Bursting, 
Lobster-Cracking, and Lengthening the Brain. Embellished with a Curious Plate was published in 1810 
and is often positioned as the first full length study of a patient’s singular description of the 
symptoms of ‘paranoid schizophrenia’. In tandem with Roy Porter’s assertion that Mathews’ 
delusional writing underscores the political tension present during his ‘ravings’ about an ‘Air Loom’, 
the work of Mike Jay (2017) similarly contextualises Mathews’ instance of mad writing to great 
effect. Mathews’ book has undoubtedly been well commented upon within the world of psychiatry 
(see Carpenter, 1989) yet has also been taken up within the psychoanalytic cannon, most notably by 
Victor Tausk in 1919, whose On the Origin of the “Influencing Machine” in Schizophrenia documents 
the common place experience by many ‘psychotic’ patients of an unknown machine or external 
force that is able to exert control over their actions and direct their bodily movements. Again, this 
idea of Tausk’s is something that I shall return to during the course of this thesis. 
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The place of mad writing holds particular importance within psychoanalysis’ theorisations 
and formulations concerned with ‘psychosis’ and ‘schizophrenia’ to make no mention of various 
neurotic complaints and its own elaborations on hysteria. Although the trajectory documented 
within this thesis is primarily concerned with the case of Daniel Paul Schreber, there exist various 
other examples of mad writing within the psychoanalytic tradition that have been called upon to 
further theoretical understandings and forms of treatment. One particularly famous example is the 
case of Renee, with an accompanying discussion and theorisation by Marguerite Sèchehaye, Renne’s 
Swiss psychoanalyst, at the hospital where Renee was confined. Renee’s (Sèchehaye, 1951) 
Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl charts her retreat from socially shared reality into what she 
terms the ‘land of Enlightenment’, whilst all the while suffering the adverse effects of a ‘system’ that 
alters and transforms her perceptions. Through the sustained attention, care and understanding of 
her analyst, Renee is able to recover and finally leave the hospital in which her ‘psychotic’ 
experience was penned. Contrary to O’Brien’s experience, psychoanalysis in the form of Sèchehaye’s 
rather unorthodox approach is able in this instance to relieve Renee’s suffering.13   
 One last anthology or collection of ‘psychotic’ text worth mentioning relates to John, G. H. 
Oakes’ (1991) collected volume In the Realms of the Unreal. “Insane Writing” with an introduction 
by Kurt Vonnegut (who himself is no stranger to mad writing with his own son having penned his 
own account of ‘schizophrenic’ experience (Vonnegut, 1975)). Oakes’ collection contains a large 
selection of prose and poetry from those deemed to be mad, most of who were resident in various 
institutions or asylums at the time of their textual production. Ranging across the last century and 
numerous different geographical areas, the collection possibly represents the first attempt at 
documenting and publishing numerous instances of mad writing from previously unknown 
                                                          
13 Further connections are to be found between Sèchehaye’s method of symbolic interactionism and the later 
theoretical underpinnings to this project via the work of Ferdinand Saussure, the structural linguist who greatly 
influenced the work of Jacques Lacan. It was Sèchehaye and her husband who in fact provided the first English 




individuals, patients or authors. Whereas the celebrated works of mad authors such as Nikolai Gogol 
or Antonin Artaud have received much critical focus, In the Realms of the Unreal offers the chance 
for unknown and essentially hidden writers to showcase their art and represents a valuable archive 
of unusual, revealing and downright challenging writing derived from ‘psychotic’ experience. 
Examples included within the volume are drawn from the Prinzhorn collection as well as psychiatric 
institutes throughout Europe and the US. They remain unanalysed with no accompanying 
commentary or analysis.   
Within the emerging field of mad writing is a particularly well-known resource; Gail 
Hornstein’s (2011) Bibliography of First Person Narratives of Madness in English (5th Ed.) details over 
600 autobiographical texts that take madness as their subject matter. Ranging across three centuries 
and numerous national, cultural or geographical contexts, this resource does not come without its 
own problems. Indeed, the entry requirements for inclusion in the bibliography are relaxed at best, 
resulting in a huge range of quality, stretching at times what may count as madness or ‘psychosis’. 
Hornstein has attempted to position herself as a leading academic on first person accounts of 
madness, yet beyond the cataloguing of these accounts, the research conducted by her on this 
bibliography or indeed any of the titles within it remains somewhat underdeveloped.14  
Far more valuable work on the place of mad writing has been undertaken by Angela Woods, 
co-director of the ‘Hearing the Voice’ project, an interdisciplinary research project on voice-hearing 
based at the University of Durham and supported by the Wellcome Trust. Woods (2013) engages 
                                                          
14 If we return to our earlier discussions circulating within the mad studies literature we find Hornstein and her 
colleagues falling foul of the much-discussed issue of utilising mad narratives to further academic research. Jan 
Russo (2016) critiques Hornstein’s (Adame & Hornstein, 2006) analysis of ten personal accounts of madness 
published as books between 1908 and 1995 and concludes that despite the author’s wish to “provide an 
alternative to medical conceptions of mental illness” (Adame & Hornstein, p.137) instead, “through the acts of 
overwriting, grouping, and renaming experiences, this approach diminishes the authority and power of the 
first-person voice that the authors gained through their own publications. The analysis imposes a new and 
controlling narrative” (Russo, 2016, p.221). Despite Hornstein and her colleague’s intentions to resist the 
master psychiatric narrative they appear to Russo, at least, to have essentially reproduced a taxonomy of 




with mad text most notably with her review of Schizophrenia Bulletin, a periodical largely stemming 
from a medical psychiatric perspective that has been in circulation since 1969. Each edition contains 
on its final pages a short piece of writing written by a ‘schizophrenic’ patient detailing their 
experiences and often their forms of treatment. Woods, in her comprehensive review, discovers that 
from all of these many instances of patient testimony, only one article appears to have been written 
by a subject undergoing a ‘psychotic’ experience at the time of writing. All the rest treat their 
‘psychosis’ as a historical event and, likewise, seem for the most part to be supportive of their 
psychiatric treatment which assisted in overcoming such experiences.  
One last important area not yet covered in respect of mad writing is the impact that such 
texts or examples of ‘psychotic’ script can have on the reader and perhaps literature in general. 
Although this remains a relatively minor area of focus, Evelyn Keitel’s (1989) Reading Psychosis: 
Readers, Texts and Psychoanalysis remains the most thorough going treatise on the structure of 
‘psychotic’ writing and its impact on the reader. Keitel attempts to instate a new literary genre 
termed the ‘psychopathographic’ which concerns the incursion of pathological states or rather 
‘psychotic’ dissolution into contemporary literature. The central issue pertains to the much cited 
issue of how such borderline human experiences can be represented through language. In a sense 
this new literary genre takes as its object of study those texts which seek to portray or represent 
that which exists beyond language, beyond the limits of verbalisation. Keitel’s’ study aims to identify 
what are the specific formal features, narrative strategies and perspectives adopted by such texts in 
their attempt to relay an experience that lies beyond comprehension. Furthermore, Keitel moves on 
to determine that some of the emotional effects that potentially characterise ‘psychotic’ states, 
(pleasure/paralysis/ misperception/estrangement) are engendered in the reading process itself. 
Drawing from ‘reader-response theory’ Keitel asserts that a sense of oppression and discomfort 
often accompanies the act of reading psychopathographies and that this reading process, which 
responds to the formal structure of the text in question, is perhaps one of the key markers of 
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psychopathographic texts. The main thrust of Keitel’s study is therefore an attempt to provide an 
overarching schema to this extremely heterogeneous genre. In doing so, she classifies these 
mediating texts into three distinct subgroups, each with its own formal features: the theoretical, the 
literary and the imitative. She concludes by stating that the narrative strategies already mentioned 
above contain a combination of pleasure and unpleasure, resulting in the reader experiencing a 
primary emotional state aligned to the basic structure of ‘psychotic’ phenomena.15   
 We have then a diverse area or emerging field which takes mad writing as its object of study. 
Furthermore, the Mad Studies literature that I opened this chapter with is explicitly problematizing 
the way knowledge is produced in such an emerging field and does so by effectively asking whether 
the language of the mad, in this case the written form, can ever be enclosed by theory or the 
exercise of knowledge due to its unique status. Mad Studies may well be the most prominent area of 
scholarship and service user activism that questions this very manoeuvre; yet I want now to 
demonstrate how these central concerns pertaining to the relation between madness, writing and 
knowledge are far from new. In fact, when it comes to thinking about them via the practice of 
philosophy we find that such concerns may well be as old as the exercise of thought itself. The place 
of madness within philosophy has long been a central issue. Plato, for instance, writing in his 
Phaedrus, explicitly praised four states of madness (the poetic, the prophetic, the telestic and the 
mystical) and concludes that they all grant man access to the realm of the unseen, a kind of esoteric 
knowledge. We note already from the classical philosophy of antiquity how madness, a form of 
veiled or hidden knowledge and the place of writing (the poetic) are all placed in close alignment. 
This juxtaposing of these elements threads its way through western philosophy and I want to turn to 
this now in order to situate Mad Studies within this philosophical legacy; one that inevitably brings 
us to the issue of methodology. I shall enter into this examination of madness, writing and 
knowledge via a much-publicised debate between Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida who, in 
                                                          
15
 In a similar vein to Keitel, the very recently published Mad Muse: The Mental Illness Memoir in a Writer’s Life 
and Work by J. Berman (2019) explores the challenges of reading such work and demonstrates that mental 
‘illness’ is often intergenerational whilst the stories about such ‘illnesses’ are intertextual.  
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many respects, have already done the historical examination of this interrelation for us, and who 
essentially set out the theoretical terrain in which we can incorporate the concern for method above 
within the larger arena of continental philosophy.  
 
1.7 The ‘Foucault/Derrida’ debate 
 In 1961, Michel Foucault published his first major work, the Histoire de la Folie, to 
widespread critical acclaim. This profound and comprehensive study of madness propelled Foucault 
onto the intellectual scene and was the first in a series of archaeological analyses that established 
him as a major force within contemporary European thought. Two years later, Foucault’s one-time 
student, Jacques Derrida would deliver a speech at the College Philosophique, entitled Cogito and 
the History of Madness, questioning the very foundations on which his former mentor’s project was 
built. The central issue pertains to the historical significance Foucault affords to Cartesian 
conceptualisations of madness in relation to reason. What followed was an acrimonious 
philosophical debate, resulting in neither party speaking directly for a decade. Following Foucault’s 
untimely death, and in the midst of his one-man assault upon structuralism and metaphysics, 
Derrida would bring a degree of closure with his last published engagement on the subject by re-
examining the debate, not through Cartesian philosophy, but rather through insights attributable to 
Freud. As will become apparent, psychoanalysis will provide a major touchstone to this project, both 
as a source for constructing differing forms of clinical and cultural theory, as well as providing a 
specific reading practice.  
Foucault’s (2006) project charts the changing nature of madness as represented through 
political, artistic and philosophical means. Beginning in the Middle Ages he traces the political 
economy of madness through to the classical age - the so-called age of reason - and demonstrates 
how madness is constructed, confined and silenced according to the social relations at any given 
time. In so doing, Foucault wishes to emphasise how contemporary understandings of madness as 
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an object of scientific enquiry - an object relegated to a deviation from medical normality - are but 
the latest incarnations of the place of madness within the social order. By releasing madness from 
the constraints of scientific knowledge, Foucault is able to assert that madness is far from a static 
entity occupying the same space throughout history, but rather a constantly shifting presence 
determined by the socio-political context in which it resides. In his efforts to summarise the overall 
objective of the project, he states - “the object, that is, is to write not a history of knowledge, but the 
rudimentary movements of an experience. A history, not of psychiatry, but of madness itself, in all 
its vivacity, before it is captured by knowledge” (2006, p.xxxii).  The relation between madness, 
knowledge or reason runs through the core of Foucault’s project and elevates it above a simple 
chronological account concerned with the changing attitudes towards madness throughout 
European history. In a much cited quote from Foucault, he again attests as to how his project is not 
simply a historiography of insanity as determined through prevailing systems of knowledge, but 
rather a history of madness itself independent of such systems, a history yet to be written and as 
such characterised by a strange silence: “the language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason 
about madness, could only be founded on such a silence. My intention was not to write the history 
of that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence” (ibid. p.xxviii).  Madness, language and 
reason, therefore, become inevitably interwoven throughout Foucault’s project.  
In keeping with Foucault’s assertion that his intention was to divorce madness from the 
systems of language that constrain it, Shoshana Felman writes that Foucault’s “main object – and 
the challenge of his study – is to contend that anthropology, philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, are 
built upon a radical misunderstanding of the phenomenon of madness and a deliberate 
misapprehension of its language” (1975, p.209). She goes on to claim that Foucault’s wish is to 
demonstrate how the “entire history of western culture is revealed to be the story of reason’s 
progressive conquest and consequent repression of that which it calls madness” (ibid, p.209). 
Madness, language and reason become inexorably intertwined throughout Foucault’s book and in 
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order to re-evaluate the means by which he constructs his project we can trace his movement 
through three distinct narratives (Boyne, 1990): firstly, the ‘political economy of madness’ 
concerned with the initial displacement of leprosy as the principle form of symbolic Otherness in the 
medieval ages, through to the ‘Great Confinement’; secondly, ‘Madness in art and literature’ by 
which Foucault engages with the works of Bosch, Brueghel and Durer through to Cervantes and 
Shakespeare; and lastly, the ‘Science of Madness’ whereby (psychiatric) knowledge comes to 
capture madness transforming it into a ‘mental illness.’  
The book begins by Foucault situating madness in and against that other great socially 
excluded entity from the medieval period - leprosy. Foucault lays bare the techno-administrative 
apparatuses present throughout Europe at the time, designed explicitly with the intent to separate 
the leper from ordinary society. For Foucault, the leper comes to serve as the Other of the medieval 
social order and the figure of the ‘lazar house’ serves as the material demarcation or exclusion of 
leprosy from medieval society. However, in the wake of leprosy’s decline or ‘strange disappearance’ 
in the seventeenth century, “something new appears in the imaginary landscape of the renaissance; 
soon it will occupy a privileged place there: the ship of fools, a strange ‘drunken boat’ that glides 
along the calm rivers of the Rhineland and the Flemish canals” (2006, p.8). In effect, the function 
that the leper served as society’s Other now comes to be replaced by this ship of fools, “Stultifera 
Navis.” Whereas madness had previously existed on the fringes of the European imagination, 
representing something both quasi-religious and mysterious, it is now re-inserted into the dynamics 
of political control. A corresponding reorganization of financial and economic infrastructure 
throughout Europe also sought to separate out those deemed incapable of contributing towards the 
market economy. The result was a new-found figure of ‘Otherness’ that took its place alongside the 
vagrants, the criminals and the poor, condemned to newly constructed institutions designed to 
separate them from the social body. This ‘great confinement’ saw madness interned into houses 
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such as the general Hospital in Paris and it was not until great reformers such as Philipe Pinel and 
Samuel Tuke that madness would once again re-enter the popular landscape. 
This movement whereby madness becomes separated or reorganised within the European 
imagination is reflected for Foucault in its changing status, as depicted in the artistic products from 
the medieval period through to the renaissance. The paintings of Hieronymus Bosch, Pieter Brueghel 
and Durer are examined by Foucault and conform to the representation of madness as a source of 
constant threat, a vision of moral decrepitude waiting to endanger the social order. Importantly, 
madness is seen during this period as a threat contained within the prevailing social dynamic and is 
yet to be relegated to a different realm. Foucault spends considerable effort on analysing, The Ship 
of Fools and The Temptation of St Anthony by Hieronymus Bosch as well as Brueghel’s The Triumph 
of Death and Durer’s Horsemen of the Apocalypse.  In so doing, he attests as to how such works of 
art “concede, and perhaps in a certain sense celebrate, the existence of madness and unreason in 
this world” (Boyne, 1990, p.21). Painting from the medieval age through to the renaissance still 
depicts madness as something contained within communal human experience. Foucault then goes 
on to stress that madness, as written in Shakespeare’s King Lear or Cervante’s Don Quixote, still 
maintains a relationship to reason as it is presented as a form of ‘willed downfall’ and as such, is 
reversible or redeemable. Following the ‘Great Confinement’, a two hundred-year silence falls upon 
artistic representations of madness and it is only with the actions of Tuke and Pinel that madness is 
reinserted into the literary landscape through the works of Goya and the Marquis de Sade.   
Finally, Foucault draws attention to the place madness comes to occupy in respect of 
science. Following the ‘Great Confinement’, a corresponding force emerges which sought to 
understand the causes and characteristics of those deemed insane. The result is the newly 
established medical science of psychiatry, with its methods for diagnosing and treating those 
confined to the madhouses noted above. From this moment on, madness becomes the preserve of 
psychiatric knowledge. No longer simply a form of moral degradation or quasi-mystical insight, 
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madness becomes a mental illness to be assessed, treated and cured like any other medical 
aberration. In short, “the effective outcome of this was to be the de-sacralisation of madness and 
the cementing of the nexus between reason and power” (Foucault, 2006, p.29), a nexus that would 
come to characterise Foucault’s archaeological analyses for years to follow. I want to return, 
however, to the central point within Foucault’s project that provided the source of contention with 
Derrida -  the so-called ‘Great Confinement’ - whereby madness was excluded from the social order 
and interned into a network of asylums. This, for Foucault, marks a definitive break in the place 
madness comes to occupy within the social field. For this physical confinement to occur, however, a 
wholesale reordering of social space (and its corresponding economic infrastructure) necessarily 
required a philosophical counterpart. That counterpart, or philosophical moment, whereby madness 
is expelled from a society now founded upon the unquestionable legitimacy of reason is found in the 
enlightenment philosopher par excellence -  René Descartes.  
 
1.8 The Cartesian Exclusion  
In a kind of preface to a chapter from the History of Madness entitled ‘The Great 
Confinement’, Foucault locates Descartes’ (1968) Meditations as that point of departure whereby 
madness is radically excluded from reason, resulting in the physical exclusion or internment of those 
deemed insane. Descartes’ aim in the first meditation is to radically question all previous 
assumptions and opinions in order to arrive at an indisputable foundation of knowledge; his famous 
philosophical method. In order to arrive at such a foundation, Descartes (1968) identifies three 
possible reasons for doubt or uncertainty. They correspond to: (1) a possible ‘errors of the senses’ 
(2) the ‘unreality of dreams’ and (3) the ‘illusions of the mad’. The importance of this distinction for 
Foucault’s reading is the relationship the first two uncertainties have in respect to truth that the 
third, ‘madness’, does not. Foucault draws attention to Descartes’ assertion that in the case of errors 
of judgement, a relation to truth is still maintained as it is only in respect to things ‘very far away’ or 
‘very small’ that such an error may likely occur. Likewise, in the case of dreams, although the content 
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may be otherwise bizarre, some relation to truth must be preserved through the manner by which 
the dream is experienced in terms of colour, shape or size. In effect, the laws of mathematics and 
geometry still apply as he states that, “even if I am asleep, two and three together always make five, 
and a square never has more than four sides” (1968, p.98).  
However, truth completely dissolves in the case of the last form of doubt - the illusions of 
the mad. Nothing can be taken as a certainty in this instance and Descartes goes beyond both 
sensory and non-sensory experience to question the metaphysical foundations of all knowledge with 
his hypothesis of an even more radical delusion - the possibility that all of his experience is directed 
by an evil malevolent god, an evil genius (Malin Génie). How can Descartes attest to any form of 
foundational truth in such an instance whereby all the certainties he has previously established are 
but deceptions brought about by such a God? In effect, Descartes posits such a ‘total madness’ as 
the antithesis to any form of foundational knowledge. Foucault’s specific point is that madness is, 
therefore, afforded an entirely different relationship to truth and reason than other forms of 
uncertainty. In his treatment of such uncertainties, as one commentator notes, Descartes 
announces, “that he would be no less extravagant than the mad themselves if he were to follow 
their example and imagine that he were made of glass.” Thus, instead of finding something in the 
thought of the mad that could not be false, Descartes effectively declares that “I who think cannot 
be mad” (Boyne, 1990, p.46). Foucault emphasizes how madness is set up in direct contrast to 
thinking or the exercise of reason. From this moment on the Cartesian Cogito, the thinking subject, 
excludes any possibility of being mad provided we employ Descartes’ two unshakable certainties: 
“that he exists as a thinking subject (ego cogito ergo sum) and that God exists as a supreme power 
and perfection” (ibid. p.41).  Foucault locates this specific historical/philosophical moment as the 
point by which madness becomes philosophy’s Other, the moment it is radically excluded from a 




1.9 Cogito and the History of Madness 
For Derrida (2001), his critique is twofold. Firstly, he challenges Foucault’s reading of 
Descartes’ First Meditation and the historical significance he affords it; and secondly, he queries the 
general logic of Foucault’s concept of reason. Ultimately, Derrida questions the very possibility of 
writing such a history of madness as by doing so, Foucault is essentially repeating the very 
manoeuvre he purportedly wants to avoid. Derrida takes as his point of departure three pages from 
the 673-page book and alleges in typically audacious style, “that the sense of Foucault’s entire 
project can be pinpointed in these few allusive and somewhat enigmatic pages” (ibid, p.37). As is 
often the case with Derrida’s close textual reading, he takes one small passage from a text he 
believes indicative of the entire project and submits it to close scrutiny unearthing the hidden 
assumptions or falsehoods. The passage in question is Foucault’s interpretation of the Cartesian 
exclusion. Derrida objects to his interpretation on the grounds that Foucault believes that Descartes 
expels madness from reason thereby engendering a relationship of exteriority between the two. For 
Derrida, however, madness is contained within the very dynamics of reason, within philosophy itself. 
As he writes, “the Cogito escapes madness only because at its own moment, under its own 
authority, it is valid even if I am mad, even if my thoughts are completely mad” (p.55). Madness and 
reason, in a sense, condition one another and encounter each other in a self-envelopment. For 
Derrida, hyperbolic doubt and the cogito itself cannot be evoked without that central kernel of 
madness characterised as an excess interior to reason. Derrida goes still further when he claims that 
contrary to Foucault’s understanding of madness as being exterior to philosophy or reason, it is in 
fact the possibility of its very condition.  
In keeping with this Cartesian exclusion which Foucault describes as central to the passage 
from the renaissance to the classical age, Derrida focuses in upon Foucault’s claim to wish to write a 
history of madness itself, prior to its taming by classical knowledge. The contradiction for Derrida is 
that Foucault sets about such a project by utilising the very language that was initially sought to 
capture madness. As Derrida states, “the expression ‘to say madness itself’ is self-contradictory. To 
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say madness without expelling it into objectivity is to let it say itself. But madness is what, by 
essence, cannot be said: it is the ‘absence of the work’ as Foucault profoundly says” (p.51). Later, in 
a similar vein, he adds, “if a discourse and philosophical communication (that is, language itself) are 
to have an intelligible meaning, that is to say, if they are to conform to their essence and vocation as 
discourse, they must simultaneously in fact and in principle escape madness...By its essence the 
sentence is normal” (p.65). Derrida is here questioning the very possibility of writing such a history, 
as in order to do so one must employ reason as expressed through systems of language, thereby 
imprisoning madness. Essentially, one cannot use reason to express or represent that which, by its 
very definition, is not reasonable.  Derrida does not state that Foucault is unaware of such an 
impossibility and instead insists that Foucault, at certain points, acknowledges this very problem. 
However, Derrida’s specific point is that Foucault repeats this objectification through his practice 
rather than his formulation. In other words, “because the silence cannot be spoken without at the 
same time re-captivating it within logos – the language of objectification – Foucault gives expression 
to it through his pathos, by means of his new and radical silent praise of folly” (de Ville, 2010, p.20). 
Derrida’s critique takes on an added level of complexity as he employs a distinction between logos 
and pathos within Foucault’s work. Later, when re-examining Foucault’s intention to pinpoint the 
precise moment when madness is divorced from reason, Derrida further problematizes Foucault’s 
use of the Greek logos as an example of what a ‘non-exclusionist reason’ might look like. Foucault 
originally states that:                                                                                                                                                 
The Greeks had a relation to something that they called hybris. This relation was not 
merely one of condemnation; the existence of Thrasymachus or of Callicles suffices 
to prove it, even if their language has reached us already enveloped in the reassuring 
dialectic of Socrates. But the Greek Logos had no contrary (my emphasis) (2006, 
p.xxix). 
It is this employment of logos as proof of some original state of ‘non-exclusionist reason’ that 
Derrida objects to. Derrida finds this bothersome as he states that the reassuring nature of the 
Socratic dialectic can only be brought about by a Greek logos that “has already expulsed, excluded, 
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objectified or (curiously amounting to the same thing) assimilated and mastered as one of its 
moments, ‘enveloped’ the contrary of reason” (2001, p.47). So, whereas Foucault utilises the notion 
of the Greek logos as an example of a historical epoch whereby reason was not separated from its 
Other (a logos with no contrary), Derrida wishes to show, in fact, that the Greek logos itself was 
characterised by its own envelopment of reason’s opposite. The problematic relations of interiority 
and exteriority are shown to be present long before Foucault’s claim that it was only in the classical 
age that madness became separated from reason.   
 Foucault delivered his reply to Derrida and the wider world in 1972, although did not 
address in full Derrida’s criticisms but instead contained his thoughts to Derrida’s notion of reason 
and his reading of Descartes’ meditations. We can summarise his position as a critique of Derrida’s 
attempts to reduce discursive practices (and Foucault’s overall analysis) to a purely textual reading.16 
In highlighting his belief that such a reduction closes off various avenues for thought and the 
exercise of philosophy, we touch upon perhaps the greatest difference between both thinkers; 
whereas Derrida’s maxim, ‘il n’y a pas d’hors texte’ ensures that the debate is reduced to its textual 
representation, Foucault’s emphasis on discursive limits potentially frees up the text from its 
immediate social, political or philosophical reading.  In an attempt to outline the differing positions, 
we may wish to turn to Slavoj Žižek’s (2007, n.p) summation - when wading into the debate he 
declares that both thinkers: 
    “share the key underlying premise: that Cogito is inherently related to 
madness. The difference: for Foucault, Cogito is grounded in the exclusion of 
madness, while, for Derrida, Cogito itself can only emerge through a “mad” 
hyperbole (universalized doubt), and remains marked by this excess. Before it 
                                                          
16
 In his reply, My Body, This Paper, This Fire, (2006) Foucault expands on this to state, “we can now see the 
price that Derrida must pay for his clever hypothesis. The omission of a certain number of literal elements 
(which appear as soon as one makes the effort to compare the Latin text and the French translation); the 
elision of textual differences (the whole play of semantic and grammatical oppositions between the paragraph 
on dreaming and the paragraph on madness); finally, and above all, the effacing of essential discursive 
determination (the double weave of the exercise and the demonstration)” (p.569).  
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stabilizes itself as res cogitans, the self-transparent thinking 
substance, Cogito as a crazy punctual excess.”17 
 In short, one position maintains that madness is the excluded necessity of reason whilst the other 
purports that madness is in fact contained within reason, an excess at the very core of language or 
philosophy.  We should, however, resist possible temptations to announce definitively that one 
party has ‘won out’ against the other and instead read Derrida’s critique as a sharpening of 
Foucault’s initial project.  In effect, Derrida is able to augment Foucault’s interpretation and by 
following his re-reading of Descartes, we arrive at a notion of madness as that which engenders 
philosophy and reason in their actuality.  Whereas Foucault wished to emphasize how a scission 
came about in the classical age divorcing madness from reason, Derrida radicalises this notion to 
encompass all of history. Or in other words, “Derrida argues that this escape from madness is not 
the product of a determinate moment in history, it is rather that which opens history, and speech in 
general” (Flynn, 1989, p. 209).  
On first glance, the above debate presents a significant challenge to a project that takes the 
written expression of madness as its object of study. Following Derrida’s critique, we may question 
the possibility that madness can be represented in language at all. On closer inspection, however, 
we come to see that madness as such is not perhaps exterior to discourse, philosophy or history, but 
is in fact, its inherent possibility. Madness exists as a paradoxical interior excess to philosophy itself. 
This, I would argue, has direct implications for the Mad Studies project. By positioning madness as 
something that is central to the exercise of thought we might side step some of the more hostile 
attitudes to mad narratives ever being utilised for academic purposes and what’s more, it potentially 
aligns with an ethico-political aim of ensuring madness, or the mad themselves, are not relegated to 
the edges of culture at large. There is already, providing we follow Foucault and Derrida’s line, 
                                                          
17
 This quote is taken from the online article entitled Cogito, Madness & Religion. Derrida, Foucault and then 
Lacan which can be found at: https://www.lacan.com/zizforest.html. Žižek further argues in this that 
“madness is inscribed into the history of Cogito at two levels. First, throughout the entire philosophy of 
subjectivity from Descartes through Kant, Schelling and Hegel, to Nietzsche and Husserl, Cogito is related to its 
shadowy double, pharmakon, which is madness. Second, madness is inscribed into the very (pre)history of 
Cogito itself, it is part of its transcendental genesis”.  
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something inherently maddening about the exercise of thought or the production of knowledge. 
Mad writing may exist at the very core of philosophical practice. The question now is how one reads 
it. By what means do we approach this ‘mad hyperbole’? The work of Shoshanna Felman (1975, 
1978) in direct relation to the above debate offers us one possible avenue - one that foregrounds 
the literary as a possible ‘buffer zone’ between madness and philosophy. 
 
1.10 Felman, Literature and the Possibility of Reading Madness 
 In keeping with the earlier distinction between pathos and logos Felman questions whether 
literature can act as the medium by which we can come to know madness. This literary theme is 
picked up by both Foucault and Derrida when Felman states that they would both likely agree that 
“the only possible meeting between madness and philosophy, between delirium and thought” 
(1975, p.220) is contained within fiction. Foucault himself engages with a number of literary figures 
within his project such as Sade, Artaud, Nerval and Hoderlin, and Felman asserts that this 
engagement speaks to the pathos of Foucault’s project -  a pathos that Derrida rightfully locates as 
the means by which Foucault’s book can in fact speak of madness without repeating the so-called 
‘Cartesian gesture for the twentieth century’; i.e. without trapping madness within the linguistic 
structures of reason. Felman goes as far as to state that “literature could very simply serve as a 
transparent intermediary between madness and philosophy; it could indeed succeed in saying 
madness inside philosophy” (1975, p.223). We may ask how is it then that literature can succeed 
where philosophy cannot? Because, in keeping with Foucault’s analysis, Felman goes on to declare 
that madness is “pathos itself, a metaphor of pathos, of the unthought residue of thought” (1975, 
p.224). Essentially, Felman draws a vital distinction for us in the quest to know madness. If we 
attempt to divine a concept of madness we are forever doomed to repeat the problem of trapping 
madness within reason. However, the possibility of knowing madness through metaphor is the 
method by which one can speak of madness without such a necessary entrapment. It is this 
distinction between concept and metaphor, or between logos and pathos that I believe speaks to the 
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heart of the debate. Furthermore, if we adopt this strategy or differentiation we can see how 
Foucault and Derrida are not necessarily opposed to one another but are in fact circling the same 
central concern through differing readings of Descartes.  
As an example, let us turn to Felman’s own deconstructive analysis of Gerard de Nerval’s 
(1855) Aurelia in order to appreciate how metaphorical operations or specific narrative structures 
are able to evoke the figure of madness without the problematic of ensnaring it within Logos. 
Felman in fact begins by juxtaposing Aurelia against Foucault’s History of Madness by emphasising 
how both writers adopt a romanticised use of poetic language within modern discourse. Drawing 
from the debate and Foucault’s intention to define the relationship between reason and madness - 
without reverting back to a “unilateral monologue of reason about madness” (1975, p.62) - Felman 
evokes the impossibility of the task that Foucault set himself but nevertheless attempted. This 
notion of the impossible book (History of Madness) is in keeping with Nerval’s Aurelia, which was 
likewise proclaimed by its author to be an impossible endeavour. Why? Because Nerval also 
understood that he could not write his own experience of madness without in some way 
constraining it by reason and formal language. Felman - via Nerval - here opens up the question of 
‘possibility’ in any autobiographical writing of madness. How can that excess or contrary to reason 
be depicted in literary form? Felman goes on to show how Nerval raises another question or point of 
departure for thinking through the writing/madness binary. As she asks is not every reading in some 
sense aligned to a kind of madness “since it is based on illusion and induces us to identify with 
imaginary heroes? Madness is nothing other than an intoxicating reading; a madman is one who is 
drawn into the dizzying whirl of his own reading” (p.64).  
Returning back to the so-called ‘impossible task’, Felman demonstrates how Nerval’s poetic 
enterprise resembles, to an astonishing degree, the philosophic enterprise of Foucault’s. Both 
attempt the impossible; to say madness itself and to return to that zero point before madness is 
divorced from reason. Felman moves on to unpick the literary techniques based within a romantic 
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discourse that Nerval adopts to say madness independent of medicalised or reductive scientific 
language. The chief operation that enables Nerval to do so is by dividing his sense of self, by evoking 
a plurality of the “I”. The pronoun “I” in this instance takes on a complex characteristic within Aurelia 
as it stands for both the hero (madman) and the narrator (he who has recovered reason). To further 
complicate affairs, these two “I’s” exist in different temporalities (the hero’s madness is present; the 
narrator reports after the event). This constant contrasting of one against the other is replete 
throughout Aurelia with both “I’s” coming to assume one position against the other (absolute 
knowledge versus ignorance, strength versus weakness, sanity versus delirium). The entire structure 
of Aurelia is shown to be based upon “an irresolvable tension between these two contradictory 
discursive tendencies in the narrative” (p.67). This contrasting of one “I” against the other gives 
subsequent form to the ‘Hero-I’s’ further hallucinatory splitting into another, or a double. Felman, 
however, utilises this figure of the double and demonstrates how this ‘Other-I’ can be read within “a 
radical dimension of castration” as elaborated within Freud’s notion of the ‘uncanny’ (p.68).18 
Accordingly, Aurelia comes to be defined by this constitutive experience of castration. Following 
which, the text is further unpacked to show how hallucinatory phenomena within Nerval’s account 
are related to the functioning of symbols or Nerval’s ‘magic alphabet’. In conclusion, Nerval’s 
madness, as contained within Aurelia, is shown to consist of “madness as a transgressive 
knowledge” and a quest for a magic language conditioned by phallic omnipotence. Nerval returns 
back from madness - the abandonment of this magic language - as Felman states, through a process 
of writing, “while the hallucination had been a reading of signs, a deciphering of one’s reality, writing 
will attempt, in contrast, to decipher one’s own dream. The writer thus becomes the reader, the 
interpreter, of his own madness” (p.76). Felman deftly shows us not only how madness can come to 
be embodied in literary form through an appeal to pathos, but how the use of psychoanalytic theory 
                                                          
18
 Freud’s 1919 paper The Uncanny describes the psychological experience of encountering something that is 
strangely familiar. Freud in his examination of this strange mental space explores the works of E.T.A. Hoffman 




can also provide the means to reading madness and arriving, in this case, at something approaching 
a clinical interpretation of Nerval. If we turn back to Derrida’s later reflections on the debate we can 
strengthen the case for utilising psychoanalysis as a means for reading mad texts.  
 
1.11 The Unconscious 
Derrida (1994) re-engages with the debate in his lecture “To Do Justice to Freud”: The 
History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis where he reassesses the possibility of Foucault’s 
book not through the prism of the Cartesian cogito but rather the Freudian unconscious. In speaking 
of Freud, Derrida claims that he was instrumental in ushering in “a new epoch of madness, our 
epoch, the one out of which is written the History of Madness” (p.235). Following which, he goes on 
to state that psychoanalysis represents a significant break with the classical age as, in contrast to 
enlightenment pre-occupations with reason, it attempts to reinsert unreason - the unconscious itself 
- into any such discussion. In effect, psychoanalysis “breaks with psychology by speaking with the 
Unreason that speaks within madness” (p.237). Psychoanalysis, for Derrida, comes to represent 
something altogether different from the previous Cartesian model of reason, as its object of study 
(the unconscious) does not conform to the measures of reason that Descartes holds as being central 
to the free-thinking subject. The unconscious, in this instance, problematizes the very notion of the 
Cartesian cogito (whereby conscious thought guarantees one’s existence) due to psychoanalysis’s 
claim that a large part of our existence is in fact determined by unconscious thought or psychic 
process.  
In order to make this claim, Derrida evokes the guise of the Evil Genius and attempts to 
correlate numerous facets of psychoanalysis with Descartes’ malevolent god. In a sense, Derrida 
draws a comparison with that hypothetical source of uncertainly (the evil genius) and Freud’s (1920) 
own theoretical accounts for human behaviour that do not conform to an expression or exercise of 
rational thought, namely the death drive or the compulsion to repeat as formulated in Beyond the 
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Pleasure Principle. The classical age, an age marked by the use and centrality of reason, is upended 
by a theoretical body of knowledge that seeks to place conceptual categories that do not conform to 
reason at the heart of human experience and understanding. As such, an entirely different 
relationship to madness is potentially made possible. In commenting further on this, Derrida states 
that Freud (as well as Nietzsche) represents the “reopening of the dialogue with unreason, the lifting 
of the interdiction against language, the return to a proximity with madness” (p.250). Our relation to 
madness, and by association the possibility of Foucault’s project, has to be completely rethought in 
the so-called age of psychoanalysis. By re-opening the door to allow unreason back into the human 
condition, madness can no longer occupy that excluded place that is solely determined by its 
exterior relation. Unreason (of which madness was previously constructed) now holds central 
importance for human experience.  We have then two possible sources, or two possible lines of 
enquiry, by which we can potentially know madness. Pathos as expressed through art and literature, 
and psychoanalysis, which reopens a dialogue with madness by dethroning the sacred place of 
reason with the entirely unreasonable unconscious.  
What I am approaching here is the bare bones of a conceptual apparatus with which I can 
formulate a possible method of reading (and interpreting) written madness. The use of pathos, as 
embodied in literature, and its encounter with psychoanalysis provides the terrain on which a 
possible reading may be constructed. What remains to be clarified is how exactly psychoanalysis can 
be operationalised on literary forms in order to construct an interpretation or body of theory. 
Undoubtedly, psychoanalytic literary criticism has a long and varied history with numerous examples 
of how concepts such as the unconscious can be utilised for specific critical reading practices.19 
However, arguably the main current within it has its starting point not with Freud but with a critique 
                                                          
19
 Psychoanalytic literary criticism remains one of the more contentious ways in which psychoanalysis has been 
applied outside of clinical settings. As Stephen Frosh (2010) states, “psychoanalysis has always been 
controversial as a method of literary analysis, particularly amongst writers and critics who regard it as a 
colonising discipline trying to tell the ‘truth’ of literature without necessarily appreciating its specificity, 
including its aesthetic properties” (p.70). Likewise, Shoshana Felman (1982) draws attention to the way in 
which psychoanalysis often subordinates literature as an object of language to be known which in turn 
valorises psychoanalysis as the authoritative framework for achieving any understanding.  
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of political economy. I am referring here to the work of Louis Althusser, the French philosopher 
largely credited for establishing a structuralist reading of Marxist theory and the materialist dialectic.  
 
1.12 Althusser & Symptomatic Reading 
Althusser advances a notion of ‘symptomatic reading’ primarily within his celebrated book 
Reading Capital (2009). Essentially, he constructed a method of reading that he found in Marx, and 
subsequently used it to then read Marx. In his own words he states that such a strategy “divulges 
the divulged event in the text it reads, and in the same movement relates it to a different text, 
present as a necessary absence in the first” (2009, p.29). It is then a way to discern how a text is 
structured or shaped by dynamics that they themselves do not deploy, as well as being a method for 
interpreting symptoms within the text that are conditioned by dynamics which lie outside of the 
text. Its focus, as a reading method, is on moments of contradiction, or the apparent lapses, gaps 
and lacunae that appear in the text but speak to something external; a larger structuring force that is 
only detectable by examining the ways it is silently in operation.  It is worth quoting Althusser at 
length here. He writes: 
 Certain moments, in certain symptomatic points, this silence emerges as such in the 
discourse and forces it against its will to produce real theoretical lapses, in brief blank 
flashes, invisible in the light of the proof: words that hang in mid-air although they 
seem to be inserted into the necessity of the thought, judgements which close 
irreversibly with a false obviousness the very space which seemed to be opening 
before reason. All that a simple literal reading sees in the arguments is the continuity 
of the text. A ‘symptomatic’ reading is necessary to make these lacunae perceptible, 
and to identify behind the spoken words the discourse of the silence, which, 
emerging in the verbal discourse, includes these blanks in it, blanks which are failures 
in its rigour, or the outer limits of its effort: its absence, once these limits are 
reached, but in a space which it has opened (2009, p.95). 
Althusser, in his reading of Marx’s Capital argues that Marx’s text is conditioned by an antagonism 
between his own take on capitalist logic and that of the classical political economists (Ricardo, 
Smith). As such, this incommensurability or competing dynamic comes to the fore in the guise of 
specific lacunae within the text’s meaning. Simply put, Marx and the classical political economists 
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are talking about two different things; or in Althusser’s terms, they are dealing with two different 
‘problematics’. The problematic, for Althusser, is his name for the ideological or theoretical 
framework that situates or positions any given form of knowledge, concept or term. He reasons that 
any word or term cannot be considered in isolation and must be regarded in relation to the 
framework that forms the conditions of possibility for the production of knowledge. The problematic 
is not, however, a world view or an expressive totality, “It is not the essence of thought of an 
individual or epoch” writes Althusser, “which can be deduced from a body of texts by an empirical, 
generalised reading; it is centred on the absence of problems and concepts within the problematic 
as much as their presence: it can therefore only be reached by a symptomatic reading (lecture 
symptomale)” (2009, p.354). We can see, therefore, how the notion of symptomatic reading is 
intimately related to his concept of the problematic. By focusing on such absences, Althusser is able 
to argue that Marx’s text is written within the problematic of the logic of capital, whereas those 
texts of the classical political economists are conceived within a problematic that is pre-capitalist. 
This in turn conditions those blanks, absences and failures in the flow of Marx’s own analysis. What 
is made visible in Althusser’s reading of Capital is a rupture between these two different logics. 
 We may ask how this relates to the use of psychoanalysis, as discussed above, in the 
interpretation of texts. Although symptomatic reading is undoubtedly indebted to Marxist theory, it 
also draws significantly from Freud, in particular his analysis of dreams. The concepts of 
‘overdetermination’ as well as ‘latent and manifest content’ play a crucial role in this respect. By 
trying to discern the relation between what is absent and what is present, between surface level and 
depth, Althusser employs Freud’s theory on the manner by which manifest dream content is related 
to latent meaning. However, a word of caution is required here as many critics have noted that such 
a simplistic division between these two unconscious phenomena (manifest and latent content) 
potentially results in an attempt to rewrite a text according to some hidden latent meaning that is 
used as a master code to interpret a higher truth residing behind or within the text. In fact, Freud 
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himself explicitly warns his readers against sticking rigidly to this binary. He states in the 
Interpretation of Dreams that “it has long been the habit to regard dreams as identical with their 
manifest content; but we must now beware equally of the mistake of confusing dreams with latent 
dream-thoughts” (2001, p.580). What is of absolute importance is the operation that transforms the 
latent dream image into its manifest content, an operation Freud referred to as the ‘dream-work’. It 
is this specific dynamic that opens up a window onto the operations of the unconscious, not the two 
polarities by which a dream can be separated. In devising such an operation, Freud had to surrender 
any idea of a one-to-one causality between these two concepts. In the place of a strict causality he 
puts forth his notion of ‘overdetermination’. Overdetermination - with the attendant dynamics of 
condensation and displacement - is the means by which many multiple meanings can be derived 
from one single dream sequence. The overdetermined nature of the dream results in it being 
repeated many times over (potentially infinitely) within different associative chains, resulting in 
certain meanings, as produced through repetition, taking on a coherence of their own. This 
coherence, however, must not be taken as an expression of the whole of the dream. It is this 
emphasis on the interaction between multiple layers of meaning as created by the overdetermined 
nature of the dream-work that is of crucial importance to Freud’s overall logic.  
 One other important concept employed by Althusser to advance this notion of symptomatic 
reading is that of the ‘epistemological break’. It is borrowed from the French philosopher Gaston 
Bachelard (1938) as found in his La Formation de l’esprit scientifique and describes how a break is 
required to move from one set of established ideas to another. Bachelard employs it whilst mapping 
the shift from the world of pre-scientific ideas to that of the scientific. This shift requires a radical 
rupture from the whole pattern and frame of reference of prescientific (ideological) notions and the 
construction of a new pattern or problematic. Peter Hallward encapsulates this when he states that 
“Science can only begin with a principled break with experience and ‘sensory knowledge’, a rupture 
épistémologique that enables a rational, self-rectifying explanation of problems that are not given in 
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or even accessible to lived experience, however ‘intimate’ or ‘authentic’ its phenomenological 
elucidation might be” (2012, p.11). This notion of a break or rupture is quite evident in other stands 
of French philosophical thought including, amongst others, Canguilhem’s and Foucault’s, the latter 
of whom was directly taught and influenced intellectually by Althusser. Althusser applied this notion 
of the epistemological break to his reading of Marx to demonstrate how Marx’s rejection of the 
Hegelian and Feuerbachian ideology of his youth represented a rupture that was able to instate the 
science of historical materialism. We have then a set of interrelated concepts that Althusser employs 
to advance his strategy of symptomatic reading.  
Certainly, symptomatic reading has a much richer conceptual history then the brief overview 
of Althusser’s practice I have covered. Two other notable theorists who have played an important 
part in the construction of symptomatic reading include Paul Ricoeur (1970) and Fredrick Jameson 
(1980). The first primarily advanced such a reading practice in his Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on 
Interpretation (1970). In it, Ricoeur demonstrates how Freud’s model of interpretation is particular 
suited to symbolic language, a language defined by Ricoeur as one “where another meaning is both 
given and hidden in an immediate meaning (p.7), the symbolic function of which ensures that this 
language comes to “mean something other than what is said” (p.12). This leads Ricoeur to put 
forward his notion of what he coined a “hermeneutics of suspicion” - a method describing an 
understanding of double meaning based not on an exegetic model of religious interpretation but 
rather a demystification of illusion; illusions which structure reality and texts therein. The second 
theorist, Fredric Jameson (1980), elaborates his mode of interpretation within The Political 
Unconscious, published not long after Althusser’s and Ricoeur’s own analyses. Jameson argued that 
by only attending to the surface of the text, the resultant critique will be largely descriptive, 
empirical, ideological and, therefore, in terms of analysis, weak.  In contrast, the ‘strong’ critic must, 
he argues, rewrite the narrative in terms of master codes, revealing its status as ideological and, 
furthermore, as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions. Similarly, to Althusser, Jameson views 
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the text as constructed by an absence, but unlike Althusser, Jameson holds that there is only ever 
one absent cause: history itself.  
 Symptomatic reading, in its various forms, provides a framework and set of reading practices 
for analysing and interpreting texts, ones that are based on a demystification of surface level 
phenomena or linguistic symbols. But what of psychotic texts? Do these tools for uncovering latent 
meaning and deep unconscious structures suffice for analysing texts which are, on the surface, 
openly delusional or delirious? Before answering this question, it is worth delving into one last set of 
concepts heavily indebted to structuralist theory to throw up some vital connections between forms 
of psychoanalytic criticism and the relevance of ‘psychosis’ to analyses of discourse. We will see how 
Lacanian inspired discourse analysis posits a fundamental relation between ‘psychosis’ and 
knowledge production, one that will reverberate well beyond these structuralist framings. 
 
1.13 Lacan and Althusser: The cahiers pour l’analyse 
 Conjoining the structuralist impulse charted above with psychoanalytic theory inevitably 
brings us to the figure of Jacques Lacan and we can trace his influence on this reading strategy via a 
detour through the Althusserian inspired journal, Cahiers pour l’Analyse. The journal was edited by a 
group of philosophy students at the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) in Paris in the late 1960’s. It 
published major articles by many of the most significant thinkers of the period including Althusser, 
Derrida, Foucault, Irigaray and Lacan. It can be viewed in many respects as the mouthpiece for a 
collective intellectual endeavour to provide a systematic and unified ‘theory of discourse’ that drew 
from Althusser’s revitalised Marxism as well as Lacanian inspired psychoanalysis. As such, it makes 
an important reference point for the philosophical enterprise referred to as structuralism. I wish to 
draw attention here to the early work of Jacques Alain-Miller who studied initially under Althusser 
before becoming increasingly drawn to Lacan, both on a personal and intellectual level, in and 
around the mid 1960’s. The text that is of relevance to our question of method emerged in 1964, 
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just after Lacan founded a new school of psychoanalysis (Ecole Freudienne de Paris) following his 
expulsion from the IPA. Miller, along with various philosophy students from the ENS, established 
themselves in a ‘cartel’ and Miller, along with Yves Duroux and Jean-Claude Milner (2012), wrote 
what many consider to be the inaugural document of the Cahiers, Action of the Structure. The article 
set out to provide a so-called ‘unitary theory of discourse’ whilst making space for the subject in the 
scientific analysis of the ‘structuring structure’. My interest here in the article is its relation to 
previous discussions above on the construction of science and the role of the epistemological break. 
The article, in keeping with the anti-humanism of the ENS, does not start with ‘given’ or ‘lived’ 
experience as a point of departure but rather with that which structures such experience. This does 
not mean, however, that Miller et al wanted to do away with subjective experience altogether but 
rather to conceptualise the idea of structure, in tandem with Lacanian psychoanalysis, to arrive at a 
definition of structure as “that which puts in place an experience for the subject that it includes” 
(p.71). 
 This line of thought leads Miller to make a distinction between ‘structuring’ and ‘structured’ 
dimensions of the complex whole. The difference between these two modalities of the structure of 
discourse is understood by emphasising how the structure as a whole includes something that 
disturbs or interrupts its action. The structure, according to Miller, necessarily includes a reflexive 
element -  “an element that turns back on reality and perceives it, reflects it and signifies it, an 
element capable of redoubling itself on its own account” (p.72). We may note some similarity here 
with Althusser’s thought on the role overdetermination plays in reflecting contradictions back onto 
the complex whole from which they emanate. Miller wants to stress how this element within the 
structure introduces a gap or absence in the overall process. The structure misses something which, 
on a subjective level, is covered over or filled in by an imaginary/ideological representation of 
completeness. Ideology as such masks over this missing gap within any given social totality. Miller 
argues that every structure must allow for the missing element which, in turn, conditions the need 
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for a representation of sorts to ‘sew up’ or ‘suture’ this lack. Miller refers to this element or 
structuring lack as a ‘utopic’ point, a point that should not rightly exist and defies any formal 
ideological recognition. What is required is a scientific analysis to expose such lacks within the social 
structure. The point of this theoretical analysis of ‘the social’ - that which is constructed by discursive 
mechanisms - is then to establish where these utopic points are in operation and uncover them. The 
question that then arises for Miller is what form of science is required for such an analysis? He goes 
on to argue that what distinguishes a true science and establishes its ability to reveal to us such 
lacks, gaps or utopic points, is the ‘epistemological break’ that expels any lack on which ideology 
functions. It must eliminate any gaps that are so crucial for non-scientific ideological discourse.20 In 
short, science as a discourse ‘lacks any lack’, it excludes, or borrowing from Lacanian theory, it 
‘forecloses’ the necessary gap within discourse. In respect of this Miller writes, “The closure proper 
to science therefore operates a redistribution between a closed field, on the one hand, of which one 
perceives no limit if one considers it from the inside, and a foreclosed space on the other. 
Foreclosure is the other side of closure. This term will suffice to indicate that every science is 
structured like a ‘psychosis’: the foreclosed returns under the form of the impossible” (p.80). We will 
note in the following chapter how for Lacan, the concept of foreclosure represents the fundamental 
principle that conditions psychotic structure. For the time being, it is only important to recognize 
that for Miller, and we might say for the Cahiers more generally, Science as founded on an 
epistemological break has an affinity with the structure of ‘psychosis’. Both exclude a constitutive 
element (the Utopic point, the ideological subject) within their structure. The role of symptomatic 
reading, as discussed above, may allow therefore a means to identify how a rupture is caused within 
a structure instating a new problematic or form of science.  
                                                          
20
 The Cahiers is an undoubtedly complex body of work. Peter Hallward (2012) summarises this collective 
effort as an attempt “to develop an account of ideological discourse, informed by the emerging sciences of 
linguistics, psychoanalysis and historical materialism, in terms that would allow ‘political practice’ to 
understand and transform it in somewhat the same way that analysis allows for the understanding and 
transformation of a neurosis” (p.50).  Again, we see clearly the connect between diagnostic entities and socio-
political frameworks.  
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1.14 Surface Reading 
 On the one hand, we might argue that forms of symptomatic reading might be well suited to 
the task of deciphering ‘psychotic’ text. Texts which appear on the surface nonsensical, irrational, 
delirious or possibly even meaningless, seem to call for a method which unearths that which is 
taking place beneath these strange hieroglyphs or odd uses of symbolic communication. Indeed, 
symptomatic reading seems particularly well suited to providing an ideological or social critique, as it 
uncovers the dynamics and discursive operations that exist outside of the text but nevertheless 
condition the text itself. This in turn may be useful in understanding how ‘psychotic’ texts can be 
utilised to construct wider cultural insights. I have shown, likewise, how the concept of the 
unconscious may be especially useful on a philosophical level in providing a structure for interpreting 
such modalities of writing. However, it is worth recognizing that by employing psychoanalysis to 
critique texts, we inadvertently start to absorb ‘psychosis’ into the psychoanalytic cannon. By this I 
mean that whilst we utilise concepts such as the ‘unconscious’ or ‘foreclosure’ to interpret 
‘psychosis’ we start to colonise madness with psychoanalytic knowledge. A strange kind of 
hermeneutic loop is at work here when one tries to apprehended ‘psychotic’ text. The 
Foucault/Derrida debate alerts us to this very problem. Derrida (1994) would likely hold that 
psychoanalysis is a privileged means by which we can confront madness and perhaps there is, 
therefore, less cause for alarm. But this style of critical reading, one centred on uncovering hidden 
meaning or deep unconscious structure, potentially contains another pitfall, yet a pitfall that 
constructively reveals to us again some intriguing similarities between theory production and 
madness itself. Psychoanalysis and structuralism (and to this we might add the various other critical 
practices touched upon above, including Marxism, deconstruction, grammatology, new historicism, 
etc.) all privilege the idea that something hidden, some veiled operation or force, is at work in 
ascribing a text’s true meaning or ideological significance. We may loosely label these critical 
practices under the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ discussed earlier - the philosophical and literary 
legacy left to us via Marx, Freud and Nietzsche. To close I want to demonstrate how these reading 
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practices are themselves imbued with a paranoid sensibility and offer a methodological caution via 
the work of Eve Sedgwick (2003) which may assist us in delineating the different ways in which 
‘psychotic’ text can be appropriated to further forms of clinical and cultural theory.  
In her 2003 essay, Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You 
Probably Think This Essay Is About You, Sedgwick argues that this ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ which 
has come to dominate critical thinking and literary analysis is itself characterised by a strong 
paranoid sensibility. In fact, she goes so far as to state that this paranoid stance has become 
synonymous with criticism itself. Such practices focus their attention on the latent meaning of 
surface phenomena, whilst drawing linkages and relations between different diffuse elements in 
order to construct a coherent whole or systematised interpretation. Furthermore, she argues that 
this paranoid stance is contagious; it tends to consume other ways of knowing (or reading) through 
its systematicity and its ability to form ever stronger associative links. To make this claim she finds 
support in the work of philosopher and psychologist, Sylvan S. Tomkins and his theory of affects. For 
Tomkins (1963), paranoia is something he refers to as a ‘strong theory’; it dominates other ways of 
thinking and comes to order more and more of experience so that nothing else can propagate. 
‘Weak theory’, on the other hand, does not denote a theory of little use or value but rather one that 
focuses in upon selective areas and may result in highly specific insights that are not widely 
attributable to other domains or objects of study. In keeping with this, Sedgwick writes that “while 
paranoid theoretical proceedings both depend on and reinforce the structural dominance of 
monopolistic ‘strong theory’, there may also be benefit in exploring the extremely varied, dynamic, 
and historically contingent ways that strong theoretical constructs interact with weak ones in the 
ecology of knowing” (p.145). Sedgwick (2003) outlines what she believes are the main attributes of 
paranoia in respect of reading practices. She identifies paranoia as being anticipatory, reflexive and 
mimetic, a strong theory, a theory of negative effects and lastly a theory that places its faith in 
exposure. This use of Tomkins affect theory is further developed by Sedgwick via an appeal to the 
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work of Melanie Klein (1946), in particular her theorisation of the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ and 
‘depressive’ positions. What Sedgwick finds so useful in Klein’s work is the reparative operations for 
the ego that can be achieved via the oscillation between these two polarities. On this oscillatory 
dynamic she maps Tomkins strong and weak theory as well as the interplay between his notion of 
positive and negative affects. Although Sedgwick’s Kleinian inflected practice is clearly derived from 
a vastly different theoretical linage to one we have traced over the course of this chapter, we can 
see once again the particular use of psychoanalysis in developing different modalities of reading, 
ones that have a direct appeal to forms of madness itself. The Lacanian inspired epistemological 
break and Sedgwick’s reflections on critical reading both posit a fundamental affinity between 
theory production and ‘paranoia/psychosis’. We will want to hold onto this seemingly odd 
correlation over the course of the thesis. 
Sedgwick’s notion of reparative reading foregrounds the potentially rich reading practices 
that can result when paranoid stances are complimented by other ways of knowing. The two do not, 
for Sedgwick, have to occupy a mutually exclusive relation. In fact, she argues that “it is sometimes 
the most paranoid-tending people who are able to, and need to, develop and disseminate the 
richest reparative practices. And if the paranoid or the depressive positions operate on a smaller 
scale than the level of individual typology, they operate also on a larger: that of shared histories, 
emergent communities, and the weaving of intertextual discourse” (2003, p.150). Sedgwick’s 
reparative reading, with its distrust of paranoid and strong theoretical stances provides considerable 
support to what is increasingly being referred to as ‘surface reading’ in literary criticism; essentially, 
a move away from symptomatic practices and the associated hermeneutics of suspicion that have 
dominated for so long. This coalesced in a 2009 special edition of the journal Representations. It is 
opened by Best and Marcus (2009) who provide a survey of surface reading in their article The Way 
We Read Now. Sedgwick’s reparative analysis features amongst other practitioners (Sontag, 1966; 
Gallop, 2000) of non-symptomatic reading who maintain fidelity to a text’s surface. From this, they 
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distil surface reading into five overall concerns that take their leave from symptomatic practices. 
They frame them as follows: “Surface as materiality”; “surface as the intricate verbal structure of 
literary language”; “attention to surface as a practice of critical description”; “surface as the location 
of patterns that exist within and across texts” and “surface as literal meaning”. Over the course of 
this thesis we may well find that this oscillation between paranoid and reparative modes of analysis, 
or indeed between a focus on surface and depth, may provide a rich resource for critiquing modes of 
‘psychotic’ text and bodies of theory produced from them. Essentially, this addendum to the practice 
of symptomatic reading provides a caution that may be necessary to counter the dominance of the 
hermeneutics of suspicion underwriting my main methodological approach. Moreover, this 
excursion into reparative modes of analysis has thrown up yet another correlation between 
‘psychosis’/paranoia (madness) and the production of theory (knowledge), a correlation we shall 
track across the course of this thesis.  
So, what does all this mean for my intended project? Essentially, this style of literary 
analysis, with a strong relation to forms of continental philosophy, psychoanalysis and critical theory, 
is not something that has been attempted within the Mad Studies project. In fact, this use of what 
we might think of as ‘high theory’ and abstract academic analysis potentially presents a problem for 
Mad Studies which, as we have seen, takes issue with forms of high intellectualism that effectively 
commit acts of epistemic violence. However, I maintain that there is a strong philosophical basis for 
utilising the above conceptual apparatus and methods of reading in the interpretation of mad 
writing and I shall outline the beginnings of a framework for doing so below.   
 
1.15 Methods and Madness 
From the ground covered above we can devise a set of reading strategies and associated 
conceptual criteria with which to firstly critique those bodies of knowledge that have already been 
produced from ‘psychotic’ text (Part 1 of the thesis) and then to apply to this project’s original object 
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of study (Part 2 of the thesis). Although this list in not exhaustive, we can distil the insights above 
into the following concepts and methodological concerns encountered so far; symptomatic practices 
tasked with elements of the text that are only interpretable via recourse to hidden operations (the 
unconscious, structure, etc.). In keeping with this, a focus on epistemological breaks or ruptures 
within the text; a focus on the way meaning is construed from the process of overdetermination, or 
rather the relation between latent and manifest content; a concern for the ‘depth versus surface’ 
binary; an awareness that paranoid sensibilities (negative affects, strong theory, reflexive or mimetic 
strategies, and anticipation and revelation) can potentially swamp analyses; as a methodological 
caution, a mindfulness towards surface or reparative analysis to counter the worst excesses of 
paranoid reading and lastly, the importance of the author’s sense of self or “I” within the narrative, 
as well as its temporal location.  
It is important to stress that as we proceed over the coming few chapters, the question of 
method raised here (with its attendant conceptual criteria) will be augmented by the different 
theoretical discussion encountered. For instance, we will see in the following chapter how a concern 
for hidden meaning in the context of Schreber’s Memoirs by Freud and Lacan alike, leads to a set of 
concepts and ideas which in turn can be used for later analysis of ‘psychotic’ text. I am mindful that 
this ‘theory generating theory’ dynamic or ‘hermeneutic loop’ poses potential problems or 
methodological issues. In one sense this is unavoidable; in another it speaks to the very heart of this 
project which focuses on the way in which knowledge is constructed. It is important to be aware of 
this relation between the practice of reading and the theory derived from it; or perhaps more 
importantly, whether the text itself is being used to bolster the theory or whether the theory is 
genuinely illuminating our appreciation of madness. I suspect that this question is one not easily 
answered and that this in itself demonstrates how the positioning (manipulation?) of ‘psychotic’ text 
reveals to us the relation between madness and reason or between clinic and culture.  Whatever the 
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case, the preceding discussions and insights will be built upon over the course of Part 1. To conclude, 
this chapter leads us to the following research questions: 
Research Questions for Part 1:  
How do the different theories encountered construe meaning from mad writing and furthermore, 
what set of conceptual criteria or reading practices do they employ to do so? 
Do these theoretical systems have recourse to latent, hidden meaning or surface level phenomena?  
Do these forms of clinical and cultural theory position madness/’psychosis’ as being interior or 
exterior to reason and socially shared meaning?   
 
Research Questions for Part 2: 
Can a clinical reading be derived from the text in line with the clinical insights exposed in the first 
half of the thesis? 
Conversely, can a broader psychosocial reading be constructed from the text, following the analyses 
already covered?  
And ultimately, what do these differing ways in which mad writing can be read, and subsequently 
positioned, reveal to us about the nature of madness itself? 
Effectively, what all of these research questions represent are the different ways in which I 
am going to tackle the main issue at stake within this overall project. To reiterate, the essential 
driving impetus to this research initiative is an examination on how knowledge is produced from 
instances of mad writing and most importantly what this process of knowledge production does to 
















Part 1: Schreber, Mad Writing and Associated Sites of Psychosocial 
Theory.  
 
“The delusions of paranoiacs have an unpalatable external similarity and internal kinship to the 

















Chapter 2: Psychoanalytic Clinical Interpretation 
 
 I want to turn now to particular instances of ‘psychotic’ text, or mad writing, which have 
been utilised to further forms of theoretical production. Undoubtedly, the major figure over the next 
three chapters is that of Judge Daniel Paul Schreber. Whilst keeping our methodological discussion in 
mind and the way in which, philosophically speaking, interpretations of mad writing have been 
problematized (the latest example of which being contained within Mad Studies) I shall demonstrate 
how Schreber’s text (1903) has been utilised by a diverse range of thinkers that straddle the 
psychosocial field. From strictly clinical speculations through to wide ranging ideas about modernist 
forms of communication and power, Schreber has provided the raw material for many prominent 
theorists to propagate their ideas. This ‘meta-analysis’ of Schreber over the coming three chapters 
also provides a foundation for my own later analysis of PKD’s Exegesis. This foundation, augmented 
by my discussion above concerning method and reading practices, introduces the theoretical tools 
and techniques that a variety of scholars have employed to derive meaning from Schreber’s writing. 
Whether they are able to stand up to the concerns voiced from within the Mad Studies project and 
beyond remains to be seen.  
However, my aim is to delve into the manner by which these authors have used Schreber’s 
text in order that we can appreciate how theory or knowledge has been produced specifically from 
instances of mad writing. Schreber, although the most prominent figure throughout Part 1 is not the 
sole example of mad writing discussed. Authors who have utilised Schreber in their intellectual 
endeavours often have recourse to other mad writers or examples of ‘psychotic’ text. I shall also 
touch on these going forward, yet it will be Schreber who comprises the main source for theoretical 
speculation emanating from mad writing. To begin, I shall firstly examine the work of Sigmund Freud 
(1911) and wider aspects of the psychoanalytic tradition. As the introduction to the latest New York 
Review of Books (NYRB) edition of the Memoirs attests, in many respects Schreber will forever be 
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‘Freud’s Schreber’. It is Freud’s reflection on this case that provides the absolute bedrock to most, if 
not all, later interpretations and as such psychoanalysis becomes our first site or theoretical 
framework to be examined.  
   The story of Freud, Psychoanalysis and the Schreber material starts in the summer of 1910 
when Freud and his Hungarian contemporary, Sandor Ferenczi spent two weeks together in Sicily. 
Freud took with him a book entitled Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken (Memoirs of a Nerve 
Patient) by Dr. Judge Daniel Paul Schreber, former Senatspräsident in Dresden. The book was 
originally given to him by another dominant figure within psychoanalytical circles, Karl Gustav Jung. 
Although relatively well discussed within the psychiatric field, the full impact and importance of the 
Memoirs was yet to be widely recognised outside of it.21 The article Psycho-analytic notes upon an 
Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paraniodes) was published in the 
Summer of 1911, with a further postscript released prior to the third International Psycho-analytical 
Congress in September 1911, published in full earlier the next year. The article, or 'Schreber case' as 
it would come to be known, undoubtedly represents Freud’s most important and sustained 
engagement on the issue of paranoid delusions and ‘psychotic’ phenomena. However, the paper is 
not solely confined to the analysis of paranoia and in fact contains the beginnings of far larger 
concerns within Freud’s metapsychological work, including the issue of narcissism as well as the 
operations of repression and projection. Towards the end of the paper Freud also touches upon 
issues that were of great interest to him during this period, such as mythology and totemic group 
functioning. Whatever may be said of Freud’s analysis of the Schreber case, one thing is certain; it 
was Freud’s paper on the Memoirs that would prove the catalyst to a wealth of attention Schreber 
would come to receive as well as elevating him to the position as the most celebrated case of 
                                                          
21
 Freud’s original intention was to work on the published memoir as if it were a ‘case’ with the younger 
Ferenczi and to jointly publish their findings. However, correspondence exchanged between the two men 
following the trip points towards a heated incident whilst in Palermo resulting in Freud penning the paper 
alone (Freud & Ferenczi, 1994). 
83 
 
madness in contemporary times. Schreber himself would quickly come to have as much purchase in 
wider cultural theory as within purely psychiatric or psychoanalytic fields.22  
 
2.2 Schreber’s Madness  
 Judge Daniel Paul Schreber, born July 25 1842, penned the literary account of his madness 
between 1900-1902 following his second breakdown or bout of ‘mental illness’. Although previously 
admitted to the Sonnenstein Asylum much earlier in October 1884 for a case of ‘acute 
hypochondria’, it was not until his appointment as presiding judge over a division of the Saxon 
Appeal Court in Dresden in 1893 that he suffered his second bout of ‘mental instability’, the one for 
which he is still so well-known due to his documenting of his experiences during the time. Between 
1893 and 1902 Schreber was admitted to a number of differing asylums before his eventual 
discharge. Clearly written with a flair for literary or imaginative style, the Memoirs have been noted 
by Freud to be authored by “a man of superior mental gifts” as well as being “endowed with an 
unusual keenness alike of intellect and of observation” (1911, p.10). These ‘superior gifts’ result in a 
startlingly vivid account of delusional paranoia which no doubt assisted their eventual publication in 
1903. Unfortunately, Schreber’s stability was not long lasting and in 1907 he suffered his third major 
breakdown, one from which he was not to recover. He spent the rest of his years interned in a state 
Asylum before his death at Leipzig-Dösen on 14th April 1911. This autobiography of madness would 
serve Freud as the foundation for his wider theorisations on the ‘psychoses’.  The potential problem 
of Freud having never met Schreber first hand nor knowing little of his personal or social history (not 
even aware of his age at the time of his experiences) is dismissed when he states that:  
                                                          
22
 Indeed, Schreber’s cultural impact is far wider than just these theoretical analyses of this historical case 
study. In 2015 a novelisation of Schreber’s experience was published entitled Playthings authored by Alex 
Pheby and in 2012 a documentary Shock, Head, Soul (Pummell, 2012) detailing his life whilst using visual 
animation techniques brought Schreber’s experiences to the screen. More recently a BBC radio drama 
premiered a long forgotten and unpublished Antony Burgess screenplay Schreber in which Burgess utilised the 
Memoirs to illuminate aspects of modern life with its intimate portrayal of repression and rebellion within the 
family unit.   
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since paranoiacs cannot be compelled to overcome their internal resistances, and 
since in any case they only say what they choose to say, it follows that this is 
precisely a disorder in which a written report or printed case history can take the 
place of personal acquaintance with the patient (1911, p.9).  
No further justification is required for Freud in utilising the Schreber material as the basis for his 
wider theory on delusional paranoia. Our earlier engagement with discussions concerning the many 
dubious ethical approaches to mad narratives voiced from within the Mad Studies project resonates 
loudly here. Freud, having never met Schreber, nor knowing the slightest detail of his biographical 
life, is content to state that his following reflections and interpretations are in no way hampered by 
the author’s context or views remaining completely absent. Already with Freud we encounter the 
dilemma of utilising ‘psychotic’ text as a platform to espouse a theoretical project that effectively 
side-lines (or completely ignores) the context from which the author of that ‘psychotic’ text writes. It 
is doubtful that Freud’s comments about paranoiacs’ lack of ability to overcome ‘internal 
resistances’ would hold much water amongst contemporary debates within the Mad Studies field. 
This complete divorce between Freud’s theory and the figure behind the Memoirs is one that I aim 
to keep in mind as we track the ensuing psychoanalytic interpretations.  
Freud’s case history charts the various strange and other-worldly phenomena that so 
characterised Schreber’s ‘psychotic’ episodes. The first matter that he draws attention to contains 
perhaps the seeds of Schreber’s later pre-occupations. Freud points towards a series of dreams 
Schreber experienced between his notification of his appointment as Senatspräsident in June 1893 
and later in October of that year when he took up the post. The most telling is Schreber’s statement 
that whilst in a state between sleeping and waking he was overcome by the prodromal insight “that 
it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman succumbing to intercourse” (1903, p.46). This 
preoccupation with sexual function and his subsequent female self-identification undoubtedly 
becomes one, if not the, major theme within the Memoirs. As his illness progressed, Schreber went 
on to experience feelings of persecution, great sensitivity to light and sound, as well as an increase in 
visual and auditory hallucinations. Importantly, various delusional ideas also become localised on his 
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body which he believed to be in the throes of decomposition. The source of his persecutory ideas 
came to be fixated on the figure of Professor Flechsig of the Leipzig clinic in which he was previously 
interned. The operation which Freud specifically highlights, by which Flechsig is believed to 
persecute him, is one Schreber famously termed ‘soul-murder’. As Schreber’s ‘psychosis’ intensifies 
he constructs an elaborate delusional system incorporating numerous differing elements. Dr Weber 
(Director at the Sonnenstein Asylum) states in a report of 1899 that the crux of Schreber’s delusional 
system is his belief that he has a mission to redeem the world, and to restore mankind to their lost 
state of bliss. The most essential component of this mission concerns his necessary transformation 
into a woman. This transformation is required for Schreber, as only then can he enter into sexual 
union with God and restore ‘the order of the world’.  
Summing up the intricate and systematic nature of Schreber’s delusional system is no easy 
task due to the elaborate fashion in which the Memoirs are presented. Perhaps the most useful 
principle by which we may wish to organise the Memoirs is to view Schreber’s delusions as a 
constant contrasting of two distinct discourses (Lucas, 2003). On the one hand we encounter an 
overtly religious/spiritual discourse that evokes God, miraculous phenomena, divine manifestations 
and appeals to a heavenly or celestial hierarchy. The second discourse - a discourse of science - 
concerns Schreber’s lengthy descriptions of biological process, nerves, sexual function and 
operations of impregnation and reproduction. This admixture of religious and scientific terminology 
leads to a unique universe corresponding to the most bizarre laws of cause and effect. Human souls 
for Schreber come to be composed of nerves which have both a physical manifestation but also a 
divine or psychic component. God, who undoubtedly plays a role of huge significance, is described as 
a body of nerves through which each human soul will come to pass. Accordingly, Schreber speaks of 
divine rays by which he comes to understand the inner workings of the universe and God’s place 
within it. God, bifurcated in nature, comes to comprise both the lower god (Ahriman) and the upper 
god (Ormuzd). The Persian or Zoastrian names of Schreber’s Gods are likely to have been derived 
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from his own literary knowledge, namely Byron’s Manfred (1816). Freud also points towards other 
literary sources enmeshed within Schreber’s text such as Goethe’s Faust (1808).  
 
2.3 Freud’s Interpretation 
Freud begins his interpretation by focusing in on the source of Schreber’s persecution, 
initially Flechsig, then his supposed ally God, both of whom are implicated in the attempt at ‘soul 
murder’. Freud’s initial assertion, based upon the Schreber material as well as his own past 
experience with ‘psychotics’ is that: 
the person to whom the delusion ascribes so much power and influence, in whose 
hands all the threads of the conspiracy converge, is, if he is definitely named, either 
identical with someone who played an equally important part in the patient’s 
emotional life before his illness, or is easily recognizable as a substitute for him (1911, 
p.41).  
Importantly, the delusion is used to compensate for an oppositional transformation in the patient’s 
emotional feelings towards the person who is deemed to have played such a vital role. Accordingly, 
Freud takes Schreber’s relation with Flechsig as of prime importance. Originally, it is pointed out, 
Schreber maintained a great deal of warmth towards the physician who treated him so successfully 
at Leipzig. Indeed, Schreber speaks of his ‘liveliest gratitude’ that both he and his wife felt in respect 
of his former doctor. For Freud, however, these feelings did not stop at simple gratitude and he 
draws attention to the apparent affection Schreber maintained towards Flechsig - an affection that 
coincided with feelings of a ‘feminine attitude’ at the onset of his second illness. The combination of 
‘feminine attitude’ and feelings of ‘affectionate dependence’ upon his doctor intensify for Freud to 
the point of erotic desire. And it is this erotic desire, subsequently counteracted by Schreber’s 
‘masculine protest’ that forms the core of Freud’s interpretation.  
 Schreber’s ‘psychosis’ has its root, therefore, an ‘outburst of homosexual libido’ directed 
towards his former physician, Doctor Flechsig. The struggle against this libidinal impulse accordingly 
gives rise to his symptoms which come to be so vividly described within the Memoirs. Freud 
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attempts to strengthen his argument concerning Schreber’s homosexual impulses by referring to a 
supposedly telling passage when Schreber states that a moment of fresh ‘nerve collapse’ occurred in 
the context of his wife’s absence. Freud speculates that Schreber’s wife had, until this point, served 
as some form of “protection against the attractive power of the men about him” (1911, p.45) 
thereby diverting his unconscious homosexual phantasy. Once the hypothesis that homosexual 
libidinal impulses are the genesis of Schreber’s paranoia is established, Freud then points toward 
another telling moment within the case. Schreber’s transfer of persecutory feelings from Flechsig to 
God and the corresponding symbolic associations with both figures is interpreted by Freud as being 
indicative of Schreber’s struggle against the father complex. God, Flechsig and later Schreber’s 
comments about the Sun all come to be understood as various embodiments of his father, a father 
who for Freud plays a crucial role in Schreber’s symptoms and delusional ideation. Accordingly, 
Freud states that the “patient’s struggle with Flechsig became revealed to him as a conflict with God, 
and we must therefore construe it as an infantile conflict with the father” (ibid, p.55). For Freud, the 
symbolic presence of the father is replete throughout Schreber’s Memoirs. By drawing on various 
cosmic myths and ancient symbolism, Freud concludes that a pre-occupation with the Sun “is 
nothing but another sublimated symbol for the father” (p.54). Unsurprisingly perhaps, the role of the 
father and the threat of castration are viewed as providing Schreber with the material to construct 
his phantasy of female metamorphosis and his corresponding ‘soul-murder’. Although Freud 
confesses that not every facet of his delusional system can be interpreted in such a manner, the 
underlying premise is certain; namely that the cause and content of Schreber’s paranoia is an 
outburst of homosexual desire in the context of his on-going struggle against the father function.  
We will recall our methodological discussion that raises the inherent tendency within symptomatic 
analysis which attempts to locate unconscious mechanisms conditioning a text’s overall structure. 
Althusser and others, as we have noted, have targeted their focus on the construction of meaning 
which is concentrated within the text’s hidden or submerged elements. In some sense, we see Freud 
here engaging in a proto- symptomatic reading of Schreber’s Memoirs which is attempting to 
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uncover a particular element (the Father) within the text that remains operational from a concealed 
depth. Although not specifically expressed by Schreber in such terms, Freud, in his reading of the 
memoir, is associating significant importance to an element of Schreber’s paranoia that he believes 
is only visible due to its effects on the surface of the text. Let us remain with this focus on the father 
function and unconscious homosexual impulses within Schreber’s unconscious mental life as we 
further examine Freud’s analysis of the intricate working of paranoia.  
 
2.4 Mechanisms of Paranoia 
 If the father complex and its associations with the homosexual phantasy are the basis for 
Schreber’s symptoms and overall paranoia, we may ask, what separates this from other forms of 
neurosis? How does this particular dynamic result in ‘psychotic’ phenomena as opposed to other 
neurotic symptoms? Freud touches on this and determines that the particular character of paranoia 
must be sought in the specific form the paranoid symptoms take, as well as the mechanism by which 
such symptoms are formed. By focusing his analysis to the form and mechanism of Schreber’s 
symptoms he is able explain how the homosexual wish comes to be manifest in an array of bizarre 
and other-worldly beliefs. To construct such an explanation Freud has recourse to the stages of 
psycho-sexual development as previously outlined within his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
(1905). The early developmental trajectory of the libido from auto-erotism to object-love, 
understood also as narcissistic identification, is shown to be of vital importance to any theory of 
paranoia.23 The relation to ‘psychosis’ is found in instances whereby those who have not adequately 
freed themselves from these early narcissistic stages are confronted with an intensification of libido 
towards a same-sex object. As a result, the paranoiac attempts to “defend themselves against any 
such sexualisation of their social instinctual cathexes” (1911, p.62) and does so primarily through the 
mechanism of projection. As he writes: 
                                                          
23
 Freud (1905) reasons that homosexual tendencies within this stage are not completely renounced but are 
deflected from the initial sexual object and combine with various ego instincts thereby investing social 
relations with an unconscious erotic factor. 
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the most striking characteristic of symptom formation in paranoia is the process 
which deserves the name projection. An internal perception is suppressed, and, 
instead, its content, after undergoing a certain kind of distortion, enters 
consciousness in the form of an external perception (ibid. p.66).  
In so doing, the projection necessarily distorts the initial libidinal impulse (I, a man, love him) into its 
opposite (I do not love him – I hate him). This contradiction within the subject’s psyche is then 
resolved, albeit in a skewed fashion, by reasoning that this source of hate is derived from the other; 
it is externalised (I do not love him – I hate him, because he persecutes me). Projection is also shown 
to play a part in Schreber’s pre-occupation with the end of the world and his own impending death. 
This for Freud exemplifies Schreber’s withdrawal of his libidinal cathexes from people and the social 
sphere. Accordingly, the end of the world catastrophe is a projection of his own internal catastrophe 
resulting in his subjective life-world coming to an end due to his withdrawal of love from it. This 
withdrawal of ego-cathexes or libidinal energy from the external world into oneself in cases of 
‘psychosis’ is further outlined by Freud (1924) in his later paper on the difference between the 
diagnostic structures.  
 It may come as no surprise to state that Freud’s’ analysis of the Schreber case has been 
widely criticised for what now reads as a pathologizing of homosexuality due to a complete 
reduction of Schreber’s ‘psychotic’ universe to an inability to adequately reconcile various 
homosexual impulses and the implication that homosexuality is linked to developmental arrest. 
Freud himself stated that his “piece is formally imperfect, fleetingly improvised” (letter to Jung 18 
December 1910).24  The Schreber case is undoubtedly open for criticism, yet Freud’s analysis of the 
autobiography does contain one fundamentally important notion for this project, which relates to 
the way in which ‘psychotic’ text or the written expression of one’s delusion may allow for further 
interpretation due to the way in which it tries to reconfigure the social. In effect, Freud, towards the 
                                                          
24
 Furthermore, later research on Schreber’s own father, Moritz Schreber, points towards a domineering and 
abusive paternal figure far removed from Freud’s assertion that he was a man of good moral standing. Morton 
Schatzman’s (1973) Soul Murder: Persecution in the Family as well as William, G. Niederland ‘s (1984) The 
Schreber Case: Psychoanalytic Profile of a Paranoid Personality provide the most thorough examination of 




end of the Schreber case, opens up the possibility that the paranoid delusion shouldn’t just be 
dismissed as the mere ravings of the insane but rather something intimately related to socio-cultural 
operations. When speaking of the disintegration of the ‘psychotic’s’ subjective world, Freud states 
that:  
the paranoiac builds it again, not more splendid, it is true, but at least so that he can 
once more live in it. He builds it up by the work of his delusions. The delusional 
formation, which we take to be the pathological product, is in reality an attempt at 
recovery, a process of reconstruction (1911, p.70-71). 
 
 Herein lies the central tenant that distinguishes Freudian and classical psychoanalytic 
interpretations of delusional paranoia from their psychiatric counterpart; the delusion is not the 
illness itself but rather an attempt to reconstruct or compensate for the subject’s problematic 
integration within a libidinal social field. So, whereas libido becomes detached from its initial objects 
it is later repaired, albeit in a skewed fashion, with the work of the delusion. The delusion, therefore, 
represents Schreber’s attempts to reinsert himself back into a social sphere; it has a restorative 
function and can thereby be viewed as an attempt at self-cure. Schreber’s need to commit this 
delusional system to writing (das Aufschreibesystem, his ‘writing-down-system’) and to subsequently 
publish it has furthermore been evidenced as his attempts to make sense of his ‘psychosis’ or 
contain it. It is this emphasis on delusion as a recovery process via a resuscitation of social bonds 
that could be argued to be the most important contribution towards psychoanalytic approaches to 
‘psychosis’. Perhaps the final summation of the Schreber case should go to Freud himself who 
reasons that “it remains for the future to decide whether there is more delusion in my theory than I 
should like to admit, or whether there is more truth in Schreber’s delusion than other people are as 
yet prepared to believe” (1911, p.79).  
 So what are we to make of the ‘Schreber case’ in light of contemporary discussions 
pertaining to the ethics of experts or academics utilising mad narratives to further claims to 
knowledge? On the one hand, Freud’s paper appears as an attempt to provide an authoritarian 
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interpretation on an individual’s ‘psychotic’ experience that bothers neither for contextual 
background nor the views or opinions of the author beyond their immediate written testimony. The 
notion of a dialogue between Freud and Schreber whereby meaning or knowledge is derived from 
the Memoirs in tandem is a non-starter. Freud claims to have the keys to unlocking Schreber’s 
‘psychosis’ and no further consideration is required. With regard to his technique, we certainly get 
an instance here of the way in which mad writing has been subjected to a ‘suspicious hermeneutic 
gaze’ which seeks to find meaning at the level of depth, whilst employing symbolism or examples of 
an ‘absent cause’ structuring the overall text. Again, Freud, the ‘expert knower’, is able to delve into 
the depths of Schreber’s madness and retrieve the meaning for us all. The methodological caution 
offered by Sedgwick (2003) and the paranoid stance of much critical reading has never perhaps been 
more apt than with Freud’s paper on the ‘psychoses’ themselves.  Yet things become a little more 
complicated when we reflect on Freud’s last quote. Freud is openly questioning by the end of the 
paper whether paranoid delusions themselves contain a kernel of truth, and by doing so, completely 
upends any static binary between sanity and madness or psychological normality and pathology. In 
doing so, we perhaps get closer to some of the political underpinnings of the Mad Studies field. So, 
although the manner by which Freud effectively commits some kind of epistemic violence towards 
Schreber’s text comes into direct conflict with a general ethical principle within Mad Studies 
research, Freudian psychoanalysis possibly presents itself as a potential ally to the larger project as it 
is an intellectual framework that, as we shall see going forward, questions the demarcation between 
those who are deemed to be mad and those that aren’t. Although the ‘neurotic/psychotic’ division 
undoubtedly exists within many aspects of psychoanalytic thinking, Freud’s early paper on paranoid 
functioning, I would argue, offers a glimpse of how psychoanalytic theory could support the political 
aims of Mad Studies-like endeavours due to its problematizing of madness as a distinctly 
pathological entity. Lastly, and something worth mentioning as we track its influence across our next 
psychoanalytic thinker, is that Freud’s analysis opens up the fundamentally important notion of a 
delusion acting as a form of stabilisation, a libidinal social bond. An interesting parallel is identifiable 
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here in that Freud suggests Schreber’s writing may also function to stabilise his ‘psychosis’. Both the 
delusion and the process of writing share similar qualities in that they serve to anchor the subject in 
the face of chaos and fragmentation. I should stress, however, that they are not to be viewed as 
identical but rather that these differing modes of stabilisation speak once again to the tight nexus 
between literary operations and ‘psychotic’ structure. Both the delusion and process of writing 
attempt to provide order to a fragmented subjective system. We can appreciate this still further by 
turning now to the work of Jacques Lacan. I do so in detail in order to provide a firm basis with which 
to later assist in the analysis of PKD’s own Exegesis.  
 
2.5 Lacan, ‘Psychosis’ & Schreber 
If the classical psychoanalysis of Freud is characterised by the figure of the neurotic, then the 
figure of the ‘psychotic’ should surely be aligned with Lacan. Whereas Freud’s engagement with 
delusional paranoia, ‘schizophrenia’ or the ‘psychoses’ formed a rather secondary concern, for Lacan 
it was at the forefront of his thinking and his reflections upon the topic characterise his intellectual 
life from one end to the other. From his doctoral thesis on the celebrated case of Aimee (1932) to his 
last theoretical formulations on topology and knot theory (1975-76), Lacan’s periodic engagements 
with ‘psychosis’ could well serve as markers to his entire corpus. That being said, however, two 
distinct phases do emerge from within his work and both take their cue from two specific literary 
sites. The first phase - the so-called structuralist phase from the mid 1950’s onwards – focuses, like 
Freud, on Schreber. Lacan’s radical rereading of the Memoirs leads him to develop his first fully 
fledged model of ‘psychosis’ and the one for which he is perhaps still best known. Following which, 
Lacan in the 1970’s has recourse to the literary works and life of James Joyce in order to elaborate a 
concept of ‘psychosis’ no longer envisioned through structural linguistics, but rather through the 
interlinking of all three of his psychic registers; Real, Symbolic, Imaginary. Although his doctoral 
thesis on the case of Aimee entitled, De La Psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la 
personnalité does not hold a prominent place within his overall work, it is worth noting the 
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significant influence Freud’s paper on Schreber had on Lacan’s interpretation and the fact that 
Lacan, likewise, utilised the writings of this delusional patient to further his earliest theories of 
paranoia and outline a structure of personality as alienation. No English translation of the thesis 
exists, nor the articles that Lacan first published relating to psychotic writing.25 Suffice to say that his 
initial engagement here with ‘psychotic’ text perhaps best served him as a transitional piece from 
forensic medical clinician to the world of psychoanalysis. As Lacan later came to state, Aimee took 
him to the ‘threshold of psychoanalysis’. To fully appreciate Lacan’s crossing of this threshold and his 
theorisations on the ‘psychosis’ that drew less from his self-proclaimed former psychiatric master, 
De Cleraembault, in favour of psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, then we must enter into his third 
seminar (1955-56) which itself delves again into the Memoirs of Schreber.  
 Lacan’s third public seminar (1955-6) entitled The Psychoses utilises Schreber’s Memoirs to 
develop a variety of concepts and operations that come to form not just his first comprehensive 
theory of ‘psychosis’ but  also to provide a corner stone to his theoretical system in its entirety. His 
subsequent article published three years later entitled On a question prior to any possible treatment 
of psychosis (1959) also takes Schreber as the primary object of analysis. I will focus here on Lacan’s 
elaboration of the so-called ‘delusional metaphor’ to provide an entry point into his engagement 
with Schreber and his subsequent theory of ‘psychosis’. If nothing else can be said for Lacan’s 
formulation of ‘psychosis’ during this period, it is that language in all its manifold forms constitutes 
the absolute horizon for any understanding of ‘psychotic’ phenomena. Lacan’s reworking of 
psychoanalytic theory through the ‘science’ of structural linguistics provides him, in the 1950’s, with 
the key components to develop a model of ‘psychosis’ that takes language, or rather the Symbolic, 
as the predominant mode or category of subjective constitution.  In effect, his previous concern for 
the realm of the Imaginary is subordinated to language or overwritten by the Symbolic order. It is 
during this period that Lacan begins to rework his clinical and theoretical apparatus drawing heavily 
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 See Lacan, J., Lévy-Valensi, J. & Migault, P. (1975) “Ecrits ‘inspirés’: Schizographie” in Lacan, J. De la Psychose 
Paranoiaque dans ses Rapports avec la Personnalite. Paris: Editions du Seuil.  
94 
 
on Ferdinand de Saussure (1916) and his Course in General Linguistics. Particular emphasis is 
afforded to the reciprocal dynamic between the concepts of signifier and signified, through the 
readings of Saussure offered by linguist Roman Jakobson (1956) and anthropologist Claude Levi-
Strauss (1949).26 The principle idea within Lacan’s presentation of the Schreber case is that the 
delusional content within the Memoirs (‘divine rays’, ‘nerve contact’ with a malevolent god and 
Schreber’s metamorphosis into a woman) are all facets of a larger delusional metaphor created by 
Schreber to compensate for the absence of a crucial element within his intra-psychic constitution. 
This element Lacan terms the ‘name-of-the-father’. As we shall see, the name-of-the-father is for 
Lacan of absolute importance in ensuring a subject’s anchoring within the symbolic, whilst also 
providing the means to navigate oneself through language. Without this the world of shared 
meaning - a world mediated through language - is rendered unstable resulting in complete 
‘psychotic’ breakdown. By utilising the Memoirs, Lacan conveys how there exists a fundamental gap 
or missing link within Schreber’s ability to make sense of the signifying chain which gives rise to his 
subjectivity. As a result, the very structure which constitutes Schreber-as-subject is rendered 
unstable and consequently the symbolic universe in which he is immersed begins to disintegrate. 
Before identifying how it is that such a breakdown occurs for Schreber, we must first clarify what 
Lacan has in mind with this crucial element within subjectivity; this name-of-the-father. 
 
2.6 Name-of-the-Father 
In order to provide such a clarification, we need to turn to the Oedipus complex. Lacan 
certainly found Freud’s use of Sophocles’ tragedy of interest; however, the mythical qualities it takes 
on were not favourable to Lacan’s reworking of Freudian theory. He believed that Freud had in fact 
focused too strongly on the neurotic fantasy closely associated with this incestuous relationship 
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 Lacan’s relation to structuralism is perhaps not as straight forward as one may take for granted. Although 
easily placed within the early structuralist period, his later work potentially represents a radical break from this 
area of thought. Moreover, his earliest period of theorisation could well be said to have been more heavily 
influenced by the surrealist school in Paris from the 1920’s/30’s onwards. For further discussion see D. Macey 
(1988) Lacan in Contexts. London: Verso.   
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(Vanheule, 2011). Utilising the reformulated science of structural linguistics, Lacan sets out to 
provide a formalised account of Oedipus and again bases its subjective operation within the 
workings of language. In so doing, Lacan has recourse to various linguistic tropes in order to account 
for the shift that occurs during Oedipal development. Borrowing from Quintilian’s (1856) Institutes 
of Oratory, he identifies ‘metonymy’ and ‘metaphor’ as those operations within language that 
function in a similar fashion to Freud’s (1900-01) ‘condensation’ and ‘displacement’ as outlined in 
the Interpretation of Dreams. For Lacan, Oedipus is an account of how the subject relates to the 
Other and it is this relation which is based on a process of metaphorisation. In order to develop this, 
Lacan focuses upon the relationship between mother and child as the archetypal relation between 
subject and Other, with desire as the medium between both. The child in infancy is able to establish 
a signifier for maternal desire and in so doing associates itself with the imaginary phallus. However, 
the child is unable to understand its mother’s absence and the cause of her coming and going. Dor 
(1998) here points to the similarity with Freud’s commentary on the Fort-da experience. Essentially, 
the infant is left with unanswerable questions such as, Why is Mother there and then not? What 
does she desire beyond myself? The child is left without meaning as such. Although it has established 
an imaginary narcissistic relationship with the Other, viewing itself as the Phallus, these unresolved 
questions produce anxiety as the subject cannot answer why there is a lack of signified. The child is 
lost within maternal desire, consumed or swallowed up by it. Without being able to account for 
maternal desire and this presence-absence conundrum, the child has no concrete position of its 
own. Existential questions of place and purpose arise from such an anxiety.  ‘What do you want?’ 
(Che Vuoi?)  is the primary question arising from this maternal signifier (Chiesa, 2007).  
The name-of-the-father brings an end to this imaginary struggle. This paternal metaphor 
leads to creation of new signification as the infant subject is able to comprehend a third term that 
crucially names maternal desire and consequently becomes substituted for it. Desire is, in this 
instance, subjected to the symbolic trope of metaphorisation. The name-of-the-father comes to 
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occupy the place as the ‘signifier of signifiers’ in comparison to the phallus as the ‘signifier of 
signifieds’. In attempting to summarise the role of the name-of-the-father, Chiesa (2007) emphasizes 
how it functions as a rigid designator in that it always comes to determine the same thing i.e. the 
object of mother’s desire. It introduces meaning and stops the incessant sliding of signifiers under 
the signified or the “non bi-univocal relationship between signifiers” (p. 94). The paternal metaphor 
is first and foremost a symbolic function allowing the newly instated signifier to organise maternal 
desire and introduce a phallic logic to symbolic space. Or put differently:  
the paternal metaphor is an operation in which the name-of-the-father is 
substituted for the mother’s desire, thereby producing a new species of meaning, 
phallic meaning, which heralds the introduction of the subject to the phallic 
economy of the neurotic and, therefore, to castration (Grigg, 2008, p.9).  
The existential questions arising from the Other are now mediated by the introduction of a third 
term enabling the subject to construct a symbolic identity through language and the process of 
metaphorisation. This crucial signifier, therefore, comes to stand in for the signifier of culture as 
such. It plays a central determinate role in how people come to relate to each other and patterns of 
exchange relations.27 If we now return back to the Schreber case we can see how the non-
installation (or foreclosure) of such a crucial signifier necessarily ensures the onset of ‘psychosis’. 
2.7 Foreclosure and Schreber’s Delusional Metaphor. 
 The principle operation that Lacan locates within Schreber’s Memoirs, that gives rise to his 
delusional system and his ‘psychosis’ as a whole, is one he terms ‘foreclosure’. For Lacan, foreclosure 
comes to represent the fundamental difference between ‘psychosis’ and other subjective positions 
such as neurosis or perversion. Whereas they are marked by processes of repression and disavowal 
respectively, foreclosure becomes the primary characteristic of ‘psychotic’ structure. Utilising 
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 The relevance of a subject’s entry into exchange relations and perhaps culture at large brings us to the 
influence of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology and his work on semantic functions present in 
different societal or tribal cultures that allow symbolic thinking to operate despite internal contradictions 
being present to those functions. For further discussion on Lévi-Strauss’ influence on Lacan see M. 
Zafiropoulos (2010) Lacan and Levi-Strauss or The Return to Freud. Karan: London.   
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Freud’s Verdrangung (repression), Verwerfung (foreclosure) and Verleugnug (disavowal),28 Lacan 
essentially constructs a three-part system of differential diagnosis.  Verwerfung which denotes a 
radical rejection is translated by Lacan into foreclosure and exists in stark opposition to Freud’s 
(1925) notion of Bejahung (affirmation). Foreclosure designates an absolute repudiation of an object 
or proposition. So whereas in the operation of repression, something must have previously existed 
to have then been repressed, in foreclosure the thing itself is never there -  it is entirely closed off 
from a field of possibility. Lacan in Seminar III and “On a Question....” identifies the name-of-the 
father as that which has been foreclosed for Schreber and gives this crucial postulate a position of 
prime importance for any subsequent theory of ‘psychosis’. Without the name-of-the-father, 
Schreber is left without the means to navigate his way through maternal desire and the field of the 
symbolic. Foreclosure gives rise to a hole or gap within the signifying chain resulting in Schreber’s 
inability to construct meaning or a coherent sense of self. In its place, Schreber develops a delusional 
metaphor to compensate for this missing name-of-the-father. In order to highlight this, I will draw 
attention to various disruptions in metonymic process indicative of a foreclosed paternal metaphor 
as well as his use of autonyms that characterise his delusional system.  
This gap or fissure in the signifying order is clearly referenced by Lacan who finds numerous 
expressions of it in Schreber’s text. For example, Schreber speaks of God losing “the capacity to say 
one single word” (1903, p.187) as well as his own inability to find words or expressions to adequately 
describe his experience. For Lacan, this points towards a common issue, namely that “at the heart of 
psychosis there is a dead end, perplexity concerning the signifier” (1955-56, p.194). Schreber speaks 
of being unable to summon the very power of thought due to this dead end which he initially 
compensates for via various miraculous phenomena. These phenomena are described by Schreber 
as ‘God’s cries for help’, the ‘sound of the wind’ and his own ‘bellowing miracle’. These attempts to 
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 There is a particular history to the translations of these terms and one that is also contested. Freud himself 
elaborates on this in his 1927 paper Fetishism when he states, “If we wanted to differentiate more sharply 
between the vicissitude of the idea as distinct from that of the affect, and reserve the word ‘Verdrängung’ 
[‘repression’] for the affect, then the correct German word for the vicissitude of the idea would be 
‘Verleugnung’ [‘disavowal’]” (2001, p.153). 
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‘fill in’ for the missing element within his subjective use of language are only partially successful, 
however, as such miracles only present Schreber with “elementary fragments of meaning [they] are 
nothing but remainder phenomena, which illustrate that the metonymy of the signifier actually 
came to a halt” (Vanheule, 2011, p.105). Without the adequate means to complete operations of 
metaphorisation, meaning is suspended for Schreber and he finds a fundamental barrier to his 
attempts to describe his predicament.  
Following which, this language disturbance comes to be realised by Schreber as a 
fundamental crisis both internal and external. Without the usual support within the symbolic there is 
a corresponding effect on Schreber’s subjectivity or sense of self-in-the-world. Foreclosure gives rise 
to the eradication or erasure of Schreber’s subjectivity as he is unable to tie himself down, unable to 
put a halt to the enunciating subject. This becomes manifest in the numerous bodily disturbances 
Schreber experiences, experiences he describes as involving decomposition and fragmentation. 
Schreber further believes that he is wasting away or undergoing a process of degeneration due to 
the problematic symbolic relationship he has with his body. He is, in a sense, unable to articulate any 
coherent sense of self which is experienced as a problem at the level of his corporeal reality. It is not 
just at the level of his own body that Schreber experiences this rupture in metonymic process, but 
he externalises onto the world around him. As such he speaks of a “feeling as if I were moving 
among walking corpses” (1903, p.187), or that others around him are ‘fleetingly improvised” (p.61). 
Consistency in this instance has given way and estrangement from his surroundings and himself is 
complete. In keeping with this, Lacan in “On a Question….” Indicates that it is only with this logic of 
foreclosure that we can understand Schreber’s numerous references to ‘soul-murder’ whereby some 
fundamental component of his subjectivity is effaced. ‘Soul-murder’ refers, for Lacan, to a 
disturbance “at the most inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life” (1959, p.466). It is this 
foreclosed paternal metaphor that engenders this disturbance felt at the core of Schreber’s soul. In 
its place he develops an alternative reality, one populated by a strange mix of newly invented terms. 
99 
 
Schreber’s Memoirs contain a vast network of words and phrases that are invested with a 
meaning understandable to Schreber alone. Lacan draws attention to these neologisms or autonyms 
which for him also come to characterise ‘psychosis’. Examples of such isolated fragments of speech 
include ‘nerve-contact’, ‘diving-rays’ or the signifier ‘Entmannen/Entmannung’ roughly translated as 
‘unman/unmanning’ or to ‘emasculate/emasculating’. The crucial point for Lacan is that these 
signifiers within Schreber’s discourse are independent of any referential symbolic order, yet they 
come to play an important role in reorganising Schreber’s subjectivity in the face of foreclosure. In 
effect they function to compensate for that central organising metaphor, the name-of-the-father. 
Gradually these autonyms or ‘dialectically inert speech elements’ (Vanheule, 2011) come together to 
form the basis for the larger delusional beliefs such as his transformation into a women and 
association with the figure of the wandering Jew. This feminine transformation, which represented 
Schreber’s latent homosexuality for Freud, is reworked by Lacan to demonstrate how his 
transformation was a necessary outcome of the conflict between elements within his intra-psychic 
constitution. Schreber utilises this delusional signifier, ‘Entmannen’ as a central axiom for the 
reconstruction of the universe. The significance of Schreber’s supposed emasculation is shown by 
Lacan (in ‘On a Question....’) to be a product of the irresolvable tension of being the phallus for the 
mother in the absence of a third term to mediate this relation. Schreber is able to reconcile this by 
radically transforming himself.  The significance of this feminine identification is not, therefore, to be 
found in Schreber’s possible homosexual impulses but rather the symbolic value the position of the 
woman holds for Schreber in his attempts to reconstruct his identity following a loss of phallic 
meaning.29  
The question as to why Schreber’s ‘psychosis’ was triggered at the time of his appointment 
to the Saxon court of appeal is also raised by Lacan. Again, the importance of symbolic 
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 Unsurprisingly, the centrality of the phallus and the name-of-the-father to Lacan’s system here has come in 
for considerable critique from feminist theorists highlighting the patriarchal terminology and conceptual 
apparatus that psychoanalysis employs. Elizabeth Grosz’s (1990) Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction 
broaches this very issue and concludes that there is a way in which Lacanian theory can be read as being 
compatible with feminist perspectives.  
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identifications is primary as Lacan suggests that, due to the missing signifier for paternity, Schreber 
was made vulnerable to situations in which he would be called upon to assume a fatherly or 
authoritative role. In a sense, what Schreber found when he was promoted to this position was a 
complete lack of support in the symbolic to fulfil this particular mandate. Schreber found the Other - 
that is, the socio-symbolic structures of language - to be lacking once he was invested with 
additional symbolic value. Schreber simply could not live up to his new role and his ‘psychosis’, as 
characterised by an array of delusions, was an attempt to make sense of his place in this new 
symbolic life-world. In keeping with his desire to make sense, or to understand his predicament, 
Lacan suggests that what motivates Schreber to write down his experiences (das Aufschreibesystem) 
and to publish them to the wider world is due to his desire to make his audience into a safe and 
supportive kind of Other (1959, p.478); presumably an Other who could bear witness to his 
experience thereby functioning as a substitute for the Other he found to be lacking; an Other 
characterised by a structural deficit.  
We note again the similarity here with Freud’s earlier assertion that ‘psychosis’, or rather 
the ‘work of delusion’, effectively serves as a means of support for the psychotic subject. Lacan too 
highlights the structural similarity that both the delusion and writing have for Schreber. Like Freud, 
Lacan is here engaged in a form of analysis which is essentially uncovering various mechanism or 
operations within the text and by implication Schreber’s psyche. Lacan’s emphasis on the dynamism 
between signifier and signified already presupposes that meaning is deduced from the interaction 
between the symbolic representation of a concept (signifier) and the concept itself (signified). It is 
perhaps not too much of a stretch to say that all of Lacan’s analyses or methods of interpretation in 
the 1950’s are built around the notion that conceptual meaning hides behind its surface level, or 
material level manifestation. His interpretation of Schreber similarly highlights how the content of 
the Memoirs (nerves, rays, soul murder etc.) actually evidences metaphorical operations (name-of 
the-father) concealed within the text’s depths. We may conclude once again that Lacan and the 
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wider psychoanalytic tradition in respect of Schreber’s Memoirs are directly employed in a paranoid 
reading stance.  
But what of the charge that psychoanalysis commits some form of epistemic violence 
towards Schreber? Does Lacan fare any better than his main theoretical predecessor? The answer is 
surely, no. Much like Freud, Lacan takes the Memoirs and subjects them to a highly abstract 
intellectual system to derive ever more convoluted, expert theory that in many respects serves to 
distance Schreber’s subjective experience from our appreciation of it. Yet, just as with Freud, Lacan 
becomes a potential ally to critical psychiatry due to his upending of medicalised understandings of 
pathology and the ostracising of madness due to his expansion of the category of ‘psychosis’ to 
encompass much of the social field. So much so that madness eventually becomes a kind of default 
position for Lacan. We can appreciate this best by moving now to Lacan’s later period from the 
1970’s onwards where we will shall see how his analysis shifts from a ‘symptomatic reading’ of 
‘psychosis’ to one we may term a ‘sinthomatic reading’. 
 
2.8 The Later Lacan and Joyce-the-Sinthome 
If we are to associate the first phase of Lacan’s theorisation of ‘psychosis’ with Schreber and 
structuralism, then the second belongs to Joyce. The 1950’s, which marked Lacan’s preoccupation 
with the symbolic as the primary mode of subjective constitution and relation to the Other, now 
gives way to the importance of all three psychic registers interacting simultaneously. From the early 
1970’s and in or around Seminar XX (1972-73), Lacan moves away from his previous dialectical logic, 
pertaining to the tension between his registers in a dual fashion, to a triangular logic as expressed 
through his use of knots (1972-73). Whereas previously the Imaginary was subordinated to the 
Symbolic or the Symbolic was situated in relation to the Real, from this point on Lacan begins to 
theorise all three registers as existing in mutual dependence on each other. Borrowing from 
mathematical topology, Lacan utilises the trefoil or Borromean knot to elaborate the three-
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dimensional constitution of the subject. Crucially, the subject is now perceived to be more than its 
constitutive parts of the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary, (R S I), and finds its subjective being in the 
interrelation between all three registers. What crucially binds these registers is something Lacan 
refers to as the Sinthome, a reworking of the French symptome which is derived from an archaic 
spelling but also plays on the polyphonic resonances of ‘saint-homme’ (saintly-man) or ‘synth-
homme’ (synthetic-man). Strictly speaking the Sinthome functions as a fourth ring to the 
interconnected rings of RSI. The name-of-the-father is now viewed as this fourth ring which provides 
support to the three registers and Lacan’s discussion pertaining to ‘psychosis’ and Joyce is 
configured through this notion of the Sinthome.  
Lacan’s daring proposition that Joyce harboured a relation to some form of ‘psychosis’ is 
well known. Aside from a chance encounter with Joyce in a Parisian bookshop as a child, Lacan never 
enjoyed a personal acquaintance with the modernist writer but nevertheless held a lifelong 
fascination with him. In 1975-76 Lacan entitled his annual seminar The Sinthome and based a large 
part of it on Joyce’s life and works. It is these reflections on Joyce that provided Lacan with the 
means to completely reformulate his notion of ‘psychosis’. Whereas previously the traditional binary 
structure between ‘neurosis’ and ‘psychosis’ (marked by the presence or absence of the paternal 
metaphor) is given prime importance, following Joyce, Lacan develops a universal clinic of 
foreclosure and attempts to demonstrate that the delusional metaphor is just one amongst a 
seemingly unending variety of ways in which psychic stabilisation can be realised. In a sense the 
name-of-the-father acts as just one form of Sinthome, one form of binding RSI.  So, whereas 
‘psychosis’ initially represented a deficit or deviation from the norm of neurosis, during these later 
years’ ‘psychosis’ shifts to becoming just one way in which the subject is able to respond to a 
potential loss of phallic meaning. So much so that Lacan famously declared in one of his later 
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seminars, “that we are all mad, we are all psychotic” (2013, p.3).30  The relevance of Joyce to this 
discussion is that, in Lacan’s view, Joyce was able to achieve such stabilisation through his writing. 
Writing in this instance served as Joyce’s Sinthome, it enabled him to bind the three registers and 
stave off the floridly extraordinary ‘psychotic’ symptoms that so characterised Schreber’s Memoirs. 
For Lacan, the name-of-the father did not provide the usual support in the symbolic for 
Joyce as it otherwise should. In reviewing his literary output and the biographic details of his life, 
Lacan finds the father function curiously missing or absent.  Although there are certainly references 
to the father within Joyce’s work, often they are characterised as being ineffectual or redundant. In 
Ulysses (1922) for example, Vanheule (2011) points to how, when a paternal figure is presented with 
a structuring role, the father function itself is often negated. Similarly, Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man (1916) and Finnegan’s Wake (1939) both portray fathers as weak or incompetent. So far, 
so familiar. The problematic father role that has accompanied much of our discussion remains 
present with Lacan’s numerous references to ‘paternal copping out’, or ‘the paternal short comings’ 
(1975-6, p.97) within Joyce’s literary creations. Yet we must dig a little deeper if we are to appreciate 
the specificities of Joyce’s ‘psychosis’. What undoubtedly remains remarkable about Joyce’s work is 
the manner in which he utilised or manipulated language, often resulting in the complete subversion 
of meaning or accepted discourse. In keeping with this, Lacan identified latent ‘psychotic’ 
phenomena within Joyce’s use of language, particularly with his so-called “epiphanies”. In an 
attempt to describe these, Grigg writes that they are formed by “fragments of actual conversations 
overheard, extracted from their context, and carefully recorded on separate sheets”, many of which 
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 This expansion of ‘psychosis’ as a category of subject formation has led to a new development within 
Lacanian theory that articulates the notion of Ordinary Psychosis; a subject position that argues that 
‘psychosis’ has become a much more common diagnostic reality where subjects present not with the classic 
hallmarks of madness such as delusion and paranoia but rather we a discreet set of ways in which they relate 
to themselves and the world. The most significant line of enquiry within Ordinary Psychosis pertains to the 
place of the body within this shifting diagnostic landscape.  Although initially developed by J. A Miller, the most 
thorough overview is to be found with J. Redmond’s (2014) Ordinary Psychosis and The Body which also details 
the criticism it has come to receive in particular from Paul Verhaeghe (2004) who puts forth the revitalised 




“were subsequently reinserted unannounced into later texts” (2008, p.21). He goes on to state that 
“torn from their context, the epiphanies remain nonsensical or enigmatic fragments and are striking 
for their qualities of incongruity and insignificance” (ibid, p.21).  The purpose of Lacan’s drawing 
attention to these epiphanies is to demonstrate how Joyce takes what should otherwise be 
considered meaningless, fragments cut off from any identifiable discourse or communication, and 
reinvests them with importance; he transforms them into “an ineffable revelation” (p.22). Much like 
Schreber, Joyce invests these isolated fragments of discourse, these ‘dialectically inert elements’, 
with an almost divine importance. The difference from Schreber is that this meaning is channelled 
through his writing as opposed to a delusional metaphor.  The process whereby Joyce transforms 
established meaning through his techniques of homophony and intertextuality undoubtedly finds its 
most complete expression in Finnegan’s Wake; a work of literature that completely subverts or 
indeed destroys linguistic process.  
The question of jouissance also plays an important role for Lacan in his reflections on Joyce’s 
writing. Lacan derives the term ‘jouissance’ from the French for enjoyment. Yet Lacan, over the 
course of his seminars series, begins to formulate this form of sexual enjoyment as something that 
goes beyond pleasure, something that by its very nature is transgressive. It is that which the subject 
has to renounce in order to enter into the symbolic matrix, a renunciation that is predicated on the 
symbolic castration of the subject which necessitates prohibition from the imaginary phallus. Lacan 
reasons that whereas Schreber transformed the invasion of jouissance following the loss of phallic 
meaning into a paranoid transsexual system, Joyce is able to harness this jouissance and rework it 
into an artistic product. In so doing, Joyce transforms jouissance into a form of ‘enjoy-meant’ (jouis-
sens). In a way he is able to tame it via the signifier, resulting in the most strikingly idiosyncratic 
linguistic product. By developing this enigmatic literature that is in a sense outside of established 
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discourse, Joyce paradoxically manages to resuscitate a social link by cultivating his identity as a 
writer.31   
Much has been made of Joyce’s absolute pre-occupation with the desire to become the 
great literary name, a writer that others would come to be enthralled and fascinated by, capsulated 
by his famous wish that his work ‘would be studied 300 years from now’.  In commenting on this, 
Lacan identifies the role the ego has to play in Joyce’s psychic make-up which doesn’t act as it 
otherwise should, but nevertheless fulfils “an important function in structuring reality” (1975-6, 
p.147). Joyce was only able to stabilise his psychic world through the elevation of his name as a great 
writer and as such finds a compensation for his otherwise fragile place within discourse. In the same 
way that Schreber develops a delusional metaphor to order his world and in some warped sense 
reorder jouissance, according to Lacan Joyce does so through a writing process which at one and the 
same time redirects evasive jouissance and elevates his name in order that he can restore a social 
bond. In commenting on Lacan’s seminar on the Sinthome, Jacques Alain Miller writes that, for 
Joyce, “the true name-of-the-father has been his name as a writer. It is his production which permits 
him to resituate himself in the signified which he lacks. It is the quilting point” (2005, p.27).  
 Homosexual libidinal desire, the father function, delusional metaphors, the name-of-the-
father, Sinthome and the role of jouissance -  all have been employed by psychoanalysis to theorise 
what precisely ‘psychosis’ is and how it has been committed to textual form. Both Freud and Lacan 
utilised the Memoirs of Schreber to excavate, and then elaborate on these conceptual formulations. 
Both have relied on a method of interpretation which, I would argue, is in itself ‘paranoid’ in the 
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 This ‘social link’ or ‘social bond’ that Lacan refers to throughout his work is a central concept to many of the 
themes covered above relating to signifying chains, Sinthome’s or the role of jouissance. Although, much like 
many of his concepts that get reworked or remodelled over the course of his career, this social bond 
effectively refers to the means by which subjects exists in relation to other subjects via language, desire or the 
Real dependant on which phase of Lacan’s seminar we enter into. That being said, the most complete 
expression, in my view, of this social bond is to be found in his 17
th
 Seminar (1969-70) entitled The Other side 
of Psychoanalysis which puts forth, possibly in response to Foucault’s work on discourse, four discursive 
permutations in which subjects exists in respect of the Symbolic, Knowledge and the Other. Drawing from 
Hegelian dialectics, Lacan defies the master’s discourse, the hysteric’s discourse, the analyst’s discourse and 
the university discourse as the four ways in which subject formation occurs and the way in which the social 
field is constructed.  
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manner that Sedgwick frames it to further their respective projects. Schreber’s psychoanalytic 
popularity serves us as the first of our sites of wider psychosocial theory that have drawn explicitly 
from ‘psychotic’ text. As we move on now to interpretations that exist outside  the psychoanalytic 
cannon to other areas of psychosocial theory, I want to keep in mind these prominent attempts that 
not only disclose the stabilising effect ‘psychotic’ text can have on its author but also the way in 
which the Schreber text has itself almost become taken over by psychoanalytic understanding. 
Divorcing it from the legacies of Freud, and to a lesser extent Lacan, is no easy task. Although 
Schreber may have been repeatedly drawn upon to bolster the claims of psychoanalytic knowledge, 
as we move forward over the coming chapters, we shall see that he has also been utilised to 
highlight psychoanalysis’ inherent shortcomings. With respect to my central research questions as to 
the possibility of performing interpretations on mad writing, we have to conclude from Freud and 
Lacan’s’ studies that psychoanalysis, at least in regard to Schreber, undeniably does commit such 
forms of violence. Stripped of context and devoid of any consideration as to how Schreber himself 
may have wanted his writing utilised, Freud and Lacan’s readings are the readings of clinicians, 
experts or intellectuals seeking to further their respective projects on the back of Schreber’s textual 
output. Yet I maintain that psychoanalysis, due to its upending of normality and pathology, via 
Freud’s comments about the delusion of philosophy or Lacan’s statement concerning the ubiquity of 
‘psychosis’, allows some space for madness to come ‘back in’ to thought or discourse, and as such, 











































Chapter 3: Schreber, Modernism and the Aufschreibsystem 
 
 The preceding chapter detailed how ‘mad writing’ in the form of Schreber’s Memoirs has 
been instrumental in elaborating theories of ‘psychosis’ within both Freud and Lacan’s systems of 
thought. In this chapter I want to turn away from strictly clinical interpretations of the Memoirs to 
forms of analysis that we may begin to term as psychosocial and ones that crucially align the 
Memoirs with the context in which they were produced. In this sense the following analyses of 
Schreber are concerned with historicising him and his paranoid world system. The works of Louis 
Sass (2017), Eric Santner (1996) and Friedrich Kittler (1985) will collectively comprise this chapter. 
Despite their different approaches, I trace the themes and investments uncovered within Schreber’s 
writing by these different theorists whose works attempt to engage with the question of 
‘modernism’. Accordingly, Schreber’s writing will be shown to reflect both the specific socio-political 
themes present during this historical period as well as being an instructive example of much wider 
alterations within modern articulations of language and culture.32  
Arising from these discussions several important elements will emerge. Namely, that 
Schreber’s writing, both in terms of its content and form, speaks to drastic social and political 
changes that occurred towards the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth century; 
changes concerned with a societal crisis centred on the transfer of power and the deficiencies of 
bureaucratic control. In addition, the development of new media technologies gave rise to radically 
different forms of cultural communication characterised by the processes of automation and 
separation permeating through Schreber’s text. Schreber’s Memoirs will, therefore, be shown to 
                                                          
32
It is worth drawing attention here to the distinction between my employment of the terms ‘modern’ and 
‘modernist’. Although I do at times use both terms interchangeably there are important differences. In 
referring to ‘modern’ I am essentially denoting a period of time beginning in the mid-19
th
 century through to 
start of the Second World War that coincided with a rapid rise in forms of technological, industrial, 
communicative and corresponding social development. The term ‘modernist’ is used to describe the relation 
to these changes as conceived within forms of art, literature and culture at large both as response and critique 
of such societal developments.  
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have a value beyond the clinic as his writing is held up as an exemplar of different modernist themes 
that suture his individual subjectivity to wider cultural domains.  
 
3.2 Schreber & the Panopticon 
My starting point for examining different theorists who have used Schreber’s Memoirs to 
further forms of psychosocial theory is Louis Sass (2017), psychologist and author of Madness and 
Modernism: Insanity in The Light of Modern Art, Literature and Thought. His widely celebrated text, 
which draws parallels between many of the clinical insights on the nature of ‘schizophrenia’ and 
crucial aspects of the modernist aesthetic, has become a key reference in any discussion on the use 
of psychiatric diagnostic entities to critique culture at large. Ranging between modes of modernist 
art and literature, Sass’s main thesis is that the phenomenological experience of ‘schizophrenia’, 
‘manic depression’ and ‘psychosis’ more generally fundamentally aligns with the extreme relativism, 
distortions of time and strange transformations of self that occur in the works of Kafka, Beckett and 
Duchamp, as well as within various examples of modernist philosophy.33  
In Schreber’s ‘psychotic’ writing, Sass finds an intriguing link to what he frames as a key 
characteristic of the modernist experience of self; an experience that Foucault principally lays out in 
Discipline and Punish (1975). Sass begins his analysis of Schreber’s text by acknowledging the highly 
irregular nature of his script that darts between “certainty and tentativeness”, “the literal and the 
abstract” and the “lucid and the utterly bizarre” (2017, p.243). Evelyn Keitel’s’ (1989) assertion that 
‘psychotic’ text can have a particularly disorienting effect on the reader echoes Sass’s experience of 
the Schreber material. For Sass, Schreber’s mad writing oscillates between various dichotomous 
poles resulting in a discomforting reading experience. Yet the further Sass delves into the text, he 
acknowledges “the more difficult it becomes to dismiss the hope for achieving some kind of 
                                                          
33
 It is worth noting again the relevance of feminist critique here. Although wide ranging in examining sources 
of modernist art, it is striking that very few female artists or writers are commented upon. There is no mention 
for instance of Virginia Woolf‘s work in the context of modernist literature’s link to transformations of self or 
defiance of convention!  
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interpretative or empathic understanding” (2017, p.244). The ‘psychotic’ writing of Schreber, in this 
instance, appears to actively invite Sass to construct some form of interpretation the longer he 
spends analysing it. Such an understanding, for Sass, is ultimately found in Schreber’s documented 
capacity for hyper-reflexivity; a condition that closely aligns to the workings of power and knowledge 
within emerging modern societies that Foucault argues to be so central to modernity itself. In 
keeping with this insight, and quite in contrast to medical science’s attempts to relegate ‘psychosis’ 
or madness to the fringes of rationality and reason, Sass boldly states that, “the most autistic 
delusional system may be uncannily reminiscent of the public world, mirroring social practices and 
mores in the innermost chambers of the self” (ibid, p.246). The psychosocial characteristic of such a 
statement is quite evident. Schreber’s ‘mirroring’, for Sass, reveals the workings of modernity’s 
tendency towards hyper-reflexivity, self-realisation and the dynamics of surveillance and control; 
tendencies encapsulated in the Foucault’s famous use of the Panopticon.34 Sass’s central argument, 
therefore, is that Schreber’s ‘inner most chambers of the self’ reveal to us the modern workings of 
power and knowledge which condition a specific form of subjectivity predicated on a dyad between 
observer and observed, or rather between self and other.  
Foucault (1975) presented Jeremy Bentham’s speculative architectural design for the 
optimum arrangement of a prison or disciplinary regime as a model for modern society at large. 
Conditioned by an absolute separation between observer and the observed, it functioned by 
instilling within the prisoner, or subjects of the institution, a capacity for self-regulation as they 
would be unaware of when they were or were not being observed. This constant level of surveillance 
by an unknown authority or central organising power effectively creates conditions for the ongoing 
self-management of one’s own behaviour due to an inability to ever know when we can and cannot 
let our guard down. Sass quotes Foucault’s description of the Panopticon as follows: “a machine for 
                                                          
34
 Sass (1993) has similarly drawn parallels between Schreber’s and others delusional narratives with the work 
of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. By focusing on ‘reality-testing’ both within the hyper-rational 
philosopher’s thought and Schreber’s delusional system, Sass concludes that such testing ultimately leads one 
to paradox.   
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dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; 
in the central tower one sees everything without ever being seen” (2017, p.252). An all-seeing gaze 
is established for Foucault in modern society by various different disciplinary structures or practices 
and this gaze is ultimately able to condition, discipline and fashion bodies and their behaviours. 
Sass’s argument is that the central elements to Schreber’s delusional and paranoid world view (the 
nerves, rays and gods we covered in the last chapter) effectively ‘mirror’ this reflexive mechanism at 
the heart of a distinctively modern form of consciousness and subjectivity. In his own word Sass 
states that his goal is to: 
show how these strange quasi-cosmological entities [nerves, rays etc.]  - which 
suggest a kind of weird planetary system existing in a reified, external space – 
must be read as symbolic representations of aspects of Schreber’s own 
consciousness, a conscious both rent and joined by an inner panopticism. 
Whereas the nerves represent the part of the mind that is observed – self-as-
object – the rays represent the part the does the observing – self-as-subject 
(p.253).   
For Sass, this dualism between Schreber’s preoccupation between the ‘rays’ and ‘God’ explicitly 
references the self-awareness (or what Sass refers to as ‘meta-awareness’) that is such a hallmark of 
modernity. Sass draws on numerous passages within the Memoirs, whereby Schreber discusses the 
proximity and omniscience of his god, which oscillates between a great distance and an apparent 
immediacy with the associated capacity for entering into Schreber’s internal mental life. Sass 
highlights the following to evidence this constant back and forth dynamic characterised by 
separation and closeness: amongst the voices Schreber hears is the voice of God stating that “I who 
am distant” (1903, p.160, 191) and of the rays who refer to God as “the one who retires to an 
enormous distance”. At the same time, Schreber refers to God having the ability to access his 
innermost thoughts when he writes that it is “always possible for God to get to know the inner 
person through nerve-contact, whenever the need arose” (p.54). For Schreber, the nerves or god of 
which he speaks are able to read his internal thoughts but they also exist at great distance from him. 
This paradoxical situation lends support to the first level of Sass’s argument whereby he aligns the 
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Memoirs and Schreber’s overall experience with a modern distinction between self and other. For 
Sass, Schreber’s internal mental life is split between his own thoughts and an agency he projects out 
from himself in the form of his ‘god’ or ‘nerve-body’. This split or distinction between them is, 
according to Sass, instructive of one’s capacity for inner speech and the ability to then reflect on it. 
In short, an acutely reflexive mind. Sass writes: 
As we have seen, the nerves constitute a kind of foundational level of experience 
in which are expressed the relatively “spontaneous” thoughts that are the object 
of scrutiny. Over these nerve-thoughts hover the rays, the part of the mind that 
actively monitors what takes place below, in the realm of inner speech. In his 
dichotomous ontology we discern the same vexed schism that is brought about by 
the Panopticon (2017, p.249). 
The relevance of this argument to our psychosocial focus is that Sass is effectively stating that 
Schreber’s projection of his inner psychological state via his writing and delusional cosmology 
evidences a very modern form of subjectivity, one built around the power/knowledge nexus that 
Foucault elaborates via Bentham’s design. It is not just a paranoid representation of general 
psychology, but rather a specific commentary on modern forms of subjectivity. In Sass’s work, we 
perhaps have the beginnings of a general appreciation of Schreber’s relation to modernism and the 
ability of the Memoirs to bridge strictly individual psychological life and the social world of power, 
knowledge and intersubjective relations. In order to further develop the value of Schreber’s text to 
uncovering the workings of modernism as well as the role of power or authority in our construction 
of self, we can turn now to another prominent Schreber scholar.  
 
3.3 Santner’s ‘Crisis of Symbolic Investiture’ 
 The work of Eric L. Santner offers us a particularly useful example of how a psychosocial 
reading of ‘psychotic’ text may be performed. Although he too situates Schreber’s Memoirs as a 
particularly revealing example of modernity, he differs from Sass quite considerably, in that 
Santner’s (1996) reading of the Memoirs align Schreber with very specific political or ideological 
developments that took place within a precise moment in German history. Whereas Sass associates 
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the Memoirs within perhaps a more general tendency towards modernist sensibilities concerned 
with hyper-reflexivity and forms of consciousness, Santner effectively reads Schreber as a profound 
document on German cultural history. Most importantly for this thesis, Santner is able to use his 
knowledge of German history to illustrate how Schreber is illustrative of a link between the psychic 
and the social. In fact, we could argue that what lies at the core of all of Santner’s intellectual work is 
a concern that places him firmly within a psychosocial terrain.35  
From his initial work on the philosopher Franz Rosenzweig (2001) through to his formulation 
of ‘creaturely life’ (2006) and his concept of ‘Flesh’ (2011), Santner has repeatedly dealt with this 
relation between the space of representation concerned with ideology, politics or history and the 
way this can become manifest in various personal, intrapsychic or indeed bodily enactments. We 
could also note the role psychoanalysis has played on Santner’s wider theoretical formulations, as he 
consistently draws on the works of Freud and Lacan to emphasise how their theories pertaining to 
libidinal investment (1932) and the social bond (1969-70) allow one to make the bridge between the 
social world of the symbolic and the private world of the subject. Indeed, Lacan’s conceptualisation 
of the Symbolic is indispensable to any appreciation of Santner’s works concerned with ‘roles and 
mandates’ that can then correlate to particular elements of psychic life. Santner’s investigation into 
Schreber is one example of how we can reconsider previous distinctions between individual 
psychological life and wider societal functioning. By shifting attention towards particular historical 
developments that took place in fin de siècle Saxon Germany, Santner (1996) demonstrates how the 
content of Schreber’s delusional paranoia is directly inflected or imbued with larger ideological or 
discursive themes. So, whereas Lacan’s analysis focuses upon the underlying mechanism within 
Schreber’s intra-psychic structure, Santner demonstrates how Schreber’s crisis in symbolic 
                                                          
35 This concern, as Santner frames it, deals explicitly with the difficulty in accounting for how anomalies or 
impasses within social space can come to result in the reorganisation of psychic structure; or as he questions, 
“how is it that a disturbance in the space of representation – the space in which we engage with one another 
by way of offices, titles, symbolic roles and mandates, generic predicates of all kinds – can generate (or more 




functioning mirrors a much wider crisis at the turn of the century; a crisis whereby symbolic forms of 
authority were themselves in a state of emergency. The notion of Schreber’s writing acting as a sort 
of ‘echo-chamber’ is encapsulated by Santner when he writes, “I call this world Schreber’s ‘own 
private Germany’ because of his profound attunement to the exemplarity of the crisis he was 
undergoing, its resonances with the larger social and cultural crises of his era” (p.16). Schreber’s 
‘private Germany’ is one that enacts and effectively reformulates the social field in which he is 
immersed. For Santner, Schreber’s ‘private Germany’ is a reconstituted or refracted version of 
German society at large. Therefore, it can be read as a revealing, or especially telling, cultural 
commentary that does away with any notion of it being a mere example of pathological functioning.   
Santner touches upon the numerous analyses that have been performed on Schreber’s 
writing whilst arguing that each of them have missed a crucial component to the Memoirs; most 
notably, that Schreber’s attempt to recover from a crisis in his socio-symbolic world through a 
complex delusional system is not only an attempt to provide meaning to his existence but, 
importantly, that this meaning is constructed according to the overriding political situation in which 
he resides. Here Santner emphasises how various connections have been made between the 
Schreber material and the “social and political fantasies at work in Nazism” (p.xi). In this vein, he 
explores the work of Elias Canetti (1960) who attempted to highlight the similarity between 
Schreber’s writing and the paranoid stance of Nazi ideology.36 The proto-fascist underpinnings to 
Schreber’s delusions, that Canetti argues for, are noted by Santner but he distances himself from 
such a reading by wishing to emphasise how the crisis in symbolic space that lent itself to 
authoritarian social control (in the case of German national socialism) is refracted through 
Schreber’s writing. It is this ‘hollowing out’ of the social order predicated on the collapse of socio-
symbolic authority that is of particular interest to Santner.  As such, Santner situates Schreber’s 
‘psychosis’ in relation to a ‘crisis of symbolic investiture’ or a crisis in the transfer of symbolic power 
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 In his work Crowds and Power, Elias Canetti (1960) describes how power permeates through crowds or large 
groupings and draws on the writing of Schreber to outline a theory of the ‘paranoid despot’ that is able to 
exert power over such crowds. 
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and authority. That allows him to bridge the crisis within German society of the time and the 
personal crisis that profoundly affected Schreber that led to him being interned within the asylum. 
This ‘crisis of symbolic investiture’ is, for Santner, the same mechanism operating within Schreber’s 
psychic life and within wider German society. It is this mechanism that conjoins both of these realms 
within Schreber’s overall sense of subjectivity. One avenue for appreciating this link that conjoins 
Schreber and society at large is via Santner’s focus on the body. 
By way of an example I want to focus on Schreber’s preoccupation with degeneration during 
his mutation into ‘God’s own concubine’. Santner’s (1996) analysis focuses in on Schreber’s assertion 
of himself as an “abject bearer of rotting flesh” as best exemplified through his self-identification 
with the signifier ‘Luder’, connoting themes of disease and wretchedness. What Santner wishes to 
show however, is that Schreber’s fixation on ‘rotting putrefying flesh’ was due to his incapacity to 
fulfil the symbolic title bestowed upon him. What Schreber discovered was an inability to inhabit 
and to feel libidinally implicated in the space of representation resulting in his ‘excitation of nerves’ 
and the corresponding ‘wasting away’ of his material presence. Schreber’s own experience of his 
material corporeal body is inextricably bound up within the titles or symbolic mandates in which it is 
inscribed.  The body is, in this sense, overwritten by signifiers and the cataclysm that Schreber 
experiences within the Symbolic comes to take on a material bodily presence. The wasting away and 
degeneration of his own flesh here correspond precisely to his inability to localise his libido on the 
title or symbolic mandate demanded of him. Here we have one specific instance of how the body, or 
‘vicissitudes of the flesh’ as Santner puts it, are concrete materialisations of performative utterances 
emanating from the world of the Symbolic. As we have seen, due to the foreclosure of the paternal 
metaphor, Schreber suffers a complete collapse of such symbolically mediated relations when 
tasked with assuming a particular societal mandate, in this case the presiding judge of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals. It is the question of symbolic authority and the position of power from which 
Schreber is asked to speak that is of prime importance in Santner’s analysis. Santner wishes to show 
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that it is the body which functions as the site through which symbolic predicates come to be 
interpreted or enacted upon. The symbolic order, in a sense, operates through the body and the 
body is in turn shaped or formed by these very operations.  
The link to wider societal functioning arrives when we appreciate how the social field was 
also characterised at this particular historical moment with a concern for a change, or rather 
degeneration, within the ‘body politique’. As we have noted, the inability to assume this position of 
power or authority results, for Schreber, in a complex multifaceted delusional system that 
incorporates religious, sexual and racial overtones. Through a nuanced analysis that integrates 
Foucault’s (1976) theory of sexuality and disciplinary control, Santner moves on to unpick the 
content of Schreber’s writings, particularly that which pertains to his ‘un-manning’ (entmannen), his 
feminine identification and his association with the figure of the ‘wandering Jew’. This diverse 
intersection of race, sex and gender becomes manifest in Schreber’s delusion of bodily 
transformations. What is absolutely crucial to Santner’s analysis is that this process reflects much 
wider societal connections between circumcision, feminization and anti-Semitism. In effect, 
Schreber’s ‘psychotic’ universe is directly influenced by the broader societal processes at work in 
nineteenth century Germany. By drawing on various historical sources, Santner demonstrates how 
the perceived social and cultural crisis effecting German society at the time was marked by ideas of 
degeneration, disease and the loss of masculine identity. Although these developments are perhaps 
attributable to other contexts outside of German society, for Santner they coalesce most profoundly 
within Germany via the feminised image of the Jew that was so prominent during Schreber’s 
historical moment. It was this marginal figure or ‘outsider identity’ that Schreber primarily 
associated with when he found his symbolic life world radically threatened; or put differently, when 
he transgressed the social pact on which his identity was founded.  The crucial point being that for 
Schreber and Saxon Germany alike, the resultant preoccupations with a degenerate body, or the 
wasting away of the flesh, is due to the same underlying operation, or rather failure of operation; a 
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fundamental impasse or catastrophe that occurs within the field of symbolic authority that then 
takes on bodily or corporeal connotations. We might be alerted here to some degree of crossover 
with Sass’s argument above. Although coming from different perspectives, both Santner and Sass 
have located the workings of power and resultant positions of subjectivity as being key to Schreber’s 
mental state. For Sass and Santner alike, Schreber is commenting not just on his own particular 
psychology, but the intricacies of modern forms of power/knowledge that comprise such a 
psychology. It is these dynamics that are essentially underwritten by an intersubjective domain 
mediated via language, the gaze, or in the widest possible sense, the realm of the Symbolic. And this 
is what Schreber is witness to, albeit in some warped or heightened sense.  
The world of politics and ideological authority is for Santner, just as with Sass, key to 
decoding Schreber’s paranoid worldview. He writes at the beginning of his reading that what drives 
his work is a belief that Schreber’s “impasses and conflicts pertain to shifts in the fundamental 
matrix of the individual’s relation to social and institutional authority; to the ways he or she is 
addressed by and responds to the calls of ‘official’ power and authority” (1996, p.xi).  Schreber’s 
inability to participate with these procedures of symbolic investiture has a structural affinity with the 
same ‘investiture crisis’ occurring at this precise historical moment. As he writes: 
One of the central theoretical lessons of the Schreber case is precisely that a 
generalized attenuation of symbolic power and authority can be experienced as the 
collapse of social space and the rites of institution into the most intimate core of 
ones being. The feelings generated thereby are as we shall see, anxieties not of 
absence and loss but of over proximity, loss of distance to some obscene and 
malevolent presence that appears to have a direct hold on one’s inner parts (pxii). 
Schreber’s numerous comments related to his body wasting away, his internal organs being 
rearranged or indeed the cursed and spiteful god that is responsible for these heinous acts is, for 
Santner, a representation, or rather a personally inhabited metaphor, for the collapse of power and 
authority altogether -  a representation that is internalised on a bodily level. Schreber literally 
embodies this metaphor and instates this failure pertaining to symbolic operations within his 
material, fleshy self.  
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 In order to develop this line of argument further, Santner draws on various cultural artefacts 
and literary sources from the era that mirror Schreber’s paranoid delusions and the state of social 
decline. Utilising the work of Franz Kafka, he emphasises how his “prose is largely a meditation on 
communities in chronic states of crisis, communities in which the force of social laws no longer 
stands in any relation to the meaningfulness of their content and the traditions from which they 
derive” (p.12). Citing works such as The Trial (1914) and Metamorphosis (1915) he shows how these 
narratives portray “institutional authority with a dimension of obscene inscrutability often linked to 
impotence, inconsistency, and debility on the part of that very authority” (p.13). This notion of 
institutional authority and the ‘force of law’ containing some traumatic ‘rotten’ core that contests 
any idea of a harmonious social structure is further developed through Walter Benjamin’s (1986) 
influential essay Critique of Violence, and later Derrida’s (1992) work concerning similar themes. 
Santner maintains that Schreber’s transgression of the social order and the authority on which it is 
founded is due to an over proximity to this ‘rotten core’. And it is through the maddening or 
bewildering prose of Kafka, for instance, that we can come to better realise Schreber’s direct 
experience as predicated upon the turmoil present within social, political or economic spheres.  
Ultimately, Santner’s ‘crisis of investiture’ references both the individual chaos faced by Schreber, 
owing to the breakdown in his symbolic world, and the collapse of symbolic functioning within wider 
society. Interestingly, both are shown to mask or compensate for this symbolic crisis through very 
similar preoccupations centred on Jewishness with associated gendered or sexual connotations. 
Freud’s earlier remark that Schreber’s delusions may contain ‘more truth than people are led to 
believe’ resonates loudly with Santner’s reading.    
 
3.4 Kittler, Discourse Networks & Madness 
 Santner’s analysis of the Memoirs leads him to suggest that Schreber’s ‘psychotic’ writing in 
a sense refracts modernism whilst also containing the core ideological investments of late 
nineteenth century Saxon Germany; notions of degeneracy, a loss of masculine identity and the 
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localisation of such themes in the figure of the feminised Jew. Contained within Santner’s analysis is 
a reference to Friedrich Kittler who, likewise, in his elaboration of media technologies and ‘Discourse 
Networks’ takes Schreber’s Memoirs and demonstrates how they are similarly imbued with a 
modernist sensibility. I wish to turn to Kittler’s (1985) analysis here, whilst also focusing on the role 
that Schreber’s Aufschreibsystem (writing-down-system) plays in understanding certain facets of 
modernity related to automation and technology. This will also offer us another avenue for 
understanding how the ‘psychotic’ text of Daniel Paul Schreber can be read psychosocially and 
reveal aspects of culture or society that have come to shape individual subjectivity. We will also note 
the impact Kittler’s work has had on Santner’s reading to the point whereby both theorists start to 
circle very similar issues. So much so that it is worth conjoining Santner’s and Kittler’s work to close 
this chapter. Before doing so, however, I want to describe Kittler’s overall intellectual framework as, 
without this, we may struggle to appreciate the means by which he is able to conjoin the subject to 
the social via his focus on media technologies. We will return to the Memoirs following this 
digression into Kittler’s conceptualisation of ‘discourse networks’ and their relation to madness.  
Kittler, owing to his eclectic use of theoretical reference points and interdisciplinary style, is 
not easily placed within neat academic categorisation. He has, in turn, been labelled the foremost 
German post-structuralist and one of its most prominent media theorists. His unique approach has 
as much in common, however, with the mathematical communicational theories of Norbert Weiner 
as it does with the usual mix of various German philosophers (Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger) and 
members of the French avant-garde (Foucault, Lacan, Derrida) that would otherwise place him solely 
within the field of critical theory. To date, he has received mixed attention in the English-speaking 
world, remaining something of a fringe or cult figure although his influence could be argued to be on 
the rise.37  
                                                          
37
 Winthrop-Young (2011), perhaps Kittler’s most prominent commentator in English, attempts to summarise 
his career and distinguishes between three clear periods within his overall work; the first which lasted from 
the mid 1970’s through to the early 1980’s was primarily concerned with texts, or rather on the discourse 
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In his celebrated book Discourse Networks, 1800/1900 Kittler (1985) engages with a number 
of literary works in order to demonstrate the way in which language, meaning and speech acts that 
make up any given culture are subject to drastic changes, especially within regard to the emergence 
of different technological capabilities and institutional practices. He defines such ‘discourse 
networks’ as “the network of technologies and institutions that allow a given culture to select, store 
and process relevant data” (1985, p.369). For Kittler, discourse networks come to embody certain 
cultural forms that are able to reflect the media conditions under which they themselves are 
produced. Kittler portrays culture as a massive store house of information, or rather a machine, that 
depending on the way in which ‘data’ is disseminated through,  is capable of altering conceptions of 
what it means to be a subject (or in Kittlerese  a ‘so-called man’) within specific historical conditions. 
The first half of the book contains a detailed analysis of various German authors such as E.T.A 
Hoffman, Goethe and von Humboldt. The major focus, however, is on how, in the latter part of the 
eighteenth-century, changes within education resulted in significant modifications in language 
teaching and practice. The role of mothers here becomes especially significant, as Kittler argues that 
rather than having children learn language via rote repetition of formal words and phonemes, a new 
practice of mothers giving voice to what he terms ‘minimal signifieds’ was introduced. Simply put, 
these ‘minimal signifieds’ are neither real words nor meaningless sounds but something located in 
between.38 The importance, however, is that the repetition of such terms, as well as the 
accumulation of them, leads to rudimentary language formation invested with a level of meaning -  
the repetition of ma for example leading to Mama and consequently ‘mother’. Kittler states “in this 
way meanings come into being on the border between sound and word through the augmentation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
analysis (archaeology) of specifically literary texts. The second period, carrying on through the 1980’s and 
1990’s, focused on media technologies such as the analogue media of the late nineteenth century 
(phonography, cinema, and mechanised writing as evidenced by the typewriter) and then, most recently, his 
last period focused on digital technology. His analysis of Schreber’s Memoirs straddles these two earlier 
periods. 
38
 The similarity here to Lacan’s concept of Lalangue is worth stating. Lacan in the 1970’s spent considerable 
effort theorising a form of jouissance enacted in language but one that did not accord to the play of signifiers. 
This language without meaning is found in the pre-linguistic sounds an infant makes and also in instances of 
psychotic speech. See J. Lacan (1972-73) Encore. Seminar XX. Norton: London.  
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of minimal signifieds” (p. 78). The mother becomes the primary vehicle via which such meanings can 
be enacted. This social bond assures that these newly acquired semantic skills are at one level 
forever tied to the mother’s body. And it is from here that Kittler is able to show how language 
practices, as dictated by ‘Discourse Network 1800’, are closely associated to maternal figures and 
ideas of nature. E.T.A Hoffman’s (1814) tale The Golden Pot is thoroughly analysed to this very 
effect. This immense circuitry of reading, writing and speaking is subsequently understood as a 
machinic system characterised as “an endless oscillating from Nature to books and back to Nature” 
(p.91). The second half of Kittler’s work concerns the replacement of various writing technologies of 
‘Discourse Network 1800’ with the analogue media of ‘Discourse Network 1900’. This transition of 
modern communicative technologies ushers in a reconfiguration of culture and the subjects that 
inhabit it. The relevance of Schreber, and what Kittler describes as a ‘simulacrum of madness’, to this 
shift in discursive possibilities is important. Before discussing Schreber it may be worth examining a 
text that Kittler (1982) holds up as being emblematic of ‘Discourse Network 1900’ with its concern 
for new media-technologies and their relation to specific regimes of madness; Bram Stoker’s (1899) 
Dracula.  
The story is well known; following the arrival of Jonathan Harker to the count’s castle 
whereby plans are made for the latter’s journey to England, Dracula begins to exert a form of 
telepathic control over Renfeld, an apparently insane man who quickly ends up interned in a London 
asylum whilst raving about the arrival of his ‘master’ -  Dracula himself. Renfeld’s inability to 
coordinate his own behaviour and speech quickly results in him being labelled ‘mad’. In this vein, 
madness is as Winthrop-Young states, “the apparent inability to control one’s speech, especially if 
that very lack of control is central to what you are trying to say” (2011, p.66). And this is precisely 
one of the central elements at play for Kittler within modern forms of communication and media; 
namely, the manner by which modern discourse channels conditions that are capable of separating 
the conscious speaking subject from the control of his own discourse. In keeping with Stoker’s tale, 
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Kittler examines the new forms of writing and communication technology present within it, 
particularly the typewriter, as exemplified in Mina Harker’s correspondence with her husband and 
Dr Seward’s phonograph with which he attempts to practice his own version of the ‘talking cure’. 
Indeed, these new-fangled inventions come to be paradigmatic examples of modern forms of 
communication that accord to the twin processes of separation and discontinuity.39 Whereas 
‘Discourse Network 1800’ was characterised by the continuous smooth flow of information from 
mother/nature via handwriting practises, ‘Discourse Network 1900’ is fragmentary and impersonal, 
following the introduction of standardised mechanical forms of language and the technological 
ability to communicate whilst remaining physically separated. 
 If this ‘inability to control one’s speech’, as illustrated by Renfeld’s delusional ravings, is to 
become a feature of modern forms of communication, then it also follows that this will necessitate a 
reconfiguration of the social bond and the wider socio-cultural formations arising from it. The tight 
knit relation between modern media technology and the separation of the conscious speaker from 
their own discourse ensures that modern forms of discourse start to resemble madness itself. In 
commenting on this, Winthrop-Young states, “the Discourse Network 1900 reveals madness – the 
inability to produce discourse as individual speech acts – to be the true state of affairs” (2011, p.69). 
Indeed, his analysis of Kittler’s work at times leads him to raise an implied question within Kittler’s 
thought (one very much in the style of Foucauldian conceptions of madness) as he asks: 
 what sounds mad in the age of reason? Answer: madness is the compulsive, 
incessant talking about the rules, protocols, and institutions that make us talk 
[….]. Obviously, branding this as madness presupposes that sane discourses are 
perceived to be individual speech acts presided over by an autonomous subject. 
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 Regarding this, Partington (2006) writes the following, “the spectre at the heart of Stoker’s story is that of 
modern technology rather than atavistic evil. The late nineteenth century’s bureaucratic revolution involved 
the incursion of writing machines not merely into the workplace, but into the fabric of existence, producing 
new writing and writers [….], and for Kittler, it is the shock of this technocultural transformation that Stoker’s 
novel registers: it depicts a world that is recognizable as historical reality, but is at the same time unfamiliar 
and aggressively technologized populated by machines that encroach into all areas of life and choreograph 




Sanity means being in control of what you say; madness is the compulsion to 
incessantly talk about that which makes you talk (2011, p.57).  
Media technology and the resultant effect on the social bond brings ‘Discourse Network 1900’ in line 
with what Kittler refers to as a ‘simulacrum of madness’. We have then the theoretical framework 
Kittler adopts to align modern forms of technological communication with madness itself. Yet, if we 
really wish to appreciate how Schreber’s ‘psychotic’ writing bears witness to these drastic changes in 
media technology and resultant forms of subjectivity, then we must delve further into one crucial 
aspect of his memoirs: his Aufschreibsystem, which Kittler also adopts as the German title of his 
1985 book.   
 
3.5 Aufschreibsystem 
 Schreber begins the ninth chapter of his Memoirs by offering an account of what he terms 
the Aufschreibsystem, roughly translated as the ‘writing-down system’. He described it as follows:  
Books or other notes are kept in which for years have been written-down all my 
thoughts, all my phrases, all my necessaries, all the articles in my possession or around 
me, all persons with whom I come into contact, etc. I cannot say with certainty who 
does the writing down. As I cannot imagine God’s omnipotence lacks all intelligence, I 
presume that the writing down is done by creatures given human shape on distant 
celestial bodies after the manner of the fleeting-improvised-men, but lacking all 
intelligence; their hands are led automatically, as it were, by passing rays for the 
purpose of making them write down, so that later rays can again look at what has been 
written (1903, p.123) 
We notice here already how for Schreber, this system of writing, the way in which his thoughts are 
recorded, is not attributable to anyone in particular, least of all himself. Yet what is taking place here 
has been argued by many to be crucial in establishing some form of stability for Schreber in ordering 
his world (see for Example, Butler, 2008).40 Just as Freud emphasised the stabilising quality of the 
delusion itself, we can situate this writing-down-system as having a similar effect in gaining or 
harnessing power over the disruption and fragmentation that threatens to engulf both Schreber’s 
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 Butler (2008) writes that, “By creating his writing-down system through his Memoirs, Schreber invests 
himself with power. He discerns how nervous energy circulates in the universe, and, having identified the 
“Technik” (technique/technology) [….] at work, he knows how to counteract the disruption of his body and 
mind by intruding rays” (p.177).  
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mind and body. This is the element that Kittler finds so important in arguing for the significance of 
the Aufschreibsystem to modern forms of communication per se. Not only does ‘discourse network 
1900’ function via separation and automation, it instates writing practices, or rather recording 
practices, whereby information comes to be collated and organised against a ‘white noise’ or 
background of communicational chaos. The ‘simulacrum of madness’ that is ‘discourse network 
1900’ has to be tamed via such a method of inscription. Schreber’s ordering of his cosmology via his 
writing directly, for Kittler, mirrors the way in which modern forms of data processing, analysing and 
storing essentially sort information from the maddening proliferation of ever-expanding discourse 
channels. Schreber himself goes further to explain how this process of writing assists him in gaining 
some mastery over the chaos surrounding him. He refers in his Memoirs to a process in tandem with 
the Aufschreibsystem that he terms Zeichnen (1903, p.210), sometimes misleadingly translated as 
‘picturing’. This ‘picturing’ (or perhaps more accurately translated as the literal act of drawing), 
relates to Schreber describing nothing more than his own imagination i.e. the idea of summing up 
mental images within one’s mind. The difference for Schreber is that these images or drawings take 
on a real material significance; he quite literally draws them into the world and reality at large. Other 
examples whereby Schreber refers to the process of organising his thoughts with great precision via 
inscription methods include his technique of writing “under consecutive numbers and with dates, 
thoughts about impressions gained, about possible future developments, etc. in the form of little 
studies” (p.173; n.80). The point in highlighting these attempts by Schreber to order his universe via 
a method of writing, is that Kittler sees in this technique something that is instructive of something 
far larger than one individual patient’s attempts to overcome their paranoia. Just as Sass believes 
that Schreber is effectively mirroring a much more general characteristic of modern forms of 
consciousness, this automatic inscription practice becomes indicative, for Kittler, of modern forms of 
communication in keeping with the notions of separation and displacement already highlighted.41 As 
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 The relevance of Schreber and Madness more generally to Kittler’s work is explored by S. Connor (2015) in 
his Scilicet: Kittler, Media and Madness. Connor argues that “Schreber’s systematic account of his delusional 
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he states, “[a] delirium written down coincides with what sciences and media themselves were 
doing” (1985, p.305). 
 
3.6 Kittler/Santner/Schreber 
There is one last area we need to cover to close the relevance of Schreber’s writing to 
specifically psychosocial forms of analysis concerned with his modernist relevance. It is an area that 
both Santner and Kittler circle respectively and one that ultimately ties their work together, as their 
respective focus on automation/separation and the collapse of symbolic functioning meet. Kittler 
sees in Schreber’s inscription practice a telling detail that registers with his much wider investigation 
into modern forms of communication; the already commented upon split between speaker and 
discourse resulting in language coming to take on an automated quality.  It is not just this 
comparison, however, that peaks Kittler’s interest but, in a similar vein to Santner, he emphasises 
how Schreber’s automated writing, which drains the agentic capacity of the writer, mirrors his 
treating physician Dr Flechsig’s neuroanatomical model of the mind. Santner draws attention to 
Kittler’s use of this theme when he writes, “the crucial feature of this registration system is its purely 
mechanical and automatic nature, specifically the absence of any animating soul or spirit” (1996, 
p.74). This loss of soul, or Geist, is in some sense the structural equivalent to Flechsig’s own 
influential thinking on the nature of the mind/body duality, as contained in his book Gehirn Und 
Seele (Brain and Soul) published in 1896. Flechsig’s contribution to physiology and neurology during 
this period offered a framework for understanding subjectivity as being “dissolved into systems of 
information transfer” (ibid. p.71) whereby any ‘animating spirt’ is eliminated in favour of strict 
biological causality. The body and its conscious mind accords, therefore, to a kind of automaton 
reacting simply to an underlying neuroanatomical technical procedure. Schreber’s seelenmord (‘soul-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
system provides more than a symptomatic registration of the awareness of new recording technologies. It is at 
the heart of Kittler’s understanding of the drastic shift from one system of inscription to another that took 
place following the development, from the 1870’s onwards, of apparatuses that allowed the storage and 
manipulation, not just of words, but of sound and of moving image” (p.118). 
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murder’) in this sense corresponds to a quite literal reduction of the human subject to its 
materialistic effects.  Santner again commenting on his close theoretical ally writes:  
Kittler’s thesis is that both Flechsig and Schreber elaborate in their writing a universe 
in which the symbolic-spiritual dimension – Geist – in its radical heterogeneity with 
regard to organic processes has been nullified. As Schreber’s text amply 
demonstrates, once the symbolic dimension collapses into the domain of bodily 
causes, we are in a universe of extreme literalisation, where words are assimilated to 
things that in turn produce immediate alternations in the body (p.75).  
This separation or gap between bodily cause and meaning as arising from symbolic effect is, as 
Santner so aptly demonstrates, the truly ‘psychotic’ element at play in Flechsig’s theory and 
Schreber’s delusion. Both attempt a kind of short circuit, or a ‘traumatic collapse’ between these 
sites resulting in an automated mechanical view of the subject as expressed via his very own writing 
method. Meaning becomes nothing more than the direct lifeless consequence of physiological 
processes. Following Santner and Kittler, we can come to appreciate how Schreber’s writing not only 
resonates with key ideological and scientific ideas of his time but also the way in which his writing 
prefigures modernist anxieties related to a loss of human spirit in an age of rapid technological 
advancement and bureaucratic control.42  
Schreber’s Memoirs can be said, therefore, to channel a number of themes that are 
evidenced in a wide range of historically similar expressions, from artistic practice to social and 
technological change; all of which may be understood together as particular instances of a 
modernist ideology.  As we move on to my later example of mad writing, the Exegesis of Philip K. 
Dick, it is worth bearing these modernist sensibilities in mind to see how turn of the century 
preoccupations with automation, technology and bureaucratisation give way at the time PKD is 
writing to postmodern concerns. In Sass, Santner and Kittler we have forms of interpretation that 
can be positioned as truly psychosocial. Moving beyond the clinical focus of psychoanalysis, each 
author has analysed Schreber’s mad writing and demonstrated how it is in sync with the socio-
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 As we close this chapter it is perhaps worth noting that this mechanised view of writing came to find a 
modernist literary critique with the surrealist practice of écriture automatique as demonstrated by Andre 
Breton in the Les Champs Magnétiques (1919) and later Le Message Automatique (1933). 
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historical themes of his day.  Before consolidating these forms of interpretation at the end of Part 1, 
I shall now engage with an overview of another psychosocial body of theory that provides an 
original, and no less controversial, interpretation of Schreber as well as other forms of mad writing: 













































Chapter 4: The ‘Schizo-Culture’ of Deleuze & Guattari 
 
In my continued overview of the interpretations conducted on Schreber’s writing, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of schizoanalysis is the body of psychosocial theory now under examination. 
Schreber shall be accompanied here by Deleuze and Guattari’s readings of Mary Barnes, Vaslav 
Nijinksy, Antonin Artaud and lastly, Henry Wolfson. Although their body of work remains formidably 
complex, it is essential that we enter into it, via their references to mad writing, to understand how 
their collective schizoanalytic project not only offers another methodological means to 
understanding how ‘psychotic’ text can reveal profound socio-cultural insights, but also how 
‘psychotic’ text has been utilised to demarcate disciplinary or theoretical differences between 
psychoanalysis and the wider anti-psychiatry movement. This chapter will conclude my extended 
literature review on the various sites that have employed mad text to further theoretical 
development. Before I embark on this journey through Deleuze and Guattari’s use of mad writing, I 
will briefly examine their overall philosophical project in which their readings of mad text are 
located. As such, I shall use their first collaborative work, Anti-Oedipus (1972), as a means to enter 
into their schizoanalytic enterprise. In order to appreciate the use of mad writing within 
schizoanalysis, it is necessary that we first have some grounding in the concepts of the desiring-
machine, processes of territorialisation and de-territorialisation, as well as the infamous Body-
Without-Organs.  
 
4.2 Anti-Oedipus, Desiring-Machines & the Body-Without-Organs  
There are two things that any commentator on Anti-Oedipus seems obliged to state from 
the start: firstly that it is a product of its time - a direct result of the events of May ’68; and secondly, 
that it is no easy read. The book is the outcome of the first encounter between Deleuze, the 
philosopher and Guattari, the militant political activist and psychoanalyst. It would represent the 
start of an intellectual collaboration between both figures that would last nearly 20 years. The 
130 
 
tumultuous political climate in which this project was conceived is reflected in the tone and style of 
their work. Its unconstrained attempts to fashion new forms of living, acting and thinking are played 
out in the project’s highly irregular and obscure presentation. Indeed, many have commented upon 
the delirious quality of the language within the book, aligning it, for some, to a sort of ‘schizophrenic’ 
discourse. Anti-Oedipus is the first part of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Capitalism and Schizophrenia’ 
project with its companion piece, A Thousand Plateaus (1980) published eight years later. In many 
respects Anti-Oedipus can be viewed as the conceptual foundation for a radical mode of cultural, 
political and psychosocial critique they refer to as ‘schizoanalysis’. Eugene Holland (1999) argues for 
schizoanalysis to be understood as a form of materialist psychiatry.43 By emphasising the 
materialism of those three ‘masters of suspicion’ - Marx, Freud and Nietzsche - schizoanalysis 
attempts to align itself to an emancipatory cause whilst drawing from the revolutionary potential of 
the ‘schizophrenic’ subject.  ‘Schizophrenia’ in a sense, serves as the vehicle by which this 
revolutionary subjectivity can be achieved. In order to construct this form of cultural enquiry and 
political practice, Anti-Oedipus draws from a huge range of disciplines.  Its sweeping analysis 
encompasses art, literature, anthropology, psychology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, economics, 
aesthetics, philosophy, biology and mathematics, ensuring that any semblance of traditional 
intellectual presentation is lost in the process.  
Whatever the conceptual origins of schizoanalysis, its stated task is to breakdown, or find an 
escape from, the way in which desire becomes entangled within a dense network of libidinal flows 
conditioned by capitalist discourse. It presents itself as a revolutionary form of analysis - ‘a militant 
analysis’ - capable of freeing up the subject from formal structures of power or authority, whether 
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 Although perhaps slightly undeveloped, I understand Deleuze and Guattari’s framing of materialist 
psychiatry as denoting the idea that psychiatry quite literary produces something. A materialist psychiatry is 
concerned with desire and what this produces as opposed, for instance, with an idealist psychiatry which 
primarily puts forth ideas or forms of expression; in effect, metaphors, which as Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
quite clearly at the very start of Anti-Oedipus: “Something is produced: effects of a machine, and not of 
metaphors” (1972, p.2). It is worth noting also that both Deleuze and Guattari identified Wilhelm Reich (1933) 
and his The Mass Psychology of Fascism as the first example of materialist psychiatry with its focus on the way 
psycho-somatic structures have to first be produced to make fascism possible.  
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they be invested in the state, the family or our own libidinal impulses. Foucault, in a much-cited 
introduction to the book, states that Anti-Oedipus can be viewed as a template for an ethics for 
leading a ‘non-fascist life’. Foucault’s statement here is not to be understood as an ethics opposed to 
autocratic totalitarian government, but as an ethics opposed to the “fascism that causes us to love 
power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (1972, p.xv). Deleuze and Guattari, in 
the process of constructing a form of analysis and practice that would liberate us from such forces of 
desire, take ‘psychosis’ rather than neurosis as their starting point, and it is this that interests us 
here.   
In their attempts to develop a new mode of critical analysis through the marriage of the 
Freudian notion of libido and the Marxian concept of labour power, Deleuze and Guattari put 
forward their ‘desiring-machine’. It should be noted, however, that the desiring-machine does not 
represent a cut and paste amalgamation of Freud and Marx in the style of Wilhelm Reich for 
example.44 In fact, Deleuze and Guattari see these twin processes of libido and labour power within 
the corresponding spheres of the psyche and economy as essentially the same thing: productive 
forces conditioned on the flow of desire. The centrality of desire within Anti-Oedipus is undeniable. 
Accordingly, they reason that “everything revolves around desire-machines and the production of 
desire” (1972, p.415).  In a similar manner by which Nietzsche proposes a ‘will to power’ as the basic 
force conditioning all life, or the manner by which Freud suggests that all living things strive towards 
a state of death - ‘a will to death’  - Deleuze and Guattari posit desire as the fundamental principle 
that underlies life or existence, as they write, “the objective being of desire is the Real in and of 
itself” (ibid, p.28). Crucially, however, Deleuze and Guattari view desire as a productive force, a 
continuous uninterrupted flow that does not emanate from lack in the manner that Lacan otherwise 
presents it. Drawing from Deleuze’s earlier work on the philosophy of Spinoza (1970) Anti-Oedipus 
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 In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari are operating within an established tradition of Freudian theory being 
aligned with Marxist philosophy. The early days of critical theory in the guise of the Frankfurt school consisting 
of Fromm, Adorno, Marcuse & Benjamin to later attempts by Fredrik Jameson, Slavoj Žižek and the Lacanian 
left in general (Stavrakakis, Glynos) all attempt to some degree this marriage of depth psychology and a 
critique of political economy.  
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utilises a model of desire quite apart from psychoanalysis. Whereas Freud brought into being a 
concept of desire that revolves around a state of need that can only be fulfilled by a proper object, 
Spinoza reasoned that desire was the positive essence of every being. So, rather than an ontological 
lack or deficit being the condition upon which desire manifests itself, Spinoza stresses that desire 
exists independent of any object and this form of pure striving is the actual essence of a thing. 45 
Desire within Anti-Oedipus is subsequently viewed as a continuous productive force and sets 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thought at odds with psychoanalysis. Desire, they are keen to stress, is also 
revolutionary, as it affects or disrupts all established order within any given society. Essentially, this 
means that no society can be conceived unless this radical force can be repressed. The manner by 
which this is achieved in contemporary capitalist society is through Oedipus, the ultimate instrument 
of repression. Whereas Freud believed desire was repressed due to its encounter with reality (the 
incest taboo, role of the father), Deleuze and Guattari reason to the contrary that desire is the very 
cause of reality, as they write, “if desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be 
productive only in the real world and can produce only reality” (1972, p. 28). So whilst they agree 
with psychoanalysis that Oedipus can be located everywhere, they see it not as innate or ahistorical 
but rather a particular mode of repression operating within capitalism.  
The chief characteristic of desire is that it accords to a machinic logic. The term machine 
here is employed not just to refer to modes of technology or organisation but specifically to 
reference machinic connection; machines connected to other machines or rather connections 
between partial-objects. By stressing that desire is to be understood as a continuous multiplicity, 
characterised only be degrees of difference, Deleuze and Guattari wish to demonstrate how it 
operates according to a series of connections, or couplings between certain desiring-machines. 46 
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 In truth, this difference between desire, drive and instinct in both thinkers work is somewhat more complex. 
Drive for Freud perhaps gets closer to Spinoza’s conceptualisation which acts as some kind of external force or 
pressure on the psyche which for Freud emanates from the body.  
46
 The desiring-machine and the forces of desiring-production are central to the schizoanalytic project. 
However, like much else within their oeuvre, pinning them down is no easy task. A well know example from 
Deleuze and Guattari (1972) may assist. In the child’s interactions with objects such as toys, they reason that 
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Central to these machinic operations are the processes of ‘territorialisation’ and ‘deterritorialisation’ 
which pertain to the way in which desire is firstly able to valorise certain organs and objects before it 
is then able to free itself up from such connections. These two dynamics operate simultaneously and 
Deleuze and Guattari employ them to demonstrate how this continual cycle of connection and 
breakdown, or rather ‘coding’ and ‘decoding’, is found not just in the subject’s unconscious but is 
mirrored in the capitalist process itself. Both libido and labour power function according to these 
fundamental laws. This discussion of machinic connection and the process of ‘breaking down’ leads 
us ultimately to the concept of the Body-Without-Organs (BWO).  
This ‘BWO’ plays a central role in Deleuze and Guattari’s system, yet, perhaps due to its 
somewhat paradoxical nature, is particularly difficult to pin down. One way to understand it is as a 
moment of anti-production, a site where intensities are distributed due to the inherent inertia 
contained within a social body. It is, in short, a figure of death within the unconscious. Its paradoxical 
nature derives from it being both an empty body - a desiring-machine that doesn’t function - as well 
as a mode of production brought about through this very inertia. It is this figure of inaction or 
breakdown that counter-intuitively spurs on the very dynamism of the desiring-machines. Goodchild 
(1996) attempts to sum this up when he writes, “there are therefore two poles to this whole without 
moving parts or body-without-organs: an empty body or quality, which does not affect production at 
all, and full body or drive that falls back upon the desiring-machines” (p.83). The BWO takes its 
conceptual name from the writings of Artonin Artaud, one of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘schizophrenic’ 
writers from whom they draw upon to further illustrate their collaborative schizoanalytic project. 
We can see from the start, therefore, how mad text plays a fundamentally important role in the 
construction of Deleuze and Guattari’s psychosocial theory. Artaud conceives of the BWO in in the 
following passage:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
such objects are not purely symbolic, but machinic in that they give desire the means to express itself and 
therefore form something constructive.  
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the body is the body/it is all by itself/ and has no need of organs/the body is never 
an organism/organisms are the enemy of the body (Artaud quoted in Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1972, p.9-10). 
Deleuze and Guattari apply Artaud’s strange notion very early on within Anti-Oedipus to further their 
concept of a body, or entity, that functions by ‘breaking down’ and then reinvesting desire within 
the machinic system to start all over again in a new form. As one Deleuzian writer explains, The BWO 
“is the antagonism which makes desire a creative force” (Tynan, 2012, p.141). 47 
 
4.3 The ‘Schizo’ 
‘Schizophrenia’ is brought into this conceptual system as they view it as a form of 
uninterrupted desire that continually scrambles capitalist coding. Guattari writes:  
the capitalist economy proceeds by decoding and deterritorialisation: it has its 
extreme cases, i.e., schizophrenics who decode and deterritorialize themselves to the 
limit; but also it has its extreme consequences - revolutionaries (2009, p. 52).  
However, it also, in a sense, becomes an archetype for a modern form of subjectivity due to this 
continuous flux which negates any fixed identity or coherent sense of self. As such, Anti-Oedipus and 
schizoanalysis become situated within a postmodern sensibility due to their concern for an 
essentially fragmented image of the subject.  This ongoing connective rhythm between partial-
objects, Deleuze and Guattari argue, resembles a ‘schizophrenic’ process which annihilates a 
subject’s sense of unity. Instances of ‘psychotic’ functioning are directly related to this dynamic as 
they state, “schizophrenia is the process of the production of desire and desiring-machines” (1972, 
p.26). So just as ‘schizophrenia’ in a strict psychiatric understanding of the term is often positioned 
as the manner by which an individual’s identity is dissolved or shattered, desire, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, is characterised by an ongoing continuous dissolution of any fixed identity or 
organisation due to the syntheses noted above - the forces of production and anti-production.  
                                                          
47
 In short, this overdetermined concept, which changes considerably between the Logic of Sense (1969) and 
the Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972/1980) project, can be viewed as the collection of virtual potentials for 
any particular body.  
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In keeping with the earlier concern for intensities, Goodchild (1996) argues that the 
individual ‘schizophrenic’ is able to gain proximity to a level of experience that would otherwise be 
shut off. He writes, “instead of being cut off from society, the schizo is able to experience underlying 
social relations and forces at the transcendental level” (p. 84). Later he again states that, following 
the logic of Deleuze and Guattari’s unconscious operations:  
the schizophrenic is the one who is best able to name the abstract social processes of 
desire and repression which impinge upon his or her body; indeed, the ‘schizo’ no 
longer speaks in the name of some individuated ego constructed within the social 
field, but speaks in the name of the collective assemblage of enunciation, the specific 
assemblage of social relations localized and focused upon his or her life (p.85).  
The relevance here to my own research is that if we are to adopt Deleuze and Guattari’s system of 
thought, the ‘schizophrenic’ potentially occupies a privileged position in being able to experience or 
possibly even name “underlying social relations and forces”. A proximity to a transcendental social 
substance is achieved by the ‘schizophrenic’ and as such we find a correlation with the modernist 
analyses above which posits that Schreber was able, via his paranoid delusions, to directly 
experience a symbolic crisis affecting turn of the century German society or reconfigure modern 
forms of consciousness via technological development.   
What makes Deleuze and Guattari’s use of ‘schizophrenia’ somewhat confusing is that it 
seems to denote at least two different modes of experience. On the one hand, they speak of the 
‘schizo’ in an individuated sense; the subject that deterritorialises itself to the limit. However, at the 
same time, it is important to note that ‘schizophrenia’ is also utilised by Deleuze and Guattari to 
refer to a “specific mode of psychic and social functioning that is characteristically both produced 
and repressed by the capitalist economy” (Holland, 1999, p.x). ‘Schizophrenia’ in this instance is not 
referencing any ‘disease’ or ‘mental illness’ but rather that which is unleashed by capitalism; a broad 
sweeping socio-historical dynamic conditioned on capitalism’s productive forces. Holland argues for 
‘schizophrenia’ to be understood in this respect as a ‘radically indeterminate form of semiosis’ 
(1985, p.293) which is brought about due to all fixed meaning and belief having been dismantled by 
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capitalism’s deterritorialising and reterritorialising processes. ‘Schizophrenia’, in this instance, 
becomes a trope for understanding contemporary western society in general. We should be quite 
certain, however, that this is not meant in any metaphorical sense. Deleuze and Guattari see 
‘schizophrenic’ functioning as the very essence of social relatedness under a capitalist mode of 
production that dissolves formal structures of identity, power and authority. However, this dynamic 
necessitates a counter reaction: a reverse tendency to combat the dissolution of all fixed meaning 
and belief. In its place, capitalism engenders a fixed absolutist structuring belief system 
characterised as rigid and inflexible. Deleuze and Guattari term it paranoia. These two polarities, 
‘schizophrenia and paranoia’, therefore, become the fundamental organising principles within 
contemporary capitalist society. This cross over between pathology (schizophrenia) and ideology 
(capitalism) is summed up by the Deleuzian inspired philosopher, Brian Massumi (1996) when he 
collapses diagnostic categories and political states into one another. He writes:  
the distinction between the two virtual poles, or drives, can be conceived as a battle 
between a limitative body without organs or plane of consistency and a nonlimitative 
one. Both are selective, but in different modes. Fascism-paranoia is segregative (tends 
towards exclusive disjunctive synthesis and the creation of rigidly bounded 
compartmentalization’s: ghettoes); anarchy-schizophrenia is expansive (tends towards 
inclusive conjunctive synthesis and the mixing of bodies and desires: misrecognition) 
(p.118).  
We now have the conceptual basis with which to appreciate the use of ‘psychotic’ text within 
schizoanalysis’ attempts to demarcate itself from other disciplinary fields whilst also formulating a 
radical form of psychosocial analysis. We can appreciate already how the vastly complex and 
abstract theorising of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis may on the one hand come into conflict 
with Mad Studies due to its undoubted high intellectualism, but also at the same time offer an 
example of knowledge being produced alongside madness. There is a mad quality to this talk of 
desiring-machines, bodies-without-organs and the way in which it is presented within Anti-Oedipus. 
We should also recall Richard Ingram’s (the initiator of the Mad Studies project) comments earlier, 
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which posited an ally to Mad Studies in Deleuze and Guattari due to their maddening prose and 
disregard for conventional academic practice.  
 
4.4 Schizoanalysis/Psychoanalysis/Anti-Psychiatry 
By focusing on two areas of mad writing within Deleuze and Guattari’s output I will 
demonstrate how schizoanalysis not only differs from its psychoanalytic origins but also from much 
of the anti-psychiatry movement with which Guattari, in particular, became so associated. The first 
example of mad text concerns, once again, the Memoirs of Daniel Paul Schreber. Schreber has 
accompanied much of our discussion thus far from Freud’s (1911) initial interpretation to Lacan’s 
(1955-6) emphasis on language and the foreclosure of paternal law. What ties these commentaries 
together is an essential familial matrix into which Schreber is placed in order to explain his delirium. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, however, Schreber serves as a prime example of the inadequacies of 
psychoanalysis and the manoeuvre whereby all psychic and social investments are reduced to the 
much sited ‘mommy-daddy-me’ triangle. Their own schizoanalytic interpretation, therefore, 
attempts to rescue Schreber from being “posthumously oedipalised” (1972, p.64), as  they ask, “How 
does one dare reduce to the paternal theme a delirium so rich, so differentiated, so ‘divine’ as the 
Judge’s?” (p.64). Deleuze and Guattari are effectively utilising the ‘psychotic’ text of Schreber in this 
instance to clearly spell out the inadequacies of psychoanalysis whilst bolstering the arguments for 
their method of politically analysing desire. By Freud and Lacan reinforcing, or indeed whitewashing, 
Schreber’s delirium with oedipal themes, something very valuable is lost for Deleuze and Guattari. 
Their comments on this are unequivocal. They write firstly that “the psychoanalyst says that we 
must necessarily discover Schreber’s daddy beneath his superior God, and doubtless also his elder 
brother beneath his inferior God” (1972, p.15). However the real crux of the matter for Deleuze and 
Guattari is that:  
the memoirs of this Schreber, and it hardly matters whether we call him a paranoid or 
a schizophrenic, contain a kind of racial, racist, historical raving. Schreber raves about 
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continents, cultures, races. It’s a surprising delirium, with a political, historical, cultural 
content” (2009, p.9). And beyond Schreber they attest that “all delirium possesses a 
world-historical, political, and racial content, mixing and sweeping along races, 
cultures, continents and kingdoms (ibid, p.97).   
Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion in Anti-Oedipus and beyond, concerning the 
‘schizophrenic’s ability to gain access to a transcendental level of experience, is touched upon here 
in their comments about Schreber’s historical ravings. Schreber is not just commenting, so they 
believe, on the breakdown in his immediate familial or oedipal relations but is in fact able to 
comment astutely upon political, historical and cultural matters. His ability to do so is conditioned by 
the ‘intensity’ he feels once he is able to break out of the oedipal matrix.  If, in contrast to the 
reductive oedipalised approaches to the Memoirs we are able, following Deleuze and Guattari, to 
frame Schreber’s writing as an expressive example of political and social investments contained 
within the content of his text, then we perhaps get closer to Santner (1996) and Kittler’s (1985) 
utilisation of Schreber to emphasise specific socio-political themes. The entire issue for Deleuze and 
Guattari is that psychoanalysis, and the traditional commentaries that have been made within that 
discipline, essentially reinscribe a psychoanalytic shibboleth onto the text itself. Our earlier 
methodological discussion about the merits of ‘paranoid reading’ and the risk of interpretation itself 
reproducing systems of knowledge that it ‘finds’ within its object are never more pertinent. Why 
reduce this multifaceted and complex delusional creation, Deleuze and Guattari ask, to the 
pathological role of the father? A father who Deleuze and Guattari are keen to stress is not even 
mentioned by Schreber, as they write: 
It should be noted that Judge Schreber’s destiny was not merely that of being 
sodomized, while still alive, by the rays from heaven, but also that of being 
posthumously oedipalised by Freud. From the enormous political, social, and historical 
content of Schreber’s delirium, not one word is retained (1972, p.64). 
A schizoanalytic approach to the Memoirs, therefore, seeks to free up Schreber from a strictly 
familial interpretation and instead demonstrates how the ‘schizo’ is plugged into numerous other 
levels of social existence. By breaking down the barrier between self and other, interior and exterior, 
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Schreber produces a heightened untrammelled experiential text, a text that is directly invested with 
cultural, historical and socio-political themes. Again, they write:  
Judge Schreber feels something, produces something, and is capable of explaining the 
process theoretically. Something is produced: the effect of a machine, not mere 
metaphors (1972, p.2).  
The mention of ‘mere metaphors’, we could safely speculate here, refers to the paternal metaphor 
which we encountered in Chapter 2, in the context of Lacan’s (1955-56) commentary about the 
Memoirs. This thinly disguised attack on Lacan’s theoretical system, drawn from mad text, 
represents Deleuze and Guattari’s sustained attempts to not only provide fresh analysis on Schreber 
but to highlight the deficiencies within the psychoanalytic project whilst doing so. For them, the 
‘schizo’ is productive, something is produced that is real in terms of effects or intensities. What is 
produced is not just an aspect of language that refers to back to language itself, as Lacan would 
perhaps maintain.  
Deleuze and Guattari continue to draw upon the Memoirs to flesh out their collection of 
interrelated concepts that effectively form the backbone of Anti-Oedipus and the practice of 
schizoanalysis. Schreber, as well as the ‘schizophrenic’ writings of Artonin Artaud, are able to further 
illustrate the inherent flaws within a strictly psychoanalytic mode of interpretation, for instance, 
when referring back to the concept of the desiring-machine. They write:  
Desiring-machines work only when they break down, and by continually breaking 
down. Judge Schreber “lived for a long time without a stomach, without intestines, 
almost without lungs, with a torn oesophagus, without a bladder, and with shattered 
ribs; he used sometimes to swallow part of his larynx with his food etc.” (Freud, 1911 
quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, p.9). 
Freud’s very own words are highlighted within Anti-Oedipus to help expand their notion of anti-
production or indeed, the effect that the BWO has within the chain of desiring machines. Schreber’s 
relation to his own body is recalled to show how the capacity for continuous libidinal existence is 
sustained by the collapse or corruption of his very anatomy. For Deleuze and Guattari all other 
libidinal systems, likewise, function according to this collapse and continual reconstruction of their 
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component parts. Capital, as a social system they similarly highlight, functions accordingly to this 
counter-intuitive logic.  
I mentioned earlier how the concept of the BWO is itself drawn from the ‘mad writing’ of 
Artonin Artaud. Artaud appears throughout Anti-Oedipus and his ‘schizophrenic’ poetry is called on 
as it contains revealing similarities to Schreber’s delirious writing. Initially, Artaud is highlighted to 
demonstrate once again the failings of a familial approach to analysing desire. In words such as the 
following:  
I don’t believe in father 
In mother, 
Got no 
Papamummy (Artaud, 1965 quoted in Deleuze & Guattari, 1972, p.16). 
Deleuze and Guattari find the ‘schizo’s’ writing tapping into the essentially non-familial character of 
the subject’s existence. Likewise, from the same work, Artaud writes, “I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, 
my father, my mother, and myself” (ibid). Deleuze and Guattari are keen to stress that the subject, 
freed from a strictly oedipalised framing, is able to illuminate our understanding of identity 
formation and what they refer to as a ‘transpositional subject’ - a subject free from the constraints 
of a set of Hegelian inspired syntheses that serve to restrict the nature of oedipalised identity. This 
subject is the ‘schizo’ par excellence, as they go on to write: 
 Schreber is man and woman, parent and child, dead and alive: which is to say, he 
is situated wherever there is a singularity, in all the series and in all the branches 
that transforms him into a woman, and at its terminal point he is already the 
mother of a new humanity and can finally die (1972, p.85). 
The transposistional subject is something that both Artaud and Schreber are able to illustrate 
through their respective writings. Once the constraints of Oedipus have been cast off, a revolutionary 
force is unleashed for Deleuze and Guattari that does away with traditional notions of any static 
subjectivity or identity which is limited to particular roles or characteristics allotted to it. The ‘schizo’ 
represents the very dynamic by which identity, image, or static forms of subjectivity are done away 
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with. In so doing, the ‘schizo’, they allege, is able to tap into wider spheres of cultural, political or 
historical life. The singularity of the ‘schizo’s’ experience reveals the social-cultural significance to 
his/her literary production. It references his or her escape or ‘line of flight’ away from an oedipalised, 
and, therefore, politically repressed existence. Following on from this, Deleuze and Guattari further 
draw from an example of ‘psychotic’ writing, in particular that produced by celebrated Russian ballet 
dancer Vaslav Nijinsky in 1919, who was also able to evidence this notion of the ‘schizo’ as 
‘singularity’. Nijinsky tragically succumbed to a ‘psychotic’ breakdown towards the end of his life and 
whilst interned in the Burghölzli asylum, he was able to maintain a diary detailing his turmoil in his 
attempts to reconcile his emotional and mental life in the wake of various paranoid and delusional 
experiences. In a similar vein to Schreber and Artaud he writes:   
I am God I was not God I am a Clown; I am Apis. I am Egyptian. I am Red Indian. I 
am a Negro. I am a Chinaman. I am Japanese. I am a foreigner, a stranger. I am a 
sea bird. I am a land bird. I am the tree of Tolstoy. I am the roots of Tolstoy …. I 
am husband and wife in one. I love my wife. I love my husband (Nijinsky, 1936, p.2 
quoted in Deleuze & Guattari, 1972, p.86).  
The ‘schizo’, as evidenced via the writing of Schreber, Artaud and Nijinsky, becomes the paradigmatic 
example of a transubjective and revolutionary form of subjectivity at the heart of all forms of 
identity. It is fundamental to their abstract theoretical system as a whole.  
If Schreber’s example of mad writing, alongside the works of Artaud and Nijinsky, enabled 
Deleuze and Guattari to critique psychoanalysis, what of the anti-psychiatry movement with which 
Guattari became so associated? Some years after the publication of Anti-Oedipus and their 
collaborative works, Guattari (2009), in an attempt to distance himself from the English-speaking 
variant of the anti-psychiatry movement (specifically that centred on the figure of R.D. Laing and 
Kingsley Hall) takes another example of mad text as his object of enquiry. Mary Barnes, who was a 
resident at Kingsley Hall, wrote her own ‘schizophrenic autobiography’ in 1974 which was appended 
by her treating doctor Joseph Berke, a psychiatrist hugely influenced by the thought of R.D Laing. 
Kingsley Hall itself became famous as a radical therapeutic community, established to offer a viable 
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alternative to the British psychiatric system. Community roles were distributed evenly and 
regardless of one’s sanity, professional background or social status, all positions were based on a 
notion of equality. Accordingly, no orders were given and no prescriptions made.  Kingsley Hall 
attempted to liberate the mad from the confines of the psychiatric system to which it was so 
opposed. Although its name will be most closely associated with Laing, many of the prominent 
British anti-psychiatric figures, such as Maxwell Jones and David Cooper, became associated with it. 
Guattari acknowledged the threats to Kingsley Hall’s existence owing to its experimental status with 
many external powers wishing its demise. However, the biggest threat for Guattari came from 
within. Despite the residents of Kingsley Hall having freed themselves from the recognizable 
constraints of traditional psychiatric institutions, Guattari states that “the internalization of 
repression continues” as they are “left under the yoke of simplistic reductions to the hackneyed 
triangle of father, mother and child” (2009, p.130). The critique of Oedipus that has followed much 
of our discussion is fundamental to his views on Kingsley Hall and in order to emphasize this he 
submits Mary Barnes autobiography to close scrutiny.  
Mary Barnes achieved cult like status and quickly became a cause célèbre for the anti-
psychiatry movement following the publication of her account. Her book details a decline into 
madness and how, through the compassion and warmth shown to her by her psychiatrist, she is able 
to regress back into childhood. This regression, she writes, enabled her to tackle early traumatic 
experiences before she was then able to ‘grow’ again. Mary Barnes’ ‘schizophrenic’ experience gets 
re-modelled into a trip, a mad journey into herself and her own problematic past. Guattari, in his 
indictment of it, writes, “it is at the same time both a model enterprise of the liberation of “mad 
desire” and a neobehaviorist dogmatism” containing both “brilliant discoveries and an impenitent 
familialism akin to the most traditional Puritanism” (ibid. p.130). Mary Barnes’ example of 
‘psychotic’ text speaks, for Guattari, not just to the oedipalised nature of the wider anti-psychiatry 
movement (as well as the new fashion for structural analysis) but to a fundamental problem going all 
143 
 
the way back to Freud’s (1901) studies on hysteria;  essentially that all of these theoretical currents 
can be reduced to three basic primers: interpretation, familialism and transference. In a sense, 
Guattari demonstrates how Mary Barnes’ madness, or rather the interpretation given to it, reflects 
the oedipalised nature of Kingsley Hall. He writes, “she thus carved for herself a small Oedipal 
territory that will resound with all the paranoiac tendencies of the institution” (2009, p.131). 
Perhaps no surprise then that Mary Barnes discovered an essentially familial basis to her ‘psychosis’ 
(via a transferrential relation with her psychiatrist) if Kingsley Hall actively sought to re-inscribe such 
elements into its therapeutic work. Again, by reinforcing or strengthening these modalities of 
interpretation, a whole ‘schizophrenic’ experience with all its complexity becomes yet more grist for 
the psychoanalytic mill. 48   
Although this revolutionary zeal to schizoanalysis may seem slightly dated to modern 
sympathies with its emphasis on escaping familial networks to instate radical forms of subjectivity, 
for our purposes it is vital to note that Deleuze and Guattari’s project had taken ‘psychotic’ writing in 
the form of Schreber, Barnes and others and used them not only to theorise what ‘schizophrenia’ is 
and does, but also to demarcate differences between theoretical system, specifically psychoanalysis 
as well as the wider anti-psychiatry movement. That said, the central concern of schizoanalysis’ is to 
show how psychoanalysis is complicit in capitalist forms of subjectification. It is not a wholesale 
critique and many psychoanalytic concepts, as we have seen, are retained within the Anti-Oedipus 
                                                          
48
 Kingsley Hall, which became such a focal point for English anti-psychiatry, finds its counterpart in La Borde, 
the psychiatric clinic which Guattari remained a member of until his death in 1992. The contrast between 
these two institutions may go some way in delineating the differences between Guattari and the anti-
psychiatry movement in general. The institute’s director, Jean Oury was himself much more sympathetic to the 
radical approaches of say R. D. Laing or Franco Basaglia and the ‘Psichiatria Democratica’. However, their 
emphasis on dissolving the institution and refusing to medicate did not find favour with Guattari. He held that 
such a position essentially meant ‘refusing the mad the right to be mad’. As he explains when contrasting 
Kingsley Hall to La Borde “what was at stake was not a dismissal of the institution altogether, but rather a 
transformation of it from the inside” (2009, p.21). Later he comments that at La Borde “everything there is set 
up so that ‘psychotic’ patients live in a climate of activity and assume responsibility, not only with the goal of 
developing an ambience of communication, but also in order to create local centres for collective 
subjectivation” (2009, p.6). The goal of creating conditions that promote forms of communication and 
instances of collective subjectivation gets close here to our earlier discussion on achieving stability in 
‘psychosis’ via a social link. In effect, Guattari is stating that La Borde attempted to create conditions which 
would be ripe for instating a social bond of sorts. 
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project, such as the unconscious, desire, libido and repression. The attacks against notions such as 
the death instinct and Oedipus are undertaken to demonstrate how they are not themselves 
universal tendencies but rather specific attributes of a capitalist system. Freud’s major downfall 
then, as we have noted extensively, according to schizoanalysis, was to re-inscribe desire upon what 
they term the ‘daddy-mommy-me matrix’ (Oedipus) or the ‘holy family’. “The main thrust of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s genealogical critique of Oedipus, then, is to break out of the stifling confines of the 
nuclear family and restore the analysis of desire to its full socio-historical context” (Holland, 1999 
p.91). Or, as they themselves state, “to discover beneath the familial reduction the nature of the 
social investments of the unconscious” (1972, p.294). The issue seems clear. Psychoanalysis is 
inherently problematic as it reproduces a capitalist set of relations within its own explication of what 
conditions the nature of the subject’s psyche. By presenting this triangular relation through which 
each subject is socialised as in some sense transcultural or ahistorical, it is unable to offer an account 
of how capitalist modes of production necessarily result in the familial organisation of desire. As 
such, psychoanalysis is unsuitable to the task of analysing the subject as it does not place the subject 
within a historical or political context of which psychoanalysis itself is also a part. Before moving on 
to the last example of ‘psychotic’ writing that Deleuze employs to further his own particular literary 
project, it is worth noting how schizoanalysis has been utilised by Deleuze and Guattari amongst 
others. Schizoanalysis, as we shall see, effectively conjoins the production of literary and 
schizophrenic production into one process. The mechanisms underlying both share fundamental 
attributes, the value of which cannot be ignored for this project which takes the convergence of 
‘psychosis’ and writing as its area of study.  
Schreber and Mary Barnes’ mad texts have, as noted, been utilised in both the critique of 
psychoanalytic reductionism and the British anti-psychiatry movement that similarly relies on 
familial interpretation. The significance of ‘psychotic’ texts or literary writing to schizoanalysis is by 
no means confined to these two examples; Nijinsky and Artaud having been also touched upon. By 
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focusing on these instances of ‘psychotic’ writing, Deleuze and Guattari manage, in a sense, to 
merge ‘schizophrenia’ and literary production into one abstract process, the purpose of which is 
again to stress the radical potential both contain. As such they state, “reading a text is never a 
scholarly exercise in search of what is signified, still less a highly textual exercise in search of a 
signifier, [but rather] a productive use of the literary machine, montage of desiring machines, a 
schizoid exercise that extracts from the text its revolutionary force (1972, p.116). Later, when 
commenting on Engels’ analysis of Balzac, they claim “literature is like schizophrenia: a process and 
not a goal, a production and not an expression” (1972, p.145).49 
 
4.5 Wolfson, the Procedure & Deleuze’s Literary Clinic 
 The last example of ‘psychotic’ text that we must cover here in our survey of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s contribution to knowledge produced from instances of mad writing , concerns Deleuze’s 
use of Louis Wolfson’s (1970) Le Schizo et Les Langues (Schizophrenia and Languages). Louis Wolfson 
was an American author who wrote in French and experienced ‘schizophrenia’ from an early age. 
The particular fascination for Deleuze was that Wolfson, following the onset of his ‘psychosis’, 
quickly came to form a strong aversion to his native mother tongue. As such, he devised a 
                                                          
49 This merger of schizophrenia and literature is a prominent aspect of the larger schizoanalysis project. 
Although I have focused on Schreber and Barnes above, Deleuze and Guattari expend considerable energy 
during their Capitalism and Schizophrenia project examining a range of literary names that have often been 
read via their mental or psychological character. Deleuze and Guattari (1975) read Franz Kafka’s work and 
develop the concept of a ‘minor literature’ which represents for them a real attempt to break free from an 
oedipal logic. Kafka, they argue offers us a ‘line of escape’ and as such is emblematic of deterritorialising 
processes. These lines of escape find expression in the recurring animalistic motifs within Kafka’s work (insect, 
mouse, dog, ape), all of which represent a flight from the immediate oedipal drama, a process of actual 
deterritorialisation in the operation of ‘becoming-animal’. Kafka finds a close ally for Guattari in the figure of 
Marcel Proust. Both are viewed as specialists in presenting “hyper-deterritorialised mental objects” (1979, 
p.231) and are of interest to schizoanalysis due to their ability to commit to writing “mutations of perceptive 
components, in the phenomena of the magnification, displacement, overlapping, acceleration, or deceleration, 
etc. … of sensorial coordinates” (p.232). Following on from these literary reference points for schizoanalysis, 
prominent Deleuzian scholar, Eugene Holland (1993) builds on Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis by applying the 
practice of schizoanalysis to the works of Charles Baudelaire. In a similar fashion to concerns already raised, he 
demonstrates how schizoanalysis is capable of unearthing socioeconomic and cultural considerations that may 




complicated communicational system whereby he immediately began translating every English 
phrase he came across into a foreign language but one that still retained a similar sound or sense to 
its English original. What resulted was a highly complex linguistic system that incorporated aspects 
of numerous other languages (notably French, German, Hebrew and Russian) which enabled him to 
avoid any relation to the English-speaking world whilst allowing him to live in his own private 
symbolic existence. The principles of this highly idiosyncratic linguistic system were committed to 
script in 1963 and eventually published in 1970 with an introduction by Deleuze himself. It has 
remained solely available in French due to the monumental challenges translation represent for such 
a bizarre and complicated work. Deleuze (1998) followed his initial introduction with an essay 
entitled “Louis Wolfson; or, The Procedure” in his last ever published work; a collection of essays 
covering literature’s relationship to what he termed ‘the clinic’. Although this Critique et Clinique 
project was the sole example of Deleuze’s singular engagement with literature, as we have seen over 
the course of this chapter, literature was called upon consistently throughout his overall theoretical 
enterprise. In his Critique et Clinique project, literature in the form of Lewis Carrol, Samuel Beckett, 
Herman Melville and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch demonstrates, for Deleuze, how literary art 
implies a way of living or a ‘form of life’. Literature as a symptom is able, according to Deleuze, to 
highlight the vitality that exists within artistic creation whilst offering new possibilities or modes of 
living.  
 With regard to Wolfson, Deleuze utilises his highly unorthodox book and example of 
‘psychotic’ text to boldly state that, “psychosis is inseparable from a variable linguistic procedure. 
The procedure is the very process of the psychosis” (1998, p.9). By this, Deleuze intends to mean 
that ‘psychosis’ and language are intimately linked but not in the way that Lacan has theorised. 
Deleuze wishes to demonstrate how language as well as bodily depth are key to understanding 
‘psychosis’ and by implication the linguistic procedure.  In perhaps a similar fashion to the way in 
which Kittler relates language acquisition to the maternal body, so too does Deleuze in his overall 
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philosophical project return to the relation between language and bodily depth or surface. 50 
Language and symbol formation occur, for Deleuze, through and in the body. Our voice emitting 
sound, for instance, is an example of the body both producing instances of language or signifiers 
whilst also differentiating itself from them. Sounds escape from the voice of the body that originate 
as units of language within its depths. Language finds its origin within the embodied depth of the 
subject yet due to it reaching the surface it undergoes a resultant change as it interacts within the 
constant flux of the social. It is the depths of the body, however, that provide the basis for the 
subject’s ability to articulate itself.  Tynan (2012) and his analysis of Deleuze’s paper on Wolfson may 
assist our understanding of language and a concern for bodily surfaces and depths when he writes: 
Language as a formal totality does not exist apart from the efforts by which the 
pathic body differentiates itself gradually. Sounds are distinguished from the body 
that omits them [….] The body reaches the limit of a certain physical process, for 
example eating, and this causes the process to change. Thus language and symbol 
formation are understood through a material genesis of the body which always 
begins in the domain of depths (p.82).  
What is important to Deleuze’s analysis of Wolfson’s mad text is that Deleuze finds within his 
account an example of how the ‘schizophrenic’ is robbed of this ‘bodily depth’. As Tynan writes 
again, “the maternal language loses its ‘good sense’, that is, it is stripped down to its bare phonetic 
forms which thus become detached from any designated sematic content or ‘state of affairs’” (2012, 
p.83). What Wolfson attempts to do, his linguistic procedure and highly bizarre technique discussed, 
is employ foreign words that exist outside of his native mother tongue in order to compensate for 
this lack of bodily support within the realm of the semiotic. Deleuze reasons by the end of his 
analysis, however, that Wolfson fails in this procedure and it is precisely this failure which, likewise, 
ensures Wolfson, in Deleuze’s opinion, does not attain the status as literature, that account for his 
‘psychotic’ status. As Deleuze (1998) writes, Wolfson’s procedure ‘remains unproductive’. The 
                                                          
50
 Deleuze (1969) reasons in Logic of Sense that this loss of bodily depth leads to a form of violence on the 
body. “The moment that the pinned-down word loses its sense, it bursts into pieces; it is decomposed into 
syllables, letters, and above all into consonants which act directly on the body, penetrating and bruising it” 
(p.100). This is precisely what Wolfson encounters.  
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concern for bodies and ‘psychosis’ is something that shall accompany us now as we enter into my 
main object of study, the Exegesis of Philip, K. Dick.  
Over the last three chapters I have surveyed a wide range of interrelated concepts, ideas 
and philosophical speculations that link madness, writing and theory together in a complex fashion. 
Although there remain key differences and contradictions in the way in which these different 
systems of thought have interpreted ‘psychotic’ text, they have demonstrated, each in their own 
way, how mad writing has provided the material for reflections on the nature of ‘psychosis’ itself, as 
well as the wider terrain in which ‘psychotic’ subjects have committed their experiences to script.  In 
short, all of the interpretations covered have lead me to the foregrounding of a psychosocial 
analyses of ‘psychotic’ text that pays particular attention to the psychoanalytically informed notion 
that ‘psychotic’ writing  (and indeed ‘psychosis’ itself) is a form of cure or self-stabilisation.51 What’s 
more, the theoretical insight afforded us by the psychoanalytic thinkers covered allows us to 
appreciate, to some extent, how  this writing cure or stabilisation process achieved through delusion 
or paranoia can allow  ‘the social’ to creep back into even the most outlandish and bizarre claims 
emanating from mad experience. Although Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis takes point with 
the psychoanalytic foundation on which this notion rests, they similarly suggest that the 
‘schizophrenic’ is able to tie himself into various plains of social existence and  this ‘machinic 
connection’, to use their language, can also be enacted via the process of writing. 
We have then at the end of Part 1, a tight nexus emerging between writing, madness and 
the way in which this can harness or reproduce social, political and ideological themes within the 
                                                          
51
 Foregrounding a psychosocial approach necessitates some discussion on precisely what I mean by ‘the 
psychosocial’. In essence, I view it as an attempt to think how the domains of the individual or the personal are 
intimately related to the social. Although a relatively new field of distinct research (‘psychosocial studies’) it 
amalgamates a number of established theoretical positions ranging from critical psychology and discourse 
analysis, through to social theory, gender studies, queer theory and feminist research as well as aspects of 
poststructuralism, wider critical theory and of various strands of philosophy. All of these differing disciplines 
and bodies of theory are drawn upon in an attempt to bridge, what psychosocial studies sees, as a gap or 
fissure between an academic focus which is strictly limited to the individual versus society or the personal 
against the political. The internal and external comprise the same space for any psychosocial enquiry.  
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content of a startlingly extraordinary account of one man’s subjectivity or place in the world. 
Reading Schreber’s transformation into a woman or the intricate nature of the cosmos that he puts 
forth, in tandem with modern developments within culture and technology, is a vitally important 
manoeuvre that I will hold onto as we enter into an original set of analyses of a different mad text. 
Kittler’s (1985) attention to developments in media and resultant forms of communication, as well 
as Santner’s (1996) focus on a breakdown in symbolic functioning that straddles both the subject 
and the social simultaneously, are incredibly rich avenues for thinking through the way in which mad 
writing can be analysed.  
Our initial methodological discussion relating to Mad Studies has to perhaps now be 
augmented slightly by these forms of analysis. In some respects there is a slight conflict here with a 
hard-line approach that states any attempt to render meaning from madness via academic 
interpretation, without seeking dialogue with an author, is necessarily unethical and serves to re-
inscribe an othering of madness via abstract theorising.  All of the interpretations of Schreber 
covered here in Part 1 have, to a greater or lesser extent, done just this. But does this mean that 
these readings are any less valuable in my own attempts to explore the mad writing of PKD? If I want 
to harness the insights on offer here but also acknowledge the ethical pitfalls that Voronka, Russo 
and Beresford outline, then I effectively will have to move beyond the debates within Mad Studies 
that are centred almost solely on whether reading enacts a form of violence or not. The readings 
that I shall develop going forward do seek to render meaning from madness and are informed by the 
psychosocial analyses covered above.  It is this commitment to psychosociality, a methodological 
focus on depth versus surface, as well as an acknowledgment of the overdetermined nature of 
interpretation that will allow me, I believe, to move past the somewhat restrictive conclusions to the 
Mad Studies debates. In keeping with the way in which psychoanalysis has provided the theoretical 
foundation from which these more psychosocially minded readings have followed, I want to 
establish a psychoanalytic reading of PKD’s mad writing first, prior to opening it up to broader socio-
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cultural analysis. Before constructing these readings and in order to contextualise them, I shall open 
Part 2 now by introducing PKD, his relation to forms of psychiatrisation and his exegetic writing; a 
collection of writing that I shall utilise as a foundation to make my own contribution to these 



































Part 2: Psychosocial Readings of Philip K. Dick’s Exegesis  
 
“The paranoids merely have “delusional ideas”; they see the same reality that we do, but interpret it 


















Chapter 5: The Madness of Philip K. Dick: PKD, ‘Psychosis’ & The Exegesis 
 
Philip Kindred Dick has, since his death in 1982, become something of a popular cultural 
icon. His vast back catalogue of science fiction and mainstream novels, as well as a 100 plus short 
stories, have secured him the position as a celebrated writer and literary figure. In 2007, a number of 
his works came to be included in the prestigious Library of America, further securing his place as a 
canonical author. However, this mostly posthumous fame is arguably found in the ever-increasing 
number of Hollywood films and TV adaptations that have been made of his work rather than his 
actual literary output. Many such adaptations bear the hallmarks of his personal and quite unique 
vision of reality. As a result, his name has become synonymous as much with uncertain ontological 
realities and highly speculative philosophical predicaments as it has with the staples of a pulp 
science fiction genre consisting of time travel, alien invasion, telepathy and so forth. Another 
prominent and recurring motif, and one that has special relevance to this thesis, pertains to 
‘psychosis' and psychopathology more generally. Novels such as Time out of Joint (1959), Martian 
Time Slip (1964), Clans of the Alphane Moon (1964) and We Can Build You (1972) illustrate this most 
effectively. Many of his other narratives are also infused with a paranoid sensibility,52 one that is also 
reflected in the biographical details of his colourful and well documented life. In this chapter I wish 
to introduce the figure of PKD, his work and ultimately his mammoth writing project that he 
undertook from 1974 until his death eight years later. PKD referred to this as his Exegesis and 
despite running at many thousands of pages, it was finally made available to the public following a 
large edited version published in 2011.53 The relation to psychopathology, ‘psychosis’ or madness 
that pervades PKD’s life and work can be understood to culminate in this lengthy, unwieldy 
                                                          
52
 For a brief but worthwhile commentary on some of these paranoid themes found in PKD’s work and the 
associated adaptations, see Daniel Wyman’s “The Paranoid Individual: An Analysis of Paranoia in the Writing of 
Philip K. Dick” in Occam’s Razor: Vol.2, Article 3.  
53
 The full Exegesis is available on line via http://zebrapedia.psu.edu/ with attendant commentary and 
discussion from the PKD fan community. (Accessed 10/04/2020). 
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document. It is this document that I shall be conducting psychosocial readings of, comprising Part 2 
of this thesis. 
Before doing so it is necessary that we contextualise PKD, his work and the Exegesis. 
Although this is not an exhaustive literature review concerned with all the areas in which PKD has 
impacted on literary studies, science fiction studies or cultural theory more generally, this chapter 
does serve to introduce some of the more prominent debates or areas of academic life in which PKD 
is often situated. To begin, I want to touch on a set of debates or ideas that circle around the 
concept of postmodernism and its relation to ‘psychosis’ or ‘schizophrenia’ in particular. In order to 
perhaps best understand the reception of PKD’s work and the manner by which it is consistently 
placed in relation to varying forms of madness, it is necessary that we reference the use of clinical 
terms such as paranoia and ‘schizophrenia’ by postmodern theorists who attempt to describe 
cultural states of being; states that are often represented in PKD’s science fiction imaginings. 
Following which, I want to turn to PKD’s own biography. As stated previously, this is not to claim that 
PKD was ‘psychotic’ but rather to highlight his undoubted preoccupation with aspects of mental 
health and his own experience of psychological or emotional turmoil. As I noted in the introduction, 
attempts to position PKD as a ‘certified psychotic subject’ or someone suffering from a 
‘schizophrenic illness’ are hotly debated to say the least. I will refer to some of these debates 
emerging from his biography whilst highlighting some of the inherent pitfalls in attempting to 
pathologize an individual via their biography or writing more generally. This is to make no mention 
of the ethical implications of doing so.54 Lastly, this chapter will touch on the scholarly work that 
already exists in respect of my object of study, the Exegesis. What should become apparent by the 
                                                          
54
 As the authors (Schmidt et al, 2020) of the short Lancet article Retrospective Diagnosis of Mental Illness: Past 
and Present state, “mental illnesses should be seen as social constructions. For example, what was considered 
as a past psychiatric disorder {….} is nowadays considered a norm variant, and some disorders have no 
equivalent past disorder. In other words, medical knowledge is socially and culturally transformed. Thus, 
projection of disease categories and definitions into the past is an inadmissible simplification and an 
anachronism” (p.14). Further discussion and full article can be found at: 




end of the chapter is that categorising this author, his life or final writing project is anything but an 
easy task and this is perhaps especially relevant when it comes to discussing the ‘madness’ that 
constantly surrounds this enigmatic writer and popular figure. 
 
5.2 PKD, Postmodernism & (Paranoid) ‘Schizophrenia’ 
 Any casual glance at the critical commentary surrounding PKD’s life and work will likely 
result in the emergence of one key term: postmodernism. In fact, two of the chief architects of the 
concept, Fredric Jameson (1991) in his Postmodernism: or the Cultural logic of Late Capitalism and 
Jean Baudrillard (1981) with Simulacra and Simulation both cite PKD in these respective works. 
Similarly, one of the most popular monographs on PKD in recent years also places his work within 
the conflictual space of ‘postmodern humanism’ (Palmer, 2003).  For Jameson, PKD’s work, 
particularly that set within the 1950’s, is indicative of postmodernism’s tendency to evoke a 
‘nostalgia for the present’. Jameson’s (2005) utilisation of PKD’s novels to provoke a questioning of 
historicity is further complemented by his later thoughts on the way in which PKD offers a method 
for conceptualising new ‘historico-temporal perspectives’, ones often obfuscated by postmodernism 
itself. Baudrillard, on the other hand, draws on PKD’s work to flesh out his ideas concerning 
‘hyperreality’ and the fabrication of our shared collective world.  
If we remain with both of these theorists, we can note also how their thoughts on late 
capitalist society depict postmodernity as bearing a certain resemblance to ‘schizophrenia’, a 
phenomenon of great interest to PKD as well. In fact, Jameson explicitly cites Lacan’s theorisation of 
‘schizophrenia’ when he describes it as a “breakdown in the signifying chain [….] the interlocking 
syntagmatic series of signifiers which constitutes an utterance or meaning” (1991, p.26). For 
Jameson, this breakdown becomes indicative of postmodernism’s capacity to illicit within us an 
inability “to unify the past, present, and future of our own biographical experience and psychic life” 
(ibid, p.27); an inability conditioned by a collapse of all temporal frames. Indeed, in a precursor to his 
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1991 book, in an essay entitled Postmodernism and the Consumer Society (1982), he again draws on 
Lacan to make a comparison between the ‘schizophrenic’s’ undifferentiated vision of the present 
(with a corresponding loss of self) and the experience of postmodern time. This notion of 
postmodern time bearing close resemblance to ‘psychosis’ or ‘schizophrenia’, particularly one 
derived from within Lacanian framework, is something that we shall return to in later chapters. 
Baudrillard similarly touches on this estrangement or altered relation to reality when, in The Ecstasy 
of Communication (1987), he emphasises how modern subjects are not now afflicted by pathologies 
we may term hysteria or paranoia but rather “a state of terror which is characteristic of 
schizophrenia, an over-proximity of all things” (p.27). The ‘schizophrenic’ state comes to characterise 
a postmodern experience for Baudrillard that is typified by an unbearable sense of intensity and 
associated confusion.  
We could say, then, that both Jameson and Baudrillard’s work, perhaps more so than any 
others within the postmodern cannon, has helped establish a conceptual link between 
‘schizophrenia’ and postmodernism. Although Deleuze and Guattari within their theoretical system 
argued for a relation between capitalism and ‘schizophrenia’, they were essentially attempting to 
highlight the transcendental potential of ‘schizophrenia’ in overcoming capitalist process. For 
Jameson, no such potential exists and his loose Lacanian theorisation of this clinical entity is used in 
a largely metaphorical sense. Although he and Baudrillard may have contributed towards the 
popular cultural notion of ‘postmodern schizophrenia’ in which PKD’s writing may have come to be 
understood, we should note that there are many critics of Jameson’s argument and his use of the 
idea. Frosh (1991) has highlighted, for instance, how Jameson and other theorists of ‘postmodern 
schizophrenia’ refuse to account for the specificity of the ‘psychotic’ process in terms of class, race 
or gender differences which underwrite subject formation. The point in highlighting this contested 
understanding of ‘postmodern schizophrenia’ is to emphasise that, regardless of whether 
postmodernism (if we can even establish this as a coherently understood concept) has an inherent 
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relation to ‘schizophrenia’, either in terms of its metaphorical similarities or shared 
phenomenological space, what we can note is a tight nexus of interrelated ideas around the figure of 
PKD. Acknowledging the potential influence of such ideas on my own interpretation and reading of 
Exegesis is paramount. Without this, there is a danger that I may simply reproduce these attempts to 
correlate psychopathological states with the postmodern cultural domain in which PKD sits. 
Although I have touched on the relevance of ‘postmodern schizophrenia’ to the cultural reception of 
PKD’s work, we should also note how another aspect of ‘psychosis’- paranoia- helped shaped the 
cultural milieu in which PKD sat.    
Much has been written about the paranoia infused within American society during the latter 
half of the twentieth century. The cold war era that PKD lived through is often associated with a 
politics of fear, conspiracy theory and a generally suspicious cultural persuasion (see, Melley 2000; 
Reisch 2012; Dunne, 2013). Richard Hofstadter (1964) coined the idea of a ‘paranoid style’ in 
American politics in the mid 60’s, and this is undoubtedly reflected in PKD’s imagined worlds and 
science fiction landscapes.55  In keeping with this, Strowa (2008), in her work on PKD’s relation to 
this cold ward climate of paranoia, adopts the concept of ‘allegories’ to explain the way in which 
many of the characters in his novels come to understand their predicament as one immense 
allegory; one that is invested with some deeper symbolic meaning that they only begin to uncover 
following an initial paranoid reaction to a series of bizarre events.  This hermeneutic logic is further 
utilised by Carl Freedman (1984) in his attempts to outline a theory of paranoia drawn from Marx’s 
notion of ‘commodity fetishism’. For Freedman, PKD’s novels illustrate a particular paranoid attitude 
that finds everyday items and objects a source of anxiety owing to their inherent spectral quality. 
                                                          
55
 Alexander Dunst (2016), in his study on how Madness came to play a prominent part in America’s political 
and cultural debates during the cold war, identifies PKD’s Exegesis as a revealing source for unveiling the 
paranoia present in US society.  Dunst pursues another line of enquiry in respect of the attunement of the 
Exegesis to its contemporary moment. He writes, "What emerges most forcefully from the Exegesis, however, 
is what I am tempted to describe by the same prefix as Dick’s religiosity. If his theology is post-Christian, then 
the medical terminology is post-psychoanalytic. No one therapeutic ideology dominates the Exegesis. As for 
the authority figure of the healer or analyst, he is increasingly replaced by the ideology of self-help that 
flourished in the 1970’s” (p.104).  
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PKD himself captured this best when he described the paranoid stance not as a fear of others but 
rather a fear of one’s entire reality. He writes that the ultimate in paranoia:  
is not when everyone is against you but when everything is against you. Instead of 
‘My boss is plotting against me,’ it would be ‘My boss’s phone is plotting against me’. 
Objects sometimes seem to possess a will of their own anyhow, to the normal mind; 
they don’t do what they’re supposed to do, they get in the way, they show an 
unnatural resistance to change (1977, p.447).  
Marx’s comment that the products of human labour appear to be ‘endowed with a life of their own’ 
is, for Freedman, illustrative of a theory of paranoia that can be derived from PKD’s thought. And 
once again we encounter a potential pitfall when it comes to analysing, reading or interpreting PKD’s 
life and work. The concepts of ‘schizophrenia’ and paranoia are already heavily invested in his 
overall status. Whether his work is being used to bolster the claims of postmodernism’s inherit 
relation to ‘schizophrenia’ or how his work channels a general paranoid stance within later twentieth 
century American life, it is hard to disentangle PKD, the individual subject and author, from the 
larger cultural milieu in which he has been placed. Of course, any author will to some degree reflect 
the cultural moment in which they write, yet PKD’s work doesn’t just reflect it, it positively embraces 
and extenuates it, perhaps more so than any other author of that period. What’s more, the absolute 
centrality of paranoia to his work invites a tautological reading where paranoia re-doubles back on 
to itself from culture through PKDs psyche and back out into culture via his novels and writing. This 
tautology is hard to escape when we enter into any discussion regarding PKD’s supposed mental 
state and the paranoid historical moment in which he lived. This tension between wanting to engage 
and simultaneously resist tautological analysis, I think, speaks to the difficulties in trying to separate 
the subject from the social or perhaps the clinic from culture.   
To complicate matters still further, PKD himself was no stranger to reflecting on the nature 
of ‘paranoid schizophrenia’ and he read widely around the topic. I mentioned above that the 
‘postmodernism-schizophrenia’ link is conjoined, for Jameson at least, by a concern for temporality 
or rather its altered nature under both conditions. PKD, likewise, touched on this issue in an essay 
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entitled Schizophrenia and the Book of Changes in 1965. In it, he elaborates his thoughts on the 
nature of this diagnostic category, arguing for it to be understood as an unresolved developmental 
state situated between his concept of personal and shared reality (idios kosmos/koinos kosmos). The 
Laingian resonance here between different senses of ‘self’ is further encapsulated when, in true anti-
psychiatry style, PKD declares that ‘schizophrenia’ is far from “a retreat from reality, but on the 
contrary: the breaking out of reality all around” (1995, p.176). The temporal dimension comes to the 
fore when he argues that the ‘schizophrenic’, in some form, exists outside of usual time and 
causality. In PKD’s reasoning, the ‘schizophrenic’ operates with an acausal time frame or one he 
terms ‘synchronicity’ (borrowing from Wolfgang Pauli and no doubt influenced also by Jung’s use). 
Anthony Enns (2006), in his article on Media, Drugs and Schizophrenia in the Works of Philip K Dick, 
goes to some lengths to support this at first odd conception of ‘schizophrenia’ by utilising the work 
of Fredrick Kittler, a figure we encountered earlier, who commented upon the effects of time 
modulation and distortion due to modern forms of media technology. We shall return to this tight 
intersection between time, technological development and the impact on psychological states below 
when we address the temporal dimension within PKD’s exegetic writing. For now, however, we can 
note that the reception of PKDs work and the underlying themes he returned to over a 30-year 
writing career are already associated with broader socio-cultural framings which are themselves 
indebted to certain understandings of ‘psychosis’.  This entanglement between his work and the 
historical landscape in which it took place takes on another level of added complication when we 
start to examine PKD’s biography and his very own relation to madness. 
  
5.3 PKD’s Madness 
 If PKD’s writing has become something of a reference point for a postmodern sensibility 
characterised as fragmented, alienated, and following Jameson and Baudrillard, possibly even 
‘schizophrenic’, then mirroring his works of fiction (which often entail bumbling heroes succumbing 
to the anxieties of their uncertain predicament) details of his own life have come to suggest that PKD 
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himself was prone to periods of great mental instability and outward paranoia. Unpicking PKD’s 
relation to forms of ‘psychopathology’ is no easy task. As stated, this is due, in part, to the way in 
which his life and writing have come to exist within a cultural domain that wishes to extenuate 
themes related to the instability of reality. PKD’s fictional output and actual historical life at times 
get submerged by a desire to portray him as some harbinger of our collective postmodern existence, 
one that has a maddening effect on us all.   
The second major issue with establishing any coherent sense of PKD’s own psychological 
state is that his biography is a contested domain. Whatever can be said of PKD one thing is for 
certain - he revelled in the chance to participate in his own mythologizing and openly contradicted 
himself in the many interviews, writings and autobiographical reflections that have served as an 
archive with which to construct his life story. At times this appears intentional. PKD, often in a 
mischievous or playful manner, would actively over-dramatize, reconstruct or altogether fabricate 
the stories or well discussed elements of his life.  Often, however, the actual difficulty in establishing 
facts in relation to PKD’s life are beset by his, at times, chaotic behaviour as well as various personal 
problems that seemed to have impacted his ability to narrate his own life story. The difficulties in 
separating PKD, the man, from PKD, the myth, will present the main barriers to any discussion 
relating to his own emotional or psychological turmoil. We should note also the sheer number of 
biographies that are in existence. Although Lawrence Sutin’s (2006) Divine Invasion: A Life of Philip K. 
Dick is often held up as the official biography, there exist many others. Emmanuel Carrére’s (2006) 
controversial ‘imaginative recreation’ of PKD’s life entitled I am alive and you are dead: A journey 
inside the mind of Philip K. Dick has gained a degree of widespread popularity. PKD’s third wife, Ann 
R. Dick (1995) also penned her own account The Search for Philip K Dick and very recently, the 
graphic novel version Philip K. Dick: A Comics Biography (Queyssi & Marchesi, 2019) was released. 
PKD himself contributed towards his own written biography through many different articles and 
interviews that are contained now across several different publications: What if Our World is Their 
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Heaven: The Final Conversation of Philip K. Dick (ed. by Lee & Summers, 2001); The Last Interview 
and Other Conversation (ed. by Streitfeld, 2015); as well as the many different pieces contained with 
Lawrence Sutin’s (1995) edited volume The Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick which also undoubtedly 
contribute to this burgeoning corpus of writing dealing with PKD’s life.  Kyle Arnold (2016) has 
written perhaps the first proper psychobiography of the author and his attempts to frame PKD’s life 
in the respect of ‘divine madness’ is something we will return to shortly. Indeed, PKD’s legacy, as 
contained within this corner of literary biography, shows no signs of letting up. Gollancz SF, the 
major science fiction publisher, has announced that at the end of 2020 they too will be releasing 
another biography of PKD, undertaken by Darryl Mason. Yet, despite all of these biographies, not 
one categorially places him as an individual who can be understood via one single psychiatric 
diagnostic label. Despite a near life long relationship with forms of psychotherapy and interactions 
with numerous psychiatrists, some of which resulted in him being detained in a psychiatric facility, 
there is a general reluctance to refer to PKD as either definitively ‘psychotic’, ‘schizophrenic’, 
suffering from ‘bipolar disorder’ or any other mental health classification. As such, he is not ever 
placed within the kinds of categories that are perhaps more familiar to the Mad Studies project. 
Titles such as ‘expert by experience’, ‘psychiatric survivor’ or ‘mental health service-user’ are not 
ones we will find associated with PKD’s name either. He has not been psychiatrised to the extent 
that perhaps other authors, who have penned narratives of their psychological turmoil have - the 
ones we find being used as ‘raw data’ for research purposes that so present issues for Mad Studies 
thinkers.56  And it is precisely this reason that makes the Exegesis such an intriguing document or 
archive with which to question the role of madness or ‘psychosis’ at play. There are many hints and 
questions around PKD’s mental state during its composition, but it is yet to be placed within a 
framework lending itself solely to the ‘psy-discourses’.  
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 I am referring here to the work of Russo (2016) and Voronka (2015), amongst others, who have 




In order to unpick PKD’s biographical conundrum and any potential relation to madness or 
‘psychosis’, I am here heavily indebted to Roger Luckhurst (2015) and his essay entitled Diagnosing 
Dick. Luckhurst’s work here represents the most sustained serious engagement with PKD’s 
biography and its possible relation to psychiatric diagnosis, and, I would argue,  has no rival in terms 
of scholarly work that has been done on PKD’s biography with the single focus on his relation to 
madness through the lens of the ‘psy-discourses’. Following Luckhurst, I have utilised the widely 
accepted ‘official’ biography of PKD by Lawrence Sutin (2006) as a secondary source. Luckhurst 
offers us a potted history of various diagnoses that he received over a forty-year period. To begin, he 
draws attention to PKD’s treatment for phobic anxiety and tachycardia by a Jungian psychotherapist 
in the 1940’s, which was followed up in the 1950’s with low doses of amphetamine semoxydrine. 
PKD himself identifies several breakdowns that followed, including one at the start of his enrolment 
at the University of California, Berkeley, aged 19. Luckhurst then points towards PKD’s later self-
diagnosis of this episode when in 1965 he described himself as a ‘schizoid affective with a 
preschizophrenic personality’.  
From here on, things become a little more complicated. We know that PKD suffered further 
breakdowns following the end of his third, fourth and then fifth marriages. Luckhurst highlights the 
familial connection to ‘schizophrenia’ with his Aunt having been diagnosed as a ‘catatonic 
schizophrenic’ who died in 1953, a possible precipitating factor to PKD’s own breakdown shortly 
after. Sutin (2006) suggests that manic depression was to blame for PKD’s visions, in 1963, of a 
‘malign iron god’ in the sky, although raises PKD’s use of ‘certain chemicals’ and ‘psychedelic drugs’ 
as possibly having their own part to play (p.127). In 1967, whilst heavily under the influence of 
Ritalin and his own non-prescribed batch of amphetamines, PKD was hospitalised as a paranoid or 
‘borderline psychotic’. A subsequent suicide attempt in May 1970 resulted in admission to a 
psychiatric ward in Marin county hospital and the Ross Psychiatric Clinic, where the attempt was 
attributed to what is now termed ‘drug induced psychosis’. Luckhurst goes still further in tracing 
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PKD’s trajectory through various psychiatric institutes and the different labels he collected along the 
way. In 1971, PKD was seen in the Orange County Mental Hospital and was at that time diagnosed 
with manic depression. Luckhurst draws attention to another suicide attempt in Vancouver in 1972, 
which “landed him in the notorious X-Kalay drug rehabilitation centre and then, following his return 
to California, he underwent treatment for symptoms variously diagnosed as manic depression, mood 
disorder, anxiety including agoraphobia, and also a bipolar condition” (2015, p.14). Needless to say, 
arriving at a clear concise diagnosis for PKD is hampered by his lifelong psychiatric career, to make 
no mention of his own self-diagnosis which has only served to confuse biographical facts further as 
PKD’s life becomes enmeshed within half-truths and popular hearsay.   
However, there remains one particular episode within Dickian folklore that, depending on 
one’s viewpoint, is either attributable to what PKD himself once described as a ‘total psychosis’ or 
something altogether different. As the popular legend goes, on the 3rd February 1974, whilst 
recovering from dental treatment and under the influence of strong painkillers (and the anti-
psychotic drug, Lithium) a delivery woman from a local pharmaceutical store came to drop off 
prescribed medication. On answering the door and noticing a Christian fish symbol necklace that she 
was wearing, PKD claims to have been struck by a pink beam of light which he came to interpret as a 
form of communication emanating from a god-like alien life form he christened ‘VALIS’ (standing for 
Vast Active Living Information System). This entity then proceeded to impart information to him via 
a series of pictures and images, leading PKD to believe that he was inhabited by at least two 
different historical personas and that Ancient Rome was still in existence, supplanted onto present 
day Orange County. PKD further reasoned that the Roman Empire was still in fact engaged in a 
centuries old conflict with certain ‘Christian sects’ and that our present reality was an elaborate 
fiction designed to conceal this (something he later came to refer to as the Black Iron Prison). The 
events - or PKD’s own short hand for them, ‘2-3-74’ - would be subject to interpretation and further 
reinterpretation for the remainder of his life. The major document to this is his obsessive 
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hypergraphic Exegesis - a 10,000-page investigation into these events and their place in the universe. 
Although much of PKD’s Exegesis attempted to frame this within an overtly theological system, his 
use of psychiatric, psychoanalytic and pseudo-neurological terminology was never far from his 
reasoning. It is worth mentioning also that the events of ‘2-3-74’ have themselves entered into a 
kind of quasi-religious mythology surrounding PKD’s life. Consequently, PKD has, for some, come to 
embody the role of a new age guru or the prophet of some spun out Californian science fiction 
religion in the style of L. Ron Hubbard (see Mckee, 2003). PKD himself contributed to this 
mythologizing when he used these experiences to develop his semi-autobiographical novels VALIS 
(1981) and later The Divine Invasion (1981). One need look no further than Robert Crumb’s 
illustrated account of ‘2-3-74’ (see appendix) to see how these events have been integrated into an 
array of pop culture formats, which has only made the task of understanding them that much more 
complex. 
We can undoubtedly recognise a diagnostic muddle which is mired not only by the 
numerous official labels PKD received but by the intrusion of his own self-analysis and furthermore, 
the entanglement of his life with the fiction of which he wrote. Luckhurst’s argument, however, is 
that PKD’s ever-changing diagnostic states can be read against a history of twentieth century 
changes in psychiatric and social theory on the nature of madness and paranoia and this is what I 
find particularly useful in my own attempts to align the Exegesis with ‘psychotic’ writing. Madness is 
forever in a state of flux and just like PKD’s lifelong experience of psychiatrisation, interpreting them 
is an open, porous endeavour where one should resist temptation to arrive at a definite diagnostic 
label or succinct psychopathological state to describe something with a rich and, at times, 
contradictory history.  In keeping with this, Luckhurst points towards the work of Carl Freedman 
(1984) cited above, who situates PKD’s paranoia not in the realm of individual pathology but in 
relation to a social or political critique that draws on ‘paranoid schizophrenia’. He quotes once again 
the work of Jameson, Baudillard and Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus as being instructive 
164 
 
examples of this. Utilising Ian Hacking’s (1986) work on ‘dynamic nominalism’ which emphasises 
how the emergence of new labels or diagnoses in themselves result in new personality types, 
patterns of behaviour or subjective positions, Luckhurst suggests that PKD, who was keenly 
interested in psychology and psychiatry, was susceptible to this very process. For instance, the 
parallels between PKD’s ‘2-3-74’ experience and the ‘influencing machine’ as portrayed by Victor 
Tausk (1919) are easy to spot. Luckhurst believes PKD would also have been aware of the popular 
1950’s account of one woman’s personal experience of ‘schizophrenia’ - Barbara O’Brien’s (1958) 
Operators and Things. Both of these may have assisted him in his construction and elaboration of his 
own possible ‘paranoid schizophrenic’ state. Definitive diagnosis in respect of PKD is, therefore, 
beset by an array of theoretical, historical and popular interpretations that, whilst offering a 
colourful backdrop to PKD’s biography, doesn’t make for an easy argument that PKD was 
categorically ‘psychotic’. As Luckhurst states in closing, diagnosing PKD: 
is only to diagnose an understanding of subjectivity that is always in the process of 
making itself up, alert to the alluring promise of the next diagnostic nosology 
appearing on the horizon, offering a promise of a final authoritative self-definition 
(2015, p.27).  
Ultimately, any attempt at arriving at diagnostic certainty has to grapple with the question as to 
what those diagnostic labels mean as they themselves are contested. This is to make no mention of 
the historical ambiguity that accompanies such labels as they consistently shift over time. In many 
respects, if I am to remain faithful to the spirit of the Mad Studies project, efforts to arrive at one 
authoritative understanding based on psychiatric nosology, diagnostics or classification is in effect 
repeating the very same manoeuvre of whitewashing individual experience by expert knowledge. 
The same mechanism is at work in utilising mad narratives to further intellectual aims as with the 
task of analysing all of PKD’s biography to arrive at a distinct and singular understanding of his 
mental state when writing the Exegesis. I believe this should be avoided at all costs. Not only does it 
raise important ethical questions but glosses over the fact that any such diagnostic label that could 
be applied to the figure of PKD will be a heavily fraught domain of knowledge.  
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5.4 The Exegesis & Current Scholarship 
Current scholarship on PKD’s Exegesis is somewhat limited. Due to it having only been 
published in 2011 and due perhaps also to its intimidating size, this is not altogether unsurprising. 
The most significant contributions available are collected together in Part Four of an anthology of 
essays dedicated to PKD’s life and work, as edited by A. Dunst and S. Schlensag in 2015. The last 
three essays in the collection tackle the Exegesis and I will here provide a summary of their 
arguments and insights as well as the possible relevance to my overall thesis. I will begin with 
Richard Doyle’s Stairway to Eleusis, or: Perennially Philip K. Dick which is an expanded version of an 
afterword published within the Exegesis itself. Doyle’s (2015) opening comments attest to his own 
‘seeking out’ of the Exegesis over many years, believing it to have contained almost prophetic like 
insights into the coming information age and “the world of pure consciousness and the realities that 
ensue from it” (p.194). This ‘seeking out’ for Doyle brought him to the earlier versions or fragments 
of the Exegesis available prior to the 2011 edition. PKD himself ‘leaked’ the existence of it out into 
passages contained within Horselover Fats (VALIS’s main protagonist) ‘Tractate’, itself a fictionalised 
version of the Exegesis. Next came the 1991 Underwood edition, edited by Lawrence Sutin, which 
contained small fragments which was soon followed up in 1995 where the Exegesis was given the 
‘last word’ in a collection of PKD’s philosophical and literary works titled The Shifting Realities of 
Philip K Dick. Such fragments dispersed over different collections and semi-autobiographical works 
offered Doyle and no doubt many others a tantalising if not frustrating glimmer into this much 
sought after work. Doyle stresses again that it was not until Pamela Jackson undertook her ‘absurdly 
epic editorial task’ that the Exegesis has been available in full (see, Zebrapedia.psu.edu) with the 
published abridged version accompanying it.   
PKD’s epic quest for understanding as contained within the thousands of handwritten notes, 
Doyle argues, makes it:  
comparable only to Sufi Ibn Arabi’s 15,000-page modern edition of al-Futûhât al-
makkiyya (‘Meccan Openings’) as a likely single-author text. PKD’s arguments, 
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diagrams, summaries, breakthroughs and premature conclusions all put him, 
along with Arabi, squarely within what Aldous Huxley called ‘the Perennial 
Philosophy’” (2015, p.195).  
Huxley’s ‘perennial philosophy’ speaks to PKD’s epic undertaking not just in its concern for tying up 
‘fragments of truth’ across hugely disparate theological systems but in its ability to conjoin Eastern 
and Western religious traditions. Huxley’s well known investigation incorporated Tao Buddhism and 
Brahmin scriptures alongside Christian mystics in an attempt to distil such diverse religious traditions 
into one profound truth. Doyle argues that PKD’s writing itself served as a kind of Tibetan tantra or 
‘core shamanism’ whereby he was able to “periodically dissolve himself into language itself – what 
he names most consistently as the Logos, the Greek term for both ‘speech’ and reason” (ibid. p.197).  
This dissolving into language, or Logos, results, for Doyle, in PKD abstracting himself from his own 
writing. The result is that the Exegesis takes on an almost autonomous quality as the VALIS 
experience conditions an ‘involuntary chain of mental events’ within PKD’s mind. Indeed, PKD begins 
to see connections everywhere which engenders within him a heighted spiritual or quasi-religious 
sense. Writing of such immense and at times manic proportions leads to PKD’s experience of the 
divine. To quote Doyle again:  
under the influence of his own writing, Dick seems to have observed himself as an 
abstraction – not in the sense of a deadened thing taken out of its context, but in the 
sense that software engineers discuss ‘layers of abstraction’: an act of metacognition 
or description that at once detaches from and observes layers of the system (p.199).  
 
If such an experience is at all attainable then it is perhaps not too difficult to imagine it taking on a 
religious significance as one observes oneself and the world around from a heightened vantage 
point.  
 Following on from Doyle, Erik Davis (2015) offers an account of ‘2-3-74’, the series of 
revelatory insights PKD experienced which proved the trigger for his undertaking of the Exegesis, 
after which he turns to PKD’s ‘occasional but significant hermeneutic use’ of one near Eastern text 
from antiquity, the Hymn of Souls. Davis argues that this particular text assisted PKD in accounting 
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for the ‘2-3-74’ visons as well as “elaborate his notion of anamnesis …. and identify, or at least name, 
one of the personalities that sometimes seemed to possess him” (p.175). Davis argues that PKD’s 
writing, in this instance, cannot be properly understood without moving away from a ‘secular bias’ 
that runs through much of the commentary on PKD’s later theological work and science fiction in 
general. Indeed, Davis expressly argues that such a position will continue to obscure our view of 
such ‘visionary productions’ and that by de-valuing such esoteric or outwardly religious experiences 
we will miss crucial insights that PKD has to offer. By collapsing all of these experiences and his 
writing into forms of psychopathology, Davis argues that PKD’s concern for the sacred is worryingly 
overlooked. And it is within the tradition of Gnosis, one of the dominant themes of the Exegesis, that 
Davis undertakes his analysis of PKD’s exegetic writing.    
  The Hymn of the Soul or the Hymn of the Pearl that PKD refers to during various stages of 
the Exegesis is a fable contained within the apocryphal Acts of Thomas, believed to be a third 
century Christian text of Syriac origin. Constructed as a song delivered by Thomas to other prisoners, 
it tells the story of a prince who is sent to Egypt to retrieve a pearl from a serpent or dragon. Once 
there he is seduced by the Egyptians, thereby forgetting his homeland and his original task. His 
father, the King, subsequently sends him a letter rousing him from forgetfulness enabling him to 
resume his task and return home. Davis cites PKD’s referencing of the fable in his personal 
correspondence with friend Claudia Bush, as well as in other entries to the Exegesis. The story’s 
themes of spiritual awakening, homecoming and transformation serve Davis as a useful framework 
for understanding some of PKD’s preoccupations following the ‘2-3-74’ experiences. In relation to 
this, Davis points towards PKD’s concern for anamnesis, or his belief in the ability of the right side of 
the brain to recollect knowledge previously unknown, which he at times frames as a form of 
collective unconscious. This interplay between hidden and overt knowledge, or knowing and non-
knowing, is underscored by Davis as he demonstrates how PKD seems to have actively played with 
this dynamic, both in his recounting of his own past awareness of the Hymn as well as in other facts 
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related to his life in general. His biography is littered with contradictions and inaccuracies, in no 
small part due to PKD’s own recollection of certain events. Often it has been noted that PKD claimed 
to be unaware of something or some particular event only to have earlier evidenced the opposite. 
Whether these are examples of PKD toying with interviewers and biographers to add an air of 
mystery to his public image or actual instances of PKD disavowing certain knowledge remains highly 
debatable. Whatever the case, PKD’s own recounting of the ‘2-3-74’ events can be seen as an 
exercise in possible subterfuge or as Davis terms a “hermeneutics of forgetting and remembering 
that performs and inscribes the ironies of the modern gnostic intellectual, who knows that non-
knowledge is at least as important as knowledge” (p.181).  
Davis moves on to relate the significance of the Hymn to PKD’s account of ‘2-3-74’. Central 
to this is the idea of ‘the call’, which conditions a reawakening in the receiver of the letter or, in 
PKD’s case, via the pink beam of light emanating from a Christian fish symbol.  In this sense, Davis 
positions PKD’s Exegesis as a kind of ‘soteriological feedback loop’ whereby his text, rather than PKD 
himself, acts in a redemptive manner following this call to remembering. This messianism is well 
evidenced throughout the Exegesis; however, as Davis wishes to stress, PKD distances himself from 
such a role offering his writing this salvational function.57 In closing, Davis acknowledges that despite 
the Gnostic parallels contained within the Exegesis, often his writing veers away from spiritual 
concerns and takes on the unmistakable characteristics of paranoia with conspiratorial overtones 
(particularly with regards to a letter PKD received from an unknown source in March 1974 and his 
later involvement with the FBI, something he later came to refer to as the ‘Xerox missive’). Speaking 
of this, Davis writes:  
for the paranoiac, there is a surfeit of meaning; anything and everything in the field 
of signs might be amplified and conjoined into a meaningful constellation of earth-
shattering proportions. In fact, large and tedious tracks of the ‘Exegesis’, including 
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 This concern for salvation is taken up by J. Burton in his 2015 monograph on PKD and his relation to the 
philosophy of Henri Bergson. Burton finds this salvific function evident in PKD’s fabulation’s that mirror 
Bergson’s writing’s on mechanism and resultant soteriology.   
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much of what the editors chose to leave out of the abridged 2011 edition, succumb 
to paranoia’s claustrophobic connection machine (p.187) 
He goes on to add:  
these pages often abandon the field of philosophical or esoteric thinking to enter the 
feverish pulp of modern conspiracy theory, with Russian agents, satellites, and mind 
control devices playing a particularly prominent role (p.187).  
It seems PKD’s Gnostic sensibility, for Davis at least, quickly gets overtaken by the classic hallmarks 
of paranoid madness.58     
The last critical discussion of the Exegesis and one that may have the most relevance to my 
own interest into the cultural interpretations of ‘psychotic’ writing relates to James Burton’s (2015) 
analysis entitled From Exegesis to Ecology. He begins with the assertion that one of the most 
significant ‘transversal themes’ of the twentieth century was the rise of environmentality, or rather 
the manner by which previous seemingly unconnected or disparate elements came to be viewed as 
part of larger ecological or environmental systems. He writes: 
Beyond the flourishing ecological sciences and associated environmentalist social 
movements, across a wide range of spheres, from geography to politics, from 
psychology to computing and the rise of digital media, things that had previously 
been seen as functioning in isolation - organisms, minds, nations, objects, systems - 
came to be understood as inseparable from their environments (p.209). 
Burton expressly questions whether the Exegesis could only now be published and receive a critical 
reception owing to these very developments across the sciences and humanities. Focusing on the 
changing nature of literary criticism, he identifies a shift over the twentieth century from forms of 
analysis that identified the text as a largely ‘self-confined autonomous object’ (Russian formalism, 
new criticism) to modes of enquiry that situated the text within much broader historical, political or 
                                                          
58
 Erik Davis has entered into interpretation and reflection of the Exegesis in other works independent of this 
essay. His earlier book (2015) TechGnosis briefly touches on the relevance of the Exegesis to his thesis that 
technological development and the age of information necessarily contain a spiritual or religious character 
permeating through them. His latest work High Weirdness (2019) tackles the Exegesis in more detail. Much of 
this is an extended discussion of the article highlighted above, however, Davis does move past this to situate 
PKD’s writing with that of the lives of Terrance McKenna and Robert Anton Wilson to demonstrate how their 
weird counter cultural offerings do in fact characterise a larger cultural persuasion emanating from the west 
coast of America that was in tune with radical technological, political and social change.   
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ideological contexts (Marxism, feminism, structuralism).  Moreover, Burton argues that literature 
found itself becoming submerged within wider technical and media contexts of which he associates 
the work of Marshall McLuhan and Friedrich Kittler as being the most prominent examples. As such, 
his attempts to read the Exegesis in an ecological vein are only made possible via the developments 
of which the text itself is already a part. Burton proceeds to set out a formal analysis of the Exegesis 
using the ecology paradigm as a framework. He firstly acknowledges the highly eclectic nature of the 
text, which incorporated a diverse set of textual and non-textual objects. The list, although not 
exhaustive, includes various: 
textual phenomena, including encyclopaedia articles, his own science fiction (sf) 
novels, and, perhaps inevitable, earlier entries of the ‘Exegesis’ itself. Yet with these 
were intermingled numerous other non-textual materials – dreams, symbols, 
snippets of popular culture, personal and political events, such as the death of his cat 
Pinky and the resignation of Nixon, physical objects, such as a necklace bearing the 
Christian fish symbol worn by the girl delivering pain medication to his door, or a 
small wooden figure of a saint with which he ‘communed’ (p.212). 
The list, needless to say, goes on, giving the Exegesis an unruly frenzied quality which escapes easy 
summation, or any summation at all. This alignment of seemingly disparate if not random objects, 
events and occurrences is the first rationale for Burton’s adoption of an ecological analysis to the 
text. The manner by which PKD assembles these elements and then reads into them a connectivity 
that is at work irrespective of the subject who’s doing the assembling is, as our previous 
commentators have noted, very striking. In this sense we again get close to the paranoid ‘connection 
machine’ highlighted above. Burton moves on to align this process of assemblage and connection to 
the strenuous work undertaken by Walter Benjamin (2002) in the Arcades Project, as well as the 
Dadaist technique of bricolage. To this I would add later variants, such as Burroughs’ ‘cut up method’ 
(see The Nova Trilogy, 1961) of which PKD himself was an admirer. Later, Burton draws comparison 
with the notion of the rhizomatic book encapsulated in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980) A Thousand 
Plateaus which comprises heterogeneous elements arranged on a horizontal plain or surface. The 
last two thinkers Burton draws on to situate PKD’s writing and the ecological paradigm are ones that 
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are familiar to us from my earlier chapters; Friedrich Kittler and the notion of écriture automatique 
as well as the already mentioned Felix Guattari and his concept of ‘ecosophy’.  
We noted previously in respect of Schreber and the ‘Discourse Network of 1900’ how the 
introduction of mechanised writing techniques and new forms of communication or media 
technology resulted in an autonomous style to modern discourse; one that is not too far removed 
from certain definitions of madness. As Burton points out, PKD frequently positions himself as the 
passive receiver of information from a computer-like artificial intelligence, resulting in his writing 
taking on an autonomous quality. This mirrors Doyle’s comments above which, likewise, stress how 
PKD’s writing was conditioned by an ‘involuntary chain of mental events’ emanating from the VALIS 
entity. Indeed, much of PKD’s own commentary on this dynamic is couched in the terminology of 
cybernetics and informatics where one lifeless machine communicates or rather relays information 
to the other. This ‘writing without a subject’, Burton reasons, finds its fullest expression in Kittler’s 
(1999) analysis of the typewriter and its ensuing effects. The advent of the digital age could well be 
seen to have further extenuated this process. This correlation between the Exegesis and a cybernetic 
paradigm pertaining to information transfer that Burton draws attention to is something I shall 
return to in Chapter 8 in much greater detail.  
Burton follows on by utilising Guattari’s concept of ‘ecosophy’ (2000) as a means to 
understand PKD’s decentring of his sense of self. Guattari proposes an ‘ethico-political-aesthetic’ 
paradigm to enforce the idea that any emancipatory action should take place across a number of 
different sites and that it cannot be contained solely to the psyche, the socius or the environment. 
PKD repeatedly within the Exegesis speaks of the breakdown of his own subjective state into any 
number of temporal and material dimensions; ones that Burton believes strikes of Guattari’s 
“different logic of …. Intensities, of auto-referential existential assemblages” (2000, p.44). 
Furthermore, Burton draws a comparison between the target of Guattari’s ecosphere, ‘Integrated 
World Capitalism’ and PKD’s own ‘Black Iron Prison’. Perhaps the most valuable contribution 
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Burton’s work can make to my own use of ‘psychotic’ text is his thoughts on the way in which PKD’s 
Exegesis was in a certain manner finely attuned to a particular sensitivity of the time, or rather, a 
particular cultural transformation that was taking place in mid-1970’s California. Burton reminds us 
that the digital age, an age composed of interconnectivity on an unprecedented scale, found its 
genesis in 70’s California. In fact, the year of PKD’s divine revelation ‘1974’ also coincides with the 
term ‘internet’ appearing in print for the first time. The ecological paradigm was also in vogue 
following the publication of James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis’ (1974) papers proposing the Gaia 
theory and Gregory Bateson’s (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind. In addition, I would add the 
emergence of ‘second order cybernetics’, developed in the mid 1970’s, stressing the importance of 
autonomy and the self-organising capability of complex systems. Likewise, the systems theory of 
Nikolas Luhmann (1975) and Karl Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1969) was widely popular during the time 
in which PKD was penning his account of ‘2-3-74’. From this we can draw some parallels between 
our earlier discussions on Schreber’ ability to channel various modernist impulses and PKD’s own 
fine attunement to the social and historical resonances of his time. One is tempted here to adapt 
Santner’s (1996) book title and state that the Exegesis could perhaps be rechristened as My Own 
Private California: Philip K. Dick’s Secret History of (Post) Modernity.  
From the work undertaken on the Exegesis thus far, I am keen to stress the recurring 
attempts to tie the Exegesis with the culture milieu in which it is placed. The emphasis on the role of 
information, cybernetics, and to some extent Burton’s ecological paradigm, suggest that the Exegesis 
is able to reveal to us something profound about its historical moment. The question for me going 
forward is whether I can incorporate a particular understanding of madness, or indeed, ‘psychosis’ in 
line with this cultural reading so that madness does not become something extraneous to culture as 
such. If the mad writing of PKD can, in a similar fashion, open up our knowledge and understanding 
of certain facets of mid to late twentieth cultural life, then not only does this do something to our 
conceptualisation of madness but it may offer us the means to move past rather restrictive 
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articulations within Mad Studies that designate interpretation of mad text as either epistemically 
violent or necessarily unethical. In order to make this manoeuvre, it is vital that we recognise the 
contributions psychoanalysis and its critique in the guise of Deleuze and Guattari make. Both 
frameworks will be employed now as I attempt a reading that holds onto madness and culture 
simultaneously. In doing so, I shall also be indebted to the focus on socio-technological 
developments that Santner and Kittler examine so closely in the course of reading Schreber’s 









































Chapter 6.1: Interpreting the Exegesis through a Psychoanalytic Lens 
  
 “The other night as I was going to sleep I was wondering who could “de-stegenographize” the 
hidden material in my writing – and the spirit responded with ‘[those who are] conscious’.” - Philip K 
Dick (2011, p.259).  
 
Over the coming three chapters, this challenge posed by PKD will be taken up as I provide 
different but nevertheless complimentary interpretations of the Exegesis. Building on the insights 
gathered over the course of the thesis so far, I will analyse PKD’s text utilising the initial 
methodological framework set out earlier (i.e. symptomatic versus surface reading) to essentially 
‘de-stegenographize’ the Exegesis. PKD’s concern for ‘hidden material’ is apt for our first analytical 
engagement with his writing. What is hidden requires a process of unearthing, revealing or 
excavating to be seen. Symptomatic reading, as we previously noted, strives to do just this; to reveal 
hidden operations at work within a text whilst maintaining a particular focus on depth as that which 
conditions surface level phenomena. Just as Freud (1911) and Lacan (1955-56) offered a clinical 
interpretation of Schreber’s Memoirs via an examination that concerned itself with revealing hidden 
dynamics (unconscious psychic process, logic of the signifier) I will engage in a similar reading of the 
Exegesis.  
I will structure this in three overlapping areas. The first will be via a close examination of 
PKD’s, at times, idiosyncratic use of language with a particular focus on his use of neologisms and 
autonyms. Secondly, I will examine comments he makes in respect of his body and the process of 
metamorphosis he states he is undergoing. Lastly, I shall argue that the entire Exegesis can be read 
as a ‘sinthomatic’ endeavour, utilising Lacan’s theory of the sinthome. Former discussions on 
Schreber and his presenting symptoms will be touched upon throughout the chapter as he provides 
an important counterpart to many of PKD’s preoccupations. By focusing upon symptoms at the level 
of language, the body and jouissance, this reading will effectively be following Lacan’s tripartite 
structure referencing the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real.  All three become intertwined in the 
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process of PKD’s writing itself. In effect, this chapter essentially sets out the argument for the 
Exegesis to be positioned as a ‘psychotic’ text via a symptomatic/sinthomatic reading covering all 
three domains. I offer the following analysis via the psychoanalytic lens of ‘psychosis’ as one avenue 
for our attempts to enter into the Exegesis and organise it around a conceptual apparatus.  
 
6.2 ‘Psychosis’ at the Surface 
PKD held a lifelong fascination with elements of psychology and psychopathology. He read 
widely and was certainly familiar with many of the classic textbooks of psychiatry as well as 
psychoanalysis. He freely quoted Carl Jung, Ludwig Binswanger and Julian Jaynes and would 
undoubtedly have been able to identify the classic hallmarks of madness that he often interwove 
within the plots of his many novels. As his biographers have noted, PKD repeatedly questioned his 
own sanity and received a number of official ‘psychotic’ diagnoses over the course of his psychiatric 
career (see Sutin, 2006).59 Following the reported events of 3-74, perhaps no surprise that contained 
within his near decade long writing obsession attempting to uncover the ‘truth’ of his experience, he 
returned to the language and terminology of ‘psychosis’ to provide meaning to his world.  
There are a dizzying number of elements at the surface of PKD’s text that would be 
suggestive of delusional thinking, moments of hallucinatory feeling, or indeed outward paranoia. 
One can open nearly any page of the Exegesis and be met with claims or recounted moments that 
appear nothing if not overtly ‘psychotic’. In no particular order, we may recall the notion of his 
immediate surroundings in Fullerton, California peeling away to reveal ancient Rome at work in his 
present moment; a god-like satellite circling the earth imparting streams of information down to 
PKD via a pink beam of light; a vast prison-like complex enslaving the entire globe or indeed the 
intrusion of his ‘AI voice’ over the remaining years of his life. This is to make no mention of what we 
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 The editors of the Exegesis ask whether this questioning of his own sanity indicates his actual remove from 
supposed madness. David Gill writes that “Simply put, crazy people do not question their own sanity like this, 
at least as a general rule” (2011, p.371). I would contest this and point towards Schreber’s own querying of his 
mental state as just one example of ‘psychotic’s’ ability to self-analyse.   
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might perhaps term the more ‘conventional’ aspects of his paranoia concerned with the FBI, 
communist agents and the perceived surveillance he believed he underwent. However, I don’t wish 
to dwell on these overt delusional sounding elements here and instead focus initially on PKD’s own 
reasoning where he posits a possible ‘psychosis’, based on his own knowledge of psychology, as the 
cause of his predicament. Take for example the following passage where he writes:       
Thus I must face the fact that I have been psychotic, and in at least 2 different ways: 
(1) Paranoiac schizo from late 71 to 3-74. 
(2) Complete schizo breakdown in 3-74, lasting a year, during which time I gradually 
recovered – and not back to the paranoid delusional state that had preceded it (but 
to anxiety neurosis – my vertigo and depression)  (2011, p.242). 
And then sometime later, 
I went over the brink into psychosis in’70 when Nancy left me – in ’73 or so I tried to 
come back to having an ego, but it was too fragile and there were too many financial 
and other pressures; the hit on my house and all the terrors of 1971 had left their 
mark – and so, especially because of the IRS matter, I suffered total psychosis in 3-74, 
was taken over by one or more archetypes. Poverty, family responsibility (a new 
baby) did it. And fear of the IRS (ibid, p.372). 
Both statements point towards periods of personal turmoil related to marital and financial pressures 
that culminated in 3-74 with a ‘total psychosis’ or ‘schizo breakdown’ as he terms it. Fatherhood is 
also touted as a potential source, one that resonates with the paternal issues detected in both Freud 
and Lacan’s analysis of ‘psychotic’ aetiology. Whatever the case, PKD is openly on the surface 
positioning his outlandish experiences in this instance in direct relation to ‘psychosis’. What is so 
striking is that, referenced within a similar time period, is his reasoning that this ‘psychotic’ episode 
in 3-74 actually provided him the means to overcome his fragile sense of self or ego.  For instance:  
 All right, all this looks psychotic. But due to my response, I have become entirely freed 
from paranoid feelings, fear, beliefs, delusions, expectations – completely (p.241). 
And again,  
A stronger, newer, healthier personality was able to form in place of the old, one free 
of the paranoid dynamism. It turned out to be a psychotic delusion on my part that 
the FBI was after me. The brief total collapse into overt schizophrenia cured me (cf. 
John W. Perry) because I was able to reach into my collective unconscious for new 
potentialities, and establish a broader, non-delusional personality on a more viable 
basis (p.241).  
178 
 
What we have here points towards PKD’s belief that his self-identified ‘psychotic’ 
experiences actually provided the means for him to stabilise his fragmented state of mind that was 
causing acute paranoia and distress. We will recall that for Freud and Lacan alike, the delusional 
construction or paranoid worldview for the ‘psychotic’ can function to shore up a disintegrating 
psyche and effectively stave off complete subjective breakdown.  Although the overwhelming 
majority of writing contained within the Exegesis would testify to PKD’s belief that he was not in fact 
‘psychotic’ but witness to, and participant in, something of great cosmic importance, these rare 
moments where he questions his state of mind, and associates it with a potential process of healing, 
strikes an important cord with Freud’s assertion (1911 p.70-71), augmented by Lacan (1955-56), that 
the delusion itself is not the illness but rather an attempt at cure; an attempt to reinstate a social 
bond. My aim is to hold this in mind over the course of the chapter when we return to the possible 
salvific function writing as a whole had for PKD in the context of the Sinthome. However, to really 
make the case for the Exegesis being positioned as a ‘psychotic’ text, it is necessary to delve a little 
deeper, to unearth some hidden operations and concealed dynamics in order to properly mobilise 
the structure of ‘psychosis’. I shall do so by working at the level of the text. Instead of focusing on 
what PKD had to say about ‘psychosis’, I shall now examine his actual use of language itself and the 
formal qualities of the text that may be suggestive of psychotic structure.   
 
6.3 Idiosyncratic Language 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, for Lacan (1955), ‘psychosis’ is nothing if not a ‘disturbance in 
language’. Due to the much referenced ‘foreclosure of the paternal metaphor’ a hole or rent is 
opened up within the symbolic order. In order to recognize, and then presumably treat, those 
deemed ‘psychotic’ one must focus in on, at the level of the signifier, peculiarities or odd aberrations 
within the subject’s use of language. These strange anomalies within language are utilised to assist 
the subject in their navigation through the symbolic order which can appear fragmented or 
disarticulated. Even outside  the psychoanalytic tradition, much effort has been spent focusing upon 
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the particular relation schizophrenics, for instance, have to language; the ‘psychotic’s’ so-called 
inability to use metaphor as well as the role of polysemy and echolalia perhaps being some of the 
more notable examples. Likewise, the use of neologisms has been heavily emphasized in ‘psychotic’ 
speech (see Chaika, 1990; Delisi, 2001 & Reiber & Vetter, 1994). Annie Rogers (2016) takes up this 
relation between ‘psychosis’ and the ‘enigma of language’ within a broadly Lacanian framework. In 
her work she coins the phrase Incandescent Alphabets to describe the way in which ‘psychotics’ use 
language in a singular, idiosyncratic way. For Rogers, delusion is a new language fashioned together 
from imposed voices and scraps of the symbolic world. Her wide range of examples and textual 
sources include many of those which we have encountered over the course of this thesis including 
Joyce, O’Brien and of course, Schreber.  
 As Rogers, and many more have noted, language often holds a particular fascination or 
appeal for ‘psychotic’ subjects. And in this sense, PKD’s exegetic writing is no different. One of the 
many themes vying for space throughout his personal recounting of the events of 3-74 is his own 
particular understanding of language and systems of communication, ones that increasingly come to 
be presented through a digital or information technology paradigm. His interest in language is 
present from beginning to end and is remodelled and reworked countless times over the Exegesis’ 
eight- year composition. For instance, during the early years of the Exegesis, PKD writes that to 
understand his conceptualisation of the universe then:  
A superior analogy would be to regard the universe as consisting of language, that is, 
a communications network of signalling systems and messages which create cosmos 
out of chaos, harmony out of random collision (2011, p.81).  
PKD’s conceptualisation of the universe comprised of language, or a system of communication, is a 
recurring motif throughout his writing. This system of communication or information transfer is 
conceived here as providing order to the universe. It is not simply an attribute or fundamental 
component of it, but rather the means by which order is created out of chaos. The idea that 
language, and in particular the utilisation of it, may be able to provide a degree of consistency or 
180 
 
stability to an otherwise fragmented, disordered existence again strikes of previous discussions 
which highlight the way in which ‘psychotic’ subjects harness an idiosyncratic use of language to 
provide consistency to their life world. “The enigma of language in psychosis,” writes Rogers, “joins 
messages to codes, but not to a given code; speaking entails making a new language out of what 
were meaningless messages” (2016, p.119). This reordering of random messages into a new 
language in order to stabilise one’s fragmented psyche highlights the often commonplace 
experience for ‘psychotics’ concerning the imposition of words and phrases into their conscious 
mind. Just as Schreber (1903) received his nerves and rays, resulting in him reconstituting them into 
his basic language or nerve-language (Grundsprache), so too does PKD write about the experience of 
language, or rather alien unknown words imposing themselves on him. Early on in the Exegesis when 
he is directly discussing the immediate events following 3-74, he writes: 
I was hoping only for increased neural efficiency. I got more: actual information 
about the future, for during next three months, almost each night, during sleep I was 
receiving information in the form of printouts: words and sentences, letters and 
names and numbers – sometimes whole pages, sometimes in the form of writing 
paper and holographic writing, sometimes oddly, in the form of a baby’s cereal box 
on which all sorts of quite meaningful information was written and typed, and finally 
gallery proofs held up for me to read which I was told in my dream “contained 
prophecies about the future,” and during the last two weeks a huge book, again and 
again, with page after page of printed lines (2011, p.8). 
Mostly, though, what I get is a lot of information, floods of it night after night, on and 
on  (ibid. p.23-24). 
And then, 
As soon as I close my eyes information in the form of printed matter, visual matter 
such as photographs, audio stuff in the form of phonograph records – it all floods 
over me at a high rate of print out (p.24). 
For PKD, information, both audio and visual, is imposed upon him, information which he states he is 
the passive recipient of. Likewise, some years later, one of PKD’s bolder claims is that he came to be 
in receipt of a foreign language of which he had no prior knowledge or experience. He writes in 
1978, “I also dreamed foreign words all of which turned out to be koine Greek” (p.345).  
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PKD later maintains that his new-found ability to understand elements of ancient Greek is directly 
attributable to the higher power with whom he is in communion. Whatever the case, PKD’s writing 
attests to the experience of language, or in his terms ‘information’, imposing itself upon him. 
Whether it be foreign languages, audio recording or forms of information, he repeatedly evidences 
the process of having some alien system of information external to his conscious self-directed on 
him. It is out of these scraps of language and fragmented bits of the symbolic order that he begins to 
fashion his own understanding of the role and purpose of language and systems of information 
exchange. His own ‘incandescent alphabet’, is one that increasingly comes to reflect a technologized 
sensibility.  
In keeping with this theme, and the particular relation to idiosyncratic language, it is worth 
examining the following passage in detail. Early on in his recounting of the experiences immediately 
after 3-74, PKD writes in respect of this imposition of information that:   
 One aspect of regarding this as an information transmission and reception-
transduction system (like a teletype) might at last throw some light on the otherwise 
puzzling phenomenon of glossolalia when seized by the “Holy Spirit”. In my reception 
of tachyon bombardment (assuming this is what it is, of course) I frequently either 
fail to transduce properly (error at the receiving end) or else there is a lapse of 
accurate transmission (as if teletype operator has his fingers on the wrong line of 
keys, etc.). When that happens, instead of seeing, in my dreams, the perfectly 
articulated English prose passages which would be the result of all components 
functioning correctly, I get gibberish like this: meaningless “names” and “words” and 
sequences of numbers which have no significance. Unless one is very, very careful to 
factor out, to use a scrupulous reject circuit of some kind (I suppose this would come 
with practice) one is confronted with the task of making sense out of random or 
inaccurate integers. I give these actual examples: 
832   Command-Odd 
835   G-12 
5412960  5242681 
Eleanor   P-13 







There are a number of elements in this passage worth reflecting on. Firstly, for PKD, his 
reasoning as to how and why he is receiving such ‘gibberish’ is based on a faulty technological 
system (‘like a teletype’) which transmits words, terms or phrases that are devoid of meaning. 
Schreber, we will remember, underwent similar experiences where he was unable to ascribe 
meaning to words or his own thoughts. Schreber refers to this as God losing “the capacity to say one 
single word” (1903, p.187) and compensates for this via his ‘bellowing miracle,’ his process of 
‘zeichen’ or ‘picturing’ as well as his ‘little studies’. Lacan (1955-56) held this as evidence for the 
supposed gap or hole within the signifying order that brings a halt to the metonymic sliding of the 
signifier. For Lacan as we previously have noted, “at the heart of psychosis there is a dead end, 
perplexity concerning the signifier” (1955-56, p.194). PKD fails to ‘transduce properly’ due to a 
similar failure in the signifier’s ability to transmit its meaning. The result is a series of words or 
fragments of information that are completely cut off from any larger referential system of 
communication. Lacan (1959) in “On a Question….” labels such instances of imposed language as 
examples of ‘code phenomena’. ‘Code phenomena’, unlike ‘message phenomena’ are for Lacan, 
“specified in locutions that are neological in both their form [….] and usage” (1959, p.450).  He adds 
that they are, “something fairly akin to the messages that linguists call ‘autonomous’, insofar as it is 
the signifier itself (and not what it signifies) that is the object of communication” (ibid). We can also 
refer to these odd, disconnected words as ‘autonyms’, those ‘dialectally inert speech elements’ that 
Vanhaule (2011) introduced to us in the context of Schreber’s Memoirs earlier in Chapter 2. Schreber 
has a panoply of terms and phrases that he invested with a huge amount of meaning but a meaning 
accessible to him alone, examples of which include, ‘nerve-contact’ ‘divine-rays’ ‘soul-murder’ as 
well as the signifier ‘Entmannen/Entmannung’ (‘unman/unmanning’ or ‘emasculate/emasculating’). 
The point being that these signifiers which are independent of any referential symbolic order take on 
a fundamentally different role within Schreber’s discourse and come to reorganise his sense of 
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subjectivity in the wake of foreclosure. PKD, I would argue, similarly employs a vast network of 
neologism’s and autonyms throughout his exegetic writing. In no particular order, readers of the 
Exegesis will be familiar with the following ‘autonyms’ that PKD tirelessly employs: 
BIP (Black Iron Prison), Firebright, homoplasmate, James-James, MMSK (macrometasomakosmos), 
ontogon, Tagore, Thomas, VALIS, Zebra,  
Whereas the isolated elements of language cited above (‘Command-Odd’, ‘Mr. Arensky’, 
‘Sadasa Ulna’) appear enigmatic and un-interpretable when he first receives them, over the course 
of the Exegesis PKD utilises this series of neologism’s and autonyms and they come to hold increased 
significance for his new-fangled cosmology. Many of them play an important function either as a 
form of alter-ego or as monikers for the divine presence with whom he is in contact. The term 
‘VALIS’ is arguably the most important of them all as it becomes absolutely central to his newly 
invented science fiction inflected spiritualism. It serves as the cause for 3-74, the continued source 
for the receiving of information via a pink beam of light as well as the agency controlling the writing 
of the Exegesis itself.  In keeping with Lacan’s analysis, we can argue that PKD starts to build his 
delusional metaphor from these autonyms and neologisms. He transforms these early ‘code 
phenomena’ into ‘message phenomena’ as they begin to lose their enigmatic quality whilst 
reinserting them within his own idiosyncratic signifying chain. From this, he can be understood to be 
actively constructing his private delusional metaphor of which the Exegesis is testament to. PKD, by 
employing such words, terms and phrases starts to reconstruct his own sense of subjectivity which, 
as we shall see in later, involves a radically reworking of his sense of self. As Rogers argues, the 
‘psychotic’ subject can:  
succeed in establishing a new subjective position by adopting speech elements or 
autonyms that have been imposed, using them to identify a meaningful task, 
mission, or purpose. In this way, building delusion not only works to stabilise the 




Essentially, if we are to follow this logic as informed by Lacan’s theorisations, then as PKD begins to 
rework his own private symbolic order there should be a direct effect on his sense of subjectivity, 
one that plays itself out in the field of the Imaginary: PKD’s own corporeal body.  
 
6.4 Metamorphosis & The Automated Body 
One of Schreber’s most notable concepts, the one with which he attributes the very ability 
to produce his memories is the aufschreibsystem, roughly translated as his writing-down-system. We 
noted in Chapter 3 that for Kittler (1985) and Santner (1996), this writing-down-system, with its 
tendency towards an automated sensibility, channelled modernist preoccupations with mechanistic 
communicative processes and the resultant change in a collective sense of subjectivity, one that 
emphasised the automated nature of the body in response to received signals from the mind. 
Schreber sums up his aufschreibsystem in the following passage:  
Books or other notes are kept in which for years have been written-down all my 
thoughts, all my phrases, all my necessaries, all the articles in my possession or 
around me, all persons with whom I come into contact, etc. I cannot say with 
certainty who does the writing down (1903, p.123).  
Schreber encapsulates a sense here of his writing being directed perhaps by something other than 
his conscious self. His thoughts, phrases and necessaries, as he puts it, materialise in written form 
but the agency behind this process is one not immediately apparent. Indeed, Schreber often reverts 
to a machine-like model devoid of any operator to describe himself and many of the experiences he 
underwent. In fact, the role of ‘mental automatism’ has long been established within the realm of 
the ‘psychoses’. As Lacanian analyst Darian Leader (2011) makes apparent, this is a striking example 
of the paranoiac’s belief in the exaggerated role of the Other, an Other capable of exerting force 
from outside onto the subject’s body. He relates this to one of the key issues present within 
‘psychotic’ subjects, namely the inability to localise libido resulting in a different conception of inside 
and outside, internal and external or the relation between subject and Other. If we remain with the 
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experience of having one’s writing directed by an outside agency, we can see that this was a 
common issue for PKD. Many examples exist throughout his exegetic writing including the following:   
let us say that I am inspired by a creative entity outside my conscious personality to 
write what I write (2011, p.13).  
I feel I have been a lot of different people. Many people have sat at this typewriter, 
using my fingers. Writing my books (ibid, p. 22).  
We are totally scripted, after all – rigidly, deterministically programmed (written: 
our roles engrammed in and onto us all). Which is the book and which the world? 
(p.331). 
And then quite some time later,  
I qua author am a function of it! I am a mouth piece for it, which is fine since it 
protects me (p.416).   
Although many authors have testified to the experience of their writing taking on an automated 
quality, the sense of a work being produced without the author’s complete conscious control, when 
we analyse these statements of PKDs symptomatically, and place them in context with associated 
themes pertaining to his bodily existence, it reveals to us a logic that would be suggestive of possible 
mental automatism; the reconfigured boundary between the subject’s sense of an inner agentic self 
and the outer world. PKD’s experience of an automated writing process, his own aufschreibsystem 
can be read here as a symptom which evidences something else at work, perhaps one not 
immediately apparent. Taken in isolation, PKD’s experience of an automated writing process could 
be associated with any number of underlying issues. Placed within the wider context of the patterns 
and themes reverberating across the entire Exegesis, they could be interpreted via an understanding 
of a ‘psychotic’ structure at play. If we refer back to the reams of the Symbolic and Imaginary, and 
how such statements speak to both interrelated domains, we further strengthen our case. 
PKD’s engagement with the Symbolic order that we discussed earlier, his very ability to make 
sense of it and to commit forms of communication to writing seems to have a direct relation to the 
action of his body. His quotes above testify to the notion that his very process of writing is being 
directed by a body that he is not in direct control over. He is ‘totally scripted’, devoid of any agency 
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and a ‘mouthpiece’ at the will of an Other who controls or operates his physical being. At the start of 
Seminar III Lacan writes:  
Since discourse, the lunatic’s printed discourse, is at issue, it’s therefore manifest 
that we are in the symbolic order. Now, what is the actual material of this 
discourse? At what level does the sense translated by Freud unfold? From what are 
the naming elements of this discourse borrowed? Generally speaking the raw 
material is his own body (1955, p.11). 
Lacan is in effect telling us here that in the printed discourse of the ‘psychotic’ (or in his somewhat 
antiquated language, ‘the lunatic’) the body provides the site or the actual source for the symbolic 
particularities that play themselves out in the ‘psychotic’s’ written text. Rogers, commenting upon 
this, likewise concludes that “the person who is psychotic has direct access to the Imaginary body” 
(2016, p.39). In ‘psychosis’, the Symbolic and the Imaginary become intertwined in a different 
manner to the neurotic. But what do we mean by this? If we use Darian Leader’s schema (2011, 
p.67) for organising symptomology in respect of oedipal processes (i.e. the establishment of new 
meaning, the localisation of the body’s libido and the establishment of distance from the object of 
the mother) then we can see that PKD’s writings are attempts to resolve these first two concerns in 
their respective domains.  
For PKD, when his existence is abruptly brought into question in 3-74, he has to reorder or 
reconstruct his symbolic life world to establishment a new sense of meaning. As a result, his body, or 
rather the body’s libido also has to be re-fashioned, it has to be tamed via his new delusional 
metaphor. The body is the site that PKD will have recourse to in order to ground, or indeed localise, 
this new idiosyncratic system of meaning that he has built. This begins with a discussion on the 
subjective distance from his body during the process of writing. This automated action, PKD’s 
aufschreibsystem, is in part a direct response to his new symbolic creation. At first, the enigmatic 
world of nonsensical signifiers creates a degree of detachment, one that is played out at the level of 
his physiology; a distance between his active thoughts and his writing practice which is literally 
bringing this new delusional world into being. As this progresses, the role of his own body becomes 
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much more pronounced. Schreber’s Memoirs are also replete with instances of his body morphology 
radically changing in the wake of his apparent visionary revelations about the ‘order of the world’. 
His transformation into a woman, his sense of ‘voluptuousness’ and the experience of having little 
men break his body apart are all examples of this drastic reorganisation of his bodily libido in 
tandem with the reorganisation of the symbolic order in which it is immersed. If the above logic 
holds, then we should see a similar occurrence unfold for PKD. For instance, he writes:  
I was genuinely broken down, stripped down, torn down to my skeletal plating, 
like an insect who has woven a cocoon, and then I passed through months of 
uniquely and actually imaginable rebuilding processes, all adventitious to me, 
improving and teaching me, altering me – well, the “possession” part alone 
remade me in the most fundamental way indeed – and clearly as completely 
remaking me as can be conceived (2011, p. 191).   
Not too dissimilar to Schreber who writes: 
I frequently had – and still have regularly daily – the sensation that my whole 
skull had temporarily thinned; in my opinion this was brought about through the 
bony material of my skull being partly pulverized by the destructive action of the 
rays; but it is restored again by pure rays particularly during sleep (1903, p.147). 
Both accounts testify to this process of breaking down and re-assemblage. The body is violently 
altered following the manifestation of ‘psychosis’. And just as the symbolic world requires a process 
of reconstitution, so too does the body require a drastic rebuilding to align itself with the new sense 
of subjectivity that both Schreber and PKD construct for themselves. From the sense of having a 
strange uncanny distance between the body’s actions and his own writing intentions, through to the 
actual decomposition of his entire corporeal body before finally metamorphasizing into something 
else entirely, we can state that PKD’s relation to his own physical being is one of the predominant 
preoccupations he commits to his Exegesis.  
I will trace this theme of PKD’s metamorphosis beyond this chapter when we examine the 
potential socio-cultural interpretation that can be made of PKD’s ‘psychotic’ text. However, we 
should note that the evidence for his sense of radical change into someone else, or perhaps even 
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better something else, can be located throughout the Exegesis. I offer the below as just a few 
examples:  
it really did happen to me, and it is strange and I can’t fully explain it – which is 
to say, name who what poured itself into me back in March and is still there, still 
here, I mean. Still in a symbiotic relationship with me (p.47).  
What grows within me grows perhaps a new body as well as a new spirit, and 
discards both of the outer ones together (p. 64). 
The golden fish necklace told me it was time; I began my work, like the worm 
constructing its cocoon. In order to die, it its original primal lower form, to be 
remade into a better newer creature! To fly up from the “sea” into the sky! 
(p.161). 
He who was alive died, and someone else lives now in me, replacing me (P.192). 
 
I have covered two domains in respect of the presenting symptomology within PKD’s text. In terms 
of how they have played out at the level of the Symbolic, I have shown how particular uses of certain 
signifiers, signifiers imposed from an Other, are reworked into an idiosyncratic system of 
communication which ultimately leads to the creation of his own private delusional metaphor. In 
tandem with this process are the alterations in PKD’s own body. Reading the text symptomatically at 
the level of the Imaginary demonstrates how PKD’s reasoning about the changes in his own physical 
being are illustrative of a reorganisation of his bodily libido in the face of possible ‘psychotic’ 
decomposition. In keeping with a Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretation, just as a potential 
delusional metaphor concerning alien satellites and ancient Rome serves a supporting function 
within the symbolic, so too PKD creates a new relation to his own corporeal body to stabilise his 
sense of subjectivity. If we turn now to the role of the Real and how all three of these registers 
become intertwined within Lacan’s later concept of the Sinthome, we can see again how the very 
process of writing itself serves as a means of stability by tying all three registers together to reinstate 





6.5 PKD-the-Sinthome   
I introduced Lacan’s (1975-76) later concept of the Sinthome in the closing discussion related 
to James Joyce in Chapter 2. Here I want to develop this in order to appreciate how PKD’s text may 
accord to this newly fashioned idea of the symptom that Lacan places special emphasis on. This will 
also result in an augmented notion of the symptom with which to reincorporate into our critical 
reading practice, a ‘Sinthomatic reading’. By doing so, I will argue that the register of the Real, in 
particular the role of jouissance, plays out in the context of PKD’s supposedly ‘psychotic’ text, whilst 
also understanding how his writing served as a kind of support or means to stabilise his subjectivity. 
The Sinthome represents one of the more notable concepts within the ‘later Lacan’ and is often 
positioned in relation to Lalangue and Jouissance; those concepts which mark a potential break with 
Lacan’s earlier focus on the Symbolic. With this set of concepts, Lacan shifts his attention to the 
register of the Real; and this differentiation between the Symbolic and Real may be a useful one to 
delineate the difference between the classical symptom and the Sinthome. The former is generally 
understood (in Lacanian terms) as a coded message that reveals some unconscious truth in symbolic 
form, whereas the latter is perceived as a moment of pure ‘non-sense’, an idiosyncratic form of 
enjoyment or better yet, jouissance, that is beyond understanding. As Lacanian theorist Raul 
Moncayo states, “The sinthome is to the Real and to jouissance what the symptom is to the Symbolic 
and the signifier” (2016, p.49). Lacan argued that the sinthome should be seen as a creative knotting 
together of the registers of the Real, Symbolic and the Imaginary. He modelled this knotting on the 
Borromean pattern whereby if one ring is unknotted the other three subsequently come loose. 
Lacan identifies the sinthome as a fourth ring knotting together the tripartite registers. Moreover, he 
asserts that in instances of ‘psychosis’, what has occurred is precisely this unknotting of the four 
rings. It is then a creative means by which one invents or fashions their relation to the different 
modalities of reality. The chief example Lacan gives of how one can do so is via the operations of 
‘naming/nomination’ and through the practise of writing, both of which are particular to the case of 
‘Joyce-the-Sinthome’ (Miller, 2005).  
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The question of Jouissance plays an important role for Lacan in his reflections on Joyce’s 
writing. Whereas Schreber transformed the invasion of Jouissance following the loss of phallic 
meaning into a paranoid transsexual system, Joyce, he asserts, is able to harness this Jouissance and 
rework it into an artistic product. In so doing, Joyce transforms this Jouissance into a form of ‘enjoy-
meant’ (jouis-sens). In a way, he is able to tame it via the signifier resulting in the most strikingly 
idiosyncratic linguistic product. Lacan identifies the role the ego has to play in Joyce’s psychic make-
up, which doesn’t act as it otherwise should, but nevertheless fulfils “an important function in 
structuring reality” (1975-6, p.147). Joyce was only able to stabilise his psychic world through the 
elevation of his name as a great writer and as such finds a compensation for his otherwise fragile 
place within discourse. In the same way that Schreber develops a delusional metaphor to order his 
world and in some sense reorder Jouissance, Joyce does so through a writing process which, at one 
and the same time, redirects evasive Jouissance and elevates his name in order that he can restore a 
social bond. As such, Lacan further moves away from any pathological notion of the symptom that 
requires some form of alleviating or treatment. In commenting on the role of the sinthome and 
Joyce’s writing, analyst and writer Patricia Gherovici (2012) argues that: 
Jouissance underpins the creation of a sinthome by which texts and the body are held 
together. Lacan’s claim that Joyce is saved from psychosis by writing is well known. 
Similarly, Schreber is freed from seclusion by his memoirs. Let us note that for Lacan, 
Joyce’s entire oeuvre is to be treated as a memoir. But Lacan’s questionable 
biographical reading, nevertheless, is not on the side of psychobiography. I will argue 
that he approaches Joyce’s work as a memoir to emphasize its function as sinthome 
(p. 275).  
What Gherovici is highlighting here is the way in which Lacan takes all of Joyce’s literary output and 
tries to demonstrate that it operates collectively as a sinthome. It is a creative endeavour that binds 
the three registers together whilst securing an ego for Joyce (or Joyce’s literary name) thereby 
staving off possible ‘psychosis’. The role of the body and its relation to textual production is key to 
any notion of the Sinthome.  
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So what is the relevance to PKD’s mammoth writing project following the events of 3-74? 
We may be able to answer this via PKD’s own self reflections. Many years into the Exegesis’ 
composition, PKD questions the very purpose and worth of his creation. He writes in respect of his 
new cosmology: 
If the above theory is wrong (and there is no negative hallucination and spurious 
reality laid over the real world – which is quite different than what seems to be) - 
then what has been the use of my writing? (p.344).  
What indeed? My argument here is that the ‘use’ of PKD’s writing, just like Joyce’s literary output, 
was to stabilise his sense of subjectivity, to bind the three registers that had come apart for him 
during, and perhaps prior to, 3-74. The Exegesis can be argued to have served as PKD’s very own 
sinthome by taming the bodily jouissance that was so apparent in our above discussion as well as 
elevating his sense of self by re-fashioning a new social bond. His newly reconfigured symbolic 
existence with the attendant changes to his body are actualised for PKD in his writing. It is through 
this textual production that PKD gives life to his delusional metaphor; he literally brings it into being 
which ultimately assists him in maintaining some form of coherence. The ‘use’ of his writing that he 
questions above can be understood via this very notion of the sinthome, a support or counterweight 
to the turmoil and distress wrought by his fragile mental state once the three rings of the Symbolic, 
Imaginary and Real threaten to come apart. If we stay with this idea of writing as a form of non-
sense or an excess that serves as a support nonetheless, then perhaps we can come to understand 
the many lengthy passages within the Exegesis that seem to evidence this redirected form of 
jouissance; an ‘enjoy-meant’ in the act of writing itself, but a form of writing that appears devoid of 
meaning on the surface at least. Take for instance this lengthy passage: 
Yes, that’s it! The encircled BIP/magnet/pathenogin is being disassembled and 
incorporated into the brain/phagocyte/sphere, which process produces time and 
flux (v. Heraclitus). But it is not an equal contest: the sphere or brain although 
facing a formidable opponent is successfully dismantling it, although the process is 
not complete. It is the upper realm of Form I eventually making irreal the lower 
realm of Form II, as Parmenides realized. Form ii. The BIP, in the aspect of eternity 
isn’t there; it’s only there in the flux time process. The phagocycte has, like the 
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dragon, consumed itself starting with the tail; the BIP may be its own antecedent 
fossil self, blind and mechanical, at an earlier level of evolution – “matter” 
insentient compared to life and thought – brain. Thus the universe, the totality, 
organizes itself into the brain that I saw, by consuming itself, what we see as 
change, flux, time, process is sign of its life, it is alive and becoming more so – just 
as I, as microbit, did in 3-74. Hologram microbit, analogy of the whole (p.378). 
This is just one of many passages within the Exegesis where PKD asserts that he has uncovered the 
true nature of 3-74 and by implication the universe/god (Yes, that’s it!) only to be followed by a 
rambling train of thought that darts between a number of highly obscure terms that become 
themselves self-referential. Despite my best efforts to follow PKD’s logic here, and the way in which 
he presents it as some profound insight, the passage comes across as devoid of meaning and lacking 
substance. However, in line with Lacan’s theory of the sinthome, we can argue that the many 
examples of these rambling ‘meaningless’ passages that make up large sections of the Exegesis serve 
not to actually illuminate PKD or the reader as to the true nature of the cosmos (although I would 
guess that is how they were intended) but rather as a means of enjoyment in the literal act of 
writing non-sense. We could read this excess of words, meaning and phrases that PKD consistently 
reworks as an attempt to organise or to order his sense of subjectivity through the act of writing 
which, in and of itself, serves as a support. In this sense the Exegesis-as-Sinthome comes to take on a 
fundamentally valuable role within his sense of being. By providing such a central role in organising 
his subjectivity, PKD explicitly recognizes the Exegesis as the means for his continued existence or as 
he boldly claims, “It is the very dynamism of my life” (2011, p.887). In fact, his writing at moments 
becomes synonymous with existence itself, something which he can’t do without. Further examples 
where PKD places such great importance on his Exegetic output are not hard to find, for instance:   
I am unable to do anything, except what little I have put in my writing. And how 
much is that? What does that accomplish? But viewed as a source of comfort, 
solace and purpose to my life, it is for me, intrinsically, everything. I have nothing 
else that I care about (p.237). 
Due to the absolute vital function that writing has for PKD in stabilising his sense of subjectivity, he 
repeatedly invests a huge amount of worth in it, which presumably also serves as the catalyst to the 
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unending need to continually produce this unwieldy text. It is the process of writing itself which is of 
prime importance to PKD as he persists in creatively refashioning his own symbolic life world and his 
sense of corporeality within it. His subjectivity, read via the sinthome, is effectively underwritten by 
the Exegesis.  
However, PKD’s writing over the course of the Exegesis does not only attest to the sense of 
importance it has for him personally but begins to take on a supposed value independent from the 
one writing it. Indeed, just as Joyce came to view his writing as the means to elevate his name and 
construct his sense of ego, so too for PKD does the Exegesis start to take on a role of almost divine 
importance thereby reinvesting him in social relations and bestowing on him a potentially grandiose 
sense of self. PKD, over the course of his writing, does not just view the Exegesis as a collection of his 
own particular reflections on the nature of theology or philosophy but he comes to afford it a central 
role in redeeming the Earth in its entirety. PKD positions his writing as having direct importance for 
others, in fact it’s very worth at times seems to be for the purposes of humankind’s salvation. 
Despite not being directly addressed to a particular recipient, PKD frames his writing as a conduit to 
another world, one that can possibly help him in his supposed time of need. Consider the following 
passages where he encapsulates this very sensibility: 
Sudden total realisation as I was falling asleep (5:50 A.M). My writing isn’t messages 
smuggled into this spurious world to tell us our situation. No – we are in a prison, 
and my writing is messages smuggled out! (2011, p.411). 
“This “reporting back” use of my writing, back to those outside, stating conditions 
here and asking for help …. (ibid). 
but now I am given to understand that actually my writing is a report on the 
situation here outgoing – meant to leave our irreal world, to break out, not in, and 
acquaint the actual world (macrobrain) of our plight. They are then appeals for 
help, by a salvific entity which has invaded this our irreal world, an entity we can’t 
perceive (p.412). 
PKD writes here of being imprisoned, of his dire situation in the current world which requires outside 
assistance for him and the rest of humanity alike. By ascribing such an important function to his 
Exegesis PKD was able, just like Joyce, to compensate for his otherwise fragile place within discourse. 
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Elevating his writing to such a degree helped secure an ego that was arguably under threat from the 
incoherence and fragmentation that accompanies ‘psychotic’ experience. But it is via a direct appeal 
to an Other that PKD attempts to achieve this. Viewed sinthomatically, PKD is attempting to 
refashion a social bond here between himself and the ‘actual world’ as he states. His writing is 
explicitly named as the means for achieving this. Via PKD’s ‘reporting back’ he is attempting to 
describe his own subjective experience, one characterised by the many delusional sounding elements 
we have discussed. But by ‘reporting back’ to an Other, PKD’s writing will potentially be able to save 
him and the world at large. We get a sense, following Lacan’s thinking, that as PKD is documenting 
many of his strange experiences within the pages of the Exegesis, he is not only shoring up his own 
psyche by creating his delusional metaphor via text but he is also attempting to appeal to an Other. 
His writing is an attempt to ‘smuggle out’ the conditions of his apparent turmoil to an audience 
which in turn will assist in their, and his own, salvation. The writing in itself serves as a social bond. 
PKD is committing to script the bond he is attempting to instate with the world at large. We will 
return to the connective theme in PKD’s writing later when we discuss the possible ‘networked 
paradigm’ inherent to the Exegesis. But for now, it is sufficient to recognise that a fundamental logic 
not immediately apparent on the surface of the Exegesis’ many pages is one that accords to the 
notion of a resuscitated social bond that characterises Freud’s analysis of Schreber’s Memoirs and 
Lacan’s theorisation of the sinthome. We have then various domains bound together in the context 
of PKD’s writing; the Symbolic as evidenced through his own use of language and the Imaginary 
relating to discussions of his bodily metamorphosis. My argument is that, by submitting the Exegesis 
to a ‘symptomatic/sinthomatic’ reading, we can appreciate how the structure of ‘psychosis’ is at 
work at both at the level of the body and the signifier. The Exegesis is being conditioned by a 
dynamic that is outside of the text but is nevertheless identifiable within it through its effects.  
Returning to the role of enjoyment in Lacan’s seminar XXIII, the sinthome is linked to 
transformations in jouissance. Whereas earlier in Lacan’s work jouissance was identified as a “deadly 
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excitation that overcomes the protective barriers set up by the pleasure principle, as a surplus or 
excess jouissance” (Moncayo, 2016, p.51), by the time of seminar XXIII different forms of jouissance 
apart from the ‘jouissance of the Other’ are formulated. Phallic jouissance (as well as feminine and 
mystic jouissance) are complimented in seminar XXIII by what Lacan refers to as jouis-sense, literally 
meaning ‘enjoy-meant’ in sense or meaning-making. It is this aspect of the Real that completes our 
understanding of the sinthomatic endeavour that is the Exegesis. What all of the domains covered 
here in our examination of PKD’s text deal with in one way, shape or form are the author’s attempt 
to compensate for the initial crisis in meaning that he undergoes in 3-74. Baffled by the initial 
experience of receiving information via his pink beam of light and the subsequent revelation of 
seeing his immediate reality stripped away to expose an ancient Rome of the past still in operation 
within his present, the Exegesis can be seen as his attempt to grapple with this new reality, and most 
importantly, ascribe some sense of meaning to it. From wild assertions based on speculative 
philosophy to a hotchpotch of monotheistic and eastern religions, PKD’s exegetic writing is nothing if 
not an attempt to establish some new found sense of meaning or understanding to his re-configured 
reality. And it is this intrusion of the Real, of jouissance, that he repeatedly attempts to re-fashion 
into some kind of meaning or sensible understanding. Jouissance reworked into meaning: jouis-
sense. Consider the following passage: 
 At this point one could begin to take it, my writing, very seriously, since everything 
seems to coalesce into something of meaning. The sense of unreality fits in … the 
disruption of the ontological categories … the sacerdotal power buried for aeons 
(2011, p.89).   
PKD is explicitly stating that the Exegesis, by tying all of its different elements together, is starting to 
coalesce into ‘something of meaning’. We noted above the ‘Yes, that’s it!’ passage which is nothing if 
not an attempt to arrive at meaning via a very convoluted, excessive writing practice. Much of the 
Exegesis is populated by instances or passages where PKD attempts to boil down a number of diffuse 
elements in order to grapple with a lack of understanding related to himself, his subjectivity or the 
universe at large. Quite often these attempts at binding are written in a list-like format, as if PKD is 
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simply wanting to produce on the page a string of ideas, experiences or points of reference in order 
to see how they may fit together to form some larger meaning or structure of understanding. The 
randomness to the things included in such lists lends a kind of manic quality to his thought process 
where ever more obscure references are piled up on top of one another in the hope of achieving a 
breakthrough or new valuable realisation. For example, early on in the Exegesis’ construction, PKD 
writes: 
         (1) I believed I was someone else. 
  (2) From Another time period.  
  (3)  Dead centuries ago and reborn. 
  (4)  A holy Christian person. 
         (5) I spoke Attic Greek somewhat and remembered Rome. 
         (6) I wanted a new name and trimmed my beard. 
         (7) All my interest and habits changed – instantly. 
         (8) My linguistic idiosyncrasies altered permanently. 
         (9) Even the way I margined my pages changed. 
         (10)  I wrote people id never written before. 
         (11) I joined a religious organisation I‘d never heard of. 
         (12) All my political life alliances of a lifetime changed totally. 
         (13) I called cats “she” and dogs “he”. 
 
      Ergo: He who was alive died, and someone else now lives now in me, replacing me. 
 
       (14) I talk to and am talked to by God. 
 
    Well, what more can you ask out of a transformed person? I know the future and things beyond 
my senses, but I’ll skip that because I am not sure if that counts. 
   
          (15) I stopped drinking wine and drank beer. 
          (16) I knew that aerosol sprays were lethal; likewise cigarettes. 
    (17) I could discern evil and could tell what was true. 
    (18) My spelling is unchanged. (To give some continuity). 
    (19) I recovered from most of my quasi-physical ailments. 
    (20) Most of my time since I spend studying theology.  
    (21) The level of my intelligence is increased – this includes reading retention, speed and,     
abstract thinking. 
    (22) My depth perception is improved. 
    (23) Mental operations which baffled me are now easy (i.e. mental blocks now seem gone). 
    (24) My psychological projections are withdrawn. (p.192). 
 
 
The structure of the passage evidences the pleasure PKD seems to take in writing, writing 
anything at all. From statements of quite a profound nature (I talk to God) to discussions of the very 
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mundane or ordinary (I trimmed my beard), the purpose for PKD is perhaps less what he is 
committing to script but the fact that he is committing to script anything in the first place. The value 
or importance of PKD’s writing exercise is the act of writing itself, which, as we can see, is a vehicle 
for recording or exploring his thoughts on just about any subject matter whatsoever. Amongst all of 
this jumbled stream of consciousness is, I believe, an attempt by the author to search for something, 
or an effort to distil his reflections into one overarching system of meaning, one that crucially never 
arrives.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
I have noted before the vast number of themes, events, ideas and concepts that PKD works and re-
works into one overarching system. He incorporates ideas from religious and spiritual traditions, 
disparate elements of garage style philosophy, his own published works, as well as a whole host of 
civilisation-defining Ur-texts and notable literary sources into one spun out cosmology. PKD in 
essence is binding, or indeed knotting, all of these different elements into one single framework of 
meaning, one that is forever being re-fashioned and re-modelled. He finds he can order and tame the 
overwhelming experience via this meaning making enterprise that is his Exegesis. PKD quite literally 
finds and redirects his enjoyment into the meaning that he consistently derives from his writing. And 
as such, it comes to be felt as a conviction for him, it provides support and consistency to his life as 
without this literary writing-machine (his aufschreibsystem) he would be unable to order his life 
world. In 1979 PKD writes:   
My writing is a deliberate attempt to take these conflicting or disintegrating 
realities, and the experiences of them, and seek some kind of ontological or 
metaphysical overview? So in a way I battled against schizophrenia by seeking a 
philosophical framework which will (1) accept as real these disruptive data; and (2) 
account for them. 2-3-74, then, can be viewed as the catalytic triumph or payoff – 
i.e. the success – of decades of observation and analysis and theorizing (p.516).  
We can get perhaps no better indication that PKD, at some level, recognised that his mental turmoil 
(what he refers to as ‘schizophrenia’ here) was countered by his constant seeking of some grand 
overarching system of meaning or understanding. In this sense, he viewed the Exegesis as a ‘catalytic 
triumph’ and we are reminded here that many of his biographers have noted that the last years of 
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his life, the ones in which he was totally immersed in the Exegesis’ construction, appear to have 
been some of the most stable of his life, certainly the most successful in terms of his professional 
and private endeavours (Sutin, 2006). We may also note that the Exegesis was an unending 
endeavour. By providing meaning and support to his existence it required continual production. An 
unceasing desire to write his subjectivity into being was brought to a halt only with the biological 
end to his life. There could never be a final reckoning for PKD, as the writing itself was the support 
he required to stave off the paranoia and fragmentation that engulfed him in (and perhaps prior to) 
3-74. 
6.6 Exegesis as ‘Psychotic’ Text? 
“I personally achieved the catalytic metamorphosis that my writing promotes. And 
my writing may aid others in expanding their inner space – pointing toward what I 
did: breaking through…..” (2011, p.532).  
 
 Metamorphosis, writing, language and an appeal to an Other - I have situated these themes, 
contained within PKD’s quote above, in respect of ‘psychotic’ structure, one that mobilises a 
specifically Lacanian interpretation based on his tripartite system of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the 
Real. I have deliberately eschewed extended discussion on the overt surface level elements of the 
Exegesis that could suggest ‘psychotic’ thinking on the behalf of its author. UFO’s and Alien beings, 
trans-dimensional consciousness, Marxist plots and the role of security services abound throughout 
the Exegesis’s pages. Instead of foregrounding these elements as evidence of PKD’s supposed 
‘psychosis’, I have chosen instead to delve into the submerged dynamics within the text itself which 
accord to a number of theories we have examined prior to this chapter. My reasoning for doing so is 
that by interpreting the Exegesis via the workings of a delusional metaphor, or the Sinthomatic role 
PKD’s writing served, a case is made for aligning the Exegesis with ‘psychotic’ structure at the level of 
text. Although listing the many delusional sounding elements within the text may provide for 
interesting reading, it wouldn’t tell us a great deal about how a possible ‘psychotic’ structure was 
operating within the Exegesis’ construction. By tracing an interrelation between PKD’s conception of 
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language, the role of his body and the manner by which his writing served as a social bond, I have 
drawn explicit similarity to our earlier psychoanalytic interpretations of another supposed mad text -  
that of Daniel Paul Schreber.  
 I am aware that this style of reading whereby many diffuse elements are coordinated into 
one overarching system of meaning (one that mirrors PKD’s own exegetic focus) is a specific trait of 
the ‘strong theory’ that Sedgwick (2003) holds as being an attribute of paranoid reading, a reading 
indebted to a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ of which symptomatic practices are a part. Likewise, the 
attempt to uncover something hidden within the text (in this instance a ‘psychotic’ structure) speaks 
to the paranoid sensibility informing symptomatic practices. Sedgwick offers a reparative model to 
counter the worst excesses of critical reading. It is a model, that as Sedgwick herself notes, does not 
have to be mutually exclusive with that of symptomatic endeavours. In fact, her argument explicitly 
states that the richest reading practices are those that oscillate between paranoid and reparative 
analyses, between a focus on surface and depth or strong and weak theory. The case for the 
Exegesis being positioned as a specifically ‘psychotic’ text is strengthened by a reading that does just 
this; one that moves between the apparent odd, bizarre and outright ‘mad’ elements on the surface 
to one that concentrates its efforts on the hidden dynamics at play within language and the process 
of writing.  
There is one large theme within the Exegesis suggestive of a ‘psychotic’ structure at work 
that we have not, however, yet covered. Just as Schreber became estranged from the world around 
him, so too did PKD assert that his immediate environment was in fact false and furthermore that 
this false layer of reality was directly concealing temporal processes running at odds with how we 
usually perceive time. By engaging in this one single theme within PKD’s text, in the following 
chapter we shall bolster the case for a ‘psychotic’ structure at work within the Exegesis whilst also 
opening up the possibility that these mad elements can be read outside of a strictly clinical focus. 
PKD’s concept of ‘orthogonal time’, as we shall see, accords not only to psychoanalytic theorising on 
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the nature of subjective temporality within ‘psychotic’ experience, but also to a set of discussions 
relating to what I am calling ‘postmodern time’. As such, we shall start to appreciate how 
interpretations of ‘mad writing’ can straddle both clinical and cultural domains (much like the 
analyses of Schreber we encountered in Part 1), as well as understanding how the conceptual 
apparatus of ‘psychosis’ I am tracing through PKD’s text lends itself to readings that suggest that the 






























Chapter 7: Dyschronia: From ‘Psychosis’ to Postmodernism via ‘Orthogonal   
Time’                     
 
“I think it is at least empirically arguable that our daily life, our psychic experience, 
our cultural language, are today dominated by categories of space rather than by 
categories of time”- Fredric Jameson (1991, p.16). 
“Parsifal: “Here time turns into space.” Is this what I saw in 3-74? Time had either 
rolled back, or aside, or departed (a “dysfunction”) and I saw augmented (i.e. 
enormously greater) space…. So if you left the mundane world and entered the 
sacred (lower realm to upper?) maybe this is what you’d notice: time (whatever 
that might be) turning into space – vast dimensions, as with the void which I 
experienced: pure, total space” - Philip K. Dick (2011, p.445).  
 
 Employing a symptomatic reading in our preceding chapter enabled us to establish the case 
for positioning the Exegesis as a ‘psychotic’ text. By building on this initial interpretation we shall 
now engage with one major theme within PKD’s Sinthomatic endeavour: one that is concerned with 
time and changes in subjective temporality.  In this sense, PKD’s writing on time will bridge both 
clinical and cultural readings that can be made of the text, thereby, establishing ‘psychotic’ writing 
within a psychosocial framework, a framework that joins the subject to the larger socio-discursive 
terrain in which s/he resides. Our critical reading practice, symptomatic reading, which posits the 
related concepts of the ‘problematic’ and the ‘epistemological break’ will again be employed.  My 
aim then is to demonstrate that the Exegesis’ engagement with temporality not only conforms to 
various theoretical insights on the subjective or phenomenological experience of ‘psychosis’ but also 
moves beyond this and starts to bear an uncanny resemblance to a number of prominent theories 
about the altered nature of postmodern time; a specific set of traits that emerged towards the end 
of the twentieth century concerned with ‘static’, ‘compressed’ and ‘timeless’ time. PKD coined his 
own term for this - ‘orthogonal’ time.  
 Moreover, the interconnection between ‘psychotic time’ and what I am labelling 
‘postmodern time’ comes full circle if we return to Jameson’s original thesis on postmodernism from 
which the above quote is taken. Jameson (1991), utilising Lacanian theorisations of ‘schizophrenia’, 
203 
 
emphasised how postmodernism elicits a collapse of all temporal frames into an undifferentiated 
present; a series of endless ‘nows’ brought about due to a breakdown in synchronic movement. In 
this chapter, I engage directly with this connection - between contemporary experiences of time and 
the use of psychopathology to frame them - via the Exegesis. If PKD’s writing does capture both the 
temporal markers of ‘psychotic’ functioning as well as the altered state of postmodern time, as I 
believe it does, then we can begin to appreciate how ‘psychotic’ writing, in this instance the 
Exegesis, can be harnessed to construct a specifically psychosocial critique. I will close by re-
introducing the work of Gilles Deleuze and his concept of becoming, which is heavily indebted to his 
reflections on temporality. By doing so, I shall evidence how PKD’s writing on a newly configured 
conceptualisation of time not only bridges this clinical/cultural divide, but also references the key 
mechanism by which PKD’s text is able to channel specific socio-cultural traits, albeit in a refracted 
sense. PKD’s writings on his temporal predicament implicitly reference a process of ‘becoming’, one 
which we shall later utilise to construct this thesis’s final socio-cultural reading of the Exegesis. 
 
7.2 Orthogonal Time 
 Orthogonal time, and PKD’s related discussions on a distinct temporal disturbance or flux 
which brought about 3-74, comprises one of the Exegesis’ major themes. PKD expends much energy 
over its eight-year composition attempting to work and re-work this, at first, highly bizarre 
conception of time in order to account for what he experienced, and perhaps more importantly, 
why.  Although not an easily understood (or perhaps even fully coherent) concept, orthogonal time 
is, for PKD, a separate temporal arrangement that runs counter to linear or cyclical time. It runs 
perpendicular or at right angles to normally experienced time and in this sense is a merging of all 
aspects of temporality into one unified state. Typically, attempts made by PKD to encapsulate what 
precisely this concept refers to dance between his own very private, very personal experiences of 
this subjective state and his larger impersonal theorisations or philosophical speculations based on a 
mix of eclectic sources. Early on in the Exegesis’s construction, PKD attempts to explain it as follows: 
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it is speculated now that besides the regular time there may be a hypertime which 
would be orthogonal, a word I didn’t know; I looked it up and sure enough, it means 
‘at right angles’.  Also, someone (Kurt Gödel, I think the Britannica article said) 
speculated that the orthogonal time might be curved, since time and space are 
regarded now as integral, and space does curve; this hypertime would curve back 
onto itself … (2011, p.77). 
Shortly after he expands on this to state: 
Our comprehension (understanding) of time is faulty; there seem to be two distinct 
kinds of time, at ‘right angles’ to each other: horizontal time (as the form-
regressions follow in ubik) and vertical, which we seem aware of alone. Hence, 
cubic time, or time seen in both axes simultaneously, like cubic space versus two-
dimensional; i.e. Time moving in two directions (dimensions) at once. Events are 
arranged within this cubic “space” or rather time as objects are in cubic space (ibid. 
p.87). 
The first quote has recourse to a particular theoretical authority in the guise of Kurt Gödel to flesh 
out the notion of orthogonal time. PKD’s use of the signifier’s ‘hypertime’ and ‘curve’ immediately 
calls to mind Einstein’s (1916) theory of general relativity and his very own field equations, which 
speculated the existence of a curved form of space-time resulting from the interaction between 
matter and energy (gravitation). Indeed, PKD is correct to employ the proper name of ‘Gödel’ as a 
source for thinking through this reconfigured notion of time, as it was the Austrian mathematician 
and logician who is perhaps best associated with the possibility (theoretically at least) of travelling 
through time via his ‘closed time-like curves’ (1949). In the lineage of Parmenides, Kant and a host 
of modern idealists, Gödel inferred that there was no such thing as a specifically objective lapse of 
time and that temporal change is in fact an illusion arising from our subjective mode of perception. 
The ‘Gödel metric’ offering an answer to Einstein’s field equations is the so-called ‘cosmological 
solution’ instigating a radical upending of cyclical or linear notions of time. Although not certain of 
his reference (denoted by the ‘I think’!) PKD has correctly tied his own theory of up-ended time to 
the major thinker of reconfigured temporal arrangements. The ‘epistemological break’ that 
Einstein’s general relativity and Gödel’s ‘causal loops’ undoubtedly represent is inherently 
referenced in the Exegesis’ concept of orthogonal time.  
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Jump forward a few paragraphs in PKD’s writing and theoretical rigour is lost in favour of a 
notion of time at right angles to itself, a new-fangled idea of ‘cubic time’ alongside a reference to 
his own science fiction work UBIK (1969). Symptomatically speaking, this dance between an appeal 
to a credible, socially sanctioned intellectual source and a return to an eminently singular 
experience or privately produced work (Gödel versus UBIK) occurs consistently throughout the 
Exegesis. Orthogonal time is perhaps the very best example of this. PKD conflates this new 
‘problematic’ in science (in the sense that Althusser speaks of) with, what appears often as, a 
completely idiosyncratic and singular appreciation of his very own reality. This dance or tension is 
undoubtedly a productive one. What marks PKD’s discussion of orthogonal time is how these grand 
cosmological speculations of time (based either in terms of ‘Einsteinian/Gödelian mathematics’ or, 
as we shall note later, in more of a sociological postmodern vein) are quite literally elaborated in an 
embodied, hugely personal sense. It is as if PKD, through his exegetic writing, is internalising this 
epistemic break or radical cultural shift in our understanding of what time is and how we can 
perceive it. This internalisation is what marks the Exegesis as a particularly intriguing source for 
thinking through the social. PKD didn’t just rethink what time is, he lived it.  
 In order to situate this internalisation of reconfigured temporal arrangements, I am going 
to return initially to the language and terminology of ‘psychosis’. PKD’s dislocation in time, his lived 
reality of orthogonal dynamics, strikes a chord with a number of clinical insights on the 
phenomenological experience of time in ‘psychosis’. By examining various quotes, passages and 
entries within the Exegesis symptomatically, I aim to show the inherent similarity to the work of 
Eugene Minkowski and Jacques Lacan who provide a framework for understanding how subjective 
temporality is radically altered under the structure of ‘psychotic’ experience. However, this reveals 
to us only one aspect of the Exegesis’ temporal concerns. Orthogonal time, and PKDs internalisation 
of alternations in usual chronological sequence, also marks out an emerging set of sociological or 
cultural insights beginning in or around a similar period to the Exegesis’ construction. As such, 
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orthogonal time provides a bridge between clinical and cultural readings and, furthermore, 
suggests that the framework for understanding ‘psychosis’ may have relevance for situating 
particular cultural practices. We should, however, remain aware of this movement between PKD’s 
inner private conception of such a temporal flux and the subsequent appeal to socially constituted 
knowledge to ground it. As we shall come to see, this dance between the two, read 
symptomatically, will reveal an important mechanism at the heart of the Exegesis’ psychosocial 
logic.  
    
7.3 Pathologies of Lived Time 
 Subjective experience of time in psychopathological states has a rich and varied history in 
philosophical, psychological and medical research. As one prominent contemporary writer in this 
area notes, “there is virtually no other field where the dialogue between psychiatry and philosophy 
has been so intensive and fruitful” (Fuchs, 2010, p.76). This intensive dialogue continues today (see 
Möller & Husby, 2000; Vogeley & Kupke, 2007; Leiviskä Deland, Karlsson & Fatouros-Bergman, 2011) 
and whilst often couched in the language of the DSM and quantitative research, with only a passing 
nod to the philosophical tradition in which it is steeped, the dialogue itself shows little sign of 
abating. The continued draw for phenomenological psychiatry within this domain is built on the 
recognition that temporality constitutes one of the absolute bedrocks for any perceived experience 
or awareness of one’s own consciousness. The work of Henri Bergson (1889), Edmund Husserl (1991) 
and Martin Heidegger (1953) has provided the existential and philosophical framework for a range of 
thinkers to expand their studies on how time itself is interrupted, blocked or altered in a range of 
conditions from ‘schizophrenia’ through to ‘melancholia’ and many others besides. Straus (1960), 
Binswanger (1960), v. Gebsattel (1954) and Tellenbach (1980) represent some of the major names in 
this field.60 However, any discussion on this relation between lived time and psychopathological 
                                                          
60
 Although perhaps originating from a different angle, the contemporary mindfulness movement pays 
particular attention to time and in particular the time of the present. In this sense it is an attempt to root 
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states will forever be indebted to the work of Eugene Minkowski, in particular his 1927 study, La 
schizophrenie: Psychopathologie des schizoides et des schizophrenes as well as his more famous 
1933, Lived Time: Phenomenological and Psychological studies. Minkowski was the first to 
elaborately detail the experience of time in what may now be termed ‘schizophrenic/psychotic’ 
states as well as more depressive type episodes. His work constitutes the undoubted foundation to 
this field and it is to this, and its relevance to the Exegesis, that I now turn.  
 Minkowski, whilst operating from within the traditions of German psychiatry (himself a 
student of Eugene Bleuler) and aspects of existentialism and psychoanalysis (an interlocutor with 
Ludwig Binswanger and Karl Gustav Jung) provides a rich phenomenological framework for situating 
and understanding aspects of psychopathology in relation to temporal concerns. Utilising the notion 
of élan vital and the concept of Duration (durée) drawn from Henri Bergson, Minkowski developed a 
theory of ‘schizophrenia’ which describes how the subjective state of the ‘psychotic’ is one 
characterised by a withdrawal of ones very own ‘life-force’. He writes: 
moreover, since the schizophrenic process, as we have seen, affects the vital 
dynamism itself, the perturbations of the phenomenon of lived time are 
particularly profound. Here time entirely breaks down, contrary to what takes 
place in other mental disorders, where a modification is produced in the domain 
of time itself (mental subduction in time) (1933, p.284).  
One of ‘schizophrenia’s’ defining aspects, for Minkowski, is this complete collapse in temporal 
functioning as opposed to mere modifications in the domain of time which characterise other 
disorders. Time isn’t just altered in ‘schizophrenia’, it comes apart altogether. How though does this 
‘breaking down of time’ present itself? Minkowski states that this new temporal arrangement for 
the ‘psychotic’ appears as a kind of ‘non-time’ or a time that is not lived in the here and now but 
rather removed or detached from the ‘psychotic’ subject. Furthermore, this dislodged time has a 
deadened quality to it with an emphasis on a stuck present or of a perpetual reliving of the past that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
experiences of mental health within temporal locations. Further interest in the temporal phenomenological 
perspectives on psychiatric experience can be found in the work of M. Ratcliffe (2014) Experiences of 
Depression: A Study in Phenomenology and Gareth Owen’s (2012) The Maudsley Reader in Phenomenological 
Psychiatry.   
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is forever intruding on the present moment. Minkowski, drawing on the contemporaneous writings 
of Franz Fischer, states that their collaborative work on ‘schizophrenia’ “emphasizes a very profound 
dislocation of the phenomenon of time, with a prevalence of the past, which, as we know, represents 
the most static aspect of lived time” (1933, p.284). Minkowski, in his work, draws on written patient 
testimony, or rather instances of ‘psychotic’ text, to highlight the apparent interruption of temporal 
processes under the condition of’ schizophrenia’. He includes the following examples: 
I tried to envisage time as usual, but I could not do it; and then came a feeling of 
horrible expectation that I could be sucked up into the past or that the past would 
overcome me and flow over me. It was disquieting that someone could play with 
time like that, somewhat daemonic. This would be perverse for humanity (p.285). 
It takes me backwards, but where? There where it comes from or where it was 
before. It goes back into the past. You have the feeling that you are going to fall 
behind. It is that which disappears, that which passes. Time slides into the past, the 
walls have tumbled down. Before, everything was solid. It is as if it is right at hand, 
as if you ought to draw it here again; is it time? It comes from far away! (p.286).  
There is no more present, there is only a going-backwards; it is more than a feeling, 
it extends over everything. In the air of the room there are all sorts of schemes 
directed against me. But I do not pay any attention to them; I rest my mind so that 
it will not split apart (p.287). 61 
Close examination of these passages reveals a number of themes. Firstly, the reliving of the past, this 
‘going-backwards’, is perceived as an involuntarily action. Minkowski’s patients are either ‘sucked’ 
into the past or ‘fall’ into it. The shock of time sliding away reveals itself as a cataclysm akin to the 
tumbling down of walls which may result in the splitting apart of one’s very mind. None of the 
patient descriptions here indicate any self-control or influence over this perceived turmoil, a turmoil 
that is experienced as more than just a simple feeling where the only option seemingly available is to 
submit to the pull of the past. The second thing we detect is the attribution of this action to a 
malevolent, or indeed, daemonic force. The paranoid or conspiratorial nature of this experience 
whereby schemes are directed against the unfortunate individual chimes with Schreber’s (1903) own 
                                                          
61 These excerpts were originally published in: Fisher, Franz, (1929) “Zeitstruktur und Schizophrenie,” 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, CXXI & Fisher, Franz, (1930). “Raum-Zeit-Struktur und 




testimony and undoubtedly countless other paranoid accounts of impending disaster. We may recall 
that for the paranoid subject, an overvaluation of the influence of the Other is a common trait. 
Minkowski’s excerpts here are no different and represent another example of clinical theory being 
derived from the written work of ‘psychotic’ subjects. 
 Turning to the Exegesis now, we will note a range of similarities with Minkowski’s work and 
the ‘prevalence of the past’ in ‘psychotic’ experience. Amongst the many reflections PKD commits to 
writing about his own subjective location within time, he offers, in 1977, the following summation: 
What is my real relationship to time? I experience the near past, the near future, and 
the very far past; a lot of my soul or psyche seems to be transtemporal …. Maybe this 
is why any given present space time seems somehow unreal or delusional to me 
(2011, p.261).  
For PKD, time has coalesced into one state, he experiences both the future and the past 
simultaneously, but interestingly it is a predominance of past experience of which he writes. Both 
the near past and the very far past intrude on his present moment. The result is that the present 
instance has an unreal quality to it - he does not have the expected investment in time as it appears 
at odds with him or in his own words ‘delusional’. However, to really appreciate the possible 
delusional aspect to PKD’s temporal locale, one that is in keeping with Minkowski’s temporal 
perturbations in ‘schizophrenia’ and the discussed ‘prevalence of the past’, there is surely one major 
component to PKD’s writing on his own lived experience of time that marks the Exegesis out from 
simple eccentricity in regards of subjectively experienced time or perhaps an overly poeticised 
account of one’s place in the universe. I am referring here to the much discussed issue within the 
Exegesis of PKD’s belief that during the events of 3-74 he experienced ancient Rome supplanted 
onto his present day home in Fullerton, California.  
 This quite extraordinary claim represents one of the more outlandish ideas within the entire 
Exegesis but one that he returns to time and again whilst incorporating it into other related 
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schemas.62 The ‘ancient Rome’ theme is called on later in the Exegesis to describe a prison-like 
complex which encases the entire world. PKD further reasons that the Roman Empire, in fact, never 
came to an end but survived to the present day in a camouflaged state, for the purposes of enslaving 
humanity. The paranoid flavour to this is quite evident. The Rome theme also takes on a much larger 
religious significance with PKD identifying himself with the persecuted Christians of the time. It is 
difficult not to assign a delusional quality to statements such as the following:   
I remember that when this first hit me, in the first couple of weeks, I was absolutely 
convinced that I was living in Rome, sometime after Christ appeared but before 
Christianity became legal (2012, p.33). 
And, likewise, when writing about his 3-74 experience he states:  
I looked around and saw Rome! Rome everywhere! Power and force, stone walls, 
iron bars (2012, p.59). 
And in 3-74 I reached that absolute world; time and space peeled back – thousands 
swept out layers peeled away in a matter of hours, and there lay Rome and the 
disciples: The true hidden persecuted despised [early] church which Luther speaks 
of. As the Greeks knew, the truly real does not ever change or depart- it always is 
(2012, p.255). 
Whatever ‘hit’ PKD in early 1974 was not just a mere feeling of the past, the ‘sliding’ or ‘fall’ from the 
present that Minkowski’s excerpts highlight above. The walls have tumbled down to reveal that the 
historical past, the past of over 2000 years, remains entirely intact. The ‘prevalence of the past’ takes 
on a new intensity in PKD’s vision and so too does the malevolent power that is orchestrating this 
new historical present. PKD’s pre-occupation with a form of the Roman Empire still currently in 
operation is replete throughout the Exegesis and it is one of the first major issues that PKD tackles 
within its many pages. As early as November 1974 PKD writes that: 
There is no doubt in my mind that my “vision” of my society was accurate in the 
sense that Mumford means it; I hadn’t gone back in time, but in a sense Rome had 
come forward, by insidious and sly degrees, under new names, hidden by the flak 
talk and phony obscuration’s, at last into our world again (2011, p.59). 
                                                          
62
 As an editor of the Exegesis states, “Dick was in many ways a genius and visionary, but this Rome business is 
just stone screwy [….] Here it raises the obvious question: Did Dick really believe this? Or is he half-consciously 
assuming a guise of madness, not so much for the sake of the reader as for his own sake, so as to get – a la the 
most romantic nineteenth-century notions of madness – at some truth?” (2011, p.382).   
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PKD’s experience of Rome is one characterised by ‘insidious’ and ‘sly’ intentions, of power and force 
as represented through prison-like architecture and the apparent illegality of the persecuted 
Christians of the time.  The need to again add an air of intellectual authority to his claim is present in 
the use of the name ‘Mumford’, referring to the American historian, sociologist and philosopher of 
technology, Lewis Mumford (1967) who cited ancient Rome as an example of a large hierarchal 
organisation or ‘megamachine’. These megamachines consisted of an amalgamation of economic, 
technical and political power in the service of complex technocratic projects at the expense of the 
repressed individual. PKD’s experience of this repressive machine aligns with Minkowski’s patients 
whose upheavals in time were attributable to an Other with malign intentions. For PKD the same 
holds, the Roman Empire, the historical embodiment of anti-Christian power, is still in operation only 
concealed behind a fictitious present day reality and it is through their own ‘sly’ and ‘insidious’ action 
that they have brought about this temporal realignment for PKD himself. We might speculate further 
that the persecuted Christian theme fits well with his own belief that his position, or indeed his 
writing, has a salvific function for mankind at large. What better example of an oppressive tyrannical 
Other, that is overcome by the redemptive powers of an enlightened individual, than the case of 
ancient Rome? The possibility that the Exegesis itself holds a similar function for PKD has been noted 
previously and we can argue that the ‘Christian-Rome’ theme here mirrors a grandiosity that is so 
often characteristic of ‘psychotic’ delusion.   
 The experience of Rome, however, encroaching on present day reality has not yet been 
described in terms of orthogonal time. It remains a private, internal construction without appeal to 
the possible temporal dynamics that Gödel for instance formulates. PKD certainly does incorporate 
the ‘ancient Rome’ theme into this schema but for the moment I wish to remain with PKD’s own 
personal recounting of his distorted experience of time whilst returning to the work of Jacques 
Lacan, who provides another means for understanding how elements of the Exegesis accord to the 
logic of ‘psychosis’ that we have introduced via Minkowski and his phenomenological existential 
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underpinnings. The ‘prevalence of the past’, the ‘stuck present’ and the ‘malevolent Other’ 
introduced by Minkowski’s withdrawal of one’s life-force are be augmented by Lacan’s contribution 
to the notion of ‘psychotic’ time.  
  
7.4 Lacan and ‘Psychotic’ Time 
 Minkowski’s theoretical/philosophical framework is one indebted certainly to early 
existential thought and is complimented, at times, with a Jungian inspired psychoanalysis. Lacan was 
also greatly influenced by Heidegger’s work and although his ‘return to Freud’ would likely mark him 
out from any Jungian lineage, there remains a degree of similarity regarding his theories on the 
phenomenology of ‘psychotic’ experience. These are similar but not identical. Whereas Minkowski’s 
focus on the withdrawal of one’s life force, the élan vital, and the corresponding ‘prevalence of the 
past’ is paramount to the ‘psychotic’s’ lived time, Lacanian psychoanalysis leads us to understand 
that yes, time is altered but it is felt as a similar traumatic halt or deadening due to the logic of the 
signifier. To understand this, we must return to Lacan’s structuralist inspired theory which posits the 
diachronic and synchronic movement of signifiers within the symbolic order. This is a movement that 
is arrested due to “sometime [when] there has been a hole, a rupture, a rent, a gap, with respect to 
external reality” (1955-56, p.45). Our analysis of Lacan’s seminar on Schreber (1955-56) highlighted 
the much discussed mechanism at the heart of ‘psychotic’ subjectivity; the foreclosure of the name-
of-the-father. This foreclosed element to the subject’s psychic life ensures that what the ‘psychotic’ 
experiences is nothing less than a void brought about due to this rent or gap within the symbolic 
register. The result for the ‘psychotic’ is to experience this as an “enormous meaning that has the 
appearance of being nothing at all” (ibid. p.85).  Lacan adds that in ‘psychosis’, “reality itself initially 
contains a hole that the world of fantasy will subsequently fill” (p.45).  
 The Exegesis, read via this Lacanian lens, is testament to the experience of this hole or gap 
which PKD sought to fill with phantasmatic notions of ancient Rome, amongst many others. The 
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Lacanian hypothesis here would be to suggest that this hole or gap is exactly what PKD was 
confronted with in ‘2-3-74’; a moment in his life-world that he could not place within the usual 
symbolic coordinates and which necessitated the need for fantasmatic elements to fill in for it. The 
result, as we have seen, is the eight-year writing exercise attempting to ‘plug’ this very hole. We will 
recall from the previous chapter how the Exegesis can be considered as one giant operation in 
meaning making, the jous-sens that he elicits and redirects through the never ceasing search for one 
single enormous understanding to his predicament (PKD-the-Sinthome). Ancient Rome, the intrusion 
of the past and orthogonal time all provide possible supports in this endeavour. This re-altered 
temporal logic also, however, provides another entry point in the Lacanian theory of ‘psychosis’.  
 Lacan’s analysis of Schreber’s delusion, with the aid of Saussurean linguistics, helps to 
illustrate the dynamic that the symbolic accords to; one conditioned by the synchronic and 
diachronic movement amongst signifiers.  In speaking of the mechanism of foreclosure (verwarfung) 
and the rejection of what he terms the primordial signifier (the name-of-the-father), Lacan highlights 
how the symbolic is constructed according to a temporal logic. He writes: 
When he speaks, the subject has the entire material of language at his disposal, and 
this is where concrete discourse begins to be formed. Firstly, there is a synchronic 
whole, which is language as a simultaneous system of structured groups of 
opposition, then there is what occurs diachronically, over time, and which is 
discourse. One cannot but give discourse a certain direction in time, a direction that 
is defined in a linear manner (1955-56, p.54). 
For discourse to be intelligible and for it to be brought into a dialectical relationship with the 
symbolic at large it must accord to this diachronic/synchronic logic. The passage of time is inherently 
at work within the use of discourse or language and, moreover, it essentially proceeds in a linear 
fashion. Without it, as Lacan then points out, we are left with an inert system of meaning. Once the 
subject is confronted with this tear in the symbolic, the usual passage from one signifier to another, 
the so-called ‘metonymic sliding’, is brought to a sudden halt. Diachronic movement is suspended 
and the experienced passage of time is, likewise, effected. The result is something akin to 
Minkowski’s observations concerning a stuck or petrified experience of time for the ‘psychotic’ 
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subject. Lacan similarly highlights the alienating character that the world takes on, for Schreber for 
instance. In an almost identical vein, PKD harnesses this experience of entropy when he asserts 
boldly that, “Time is ending, literally” (2011, p.399) or when he claims, “I see at once. Growth is 
absolutely halted. Time itself is stopped” (ibid. p.414). The linear movement of time has for PKD, 
here, and in numerous other instances throughout the Exegesis, quite literally been suspended.   
 The suspension of linear time leads us to another related aspect that is present in both 
Schreber’s and PKD’s discourse - the pre-occupation with mortality and the belief in the world’s 
impending demise. The work of M. Denischik (2015) may assist us here especially. Denischik, whilst 
operating within a Lacanian framework, has brought attention to the resultant experience of 
alienation and ultimately of death in response to the halting of time in ‘psychosis’. Although her 
focus is primarily on the broken play of presence and absence within a ‘psychotic’ subject’s psychic 
life, as opposed to the arrest of diachronic movement, she is able to reason that the ‘psychotic’s 
concern for impending disaster and their own fragile mortality is directly related to the suspension 
of linear time. She writes:  
the dynamism of the world-organizing play of presence and absence ceases in 
psychosis, leaving the delusional subject hostage to the staticity of petrified, 
attenuated time. The time of psychosis is not grounded in the apparent presence 
of the world but hovers over the abyssal void of non-existence (p.159).  
Presence and absence, which condition the passage of time and, therefore, one of the fundamental 
bedrocks of human experience, is dramatically upended due to the much discussed gap within the 
symbolic order. This abyssal void results, for Denischik, in the destruction of both the world and 
one’s ego due to the complete lack of temporal markers which would normally be called on to 
situate one’s biological development, the very passage of subjective life, as well as the historical 
movement of the world at large. Again, in respect of Schreber, she writes:  
the continuous sense of belonging to the world dissipates along with the elements 
that constitute this relation, the person enters a state of alienation. A sense of the 
world’s otherness reaches its apex, for Schreber, when the world must cease to 
exist for him to go on. Either Schreber or the world must become radically other, 
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that is, non-existent. It is my claim that the temporal function of psychic processes 
is so thoroughly dislodged in cases like Schreber’s that a sense of non-existence, 
of being outside of time, a feeling of utter alienation manifests as a wish for the 
annihilation of the world and all relations with it (2015, p.157).  
The absence of time manifests itself as a termination of one’s mortality and relations with the world. 
Schreber’s discourse, effected by this diachronic emergency, repeatedly references his belief that he 
is already dead or dying. PKD’s exegetic focus mirrors Schreber in this very regard. On multiple 
occasions PKD questions whether he may in fact be dead, living in an afterlife or an alternate 
universe as a possible explanation for this experience of time’s end. Take for instance: 
So I may be dead, as of 3-74. My cosmological concepts are so terrific, so 
advanced as to be off the scale. I create whole religions and philosophical 
systems. The very fact that I honestly ponder if I may be dead and in heaven is 
prima facie of how happy I am (2011, p.512). 
My experiences in ‘2-3-74’ were like those in Ubik [….] Therefore I am dead (ibid. 
p.549). 
I had, as in 1974, come to the end in some real and perhaps even ontological sense; 
mentally I had in fact died (p.712). 
We will note that these quotes appear midway in the Exegesis’ construction where PKD begins to 
theorise in full a new conception of life and vitality, one that he locates in the abstract notion of 
information. I will shortly make the correlation between his bodily metamorphosis (discussed in the 
last chapter), his own mortality and the emergence of a new disembodied form of subjectivity. 
What is of importance right now is this awareness of PKD’s experience of death (or mental death) 
and the temporal disturbance that underwrites it. All of this I shall come to situate in respect of 
PKD’s process of ‘becoming’. For the moment, I can conclude that these themes inherent to the 
Exegesis concerned with ancient Rome, the suspension of time, the prevalence of the past and 
PKD’s own morality are, at least in part, explainable via theories of ‘psychosis’ that stress its altered 
phenomenological characteristics. Minkowski’s discussions on the withdrawal of one’s life-force in 
‘schizophrenia’ has provided some surface level similarities to PKD’s assertions about the 
suspension of time and the encroachment of a historical past into his present moment. By 
incorporating Lacanian theory into the mix, we can appreciate to a more nuanced degree, and one 
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that has a focus for concealed dynamics (at the level of signifiers as well as metonymic sliding and 
associated diachronic/synchronic movement) how the statements, comments and written 
discourse of PKD can be interpreted via the structure of ‘psychosis’ interwoven throughout the 
Exegesis.  
 I mentioned earlier that PKD’s dance between socially sanctioned sources of 
intellectual/theoretical rigour and his own spun out theories about time and the nature of reality is 
a common trait within his exegetic production. Gödel and Mumford are two such examples we 
have encountered so far. Philosophers of time, in the guise of Alfred Whitehead and Gottfried 
Leibniz, also hold prominent places within the Exegesis’ many pages. The need for PKD to situate 
his own private experiences against these eminent figures of knowledge and thought, I believe, 
strikes of his deep felt desire to make his eccentric, if not outwardly delusional, sounding ideas 
accessible or intelligible to others. In this sense, it is an attempt to align his thoughts with an 
authority that will add a degree of credibility to his writing and his own theorisations about the 
nature of reality. This appeal to an Other is yet one more possible way we can understand his 
writing as a form of social bond. He binds his radical, outlandish claims with the proper names of 
philosophy and mathematics in an attempt to make his notion of orthogonal time accessible in a 
wider cultural sense.  In doing so, PKD perhaps consciously is referencing a shift or break in 
theoretical understandings about the nature or composition of time, a shift or break that he himself 
underwent. PKD’s orthogonal time chimes with this new ‘problematic of science’ instated by 
‘Gödel’s metric’ and his associated ‘closed time-like curves’. However, orthogonal time, perhaps 
unbeknown to PKD’s (conscious) self, also refracts one of the defining features of late modernity. In 
his frantic, and we might say delusional, theorising about the nature of orthogonal time as a means 
to explain his own very private experience, PKD unwittingly channels widespread alterations in 
collective experiences of temporality which are largely the result of rapid transformations in 
technological advancement. By delving deeper into PKD’s theorisation of orthogonal time now, and 
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away from his pre-occupation with ancient Rome, I want to shift from a clinical lens and appreciate 
how the Exegesis can be read culturally; in this instance by aligning orthogonal time with a possible 
‘ontological break’ that occurred towards the end of the twentieth century in respect of how time 
is felt on a global level.   
 
7.5 Postmodern Time  
One year after his ‘2-3-74’ vision of ancient Rome that he used as the springboard to 
conceptualise orthogonal time, PKD writes, in respect of various ‘signs’ or ‘non-living objects’ that 
each of us encounter as we move through our reality and, thereby measure the passage of time, 
that:   
There is really nothing in them but minimal – economic- transfer of information 
that one particular now has replaced the now (or prior signal) before it. We 
advance from signal to signal. The signals are unmoving, totally inert. We are 
driven inexorably; none of us can halt himself in that motion from signal to signal, 
since each one of the signals carries with it transfer-information to last until the 
next: each hands us over, as it were, when its “now” has expired (2011, p.123).  
The passage of time is described in terms of signals transferring information over to other signals. 
The quote immediately calls to mind a technologically inflected, perhaps even digitally realised, 
framework for understanding how we experience time; a passage only perceived due to the 
information that one particular ‘now’ possesses before it expires in favour of another signal or 
carrier of information. For PKD, the transfer of information (from signal to signal) holds the key to 
understanding the experience of time passing.  With the word ‘internet’ coined just a year before 
and with the emergence of home-based computer technology just around the corner, PKD’s concern 
for information transfer (which will come to drive us inexorably) couldn’t, historically speaking, be 
more apt. Moreover, his alignment of time with the transmission of information immediately 
references what I am terming an ‘ontological break’ in how time has been experienced due to the 
emergence of digitalised communication, computerised informational processes and the general 
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shift towards late capitalist production.63 PKD’s theorization of orthogonal time, and most 
importantly his lived familiarity of it, I ascertain, references these very developments. Frederic 
Jameson’s (1991) thesis on postmodernism, and the attendant quote that opened this chapter, 
argues for the radical reconfiguration, if not outright obliteration, of time in favour of space. Lacan’s 
thoughts on ‘schizophrenic’ functioning is employed to explain that associated collapse in synchronic 
movement thereby opening up, if only on a metaphorical level, the apparent similarity between 
postmodern time and ‘psychotic’ structure. Jameson is far from alone in his theorizations on the 
altered nature of postmodernism and the use of psychopathology to frame it (see Baudrillard, 1987). 
Before unearthing those passages or sections of the Exegesis that strike a major cord with Jameson’s 
thesis, I want to plot a course through some of the major intellectual sources that have contributed 
to a modality of time that is characterised by inertia and conversely speed due to the changes in 
communicative and information technology; the sources that map out the ontological break that is 
postmodern time.   
 In keeping with Jameson’s assertion that our subjective appreciation of space and time has 
radically altered, David Harvey (1989) argued in the late 80’s that one key feature of our so-called 
postmodern age is a form of “time-space compression”. Harvey reasons that this compression has 
come about due to “processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we 
are forced to alter sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves” 
(p.240). Harvey asserts that we can best understand these changes in conceptions of space and time 
through the altered modes in global production/consumption processes. He links these changes to 
the changes wrought by the transition from static, highly mechanised and exceedingly regimented 
manufacturing processes to ones replaced by increased degrees of flexibility and individual tailoring; 
essentially, from rigid Fordist forms of industrial production to fluid, dispersed and fragmented 
organisational forms. The role of information technology and networked digital practices are central, 
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 For a more detailed examination of how this experience of time is felt, and crucially how one’s experience of 
labour necessarily effects ones temporal standing see S. Sharma (2014) In the Meantime: Temporality and 
Global Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
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for Harvey, to this change. Such computer based systems of communication have enabled a rapid 
rise and increased speed of information flow across the globe, resulting in streamlined modes of 
distribution and the enlarged transfer and consumption of commodities. Likewise, Harvey draws 
attention to the rise in electronic banking and the computerization of financial markets as being a 
key feature of this changing global experience. The global flow of capital is, for Harvey, at the heart 
of this experience of both space and time contracting.  
Harvey’s ideas find some degree of commensurability with those of social theorist, Manuel 
Castells (1996), in particular his notion of the ‘network society’. Castells asserts that nearly three 
millennia after the invention of the alphabet, a new technological transformation in respect of our 
communicative ability is radically transforming our experience of socially shared reality. He coins this 
transformation ‘real virtuality’ and he writes:  
The potential integration of text, images, and sounds in the same system, interacting 
from multiple points, in chosen time (real or delayed) along a global network, in 
conditions of open and affordable access, does fundamentally change the character 
of communication [….] because culture is mediated and enacted through 
communication, cultures themselves, that is our historically produced systems of 
beliefs and codes, become fundamentally transformed, and will be more so over 
time, by this new technological system (1996, p.328).  
The term ‘real virtuality’ is adopted to address this drastic change in culture. The two central 
categories that are transformed by this immersion into a virtual setting are once again space and 
time.  His basic assertion is that time was, until relatively recently, constricted by space. Only actors 
or subjects who shared a similar space could operate in real time. Time and space were, for all 
intents and purposes, coextensive. However, just as space became subject to new societal dynamics, 
so too time and our experience of it drastically changed during the latter half of the twentieth 
century. The introduction of communicative technologies, that Harvey draws attention to, allows for 
subjects to operate with others in real time whilst remaining in vastly different geographical and 
spatial locations. This, in turn, instigates a completely new temporal-spatial arrangement. 
Effectively, a new space-time is created allowing actors to share different spaces but the same time. 
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Castells names this the ‘space of flows’. In developing this idea, Castells finds some theoretical 
alliance with a range of social theorists who have, likewise, commented on the effects modern life 
has on shared experiences of space and time. Anthony Giddens (1984) has theorised a so-called 
‘time-space distanciation' (the stretching of social ties across space and time) as being one of the 
hallmarks of modernity. Paul Virilio (1995) has also taken this notion one step further and argued 
that following the introduction of networked digital communication, space is being annihilated, 
leading to a “dictatorship of speed” across all social, economic and political arenas.  
Castells’ difference from such theorists is found with his assertion that space has not 
disappeared but rather altered into a ‘logic of flows’, a new material basis for time sharing on which 
dominant social processes are reorganised. Essentially, the ability to act and communicate across 
different physical spaces results not, as one commentator on Castells notes, in the “linear shrinking 
of distance, but the establishment of an environment with a completely different, nonlinear spatial 
logic” (Stalder, 2006, p.147). This ‘space of flows’ engenders a binary spatial logic whereby distance 
is only understood in terms of presence or absence, no distance and infinite distance. Stalder goes 
on to state that “it is this condition that allows nodes to flexibly connect within one another, no 
matter where they are located, because they are all “here” in the same time sharing environment 
that is the space of flows” (ibid. p.153). The effects of communicative technology are also analysed 
by Castells in respect of time. He reasons that, contrary to previous conceptualisations of time as 
being cyclical and linear, the time of flows results in a disturbance in the sequential order of 
phenomena. For Castells, we no longer live with a dominant form of temporality whether that be 
biological time or clock time. The emergence of digital practices and networked interaction has given 
rise to multiple temporal experiences which creates a degree of chaotic fluctuation in in the ordering 
of sequential events. For Castells, this results in a ‘timeless time’, a mode of temporality that is 
characterised by the absence of a fixed sequence itself. Now consider the following passage from 
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the Exegesis where PKD asserts that his own unique temporal arrangement is conditioning a state of 
disorder in linear sequence: 
The re-emergence of cyclic time would be the method of restoration. It is not 
logically evident that hyper or orthogonal time {OT} would of necessity be cyclic; at 
first I thought it was retrograde. However, it does differ from lineal time in that 
lineal time is only unidirectional (by definition). OT is two-way or many 
omnidirectional (2011, p.118). 
We can perhaps now begin to appreciate what the relevance of Harvey’s, Castells’ and other similar 
theorists’ ideas about the changing nature of contemporary space and time has to do with PKD’s 
orthogonal time.64 Essentially, just as PKD’s ideas about orthogonal time and the end of temporality 
are reminiscent of ‘psychotic’ phenomena, so too could it be argued that they touch upon this set of 
ideas related to a space of flows and timeless time. Both describe a domain where the usual passage 
of forward moving time (linear or cyclical) has been upended in favour of something altogether more 
complex. A version of time that contains numerous different movements and dynamics, a space of 
flows that PKD names as ‘omnidirectional’. These movements of time branch off into multiple 
different directions and, as such, they come to exist in all possible spaces or arrangements (an ever 
present ‘now’) as in an omniscient or omnipresent space-time.  In regards a compression of space 
and time, that is a supposed hallmark of Harvey’s postmodern experience, we can get no clearer 
indication from PKD that his 3-74 experience channelled such a similar notion when he writes:    
Time both expanded (I recalled 1,000’s of years) but those 1,000’s of years shrank 
down into an immediate sequence, as if very short. The telescoping of literally 
millennia disclosed a single underlying event – although spread out – seemingly 
elongated – in linear time, this collapsed view was the correct one. This was not just 
another way of seeing reality; it was the accurate way (2011, p.297).  
PKD’s new reality is one characterised by a single unified time. One that has been compressed or 
flattened out into one immediate sequence, a state containing all time frames together in one ever-
present moment. What we find, though, is that this unified time comes eventually to be experienced 
                                                          
64
 As Erik Davis (2019) draws attention to at the end of High Weirdness, Manuel Castells himself states, “Only 
in the 1970’s did new information technologies diffuse widely, accelerating their synergistic development and 
converging into a new paradigm” (2010, p.39). The point being that 3-74 happens precisely at the same 
moment that this new paradigm came into being.  
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as no time at all. Without the sequential rhythm of time, which Lacan and Denischik write of above, 
time ceases to have any relevance and is experienced as abstract, detached or alien. PKD later 
describes how the experience of inhabiting all time frames simultaneously, of living through this 
compression of time into one ‘immediate sequence’, ultimately leads to him removing himself from 
any orientation in time whatsoever. PKD writes much later into the Exegesis’ construction towards 
the end of 1979, that following his ‘2-3-74’ experience:  
The situation was a desperate one; I was consuming time faster and faster, which 
bears out my recent insight that I had been speeding up in relation to real time until 
finally I used up all time totally and passed outside of time! (2011, p.556). 
PKD seems to be living within a domain whereby he is subject to massively increased temporal 
pressures, a so-called ‘dictatorship of speed’. There is a sense that the movement of time is 
increasing to such a degree that it results in the eradication of temporality altogether, an eradication 
that, as we have noted, is a supposed trait of postmodern experience.  
 We have, then, two different lenses to try and situate orthogonal time and PKD’s writing on 
temporality; one clinical, the other related to a general condition of late modernity. Whilst the 
outright delusional sounding elements to PKD’s ancient Rome theme are hard to ignore, his 
personalisation of a shift in how reality itself is collectively experienced in a temporal sense is 
intriguing. The upending of time brought about by developments in mathematical theory in the early 
twentieth century is something PKD seems at least partially aware of and this new problematic is 
intentionally brought to the fore in his attempts to understand 3-74 whilst also grounding his 
experience in social terrain. At this level, we may postulate that PKD is binding his experiences to 
socially shared knowledge and his mad writing overlaps with this epistemological break. However, it 
is not just Einstein and Gödel who theorise a break in sequential or linear time. Those postmodern 
theorists, noted above, similarly arrive at a theory of time that no longer accords to linear 
movement. The difference separating both is that the first set of theoretical insights are entirely 
constructed within the field of ‘hard’ knowledge, within mathematical equation or scientific 
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calculation, while the latter is supposedly based within collective sociological experience due to 
cultural shifts in technological change. The epistemological break of Einstein/Gödel is mirrored to 
some degree on an ontological level with Harvey, Castells and other social theorists. Technological 
development appears, in their eyes, to have altered reality itself on a deeply subjective level. PKD 
explicitly references the break in epistemology but it is this implicitly referenced ‘ontological break’ 
that is perhaps more telling. As PKD moves from his own private break with reality (ontic) to socially 
shared knowledge (epistemic) he is simultaneously channelling, albeit unknowingly, a cultural shift in 
ontological understandings on the nature of postmodern time. This complex dance between private 
reality and the ontic/epistemic field with which to ground it, is one of the key mechanisms to 
understanding quite how the reconfigured social bond in ‘psychosis’ can produce wider cultural 
insights. Before we unpack this tight relation further over the remainder of this thesis, there is one 
last concept to throw into the mix that will further illustrate how the Exegesis, and we may add mad 
writing, can evidence changes in the field of psychosocial subjectivity and, therefore, provide a 
possible socio-cultural reading. This is a subjectivity that, according to Gilles, Deleuze is constituted 
within specific temporal logics.  
  
7.6 Temporal Becoming & Psychopathology 
The concept that I’m a time traveller from 70 A.D. completely explains Thomas. The 
PKD personality is a memory-less mask, and Thomas is the authentic personality of 
the time-traveller, and hence Thomas is really myself – the actual me who was sent 
here: like a cuckoo’s egg. I am not PKD; I am Thomas – there was no theolepsy; only 
anamnesis (Dick, 2011, p.299). 
 The cuckoo’s egg of which PKD writes, hatches to reveal a newly emergent, authentic 
persona to that which has gone before. For PKD, this new character (Thomas) is both a historical 
figure from the Christian Roman era, as well as the identity he will inhabit in the future. It is the 
aspect of PKD that can travel through time, the aspect that he was and perhaps, more importantly, 
will come to be. We saw in our previous chapter how change felt at the level of the body and an 
associated subjective metamorphosis is a key trait of ‘psychosis’, one that PKD writes of throughout 
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his Exegesis. Here his metamorphosis takes on a temporal concern and this change into someone or 
something else existing at differing levels of time cannot but lead us to a discussion on Gilles 
Deleuze’s wide ranging concept of ‘becoming’.  
Extending through his collaborative Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972/1980) project with 
Felix Guattari and his own Logic Of Sense (1969), the concept of ‘becoming’ is one central to 
Deleuze’s philosophical apparatus dealing with the ‘actual/virtual’, the ‘three syntheses’ as well as 
the roles of difference and repetition in the make-up of (larval) subjects. Deleuze, over the course of 
his theoretical output, was invested in constructing a ‘system of becoming’ that was not beholden to 
the ‘four shackles of representational thought’. As one key Deleuzian scholar notes, these consisted 
of ‘identity’, ‘analogy’, ‘opposition’ and lastly, ‘resemblance’ (Bankston, 2017). These shackles are 
associated, for Deleuze, with a strictly temporal error that underwrites them, an error that posits 
change in terms of mechanistic causality alone. In order to rectify this error, and the temporal 
framework that holds representational thought together, Deleuze has recourse to two philosophers 
who provide the foundation for a critique of chronological time: Friedrich Nietzsche, whose ‘Death 
of God’ brought metaphysics to a halt and essentially overturned a hierarchal transcendental 
ordering of concepts (Being, Truth, Reason) in favour of immanent processes, and Henri Bergson, 
whose notion of ‘virtual memory’, likewise, posits a form of empty time which is at odds with the 
temporal underpinnings of representation. Nietzsche’s eternal return (as well as the ritonello) and 
Bergson’s concept of duration are the primary philosophical locations that Deleuze appropriates into 
his concept of ‘becoming’. This dynamic, for Deleuze, is at work within and across concepts and 
ultimately provides for an understanding of how change is evoked within bodies and objects, whilst 
essentially detailing the way in which virtual elements are actualised through creative processes. 
Becoming is the work of difference, or indeed the virtual, within the actual. To appreciate this, we 
must employ different modalities of time outside of the usual mechanistic linear modalities in which 
it is so often conceived. Identity, which is founded on linear time, is completely undone by Deleuze’s 
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‘process of becoming’; a creative refashioning or change which is inherent to all objects comprising 
the real.  
Although PKD’s orthogonal time may not have the intellectual or philosophical rigour 
inherent to Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s work, it is attempting something similar; a reworking of linear 
temporality in favour of an altogether altered form of subjective time. Orthogonal time potentially 
provides a space for this very process of becoming due to its non-linear chronological logic. 
Orthogonal time, just as with duration and the eternal return, disrupts the foundation on which 
representational (and we might add static) forms of thought operate from. PKD gets uncannily close 
to Nietzsche when he reflects on his own concept:  
if orthogonal time is circular then there is no regression along its axis in a linear 
sense; it would be a perpetual return, always a return; the direction of movement is 
one of depth not length (2011, p.80).  
The point being that for something new to emerge, for difference to break into the domain of 
actuality, then we must approach time from a wholly different perspective, such as the Nietzschean 
inspired ‘perpetual return’ that PKD writes of. It is perhaps no surprise then that one of the fields 
ploughed by Deleuze (and Guattari) to illustrate processes of becoming is that of psychopathology 
which, as we have seen, so often entails altered forms of temporality. Taking its place alongside 
poeticism and artistic production, psychopathology for Deleuze demonstrates the creative and 
affective turn that ‘becoming’ essentially references. Following comments in Anti-Oedipus (1972) we 
may situate Schreber’s dramatic shift in subjectivity for example with a process of ‘becoming-
woman’ or ‘becoming-machine’.65  
Lisa Blackman (2012), in her work on disembodied subjectivity, has similarly correlated 
Deleuze’s work on ‘becoming’ in psychopathology with the ‘creative breakdown’ inherent to 
outsider art. Taking its place alongside Deleuze’s own focus on Antonin Artaud for example, 
                                                          
65
 Deleuze’s concept of ‘becoming–woman’ has received its fair share of feminist critique. For further 
discussion see R. Braidotti (2003) “Becoming-Woman: Or Sexual Difference Revisited” In Theory, Culture and 
Society.Vol.20: no.3, p. 43-64.  
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Blackman draws attention to a range of outsider artists (as well as more established figures such as 
Virginia Woolf and F. Scott Fitzgerald) who, through their creative output and channelling of their 
‘madness’, were able to free themselves to some degree from the confines of social life and move 
beyond various imposed limits. Although Blackman rightly identifies how this process of creative 
‘becoming’ has at times been overly romanticised in favour of the ‘schizophrenics’ ‘poetic fire’ or 
‘profound sensitivity’, what is of importance is the recognition that these so-called ‘psychotic’ states 
are able to potentially provide spaces for creative and affective practices (becoming’s) that allow for 
the emergence of different subjective and cultural states.  For Deleuze, ‘schizophrenia’ is an example 
par excellence of ‘becoming’, of a newly emergent deterritorialised subjectivity fashioned together 
from different assemblages. Underwriting all of this is a non-linear modality of temporality that 
effectively reconfigures the foundation on which representation is based. My argument here is that 
PKD’s orthogonal time provided him the means to ‘become’ something other than himself and 
create a space, realised via his writing, to reconfigure his subjectivity in a radical fashion.  
Time, ‘psychosis’ and metamorphosis are all fundamentally intertwined with Deleuze’s 
practice of ‘becoming’. We will immediately recognize that a creative re-fashioning of one’s self and 
sense of subjectivity via artistic process brings to mind the Lacanian notion of the Sinthome. This 
correlation between Lacan’s mechanism for the binding of subjectivity and Deleuze’s mechanism for 
the reworking of representation will follow our discussion into the next chapter and the final analysis 
of the Exegesis. Both the ‘concept of becoming ‘and the Sinthome are conceptual tools with which 
we can interpret PKD’s mad text and form a dualism that will assist in establishing the means by 
which the clinic can be conjoined to culture. The beginnings of the socio-cultural reading established 
here will also be reinserted into my final analysis that associates PKD’s newly emergent subjectivity 
with a process of ‘becoming-information’. The ontological shift in postmodern time, predicated on 
networked information and digitised communication, feeds into PKD’s re-fashioned subjectivity that 
pre-occupies him towards the later stages of the Exegesis’ construction. What ties all of my analyses 
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together, and ultimately demonstrates how written madness can be read at the level of clinic and 
culture simultaneously, is PKD’s process of change, metamorphosis or ‘becoming’ that on one level 
references individual subjective ‘psychotic’ states whilst simultaneously existing on a continuum that 
evidences change on a socio-cultural level. PKD’s oscillation between the altered aspect of time in 
‘psychosis’ and the ontological break of postmodern time (both of which comprise the material for 
his own orthogonal time) essentially allows for my final reading centred on PKD’s concern for his 
own disembodied subjectivity, process of ‘becoming-information’ and an implicit appeal to the 





















































Chapter 8: PKD’s Body of Writing    
 
“Indeed, it seems clear enough that when you have nothing left but your 
temporal present, it follows that you also have nothing left but your own body. 
The reduction to the present can thus also be formulated in terms of a reduction 
to the body as a present of time” (Fredric Jameson, 2003, p.712). 
 One of Jameson’s key assertions in his widely celebrated analysis of postmodernism is that 
time has been completely altered under the logic of late capitalist society. In fact, for Jameson, time 
has taken on a fundamental affinity with the structure of ‘schizophrenia’ due to a breakdown in the 
synchronic/diachronic movement amongst signifiers.  What remains is a stuck or petrified present. 
An endless now, devoid of usual linear movement or the passage of historical time. We noted above 
that many other theorists within the postmodern cannon have similarly emphasised the compressed, 
static and essentially timeless quality of collective experiences of temporality (Harvey, 1989; Virilio, 
1995; Castels, 1996), much of this owing to the rapid advance in communicative and digital 
technologies. For PKD, as we saw over our previous chapter, orthogonal time conditions a similar 
temporal state; one resulting in an absence of successive movement through distinct temporal 
phases (past/present/future) in favour of an ever present series of ‘nows’; a collapse of temporality 
altogether. When Jameson (2003) came to reassess his initial claims about our so-called postmodern 
condition, particularly those that relate to this absence of time, his conclusion, noted above, is that 
this obliteration of time ultimately leads back to the body as the last remaining site of one’s 
experience of self.  
 In this final chapter analysing PKD’s Exegesis I want to reintroduce the body, and PKD’s 
written comments pertaining to embodiment, in order to demonstrate that our earlier focus on 
bodily metamorphosis not only accords to psychoanalytically informed insights in respect of 
‘psychotic’ phenomena, but that PKD’s concern for his corporeal existence also harnesses a set of 
discursive themes related to information theory and cybernetics. These coalesce into the figure of 
the posthuman and radically different emergent forms of subjectivity towards the end of the 
230 
 
twentieth century. In keeping with Jameson’s claim, I argue that it is PKD’s altered relation to 
temporality that propels his sense of embodiment to the forefront of his writing and, likewise, this 
altered experience of time provides the essential means for his sense of bodily subjectivity to 
undergo dramatic change. We closed our last chapter by referencing the Deleuzian notion of 
‘becoming’ - a dynamic state of internal self-differing conditioning new creative potentials, energies 
and forms of identity. For Deleuze, alternative forms of temporality provide the internal logic 
required for such a process of ‘becoming’ and I ascertain that PKD’s orthogonal existence essentially 
enables his body to become something other. What such a body may ‘become’ is the focus of this 
chapter and will provide the arena in which a broader cultural interpretation of the Exegesis can be 
constructed. In this sense, our analyses of PKD’s writing come full circle. We began with the 
experience of bodily metamorphosis in respect of ’psychosis’. Now we shall see that PKD’s 
metamorphosis directly taps into emergent technologies and developments within mathematics, 
thereby demonstrating how his outlandish claims essentially mirror much wider cultural 
preoccupations about the seat of subjectivity in a rapidly changing digitalised world.  
 I have targeted my reading on passages and quotes within the Exegesis that deal with PKD’s 
discussion of bodies or sense of embodiment. What has become apparent is that discussion about his 
own body (as well as the concept of a collective body) is often mentioned alongside his evolving 
notion of information. Herein lies the pattern that exists at the text’s surface, an ‘information-
embodiment’ correlation that I ascertain finds a direct parallel in developments in 
mathematical/cybernetic theory in or around the same historical period as the Exegesis’ 
construction. I add that the insights unveiled here by my analysis not only suggest that PKD’s text is 
especially in tune with the techno-scientific theory of the time, but that it also offers something new 
in the guise of PKD’s process of ‘becoming-information’ and a renewed form of vitalism in respect of 
changing structures of subjectivity in late capitalist society. To begin, however, I want to focus my 
reparative surface level analysis on the concept of the network; the reason being that from the very 
231 
 
beginning of the Exegesis’ construction PKD associates the role of information in respect of networks 
and it is the model of the network that repeatedly resurfaces across the text.   
 
8.2 Networked Text/ Networked Bodies  
 Perhaps the first thing that we can note in respect of a networked paradigm within and 
across the Exegesis is that the text itself accords in many respects to a networked model of textual 
cohesion. By this I mean that the very structure of Exegesis adheres to a framework whereby 
differing elements, cords or threads intersect at regular intervals; or, as the sociologist Manuel 
Castells (1996) defines a network, a series of points or nodes that are interconnected by different 
communication pathways. We get a sense in PKD’s exegetic writing that any number of the many 
diffuse elements taking up his interest may be reintroduced at any given time over the text’s eight-
year composition. Themes, concepts and ideas formulated in, say, early 1975, reappear in a modified 
form interacting with ideas brought to the fore in the mid 1980’s. This constant criss-crossing 
between ideas (VALIS, orthogonal time, information, ‘2-3-74’, God) ensures that the Exegesis never 
achieves a final summation or theoretical conclusion. There is no beginning, middle or end, no logical 
progression of thought or systematised developmental trajectory of ideas; rather a constellation of 
terms, words, signifiers and concepts all interrelating with each other without, it seems, any 
underlying logic aside from the notion that together they comprise something greater than the sum 
of their parts. The longer the Exegesis exists, the wider the net is cast. In fact, one may enter into the 
Exegesis on almost any page and find PKD incorporating differing elements from the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, various Religious books, the i-ching and Gnostic tracts to provide the material for ever 
new theoretical insights on the nature of the universe and the inexplicable events of early 1974. The 
Exegesis, in a sense, comes to exist in a networked relation to these other civilisation defining Ur-
Texts, and PKD presents it as a body of writing interacting with these famous books in order to 
synthesize their insights and profound ‘truths’. 
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 Moreover, the Exegesis also feeds off itself to produce further pages of script. Ideas that first 
start life as rather vague speculative notions are soon drawn upon to explain yet further intellectual 
flights of fancy. Like the ouroboros serpent consuming its own tail, the Exegesis subsumes elements 
within it to sustain its ongoing creation. In this sense, the text appears to have a number of parts 
that are consistently reworked to provide ever new combinations which are then utilised to further 
advance PKD’s overall cosmology, but one that strangely never achieves a definitive totality. Its 
sprawling, rhizomatic structure, along with the vast quantities of information and language that are 
being plied into his writing, mean that the text itself starts to come to resemble the very universe he 
is attempting to describe; one whereby an ever-expanding reality is continually incorporating 
information which is transmitted between differing points, monads or indeed human individuals. So, 
just as the text accords to a networked paradigm in terms of form, so too does this model of 
interaction or information exchange start to bleed into the content of PKD’s writing. Take for 
instance the following passage: 
However, Valis is real and is subsuming progressively more and more of its 
environment. Its internal complexity continually grows. Its metabolism seems to 
be information and the processing of information. Its plural constituents are 
arranged in such a way as to constitute a language or information or messages; 
if you cannot see the arrangement you cannot read the message. And you 
cannot perceive Valis  (2011, p.612).  
‘Valis’, PKD’s name or signifier for the entity that is synonymous with reality itself, is something that 
is metabolising information in its efforts to constantly expand. But it is an entity of ‘plural’ parts 
that together comprise a form of communication or language.  I claimed earlier that language holds 
a special fascination for the ‘psychotic’ subject and that for PKD, his focus on language is often 
reformulated through technological terminology concerned with signals and modes of 
transmission. Early on in PKD’s writing when he is first attempting to describe, or indeed account 
for, his ‘mystical’ experience, he writes of ‘2-3-74’ that: 
 What I saw about the external disinhibiting structure which evidently surrounds 
each human being, as a sort of cube-like chamber, was the utilization of every 
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sort of datum, especially visual, so that when required that particular datum 
projected a signal (as I mentioned) which the intended person to be disinhibited 
received (ibid. p.69-70). 
and:  
This is indeed a kind of ship we are within, but in shape more like a gigantic 
hollow cube, all sides of which surround us and fire information and instructions 
in rapid, elaborate sequence: we are seeing the physical body of the creator, 
who animates all (p.72). 
For PKD, his subjective universe is one consisting of information (signals) being fired at us from the 
environment surrounding each individual. However, for this data to be transferred, what is required 
is a disinhibited individual, a passive receiver (and then presumable transceiver) that comprises 
something akin to a node within this giant structure or cube like chamber. If we examine these 
quotes carefully we can see that ‘information’ or ‘datum’ is conceived in direct relation to physical 
bodies or disinhibited persons. The ‘cube-like chambers’ or ‘gigantic hollow cube’ encasing individual 
beings immediately brings to mind PKD’s science fiction-esque imaginings, a paranoid conception of 
humans imprisoned within an invisible structure. Yet this structure is precisely the means by which 
information is ‘fired’ or ‘projected’ between ‘intended persons’. This transmission of data or 
information occurs across and between bodies, between individuals who are disinhibited to such a 
degree that they can only act as completely passive terminals. Following which, if we examine a 
selection of quotes spanning the first half of the Exegesis’ composition we get a sense of these 
bodies interacting within a networked logic. Take for instance:  
 the “signals” or events are incorporated into each of us as learning – learning 
by experience – and they permanently modify our brain tissue, leaving 
permanent although minute trace-changes in us. This way we store this 
information combining it and altering it, and we are prepared to transmit it 
again when instructed, to whoever were instructed to transmit it to. Each of us 
is a vast storage drum of taped information which we purposefully modify, 
each of us differently (p.129).  
I am led to the inescapable conclusion that, totally unknowingly, we are all 
constituents of a vast living organism, and that everything which occurs in it, our 
reality, happens due to its deliberate intention – that of its own brain, NÖÖs or 
psyche- and, further, this vast living organism which governs and regulates our 
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every move and experience resembles an AI system or computer, and that under 
certain exceptional circumstances it can and does speak of one or more of us, its 
members – finally, the organism – or this part of it – is in trouble …… We are the 
distressed fraction, member, circuit or element, or organ, part or unit (p.278).  
 So our little psyche-world systems are perpetually bombarded with incoming 
information which we process and, at the right time to the right other stations 
we transmit in the rightly modified form – but all this takes place through us as if 
we were transistors, diodes, wires condensers and resistors, all none the wiser 
(p.387).  
Transistors, diodes, circuits, wires, organs, members, parts and individual stations; these are all terms 
PKD employs to describe human individuals that act as discreet units relaying or transmitting 
information to one another which together comprise a higher form of technologically inflected life, 
or as PKD terms - the ‘body of the creator’. Individual beings are in turn modified by ‘minute trace-
changes’ due to the effect of information passing through them. The ‘vast living organism’ which PKD 
asserts resembles a computer or AI is constructed from a networked relation between individual 
human beings processing and relaying data between themselves, indeed through their very bodies. 
PKD’s attempts to theorise the nature of his universe following the events of ‘2-3-74’ leads him to a 
model of interacting human bodies that exist to transmit information; a gigantic circuit board or relay 
of information wherein human bodies are directed and controlled without their conscious 
knowledge. The automatism, of which we covered earlier, takes on a new significance here as PKD 
works his involuntary action or behaviour into this model of human relatedness under the conditions 
of information exchange. We can note also that this picture of data being fired between disinhibited 
individuals to comprise a collective networked body (VALIS) is chiefly characterised by human beings 
connected to one another via data or mathematized language. I argued previously that much of 
PKD’s ‘sinthomatic’ writing endeavour - the Exegesis itself - was his creative means to fashion a social 
bond of sorts, one that he writes into being. One way of reading this concern for networks is to view 
PKD trying to resuscitate a social bond, albeit within the terminology of information technology. We 
get no better example of this when, in June 1978, PKD states in respect of the agency that he 
attributes to this grand system of information exchange:  
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The network voice – she talks to me. I am patched in to the network, so I am not 
alone (P.343). 
By PKD ‘patching into this network’ he has built a connection with others around him and staved off 
complete isolation. This network of information provides something of a support for PKD’s fragile 
state of mind following the overwhelming experiences of early 1974. Although it is a voice that alerts 
PKD to this realisation, it is not established for him until committed to script. The network is in quite 
a literal, surface level sense, a social bond, the means by which he is connected to others.   
 We have then, on the surface of the text, a direct correlation between this notion of bodies, 
or a collective body and the network model. What conjoins the two for PKD is his evolving concept of 
information. This concern for information, as I have stated, straddles the entire Exegesis from 
beginning to end. It is arguably the dominant theme within his writing and one that is subject to 
constant revision and remodelling. For example, as early as June 1974, three months after the events 
of ‘2-3-74’, PKD writes in respect of his experience: 
I had a keen intuition that information of some kind was arriving at us all, in fact 
bombarding us, from sidereal space (2011, p.8). 
Fast forward to February 1982, mere weeks before his death, and we again find PKD still grappling with 
whatever it is that he saw bombarding him, and us, from the heavens or wider cosmos. 
So since we can’t see the info we can see the structure, so we see plurality; 
when I saw Valis I saw unity, structure, hence info (ibid. p.891).  
After eight years of constant writing, thinking and hypothesising, information still holds a special 
fascination for PKD. We get a sense from the above passages that our environment, or indeed our 
very reality, is one dominated by the flow and exchange of information, so much so that we are 
unwittingly connected to one another in a system that has total control over our lives. It is not hard 
to detect some of the defining characteristics of our age relating to ‘hyper-connectivity’ or 
‘information saturation’ refracted through these statements. PKD, writing in the mid 1970’s, was, for 
all intents and purposes, prefiguring the age of mass digital communication, computerised modes of 
social interaction and perhaps even the diminished sense of individuality or agency that accompanies 
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contemporary experiences of globalisation. Many have drawn attention to the prophetic like quality 
of the Exegesis and the direct resonances it has to the information age. 66 Indeed, cybernetics and 
evolving techno-scientific theory was of great interest to PKD, as evidenced in his fictional works and 
published interviews. Perhaps no surprise that such ideas should feature in the Exegesis itself. Yet, 
what interests me most, and something perhaps less apparent in the comments on PKD’s 
attunement to the age in which he lived, is the manner by which his outright crazy assertion that he 
was metamorphasizing into a form of ‘living information’ might not seem quite so mad if we read it 
alongside specific developments that occurred within information and cybernetic theory close to his 
own historical moment.  
I want to make the case now for interpreting the Exegesis in line with developments in 
techno-scientific theory which doesn’t just draw parallels with his cybernetic inflected language but 
focuses attention to the way in which his sense of bodily change, which we encountered above, is 
actually reworking the way in which ‘information came to lose its body’ towards the end of the 
twentieth century. In this sense, PKD came to view his own body as an immaterial non-tangible 
entity: Disembodied information as a new form of life. And this is the key arena in which we can 
appreciate how his altered relation to his body can not only be read clinically through the 
psychoanalytic lens of ‘psychosis’, but can simultaneously be read at the level of scientific and wider 
cultural development. Reading PKD’s statements about his own sense of embodiment allows us to 
appreciate, at a more nuanced level, how his writing does not just evidence his own overt knowledge 
of cybernetics and the emerging information age, but the way in which his outright delusional 
sounding claim that he is transforming into something lacking corporeal support, itself mirrors a shift 
from materiality to immateriality that may well have started within information theory but has since 
crept into much broader arenas of socio-political life.   
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 There are numerous writers (Burton, 2015; Davis, 2019) who have drawn parallels between PKD’s writing 
and a cybernetic paradigm infused within it. PKD himself was a known reader of cybernetic theory. Burton and 
Davis have, likewise, emphasised the relevance of the internet and networked models of communication 
arising at precisely the same time period as PKD’s revelatory insights.  
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8.3 Cybernetics, Information & Embodiment.  
In order to advance this argument, I will briefly set aside the Exegesis and turn to 
developments in cybernetic theory. As we have noted, cybernetics was of real interest to PKD and he 
would have been familiar with aspects of it. My claim is that his ‘mad writing’ may be implicitly 
referencing a turn to disembodiment that may originate in the information theory of his day and 
that he literally encapsulates these developments in his outlandish claims about his sense of 
subjectivity. This, in turn, brings us full circle to earlier similarities with ‘psychotic’ structure and 
experiences of bodily change.  In order to trace these developments within cybernetics and 
information theory, I will adopt N. Katherine Hayles’ (1999) schema which identifies three distinct 
eras that occurred within the trajectory of this interdisciplinary field. The first pertains chiefly to the 
way in which information came to lose its body; essentially, how it came to be conceptualised as a 
phenomenon that was distinct from the various material forms in which it was thought to have 
previously resided. The second relates to the emergence of the cyborg as a cultural object in the 
second half of the twentieth century; and lastly, how in relation to these first two themes a third 
emerges which demonstrates how the construction of that thing called the human is gradually giving 
way to a different construction termed the ‘Posthuman’.   
Hayles (1999) identifies the Macy conferences between 1941 and 1960 as being especially 
relevant to the emergence of the idea of ‘disembodied information’ during the first wave of 
cybernetics.  Specific conferences on cybernetics organised by Lawrence K. Frank and Frank 
Fremont-Smith were of central importance in defining cybernetics as a distinct theoretical discipline. 
At root, cybernetics began life as a cross-disciplinary science attempting to define and theorise 
processes of control and communication between systems with specific attention to the role of 
feedback and self-adaptive behaviour within such systems, whether they be machine or biological 
organism. What emerges from these pre-1960 Macy conference discussions is a view which places a 
mathematical theory of information as being of more importance than materiality when it comes to 
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understanding the dynamic within and the interface between different systems. Hayles (1999) notes 
that there was a degree of resistance to this reification of information from across the diverse range 
of academics and disciplines represented. Ultimately, however, this reification triumphed during the 
first Macy conference led by John von Neuman and Norbert Wiener, who asserted that the key issue 
in the man-machine interface was not energy but rather information. Adopting mathematician and 
cryptographer, Claude Shannon’s (1948) theory of information as a “probability function with no 
dimensions, no materiality, and no necessary connection with meaning” (Hayles, 1999, p.52), 
Wiener (1985) defined information as something whose value was completely divorced from the 
context in which it resides. Essentially, information in this instance is stripped of meaning as such. It 
followed, therefore, that if information was an entity separate from the environs or material 
supports in which it was measurable, visible or identifiable then it could flow evenly between such 
material substrates unchanged, whether that be via the integrated electronic circuitry of a computer 
system or the neural pathways of the brain.67 
Counter to this view that ultimately won out at the first round of the Macy conferences, was 
the information theory of British physicist, Donald MacKay (1951). Some years later, at the seventh 
conference, MacKay presented his view of information that would take meaning into account by 
focusing on the impact information had on the one who was receiving it. Contained within these 
differing views on information theory is the age old subjective /objective divide that underwrote the 
criticism or support for either viewpoint. Either information is an objective context free entity 
(Neuman and Wiener) or it is something that can only be measured or produced via subjective 
interpretation (as in Mackay’s theory whereby it is defined by the impact it has on the one who 
receives it). Hayles (1999) notes that this debate provoked a good deal of anxiety within many of the 
conference participants who were attempting to ground cybernetics as a hard science that would be 
                                                          
67
 Norbert Einer himself was no stranger to theorising psychopathology. He devotes a chapter of his 1948 book 
Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in The Animal and The Machine to the possibility of exploring 
computer like models of the brain to uncover the mechanisms behind psychiatric afflictions. He comes into 
close alignment here with Bateson’s own rendering of the ‘Double Bind’ which portrays ‘psychosis’ as the 
result of problematic forms of communication.  
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free of semantics and subjective interpretation. If information was to be defined by what it does 
rather than what it is, then a whole host of subjective concerns could arise which would complicate, 
or indeed undermine, the scientific rigour and objective status of cybernetics as a scientific 
epistemology. Hayles writes that this: 
formulation emphasises the reification that information undergoes in the 
Shannon-Wiener theory. Stripped of context, it becomes a mathematical 
quantity weightless as sunshine, moving in a rarefied realm of pure 
probability, not tied down to bodies or material instantiations [….] the price it 
pays for this universality is its divorce from representation. When 
information is made representational, as in MacKay’s model, it is 
contextualized as an action rather than a thing. Verblike, it becomes a 
process that someone enacts, and thus it necessarily implies context and 
embodiment (1999, p.56).  
 
8.4 Autopoiesis 
Before I draw attention to the relevance of these developments with the content of PKD’s 
exegetic writing, I want to touch on one last additional shift within the trajectory of thought 
pertaining to cybernetics. The shift finds its beginnings in the above concern for reflexivity that 
Mackay, amongst others, used to problematize the new disembodied concept of information. This 
additional shift will enable us to further appreciate how the Exegesis essentially speaks to discourses 
drawn from developments in the techno-scientific theory of the time which then came to seep into 
wider social-cultural thought. Whereas the first wave of cybernetics was marked by a concern for 
homeostasis according to Hayles, the second, leading on from MacKay’s thoughts, pertained to 
reflexivity.  Although the notion of reflexivity did not find much favour in the first round of the Macy 
conferences, Hayles (1999) argues that from the 1960’s onwards it came to hold central relevance to 
this evolving set of theories and knowledge. At the very beginning of the decade, Heinz von Foerster 
(1960) published a paper entitled On Self-Organising Systems and Their Environments which 
describes the paradox of observing systems. As one information theorists summarises, his paper 
argued that:  
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on the one hand, if the observer remains outside the system, it is not clear 
whether knowledge of its inner workings is possible; on the other hand, if the 
observer is part of the system, self-observation leads to an infinite regress that 
makes complete knowledge of the system impossible (Taylor, 2001, p.88).  
Gregory Bateson himself noted in his own conference later in 1968, that if the role of the observer 
was to be problematized then a wholesale reworking of realist epistemology was required. Hayles 
(1999) identified two key figures who in one way or another took up this challenge, Francisco Varela 
and Humberto Maturana. Their jointly authored work (1979) Autopoiesis and Cognition: The 
Realisation of the Living is the major testament to this. Their collaboration questioned the idea of 
any objective external world that could be discussed independent of the one that observes it. 
Essentially, this realisation problematized the very assumption of an independent reality existing 
irrespective of the observer witnessing it. Maturana and his colleagues would similarly highlight how 
no direct correlation could be discerned between an animal’s perception of colour and the ‘external 
world’, leading him to conclude that perception is not fundamentally representational, it is in fact a 
constructed experience. From this insight, Maturana and Varela argued that circularity or reflexivity 
was at the heart of living systems. Indeed, no description of absolute reality was possible for them as 
the observer cannot escape the pitfalls of an endless self-reflexive manoeuvre. The basic tenet is 
that a nervous system’s action is determined by its own organisation leading to this self-reflexive 
dynamic; a dynamic they termed autopoiesis meaning ‘self-creating’. They defined such an 
organisational structure as follows: 
An autopoietic machine is organised (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the 
components, which: (i) through their interactions and transformation continuously 
regenerates and realize the network of processes (relations) that produce them; and 
(ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the 
 components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its relation as such a 
network (1979, p.78-79). 
This autopoietic function is one that can be detected within the construction of the Exegesis itself 
and is something I have highlighted above; the endless reabsorption of elements of text back into 
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the writing process meaning it takes on a self-creating function of sorts.68 Moreover, this autopoietic 
function is something that is central to the main characteristics of PKD’s new form of life, not just 
one that references it self-organising capacity but one that stresses how life itself is morphing into 
something with no tangible, material support; something mirrored within cybernetic development 
itself.   
 
8.5 (Dis)embodiment  
We can state that Maturana’s initial attempts to make autopoiesis the fundamental 
component of living systems, indeed to equate it with life itself, marks for Hayles the dividing line 
between first and second wave cybernetics. Initially, whereas Wiener and his colleagues had 
stressed the importance of a system’s behaviour, Maturana argued that it is the system’s autopoietic 
processes generating behaviour that is of primary importance. Furthermore, as Hayles writes:  
whereas first-wave cybernetics played a large role in divesting information of its 
body, autopoietic theory draws attention to the fact that “information,” so defined, 
is an abstraction that has no basis in the physically embodied processes constituting 
all living entities (1999, p.149).  
The disembodied nature of information takes another layer of significance as it now exists only as an 
inference on behalf of the observer. Autopoiesis becomes the fundamental organising principle, 
following Maturana, for understanding a system’s behaviour and the manner by which information 
and communications are understood in networked relations. Hayles reasons that such shifts mark a 
concern towards pattern and randomness (in terms of how we understand information) and away 
from previous concerns that tended towards an understanding based on presence and absence. 
                                                          
68 This autopoietic dynamism is also something commented upon by psychologist Kyle Arnold (2016) who 
undertook the aforementioned psychobiography of PKD. Arnold concludes that “although Dick does not 
appear to have been familiar with the work of Varela and Maturana, their views provide a scientific basis for 
his claims about living information. If all self-generating systems are by definition alive, and the Exegesis is a 
self-generating system, then it is by definition alive” (p.147). This is a bold claim. My point in highlighting this 
autopoietic quality to PKD’s writing, however, is not to suggest that actually, yes, the Exegesis and by 
association VALIS are actually living entities, but rather to argue how important and widespread ideas within 
cybernetic thinking were playing themselves out in the content and construction of PKD’s cosmology. 
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Indeed, a shift away from material presence/absence to informational pattern marks, for her, one of 
the key developments in communication, literary and textual production as well as a whole host of 
technological, economic and social processes in the late twentieth century. In commenting on this 
mutation in various diverse fields that impact upon our very sense of subjectivity, Hayles adds that:  
the contemporary pressure toward dematerialisation, understood as an epistemic 
shift towards pattern/randomness and away from presence/absence, affects 
human and textual bodies on two levels at once, as a change in the body (the 
material substrate) and as a change in the message (the codes of representation) 
(ibid. p.29). 
It is these changes that affect ‘human and textual bodies’ that I ascertain can be detected in PKD’s 
exegetic writing, changes that exist at the surface of his textual output. We don’t need to delve into 
the hidden logic of PKD’s writing to find this correlation, as it is starkly apparent in the immediacy of 
his words. This correlation is manifest in two distinct ways.  Firstly, PKD touches directly on the 
notion of information as something that exists independent of its supporting housing; take for 
instance this quote from January 1980: 
 I’ve got it. Valis is not an entity which thinks - e.g. a discorporate pure mind; or a 
mind incorporated, as our human minds are. No. It is a mind which uses all reality 
by which to think; so it is neither discorporate nor does it have a body as such 
(2011, p.569). 
Although he appears to dart from one opposing view to the other (from discorporate to incorporate) 
his ultimate conclusion that VALIS, the entity comprised of discreet unit’s exchanging information to 
one another via a network logic, is an entity that does not have ‘a body as such’. It is a system of 
information exchange which appears to feed off reality itself and is chiefly characterised for PKD by 
its lack of material substrate. VALIS, or reality, is akin to a human mind that lacks any bodily organ 
with which to house it. Interestingly, VALIS, which PKD previously conceived of as a network of 
interacting human individuals, is now compared to the workings of the mind, workings that are so 
often framed in terms of neural networks and pathways. Whether VALIS is constructed as a giant 
circuit board implying computer type technology, or a discorporate human mind, the network 
paradigm weaves its way into his explanatory reflections.  Again, shortly after this, PKD reflects that: 
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What I saw that I called the plasmate are the filaments of the vine; they are 
information, hence energy (or else information without a carrier) (ibid, p.596).  
PKD’s term ‘plasmate’ is yet another signifier he coins to describe the process by which a human 
body or entity has ‘cross bonded’ with information, an essential metamorphosis by which 
information has come alive. In this particular speculative offering, PKD states that he has observed 
the underlying basis of reality and that it accords to an arboreal construction; a construct which is 
once again comprised of information. We notice also that these filaments or vines (sounding oddly 
familiar to Schreber’s rays or nerves) comprising reality are formulated in tandem with energy, an 
essentially non-tangible entity that exists independent of its carrier.69 Although there is a danger of 
overly confusing the many intersecting concepts that PKD deploys over different pages of script 
(from VALIS to plasmate to reality and back again) the connecting thread between all of these at 
times evolving, dynamic concepts, is PKD’s conception of information. Rarely do PKD’s speculative 
ideas retain any static quality and their over theorisation leads to a strange sort of 
underdevelopment as no one concept, thought or idea in relation to ‘2-3-74’ ever stays still long 
enough for one to fully appreciate its essential being. The one consistent theme, however, within the 
Exegesis, undoubtedly relates to the role of information.70 Despite its ongoing conceptual evolution, 
PKD reifies it into a phenomenon that has no tangible, material essence. The VALIS network 
comprising reality is marked for PKD by interacting bodies transmitting an immaterial force which 
works between and through them; bodies themselves which are formed of information, a substance-
less form of collective subjectivity.  
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 We should also note the similarity here to the Deleuzean (1970) notion of affects which act in some sense 
independent of the body. We may also want to draw attention to the rhizomatic structure Deleuze puts forth 
by which affects amongst other things such as ideas or thoughts move between an arboreal like construction 
with no identifiable beginning or end.   
70
 As Erik Davis (2019) states when commenting on the themes present within the life and work of 1970’s 
counter culture figures including PKD, “Information becomes a thing-in-itself, an almost metaphysical 
substance that, through its technological instantiation in networks, massively shapes both individual and 
collective existence. Information not only became a technical expression (or perversion) of “spirit,” but 
achieved a sort of collective, transhuman novelty through its circulation through networks. [….] All of these 
features are reflected in the deliriously mediated information metaphysics of our psychonauts” (p.394). PKD, 
the psychonaut, reflects these features throughout his writing to the point where it becomes the thing-in-
itself, synonymous with the Exegesis and reality at large.    
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 The second correlation pertains to that already raised above, the second wave focus on 
autopoiesis which came into prevalence precisely at the same historical moment as PKD’s musings on 
the nature of the cosmos and his place within it. Some years before the above quotes detailing PKD’s 
ideas in respect of disembodied or discorporate information, PKD writes: 
 If this info is an entity in itself which can modulate itself, then to know this 
information is to be possessed by it; you are automatically in a symbiotic state with 
it. This is a new category of existence (2011, p.329-330).  
What is recapitulated is not another homoplasmate but the same one; it gives birth 
to itself, replicating itself over and over again under the proper conditions (ibid. 
p.417). 
PKD here is boldly establishing a ‘new category of existence’ but one that is chiefly marked by its 
own ability to ‘modulate itself’. We noted above how, for Maturana, a system’s self-reflexive 
ability, its capacity to create itself, is the chief characteristic of life whether that be biological or 
mechanical. PKD here too reasons that his networked body, VALIS, is able to instate a new way of 
being via its own ‘modulation’. Again, we find similar themes in PKD’s insistence that VALIS is able 
to give ‘birth to itself’ and instate a continual process of replication. The self-reflexivity at the heart 
of such autopoietic systems is also evident in VALIS as PKD comments on the feedback mechanism 
whereby the subject (or observer) necessarily implies the reality in which they are immersed. As 
PKD writes, ‘to know this information is to be possessed by it’ - one cannot analyse VALIS in any 
objective sense as to engage with it is to essentially enter into a closed system of mutual self-
realisation. This symbiotic state ensures that no divorce can be established between an individual 
agent and the information comprising its reality. In addition, we will recall Maturana’s quote above 
explicitly detailing the nature of autopoietic organisational structures, those whereby a network of 
constituent parts establish and reenergise the further processing of components that form a 
discreet ‘concrete unity’. I have already highlighted how the Exegesis puts forth a model of reality 
as something consisting of discreet units transferring information which in turn metabolise and 
expand to subsume more of that very reality. I would argue that VALIS’s self-creating capacity, and 
PKD’s assertion that individual human agents exist in a mutual constitutive state with it, evidences 
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the autopoietic quality to the Exegesis’ theorisations. Moreover, the manner by which PKD utilises 
his own exegetic material from earlier pages of script to revitalise and sustain its ongoing 
production speaks again to this autopoietic quality. We have then two distinct areas (autopoiesis 
and disembodiment) whereby PKD’s writing on information and networks accord to the major 
strands within cybernetic theory that seeped into prominent areas of scientific, literary and societal 
process towards the end of the twentieth century.  
Although I have targeted my comments on the similarity between PKD’s ‘information-
embodiment’ correlation with developments in cybernetics, a field very much operating within the 
hard sciences and abstract mathematical formulation, this shift from embodiment to 
disembodiment does not stop with information theory or the field of science. In fact, one could 
argue that it crept into much wider areas of social-cultural life around a similar time period and that 
PKD’s pre-occupation with new forms of life and how they are managed or operationalised speaks 
directly to this. In his reflections on Foucault’s (2010) later concept of biopower and related 
disciplinary forms, philosopher Byung-Chul Han (2017) posits that contemporary forms of power 
and authority have instated a shift away from biopower concerns with the management of bodies, 
towards what he terms psychopolitics. He frames it as follows: 
But neoliberalism, a further development – indeed, a mutated form – of capitalism, 
is not primarily concerned with ‘the biological, the somatic, the corporal’. It has 
discovered the psyche as a productive force. This psychic turn – that is, the turn to 
psychopolitics – also connects with the mode of operation of contemporary 
capitalism (p.25). 
Originally, lecturing about biopolitics in the mid 1970’s, Foucault’s initial focus was very much on 
bodily capacities under capitalist modes of production. For Byung-Chul Hal, neo-liberalism, which 
quickened in pace during the early 1980s under ‘Reaganomics’, for instance, has effectively marked 
a shift away from bodies towards psychic forms of production. As such, the networked digitised 
forms of late neoliberal capitalist production mirror the shift a decade or so earlier that occurred 
within the very technological paradigm that effectively underwrites the structure of this globalised 
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socio-economic system.71 In truth, this equation between PKD’s Exegesis and the effects of new 
formations of our collective existence based on information have been commented upon by a 
range of authors and compliment the discussion above. Burton (2015) channels similar sentiments 
in his work on the ecological paradigm that characterises the Exegesis’ construction. Likewise, Eric 
Davis (2019) and Scott Lash (2010) have stressed the centrality of information to any understanding 
or framing of PKD’s writing post 1974. Following this, I shall now close this chapter by offering 
another possible means by which we can conceive this ‘information-embodiment’ correlation 
within PKD’s writing that not only, once again, draws from development within scientific theory and 
perhaps wider socio-cultural existence, but one that allows us to tie in a process I earlier argued to 
be at the heart of PKD’s metamorphosis, one drawn from the temporal aspect of his supposedly 
psychopathological experience. 
 
8.6 ‘Becoming-Information’  
 I have demonstrated how, arguably, the dominant theme within PKD’s exegetic writing, that 
of ‘information’, mirrors fundamental developments within mathematics and the new discipline of 
cybernetics that took place in and around his revelatory experience. Indeed, the two central tenants 
that emerge from cybernetics in the 1970’s, ‘disembodiment’ and ‘autopoiesis’, are refracted 
through PKD’s conception of ‘VALIS/information’ as well as the self-sustained creation of the 
universe (or the Exegesis, which essentially amount to the same thing for PKD). Moreover, PKD quite 
literally embodied these developments and channelled them through his notion of VALIS and 
corresponding changes to his subjective sense of corporeality. We have then the foundation on 
which to argue for the Exegesis to have cultural significance beyond the clinical interpretation that 
provides ‘psychosis’ as a possible lens to understanding quite what PKD is on about during his 
exegetic writing. The outlandish, completely bizarre, if not outright delusional sounding notions that 
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 Drawing heavily on Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical system, Maurizio Lazzarato (2014) argues that 
capitalism’s primary mode of production is one that now concerns itself with the production of signs and 
signifying systems. As such, capitalism has moved away from forms of material to immaterial labour.  
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litter the Exegesis do in fact, when read in quite a literal sense, at the very least hold an uncanny 
resemblance to much of what Hayles documents. PKD’s surface level cogitations on the nature of 
information, the means by which it connects individual human beings in a vast living network, as well 
as the self-creating discorporate character of this system harness the central tenets within a 
prominent area of human knowledge that will come to play a hugely significant role in the 
‘cybernetic universe’ and so-called ‘information age’ that we now inhabit.  Yet there is another 
crucial component to PKD’s writing that further emphasizes his attunement to these rapid 
developments in communicative technology and the resultant forms of subjectivity towards the end 
of the twentieth century.  In Hayles’ (1999) survey of these developments within techno-culture she 
is lead to the revolutionary figure of the posthuman. She identifies four key characteristics: 
1) The idea of the posthuman privileges informational pattern over materiality so that 
embodiment in a biological organism is seen as a non-essential attribute of life or 
consciousness. 
2) In relation to consciousness, the concept entails the view that it is but one part of a much 
larger story and displaces its importance as the foundation of human identity. 
3) With regard to the body, the posthuman view treats it as a prosthesis that we learn to 
manipulate. Extending or replacing this prosthesis is a logical next step. 
4) Lastly, the posthuman view asserts that there are no absolute differences or demarcations 
between bodily existence and machine or computer technology. There is a possible interface 
or connection between the two (p.3). 
Hayles’ work demonstrates how the material body has given way to machine or informational 
pattern. The body is essentially undergoing dramatic change in the wake of advanced computer or 
machine technology, leaving no absolute differences or demarcations between them. The body, it 
seems, is becoming something other. In close proximity to Katherine Hayles’ work is Rosi Braidotti, 
and in particular, her 2013 book, The Posthuman. In this work Braidotti reasons that the category 
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‘posthuman’ has emerged following a challenge to an anthropocentrism. She writes that the 
emergence of this posthuman form “opens up perspectives for affirmative transformations of both 
the structures of subjectivity and the production of theory and knowledge” (2013, p.66). Braidotti 
identifies three separate ways in which this has manifested itself and refers to them as the 
posthuman understood through, ‘becoming-animal’, ‘becoming-earth’ and lastly, ‘becoming-
machine’. We should be alerted here to the Deleuzian resonance running through these changing 
forms of subjectivity. The process of ‘becoming-other’ that Deleuze speaks of in respect of 
psychopathology and crucially alternative forms of temporality (such as PKD’s orthogonal time) is 
deployed by Braidotti to formulate her three lines of flight that posthuman subjectivity has taken. In 
this sense, she is directly drawing from Deleuze and Guattari’s 1980 collaborative work A Thousand 
Plateaus which outlines various differing arrangements of becoming such as ‘becoming-intense’ and 
‘becoming imperceptible’. ‘Becoming’, as I established previously, is the movement of the virtual 
within the actual, a process of internal self-differing allowing for new creative potentials and 
identities. Both concepts and corporeal bodies are subject to this ‘process of becoming’ and it is 
altered temporal frameworks that effectively underwrite these dynamic states. The posthuman 
offers one such avenue for the human being to undergo both a corporeal and conceptual becoming. 
Braidotti touches on Hayles’ concern for the disembodied nature of this new posthuman subjectivity 
when, in relation to the process of ‘becoming-machine’, she writes:  
the metaphorical or analogue function that machinery fulfilled in modernity, as an 
anthropocentric device that imitated embodied human capacities, is replaced today 
by a more complex political economy that connects bodies to machines more 
intimately, through simulation and mutual modification [….] electronic machines 
are, from this angle, quite immaterial: plastic boxes and metal wires that convey 
information. They do not ‘represent’ anything, but rather carry clear instructions 
and can reproduce clear information patterns (2013, p.90). 
The relevance of this to my cultural analysis of PKD’s exegetic writing is that PKD himself, I ascertain, 
underwent his own ‘process of becoming’ that he writes into being. The Exegesis can be seen in this 
regard as PKD’s creative means of ‘becoming’ from 1974 onwards, a process that he brings into life 
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via his continued writing. I wish to complement Braidotti’s work here by establishing my own 
Deleuzian informed concept of ‘becoming-information’ - a ‘process of becoming’ that PKD underwent 
and, moreover, a process that channels the above themes of disembodied information as well as 
interface with non-organic forms of life. Importantly, PKD’s process of ‘becoming-information’ is his 
own expression of the emerging figure of the posthuman in the wake of cybernetic knowledge. It is 
this figure that can be utilised as an analytical devise to establish the Exegesis as an object with wider 
cultural significance beyond the clinic. PKD’s apparent madness, I argue, speaks to this new cultural 
construction and, thereby, elevates the Exegesis above a mere example of pathological functioning.  
My engagement with a surface level reading of PKD’s text, or rather, the aspects of the text 
that deals explicitly with the ‘information-embodiment’ correlation, leads to three distinct but 
nevertheless complimentary phases that can be organised in respect of PKD’s changing body 
morphology. For the first phase of ‘becoming’ we can directly relate PKD’s metamorphosis with 
information exchange. Take for instance the following quotes ranging over three years from mid-
1975: 
 We must be an early stage in a life-form which metamorphoses into a higher 
space-time continuum (2011, p.197). 
Perhaps the transformation of and in me in 3-74 was when this mimicking “plasma” 
reached me and replaced me – although I appeared outwardly the same (i.e., my 
essence changed – a new self-replaced the old) but my accidents stayed untouched 
(ibid. p.222).  
One way it does this is by a continually growing development and transfer of 
knowing (awareness), by means of transferred information throughout the 
interstices or stations (p. 253). 
For it, information is energy: its very psychic life energy – until it implants the 
“special signal” in the “fossil” …. Upon this 2-74 signal, contact with it is re-
established, since now they know exactly when and where it is. So all that info I got 
wasn’t meant for me but for it. It was living symbiotically in me – had been for 
some while, but at a subcarrier level (p.329). 
PKD reasons that he is undergoing a process of evolution into a higher life form and that his very 
essence is being replaced by the action of information transfer between ‘interstices or stations’. 
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Again, the network paradigm works its way into his process of ‘becoming-other’. We may think, on 
first glance, that PKD’s subjectivity is being effaced here altogether but there is a concern for life in 
amongst these bizarre declarations, a concern for a new form of vitality. As we noted above, post-
humanism asserts that our subjectivity is developing into something else altogether whilst greatly 
reorganising our sense of human identity. PKD’s own sense of identity is clearly being modified in 
the face of an evolution from human organism into something further enhanced. This is an 
enchantment that is predicated on technological development. This ‘continual growing’ as well as 
‘development and transfer of knowing’ leads to a fundamental change of ‘essence’ and a ‘new self’ 
replacing the old. Although PKD asserts that he appears ‘outwardly the same’, the process of 
‘becoming-other’ is leading him to merge with ‘info’ at a ‘subcarrier’ level energising him to morph 
into a higher form of life.  
Yet, PKD’s process of ‘becoming-information’ doesn’t just reference this bodily 
metamorphosis into a higher level of (disembodied) life but also taps into the merging of life with 
technological or non-human objects. This second phase we can detect within PKD’s ‘becoming-
information’ speaks directly to one of Hayles’ chief characteristics of cybernetic development and 
post-humanism  i.e. the blurring of distinctions between organic matter and machine.72 The figure 
of the posthuman emerges when the dividing line or demarcation between human and non-human 
cannot so easily be distinguished. Following on from the above quotes when PKD asserts that this 
new vitalism is conditioned by information ‘living symbiotically’ within him, we find further 
examples of instances where his bodily boundary has been breached by the interface with 
information or a non-biological entity. Take for instance the following: 
 This being replicates itself through – as – information …. We become it 
(p.337).  
                                                          
72
 Extending his widely known thesis that consciousness exists on a continuum with the environment in which 
subjects are immersed, philosopher and neuro-scientist Andy Clark (2003) argues that humans have always 
been cyborgs and that what marks our humanity is an ability to integrate technology into our very being.  
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 So somewhere along the line it entered me as information and patterned me 
so that in my own writing I replicated (and boosted) it; it got distributed  
(p.418).  
The human body has cross-bonded here with some kind of appendage, something external to PKD’s 
sense of bodily integrity. So much so that the human body is completely subsumed (‘we become it’) 
within this non-organic, non-biological being that ‘enters’ into the human body before overriding it 
entirely. By 1978, PKD reasons that this non-tangible form of information, that is capable of merging 
with his own body, is effectively leading to a novel conceptualisation of life or consciousness. Life 
itself is being altered, advanced or altogether reconstituted by the interface, and then submission, to 
an external non-biological force. Like a virus or pathogen entering a host, information comes to 
reshape the body in its own image once it has crossed and subsequently blurred the bodily threshold. 
The resonances with Braidotti and Hayles’ notion of the posthuman are clear. By the time of the third 
phase of ‘becoming-information’, which PKD undergoes towards the end of 1978 onwards, the 
human body appears to have been done away with altogether. Life, it seems for PKD, now no longer 
requires any material substrate to exist. Information has become so dominant in its envelopment of 
biological human identity that it can now exists as a life form independent from any hard organic 
casing. PKD’s process of ‘becoming-information’ has reached its natural conclusion as information 
now stands in its entirety as a new category of vitality or what he terms ‘real life’.  
 Yes, the info signals are to create homoplasmate life in us: impregnate us with 
information – info fired at us until we finally come to life – real life (p.430).  
Information is alive. The basis of life of the mind or brain. Bottom line: Living 
information which impregnates us and brings us to life as beings (plasmates) 
(p.430). 
The AI voice I hear is its voice. I am in symbiosis with it. This is to my benefit 
because it can crossbond me into it and hence make me immortal. It is higher 
species using us for its purposes (p.430).  
still, there is such a thing as living latent information that somehow is an 
acausal analog of reality (p.602).  
Life is to be found in the phenomena of information itself regardless of any carrier, host or material 
object. Information is then, in turn, able to instil ‘true’ life into PKD, he is able to become part of a 
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‘higher species’. As Hayles (1999) documents, the posthuman arises when biological organisms are 
viewed as a non-essential attribute to life and I argue that this is precisely what PKD is attempting to 
formulate in the above passages. This is a version of information that lives free of any human 
individual but is nevertheless able to reconstitute such individuals to progress to another realm of 
vitality - Disembodied information as a new form of life. 
We have, then, the following aspects of PKD’s ‘becoming’ that lead us to the figure of the 
posthuman. A fundamental metamorphosis or transmutation of self, the addition of an external non-
biological force effecting such a change, and finally the realisation that this new form of life or 
consciousness does not require a human or organic form with which to thrive. PKD’s process of 
‘becoming-information’ harnesses all of the above discussion on networks relations, discorporation 
and autopoietic function. Essentially, PKD through his textual output is engaged in an act of self-
creation which leads him to view his own subjectivity as something that exists in direct connection to 
another larger immaterial force. In fact, PKD’s entire ontology is one now fused with a cybernetic 
paradigm favouring disembodied life over organic consciousness. By subjectively existing outside of 
usual chronological time, PKD is able to become something other and this process of othering 
refracts cybernetic discourse which has seeped into culture at precisely the same time as PKD’s 
revelatory experiences. PKD has in effect subjectivised these cultural developments in mathematics 
and information theory, just as he internalised changing relations to temporality in our post-modern 
world.  His inhabitation of a different form of temporality, different from those that would usually 
underpin the notion of static corporeality, enables him to re-create (or indeed self-create) his own 







































Chapter 9: On the Construction of Mad Knowledge 
In 1993, O’Dell and Weidman, two researchers from the Department of Psychology in East 
Michigan University, published a paper entitled ‘A Computer Content Analysis of the Schreber Case’ 
in the Journal of Clinical Psychology. The authors claimed, citing an earlier attempt by researchers to 
analyse Schreber’s Memoirs via a computational method, as well as Freud’s and Lacan’ 
interpretations, that “notwithstanding valuable insights, all of the above analyses somehow missed 
Schreber’s’ fundamental problem” (p.121). O’Dell and Weidman then set about to rectify this issue. 
To do this, they scanned the entire document to feed every word into a specially designed 
programme. The programme classified and categorized all the words inputted into the system to 
‘see whether they were used consistently and whether they had psychological interest’ (p.121). 
O’Dell and Weidman added that ‘only words that were clearly psychotic were categorized’ (ibid). 
Following the results of their analysis, the researchers concluded that Schreber’s thinking was: 
“intact but obfuscated by his delusional system. We hypothesize that the 
delusions arose from the continual impact of voices of Schreber’s thinking. A 
‘terrible, monotonous repetition of ever recurring phrases’ or ‘an empty 
babble of ever recurring monotonous phrases in tiresome repetition’ must 
reduce one’s mental efficiency. A bright person would have to try and make 
sense out of this torrent of nonsensical material, leading to an elaborate, 
incompressible delusional system, developed purely as a defence” (p.125). 
Nearly one hundred years after the profound set of experiences that Schreber committed to writing, 
the key to unlocking his delirium is presented here via a computational analysis, an analysis that 
leads to a somewhat tautological conclusion that Schreber’s madness, in the form of delusion, is 
caused by another aspect of his madness, the incessant phrases that impact on his mind. 
What are we to make of this affair that strikes of a Philip K. Dick imagined future where 
computer programmes haphazardly diagnose individuals? Must we conclude that we no longer 
require the human reader to interpret a text? Can the task of obtaining knowledge from mad writing 
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become divorced from any possible bias or inherent fault on behalf of the human researcher? 
Perhaps the cold, calculating gaze of a computer programme can offer us a definitive understanding 
of what is going on within Schreber’s delusional system. Moreover, perhaps advances in computer 
technology, that seeks to reduce interpretation to an objective scientific method, will do away with 
those researchers who simply apply and reproduce their theoretical knowledge when interpreting 
texts. Or perhaps not. 
Leaving aside the authors’ problematic statements to only include words within Schreber’s 
Memoirs that were ‘psychologically interesting’ or ‘clearly psychotic’ (whatever a ‘psychotic’ word 
may be!), we should rightly conclude that such attempts to remove human interpretation from 
computational methods are always-already indebted to human predesign and arrangement. O'Dell 
and Weidman's criteria for allowing words to enter predesignated categories within this 
‘psychological’ study speaks to this issue entirely. However, my point in highlighting this misguided 
attempt to identify Schreber's 'fundamental problem', is not to critique the employment of 
computer technology in the act of analysis per se. Rather, my point is to question whether the 
interpretation of mad writing can ever eschew the subjective knowledge base, political persuasions, 
ideological framings or historical situatedness of the interpreter. Throughout this thesis, I have 
demonstrated how the act of interpretation, allowing for the construction of knowledge from mad 
writing, necessitates questions about how theorists arrive at their interpretations. I opened the 
study with the problematizing of this manoeuvre by current strands of thinking within the larger 
critical psychiatry arena: those drawn together under the banner of Mad Studies. For those figures 
within this new field of thinking about what madness is, the entire task of interpreting mad 
narratives is loaded with ethical and political pitfalls. The 1993 Michigan study (mentioned above) 
would no doubt fall foul of Mad Studies’ ethical stance, which would highlight the complete 
decontextualization of the Memoirs by academics utilising a positivist pseudo-scientific method to 
divorce Schreber from any dialogue whatsoever. There are several questions that remains for me at 
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the end of this thesis. Do my analyses of PKD’s Exegesis, built upon the insights gathered over our 
meta-analysis of the Schreber case, indicate whether the task of interpretation is ever possible 
without committing acts of epistemic violence? Is it possible to move beyond these debates within 
areas of research, such as Mad Studies, so that we do not get caught up in arguments about who can 
read who? And what will be my final consideration here, can we ever establish ‘mad knowledge’ 
between researcher and text? 
Indeed, my thesis has explored this third question through three analyses of PKD’s Exegesis, 
which all straddle the clinical and the cultural. My psychosocial reading over three distinct, but 
complementary, interpretations has established a connection between 'psychosis', temporality, 
advances in information theory and changing forms of subjectivity. Ultimately, this set of 
connections, which I believe blurs the line between ‘psychosis’ and sanity, or clinic and culture, is a 
different articulation of the initial philosophical framework that we examined for placing madness 
and knowledge in relation to one another. There is a strange interrelation between these two terms 
‘madness’ and ‘knowledge’: they are mutually inclusive of one another, yet they also stand in stark 
contrast. I hope my readings expose this strange conjuncture. Moreover, they hold direct relevance 
for moving past the restrictive debates within Mad Studies that treat all forms of interpretation as 
acts of violence (asides from when such interpretation is pursued via the co-production of research 
with the authors of the texts in question). My three analyses of PKD’s Exegesis demonstrate that 
interpretation, and by implication the production of knowledge, from mad writing is possible. 
Although any reading commits some violence to a text, the method I have employed in the thesis 
suggests the possibility for rendering meaning from madness. But most important, it does so in a 
way that does not reduce madness to pathology or reify it into a protected category of which no 





9.2 Psychosocial Interpretation of Mad Writing 
My reading of PKD’s (2011) Exegesis has moved between several different theoretical 
approaches (largely Lacanian psychoanalysis and Deleuzian-inspired philosophy). It also draws from 
a methodological focus that separates surface from depth. My overview of the Schreber case has led 
me to foreground a specifically psychosocial approach to analysing mad writing, which conjoins the 
individual subject’s psyche to their wider socio-cultural environment. The different theoretical and 
methodological strands that have been employed to read PKD’s mad text are housed within my 
commitment to psychosociality. This, I believe, has enabled me to read madness in a way that goes 
beyond reductive debates that centre almost solely on epistemic violence.  
This is not to say that those who raise the issue of epistemic violence or injustice are 
misguided in their examination of the way in which mad text, and mad experience, is often 
overwritten by other domains of knowledge. Rather, my reading suggests that there must be other 
ways to think about, and position, mad writing. The implications, or danger, of not moving past the 
debate on ‘who can read who’ is that this may result in madness not being read at all, for fear of 
acting unethically. The irony, however, is that this very manoeuvre of not reading madness 
effectively creates a distance between madness and culture at large. Removing madness from the 
gaze of academia, or research in general, further separates it from society. Consequently, madness 
continues to take on its all too familiar character as the ultimate ‘Other’ to rational thought, culture, 
and philosophy. This consequence would, I imagine, jar with a Mad Studies approach that seeks to 
remove the stigma and negative language that reinforces the exclusion of madness and mad people. 
We have then something of a conundrum: How do we read and discuss madness without at the 
same time overwriting it or whitewashing its essential character? How do we articulate madness 
itself without losing it?  
 My answer to this impasse is to conduct a psychosocial reading of madness that places an 
individual’s diagnostic state in tandem with prevailing ideological, political or social currents. Such a 
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reading acknowledges the specificity of an individual’s experience of madness. For example, in this 
study, I have shown how PKD’s text demonstrates a ‘psychotic’ structure at work through his 
particular use of language, the place of his body, and the role of enjoyment in his writing. But I also 
tie this specific case of madness into the discursive arena in which it is played out. I situate his mad 
writing in respect of alternations in temporality and a cybernetic paradigm, which weaves its way 
through collective experiences of information and post-humanism. By holding onto these two sites, 
the individual and the discursive, or rather the continuum between them, we can navigate our way 
through the peculiar dynamic set out by Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida: that posits madness 
as a strange kind of ‘internal excess’, which exists both at the borders of language and thought and 
as a condition at their centre. Affording madness one status or another as either inside or outside of 
culture loses its essential character: the means by which violence is actually committed. Often, 
madness is either brought back into the realm of culturally-sanctioned knowledge (psychiatry, 
psychoanalysis), and is effaced in the wake of expert terminology and specialised language, or it 
remains at the margins of culture—forever at a remove from intelligible understanding. If we only 
afford madness one of these positions, then its true essence will always elude us. Acknowledging 
that madness exists in both spaces (the space of the individual subject and the larger space of the 
discursive) simultaneously and that a continuum is at work across these spaces is fundamental to 
understanding madness. Focusing reading on such a continuum is the task for psychosocial analysis.  
 In my psychosocial readings of PKD’s text, I demonstrate how his writings about his body 
accord to a Lacanian understanding of ‘psychotic’ structure. In addition, I have shown how by taking 
note of profound developments in wider culture (as conditioned by an informational paradigm) we 
can appreciate madness as existing as a distinct entity at the meeting of the individual psyche and 
the socius. In my view, this juncture, what I refer to as a continuum, is where reading practices 
should be focused if we want to analyse or interpret madness. Through a psychosocial reading of 
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madness, we can retain its radical ulterior essence, as well as its value as a cultural entity that 
reflects those social processes whilst also being defined by them.  
Ultimately, a question that is subsequently raised from my interpretation of the Exegesis is 
whether there is something inherently maddening about contemporary notions of time and the 
associated informational paradigm leading to disembodied experiences of self? I have focused on 
how PKD’s Exegesis illuminates our understanding of madness as well as cultural developments. I 
have concentrated my efforts on evidence of ‘psychosis’ within the text, and I have linked this to 
prevailing socio-technological shifts. However, a further line of enquiry could be an examination of 
whether the ‘psychosis’-culture continuum is working the other way around. That is, do cultural 
developments and their associated impact on subjectivity resemble aspects of ‘psychotic’ 
experience? On reflection, though, I believe that we should resist the temptation to engage in this 
form of speculation. As my psychosocial study argues, madness in PKD’s Exegesis is coextensive with 
vitally influential aspects of social and scientific development, which have a structuring effect on 
society and subjectivity at large. Yet, asking whether one’s madness is in tune with society or 
whether cultural developments themselves harbour some form of madness misses the point. The 
two are not distinct from one another, and PKD’s Exegesis shows us that separating madness from 
the world of shared meaning and knowledge is a false distinction. The Exegesis is equally testament 
to an individual’s knowledge of the world via their continual interpretation of their place within it, as 
it is to their supposed remove from such a world due to their chosen language and 
terminology. Analysing the connection between ‘psychotic’ experience and cultural developments 
cannot start with the subject and proceed out to the social only, nor can it locate cultural themes 
and then reduce them to individual experience alone. The two are mutually inclusive of one another, 
and this ‘psychosis’-culture connection speaks to the continuum that exists between subject and 
society. This acknowledgement of the interrelation between clinic and culture has provided the 
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conceptual space for me to derive and construct forms of knowledge from PKD’s writing, while 
keeping madness at the very forefront of my reading.   
 
9.3 The ‘Foucault/Derrida’ Debate Revisited 
Here, I am going to revisit the overarching philosophical framework that initially suggested 
to me that writing can express madness; and that such writing occupies a strange paradoxical 
position of being both inside and outside of discourse. By doing this, I hope to address how the 
psychosocial continuum between the individual subject and larger societal structure might be 
mapped onto madness: that ‘internal excess’ at the heart of philosophy that the Foucault/Derrida 
dispute suggested. In Part 1, I highlighted the relation of Freudian theory to the debate about how 
madness is conjoined to the social. Following our journey through the main theoretical critique of 
psychoanalysis by Deleuze and Guattari, it is necessary now to review their work against the 
philosophical dispute that opened this thesis in order to see if schizoanalysis has anything different 
to offer us.  In situating the ‘Foucault/Derrida’ debate against schizoanalysis, first, we must 
remember that madness does not necessarily occupy an extra-discursive position (outside of reason 
and history). Indeed, madness may well be a fundamental excess residing at the core of social 
existence. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1972) attempt to correlate ‘schizophrenia’ with the workings of 
capital speaks to this proposition. For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘psychosis’ or ‘schizophrenia’ is an 
integral aspect of contemporary social functioning, and it is synonymous with capitalism itself. 
Second, regardless of whether we view Oedipus as an operator specific to capitalism, or side with a 
Lacanian symbolic interpretation, the possibility of reading ideological themes within the content of 
madness appears, theoretically at least, possible. Irrespective of the way we conceive of ‘psychosis’ 
(problematic symbolic resolution of Oedipus complex versus the deterritorialised limit of the 
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desiring-machine) we arrive at the same point. That is, the textual representations of ‘psychosis’ can 
potentially express social, cultural and historical investments.73  
As shown, many thinkers have attempted to demonstrate how madness in its textual form 
can uncover larger social, political or ideological themes (from Santner’s crisis of symbolic investiture 
to Kittler’s discourse networks). Yet, there remains a query as to how an individual subject’s 
‘psychotic’ experience can channel such broader psychosocial themes into writing. There is the 
theoretical basis for understanding this via the continuum, which I hold exists across the subject-
socius divide. But how does this lead to delusions or paranoid ideas reflecting specific cultural traits? 
In answering this, whilst also adding my contribution to this idea, I want to briefly return to 
something I put forward during the discussion of PKD’s ability to bridge clinical and cultural themes 
via his concept of orthogonal time. The construction of mad knowledge, I argue, is perhaps made 
possible by the oscillation between one’s private subjective experience of reality (ontic) and the 
manoeuvre to reformulate this experience through pre-existing social criteria and understanding; 
essentially pre-existing knowledge (the epistemic).That is, the 'psychotic' experience communicates 
through this appeal to socially shared knowledge. In my view, what ties these two domains together 
is the process of subject formation, something both Lacan (in the concept of his sinthome) and 
Deleuze (via his notion of becoming) have expended great energy in presenting. I hold that this 
relation (between the ontic and the epistemic) can support us in understanding how a singularly 
private experience that falls outside of the usual remit of socially shared understanding can 
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 The relation between Lacan and Deleuze’s thought is complex and has invited a significant amount of 
discussion. We can state that within Anti-Oedipus, the relation to Lacanian theory is somewhat ambiguous 
with Lacan’s conception of Oedipus being met at times favourably. Deleuze and Guattari, for instance, state 
quite clearly that ‘Lacan does not enclose the unconscious in an oedipal structure. He shows on the contrary 
that Oedipus is imaginary, nothing but an image, a myth’ (1972, p.341). In fact, throughout Anti-Oedipus, Lacan 
repeatedly figures as a potential ally and perhaps the most schizoanalytic of all the psychoanalysts discussed. 
By the time of A Thousand Plateaus, however, Deleuze and Guattari dismiss Lacan, and no further mention is 
made of him or his theoretical approach. Peter Hallward (2010) argues that despite the initial warm reception 
Lacan received in Anti-Oedipus, there are irreconcilable differences between his system of thought and that of 
Deleuze’s. He traces at least five moments of divergence between the two. Drawing upon the opposing views 
pertaining to the limits of their respective fields of enquiry, Hallward states that the competing notions of 
intersubjectivity, representation, the primacy of signification, and the place of the unconscious itself mark the 
complete incompatibility between both thinkers. Despite the favourable view of Lacan within Anti-Oedipus, it 
seems that Deleuzean theory starkly contrasts with Lacan’s overall theoretical project. 
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reproduce, once presented in various discourses, the prevailing social, political or larger ideological 
elements at play within any given historical moment. The ‘psychotics’ attempt to rebuild their 
subjectivity necessitates the need to draw from the available symbolic, linguistic and knowledge-
based constructs circulating around their immediate psychosocial environment. In my view, PKD 
does just this in Exegesis and that this ontic-epistemic mechanism is another route we can take in an 
effort to explain this peculiar attribute of mad writing that is able to express profound aspects of 
socio-cultural life.  
Such aspects speak to this very issue at stake within Foucault and Derrida’s debate. As such, 
I conclude that ‘psychotic’ text can construct mad knowledge and that interpretation is possible. This 
is because madness and knowledge are not diametrically opposed to one another, as many areas of 
contemporary science and medicine have us believe, far from it. The philosophical debate that 
opened this thesis provides continued relevance to Mad Studies and the wider domain of critical 
psychiatry. By problematizing relations of internality and externality, it provides the philosophical 
space from which very real ethical and political practices can follow. In this way, madness can be 
conceived as something not necessarily alien to the world of intelligible communication and 
understanding that we think we reside in. 
  
9.4 The Exegesis of Daniel Paul Schreber 
Having reviewed the central theoretical positions and influences underscoring this PhD 
thesis, as well as the philosophical arguments that have enabled this project, I now revisit the mad 
writing that inspired the whole project. Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs and Philip K. Dick’s Exegesis 
have been the main focal points to this investigation into the nature of ‘psychotic’ text and the 
possibility of constructing knowledge from it. I have consistently placed the two writers in tandem 
with one another, and I have, at times, pointed towards glaring similarities between their supposed 
madness. However, it is essential to note that there are key differences between them, which should 
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be recognised to ensure that the Memoirs and the Exegesis do not start to occupy the same critical 
terrain. Because I have made attempts to situate them both as instances of mad writing does not 
mean that they inhabit the same space, nor that they share some fundamental over-arching affinity. 
To make this correlation collapses the texts and, by implication, many other instances of mad writing 
into the same abstract phenomenon. Indeed, the Memoirs and the Exegesis are distinct, and they 
should be read as such.  
Beyond the obvious ethics of treating all instances of mad writing as fundamentally different 
iterations of the same underlying social or psychological process, it is important to establish the key 
differences between the texts. Many readers and critics have pointed towards the inherent similarity 
between PKD and Schreber. For instance, the editors of the Exegesis state: 
Dick’s mystical vision or apparent psychosis seems to put him in touch with the 
eternal feminine. This is one of the many moments when the Exegesis resonates with 
Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of my Nervous Illness (1903), where the erstwhile 
high court judge became convinced that his body took on breasts and female 
genitalia in order to be properly penetrated by the rays of God and to redeem the 
Universe (2011, p.372).  
 
Moreover, a number of commenters have also drawn attention to the fact that PKD had read 
Schreber during the course of his psychological studies. As biographer Emmanuel Carrère (2006) 
notes, having read Freud’s paper, PKD—in his typically playful style—decided that the Memoirs 
could make a great work of science fiction—if retitled The Man Whom God Wanted to Change into a 
Woman and Penetrate with Larva in Order to Save the World.74 In reading this, there is a danger that 
we could come to view the Exegesis as an instance of PKD actively playing with his psychoanalytic 
knowledge of paranoia. This would call into question my attempt and that of others to align his 
madness with Schreber. But in my view, this would be an all too easy and clumsy manoeuvre to 
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 Carrère (2006) attempts to channel PKD’s thoughts and questions from the science fiction author’s internal 
perspective, ‘What if Schreber was right? What if his supposed delusions were in fact an accurate description 
of reality? What if Freud was just another self-righteous know-it-all, pathologizing a man who understood 
better what was really going on?’ (p.39). Laurence Rickels (2010) in his wide-ranging analysis of PKD’s fiction 
goes further still and suggests, without much in the way of evidence, that PKD’s 1959 book Time Out Of Joint 
was the direct result of PKD’s reflections on the Schreber case! 
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make. Aside from the comments regarding the science fiction potential of Schreber’s script, to my 
understanding, PKD never mentioned Schreber’s text or Freud’s paper again. Furthermore, neither 
of these works features in the Exegesis at all.  
But what if PKD had consciously (or not) incorporated Schreber into his own madness during 
his eight years of incessant writing? There are definite similarities between the Memoirs and the 
Exegesis: in the concern for sexual identity, as well as in the contrast between techno-scientific 
language and overt spiritualism (themes that are common to many delusional and paranoid 
accounts). Despite these likenesses, however, there are also startling differences. On the one hand, 
Schreber presents his cosmology as one intact, complete totality. There is a logic to it from start to 
finish, and the intricate nature of ‘nerves, rays and the forecourts of heaven’ are conceived within 
one grand design or construct. The Exegesis, on the other hand, is radically different. PKD’s text is an 
exercise in reformulation and transformation, which ensures that no definitive unified system is ever 
achieved. He offers us multiple levels of analysis repeatedly, and he consistently attempts to 
abstract himself from his writing only to reinsert his own next level analysis. I am sure this 
complexity will continue to present difficulties for those who wish to engage seriously with PKD’s 
exegetic output. He has already analysed his experience for us many times over. Hence, my analysis 
of PKD is of his own reading: an analysis of an analysis or an exegesis of an exegesis. This stands in 
stark contrast to Schreber, who presents his delusional system as one coherent world view. It is not 
undone and reconstructed multiple times over. It exists as one totality.  
 There is another important difference to note between Schreber and PKD. Whereas 
commenters and critics, for the most part, take Schreber’s madness and experience of ‘psychosis’ for 
granted, PKD’s madness is far from certain. Indeed, the question of PKD’s mental state never seems 
to go away, and commenters and critics are routinely engaged in the act of looking for something 
that can prove that he was certifiably mad; even though, the answer to this question is 
unobtainable. Curiously, such assurances about Schreber’s madness are rarely sought, and his 
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‘psychosis’ is taken at face value. Of course, Schreber was committed to an asylum for many years, 
and his Memoirs certainly indicate some form of paranoid suffering. Yet, to label Schreber as 
‘psychotic’ repeats, in some way, the very manoeuvre that this project takes issue with. We do not 
know, and never can know, what Schreber’s experiences pertain to. They are his experiences alone. 
Even if we remain in the domain of medical science, we cannot ever be certain that he was not 
suffering from some form of organic brain injury, a viral infection, early onset dementia, or any other 
medical affliction that can produce ‘psychotic'-like symptoms. Granted these other explanations 
appear unlikely, but they do point toward an inherent problem in psychiatry: all diagnoses are 
informed opinions, not concrete representations of a hard-underlying reality.   
Lastly, we must in the spirit of Mad Studies acknowledge that PKD never intended for his 
writing to be utilised in the way that I have done in this thesis. Neither, of course, did Schreber. 
Schreber was posthumously co-opted into the psy-discourses, while PKD appears, for the most part, 
to have resisted this in any substantial sense. Nevertheless, my project has begun to incorporate 
PKD and his work into the psy-discourses—albeit with a strong critical stance toward those very psy-
discourses. Would PKD have approved? I am uncertain. His anti-psychiatry credentials are 
complicated. Although PKD revelled in satirising psychiatry and the mental health care of his day, by 
the time of VALIS (1981), the novel inspired by his visionary experiences (what he called 2-3-74), any 
discussion relating to hospital wards or the care afforded to the mentally ill is fairly complementary. 
Given that VALIS contains his most lengthy engagement with the mental health care system in 
existence, it is curious that any anti-psychiatric sentiment is largely disavowed. I think it is safe to 
assume, that my attempt to situate aspects of his Exegesis in line with clinical understandings of 
‘psychosis’ would, at points, have been met favourably with PKD’s own theorising on his experience. 
But, more likely than not, it would have been in stark contrast to how he felt towards his life 
changing events for much of his time spent reflecting on them. I hope that my critical attitude 
towards what we actually mean by ‘psychosis’, and the way I have consistently sought to 
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demonstrate that the Exegesis has value beyond strict clinical understandings of ‘psychosis’, would 
have met with some degree of interest from its author. I do not doubt that the conundrum that his 
writing presents to myself and many others besides, as well as the multiple attempts to decipher it, 
would have been pleasing to this most enigmatic of writers and personalities.   
 
9.5 Madness and Method: On the Possibility of Interpretation 
After a lengthy journey through the writings of the mad, and my efforts to question the very 
possibility of interpreting madness, I close here with a review of the methods that I have employed 
throughout to gain insights and procure knowledge from PKD’s writing. As mentioned, I have drawn 
these methods mainly from work already undertaken on Schreber, as well as from those present in 
the philosophical debates centred on madness’ relation to writing. By building on contemporary 
critical approaches to mad narratives, and some of the different methods generally employed with 
texts, I believe that I have formulated an approach to mad writing. The most vital aspect of my 
engagement with mad text has been a commitment to multiple analyses of the text in question, 
drawing from a plurality of theoretical understandings. As stated, this has allowed space for 
ambiguity, difference or, indeed, contradiction to emerge in the analysis of mad text, which resists 
any final dominant mode of interpretation. I have used theoretical frameworks that have had a 
degree of commensurability between them. But I have also engaged with theoretical approaches 
that are in direct contrast to each other. My use of psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis is one such 
example. Although not the only epistemological system for engaging with mad writing, I have found 
psychoanalysis, particularly in its Freudian/Lacanian guise and schizoanalytic critique, to be well 
suited to interpreting mad writings, while also maintaining fidelity to the Mad Studies project. This 
preference is due to the way that Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis de-pathologizes madness and 
brings madness back into the realm of discourse, knowledge and culture. Just as with the use of 
multiple theoretical sites, I have also found oscillating between differing reading practices frees up 
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analysis from delimited and closed conclusions. Further, the concept of overdetermination has 
greatly assisted this project and been key in helping me resist the worst excesses of epistemic 
violence. Although drawn from a specifically psychoanalytic informed methodology, 
overdetermination can be generalised to reinforce the notion that no specific reading can have final 
word on any text. My engagement with PKD’s writing and, to some extent, Schreber’s Memoirs 
validates the idea that interpretation should be thought of as a continuous and, therefore, open 
process.  
In many respects, this entire PhD thesis is concerned primarily with the issue of method: 
which methods should we employ to read madness? What methods can realistically be drawn from 
philosophy or theory? How does method itself leads to favouring certain interpretations over 
others? I believe that this concern for method and how we read madness will bridge the gap 
between the highly abstract and theoretical terrain in which this thesis sits and more practical 
engagements with those deemed mad and their associated works of art. As someone employed in 
mental health care, I wonder if my reading practices above could possibly inform the direct work 
with those who find themselves in contemporary mental health services. Disciplinary and 
professional contexts often provide individuals with the guides, assessment criteria, terminology and 
overarching system of knowledge with which to intervene in the lives of the mad. Could it be 
possible that a concern for multiple levels of understanding, informed by a plurality of theoretical 
and practical approaches, may help to avoid the reductive and potentially harmful engagements 
with those deemed mentally ill? I believe that by maintaining a commitment to true dialogue with 
another’s experience or narrative, as well as to understanding that there are always different ways 
in which thoughts, feeling and behaviours can be interpreted, we might be able to move away from 




I referenced my role within the mental health services at the start of this thesis. 
Incorporating such a multi-level analysis or anti-authoritarian approach within my everyday practice 
is undoubtedly a tricky task. Moreover, to do this, for the most part, would be in opposition to the 
professional and statutory contexts in which I work. Nevertheless, I am certain that such an 
approach can assist critical thought and action within the field of mental health. I am also keenly 
aware that the act of interpreting an individual’s madness, whether in the form of diagnosis or via 
more abstract academic critique, is intimately linked to a whole set of socio-political relations. Who 
is able to interpret who has at its heart a concern for power. We witnessed earlier how the 
interpretation of mad narratives have been used to demarcate disciplinary or intellectual differences 
between various thinkers. This remains true with all acts of interpretation based on the behaviour, 
thoughts, feelings, speech acts or indeed artistic creations of those labelled mad. In this thesis, my 
journey through these issues has reminded me that all interventions in the lives of those in receipt of 
such labels can help to reinforce those disciplinary and professional boundaries; boundaries that 
actively serve to exclude or include those within relations of power. Maintaining a dialogue with 
madness and the mad, who are traditionally placed outside of the walls of intelligible 
communication and understanding is, for me, perhaps the most vital issue at stake. In a time when 
true dialogue across the wider social spectrum is so sorely lacking, examining how we attempt to 
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